LYBROOK (SUSAN RAYE) VS. LOWE (DONNA)
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 4, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000085-MR
AND
NO. 2008-CA-001241-MR
SUSAN RAYE LYBROOK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEFFREY L. PRESTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00116
DONNA LOWE, AS EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF BRYANT
HENRY LYBROOK
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; VANMETER, JUDGE; LAMBERT,1
SENIOR JUDGE.
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE: Susan Raye Lybrook appeals from the December
4, 2007, decree dissolving her marriage to Bryant Henry Lybrook. 2 She claims
error in the division of property.
Susan Raye Lybrook and Bryant Henry Lybrook were married in
1997, and Susan filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on February 16, 2007.
During the marriage, the Lybrooks and their children resided in the marital
residence located in South Shore, Kentucky. During the pendency of the divorce
proceeding, the trial court granted temporary possession of the marital residence to
Bryant.
On November 13, 2007, an interlocutory decree of dissolution of
marriage was entered. Property issues were reserved until a final was hearing held
on November 20, 2007. On December 4, 2007, the court rendered findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and its decree. In the decree, the court awarded the marital
residence to Bryant. The court also ordered that retirement accounts or
investments owned by the parties be subjected to a QDRO.3 On December 21,
2007, the trial court clarified its decree holding that the funds acquired during the
marriage were to be equally divided but that Susan was not entitled to any interest
in funds for periods of time that the parties were not married.
2
Susan originally appealed from the trial court’s orders of December 4, 2007, December 21,
2007, and June 3, 2008, on property issues and child custody and visitation issues. However, on
June 10, 2008, Bryant Lybrook died and Donna Lowe was appointed executor of his estate.
Susan then moved the Court to substitute the executor as the appellee in this proceeding. Susan
also informed the Court that, while all issues of property division remained before the Court,
issues pertaining to child custody and timesharing were moot by virtue of Bryant’s death.
Accordingly, those issues will not be addressed herein.
3
Qualified Domestic Relations Order.
-2-
On March 7, 2008, an agreed order for the division of several IRAs
was entered. Thereafter, Susan filed a motion to enforce the decree, stating that a
Fidelity account, which was in existence at the time of separation but had been
liquidated prior to the final decree, should also be divided between the parties. On
June 3, 2008, the trial court denied the motion, stating that it had taken the closed
Fidelity account into consideration at the time of the decree and that it was not the
intention of the court that the Fidelity account be divided as with other
investments. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Susan argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to award her a portion of the equity in the marital home and by failing to
award her a portion of the closed Fidelity account. Specifically, Susan argues that
the court erred in allowing Bryant to claim certain funds as non-marital since he
had failed to claim any non-marital property during discovery. She also argues
that the court erred when it excluded $20,000.00 from the equity in the marital
residence and categorized it as a gift to Bryant from his parents.
Susan maintains that the parental gift was repaid by the liquidated
Fidelity account, a marital asset. Finally, Susan argues that she was entitled to a
portion of the Fidelity account since it was used to repay the gift which was
ultimately labeled as a non-marital contribution to the marital residence.
The division of marital property is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Neidlinger v.
Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513, 523 (Ky. 2001).
-3-
Abuse of discretion in relation to the exercise of judicial
power implies arbitrary action or capricious disposition
under the circumstances, at least an unreasonable and
unfair decision. The exercise of discretion must be
legally sound. [Quotation marks and citation omitted.]
Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d 777, 783 (Ky. App. 2002) (overruled on other
grounds by Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528 (Ky. 2008)).
In dividing marital property, including debts, appurtenant
to a divorce, the trial court is guided by Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 403.190(1), which requires that
division be accomplished in “just proportions.” This
does not mean, however, that property must be divided
equally. It means only that division should be
accomplished without regard to marital misconduct and
in “just proportions” considering all relevant factors.
Lawson v. Lawson, 228 S.W.3d 18, 21 (Ky. App. 2007) (citations omitted).
The pertinent language of the December 4, 2007, order of the trial
court is as follows:
[t]he marital residence has both marital and non-marital
components to its value. Of its $216,500.00 value,4 at
least almost $40,000.00 is [Bryant’s] non-marital interest.
$20,000.00 of the property value could be traced to a
$20,000.00 gift that was given by [Bryant’s] parents to
him to build a garage on the property. Thus almost
$60,000.00 of the $216,000.00 value of the property is
non-marital. The marital interest in the property would
thus be $156,000.00. The current first mortgage is
$135,000.00 leaving a net equity of $21,000.00. The
second mortgage on the residence has to do with the
house in Piketon, Ohio. The Court orders that [Susan]
finance the house in Piketon, Ohio to pay off the second
mortgage [of the marital residence] and that upon doing
so [Susan] will be awarded the Piketon, Ohio residence.
4
The trial court appears to have subtracted $19,000.00 from the value, representing the value of
the adjacent lot. However, since the lot was awarded to Bryant alongside the marital residence,
we have included it in our calculation as part of the marital property value.
-4-
[Bryant] had advanced [Susan] $5,000.00 for the
purchase of a residence and [Susan] has taken all of the
income tax refund in the amount of $4,107.00. Based
upon these factors and the Court assuming there is some
equity in the residence in Ohio, the Court finds it would
be an equitable division of the real estate to award the
marital residence to [Bryant] and have him responsible
for the payment of the first mortgage. [Susan] shall be
awarded the house in Ohio and she shall immediately
cause the second mortgage on the marital residence to be
removed. . . . [Bryant] has various retirement accounts
and a 401(K) and the Court finds that any retirement
accounts or investments owned by the parties is marital
and is subject to division by [QDRO] and so orders.
To determine non-marital contribution to a marital residence, this
Court has held and it has become firmly accepted that:
the interests of the parties [is] “the same percentages as
their respective contributions to the total equity in the
property.” In other words, there is to be established a
relationship between the nonmarital contribution and the
total contribution, and between the marital contribution
and the total contribution. These relationships, reduced
to percentages, shall be multiplied by the equity in the
property at the time of distribution to establish the value
of the nonmarital and marital properties.
Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871, 872 (Ky. App. 1981) (citations
omitted).
The parties stipulated that the value of the marital residence, along
with an adjoining lot, was $235,500.00. The home had first and second mortgage
liens totaling $180,985.00. The second mortgage, $46,000.00 at the time of the
hearing, was used to purchase a second home in Ohio which Susan received. In
turn, Susan was required to remove the second mortgage from the marital home.
-5-
This is not disputed. Accordingly, the remaining first mortgage on the marital
home was $135,000.00, resulting in an equity of $100,500.00 ($235,500.00
stipulated value minus $135,000.00 first mortgage).
When the residence was purchased, the parties contributed a down
payment of $42,385.99, of which $39,000.00 was Bryant’s non-marital
contribution from the sale of a home he owned prior to the marriage. Another
$20,000.00 was provided by Bryant’s parents, and this was used to build a garage
on the property. The original amount of the first mortgage was $142,000.00,
making the mortgage principal reduction $7,000.00.
Using the figures above, we see no error in the trial court’s
determination that Bryant’s non-marital contribution was “at least[,] almost
$40,000.00.” According to Brandenburg, the correct amount would be $59,000.00
($39,000.00 non-marital purchase contribution plus $20,000.00 parental gift). The
marital contribution was $10,386.00 ($3,386.00 marital purchase contribution plus
$7,000.00 reduction in mortgage principal). Therefore, the total marital and nonmarital contribution toward the residence is $69,386.00. Bryant’s non-marital
share of this contribution is 85% and the marital share is 15%. The total equity in
the property is $100,500.00.5 Applying the Brandenburg formula to the equity,
Bryant’s non-marital share of the equity is $85,425.00 and the marital share of the
equity is $15,075.00. See Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d at 872.
5
This amount is arrived at by subtracting the first mortgage ($135,000.00) from the stipulated
value ($235,500.00). Because the second mortgage is actually attributable to another home, and
that home and corresponding mortgage were assigned to Susan, we did not consider this when
calculating the equity on the marital residence.
-6-
Although the trial court seems to have utilized a method other than
that outlined in Brandenburg, this alone does not demonstrate an abuse of
discretion. The Court in Brandenburg stated:
We do not intend to imply by the adoption of this
formula that this Court will not approve other procedures
utilized by the lower courts in arriving at an equitable
division of property as long as the relationship between
the contributions of the parties is established.
Id. at 873 (emphasis added). In its order, the trial court clearly established the
individual contributions of the parties. Furthermore, in choosing to award the
marital residence and all of its equity to Bryant, it is clear that the trial court
divided marital property “in just proportions considering all relevant factors,”
including Susan’s retention of the parties’ $4,107.00 tax refund, the $5,000.00
advance she received from Bryant, and her award of any equity in the parties’ Ohio
home.6 KRS 403.190(1). The trial court also clearly stated, in its June 3, 2008,
order that it had taken the liquidation of the Fidelity account into consideration
when dividing the property. This comprehensive, albeit unconventional, analysis
by the trial court persuades us that there was no error in the result achieved.
Although Susan has shown that the trial court used an alternative
method to calculate its equitable division of the marital property, she has failed to
show that this method was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Furthermore,
her argument that Bryant did not identify any non-marital property in his discovery
responses is without merit. The court is the finder of facts and the lack of
6
We note also that use of the Brandenburg formula yielded a marital equity of $15,075.00,
whereas the trial court’s formula actually yielded a higher marital equity of $21,000.00.
-7-
identified non-marital property does not preclude the court from finding the
existence of non-marital property based on the testimony of the parties and the
evidence presented, as long as that finding is supported by substantial evidence.
See, e.g., Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d at 782. Our review of the record indicates that this
allocation of non-marital contribution in the marital residence is supported by
substantial evidence. Accordingly, the December 4, 2007, order of the Greenup
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Christopher A. Dawson
Flatwoods, Kentucky
Gordon J. Dill
Ashland, Kentucky
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