SPRINKLES (RANDY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 14, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000047-MR
RANDY SPRINKLES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00120
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND NICKELL, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE: Randy Sprinkles appeals from a Knox Circuit Court
order denying without a hearing his motion to vacate his conviction and sentence
under Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. On appeal, Sprinkles
alleges the following grounds for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim: (1)
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Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Counsel failed to investigate the weight of the Commonwealth’s evidence and
potential defenses; (2) Counsel coerced Sprinkles to take a plea agreement; (3)
Counsel allowed Sprinkles to plead guilty to an increased charge of first-degree
rape; (4) Counsel rushed Sprinkles’s case in order to handle other cases; and (5)
Counsel failed to request additional DNA testing. In addition to these claims,
Sprinkles challenges the trial court’s denial of his requests for appointment of
counsel and for an evidentiary hearing. Finding no error in the trial court’s
decisions, we affirm the Knox Circuit Court’s order.
On May 23, 2003, Sprinkles had sexual intercourse with S.N.B., a
thirteen-year-old girl. On that date, S.N.B. spent the night with H.S., Sprinkles’
eleven-year-old stepdaughter. S.N.B told police that Sprinkles gave both girls a
pill to help them sleep. After she passed out, S.N.B. awoke to find Sprinkles
penetrating her. About a month later, S.N.B. told her mother what happened with
Sprinkles. Her mother took S.N.B. to the hospital where she learned that she was
pregnant.
The police interviewed Sprinkles on June 24, 2003. He confessed to
having sexual intercourse with S.N.B. but denied providing her any type of pill or
other drug, and he insisted that the intercourse was consensual. Instead, Sprinkles
claimed that S.N.B. brought marijuana and pills to the sleepover. Sprinkles said
that S.N.B. used the drugs and came to his room in the middle of the night, took off
her pants, and got on top of him. H.S.’s statement to police supported Sprinkles’
statement. At the conclusion of his interview, Sprinkles was arrested without a
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warrant and charged with second-degree rape due to S.N.B. being under the age of
fourteen. KRS 510.050.
On August 8, 2003, in light of S.N.B.’s allegation that Sprinkles gave
her a pill, the Knox County grand jury indicted Sprinkles on a charge of firstdegree rape. KRS 510.040 (victim physically helpless and use of forcible
compulsion.) On April 30, 2004, Sprinkles pled guilty to first-degree rape in
exchange for the Commonwealth’s offer of ten years’ imprisonment. He was
sentenced on May 5, 2004. His RCr 11.42 motion was filed on June 4, 2007, and
denied by the trial court without a hearing on August 9, 2007. This appeal follows.
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
“A guilty plea is valid only when it is entered intelligently and
voluntarily.” Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Ky. 2001). Because a
guilty plea taken with ineffective counsel may not meet that standard, “[a] guilty
plea is open to attack on the ground that counsel did not provide the defendant with
reasonably competent advice.” Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 8, 10
(Ky. 2002) (internal quotations omitted).
Sprinkles claims that his conviction and sentence should have been set
aside because his guilty plea was a product of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Sprinkles argues that the test for ineffective assistance of counsel should be
whether the defendant is satisfied with the agreement or sentence. His analysis is
incorrect. Our courts have long held that trial counsel’s performance is presumed
competent unless the petitioner proves that counsel was deficient and that the
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deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). With respect to a guilty plea, the
movant must also show that the deficient performance was so serious that, but for
the counsel’s ineffective representation, there is a reasonable probability that the
defendant would not have pled guilty. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct.
366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).
First, Sprinkles argues that trial counsel’s performance was deficient
because he failed to investigate whether the Commonwealth’s evidence supported
a first-degree rape charge2 and whether any potential defenses were available.
Sprinkles was entitled to competent representation, including reasonable
investigation of all potential defenses. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. “In any
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of
deference to counsel’s judgments.” Id. Unless Sprinkles shows that his defense
counsel made errors so serious that counsel’s performance fell outside the wide
range of professionally competent assistance, it will be deemed competent. Id. at
687.
Based upon Sprinkle’s lack of specificity, we decline to find that trial
counsel’s actions were unreasonable. Sprinkles failed to specifically identify any
2
Evidently Sprinkles labors under a misconception that his trial counsel had the power to control
the Commonwealth’s grand jury presentment and the grand jury’s decision to indict him on a
higher charge than the charge on which he was originally arrested.
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defenses or evidence that his counsel failed to investigate.3 Sprinkles also failed to
articulate how he was prejudiced by this failure. In light of Sprinkles’ confession,
it is unrealistic to suppose that he would not have pled guilty but for trial counsel’s
failure to investigate.
Next, Sprinkles alleges that his trial counsel coerced his guilty plea.
Sprinkes, however, did not claim duress or specify how he was pressured. Instead,
he only claims that trial counsel encouraged him to accept the agreement. The
Kentucky Supreme Court held that an attorney’s advice to his client to plead guilty
is not any indication that the attorney rendered ineffective assistance. Beecham v.
Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 234, 236-37 (Ky. 1983). Since encouragement is
Spinkles’ only claim of coercion, his claim is without merit.
Sprinkles also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because he
allowed Sprinkles to plead guilty to the increased charge of first-degree rape.
Once again, Sprinkles failed to show that the plea was not voluntarily entered. In
fact, our review of the plea documents and plea colloquy indicate that Sprinkles
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered the plea.
Next, Sprinkles claims that his counsel was ineffective due to a
conflict. Although Sprinkles describes this issue as a conflict, he claims that his
counsel encouraged him to plead guilty so counsel could conclude Sprinkles’ case
and move on to other duties. The record refutes this argument. Sprinkles was
3
Sprinkles fails to recognize that the testimony of S.N.B. at trial, if it were consistent with her
statement to the police, would suffice to support a conviction for first-degree rape even if it were
contradicted by other witnesses. Clements v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Ky. 1964).
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arrested in June 2003. He was not sentenced until May 2004. During that time,
there were at least three pretrial conferences. There is no evidence that this case
was rushed in any way.
Next, Sprinkles argues that trial counsel should have requested that
DNA tests be performed on S.N.B. to determine if she had sexual intercourse with
any other men. Although Sprinkles was entitled to a reasonable investigation, we
decline to find that counsel was required to embark on a wild goose chase that
would be unlikely to help his case. Sprinkles confessed to having sexual
intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl. Whether she had sexual intercourse with
other men does not change the status of his crime. Indeed, it is highly likely that
the so-called Rape Shield Law, Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 412, would
render such evidence inadmissible at trial in any event. Therefore, we find no error
in the trial court’s rejection of this claim of ineffective assistance on the part of
trial counsel.
II. Procedural Claims
Sprinkles claims that the trial court erred by failing to grant him an
evidentiary hearing on his RCr 11.42 motion for relief. We disagree. Trial courts
are not required to grant evidentiary hearings on RCr 11.42 motions unless the
defendant’s motion raises an issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of
the record. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993).
None of the issues raised by Sprinkles meet that standard. Therefore, we hold that
the trial court correctly denied Sprinkles’ motion.
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Sprinkles also claims that the trial court erred by denying his request
for appointed counsel for the RCr 11.42 proceedings. A trial court, however, is
only required to appoint counsel when an evidentiary hearing is required, the
defendant is indigent, and the defendant has specifically requested, in writing, that
counsel be appointed. Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 453 (Ky. 2001).
Since an evidentiary hearing was not required, we hold that Sprinkles was not
entitled to appointed counsel.
Finally, Sprinkles claims that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Although Sprinkles filed an affidavit of
indigency, the veracity of the affidavit was called into question by a document
filed by the Kentucky State Reformatory. The document reflected that Sprinkles’
prison account had a balance of $1,048.12. Further, the document stated that
$2,179.15 had been deposited within the previous six months. In light of his prison
account, we hold that the trial court had sufficient evidence on which to conclude
that Sprinkles was not indigent and was not entitled to proceed in forma pauperis.
Accordingly, the order of the Knox Circuit Court denying Sprinkles’
RCr 11.42 motion is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Randy Sprinkles, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Jeffrey A. Cross
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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