PORTER (WILLIAM), ET AL. VS. SHELBYVILLE CEMETERY COMPANY , ET AL.
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RENDERED: MARCH 20, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002545-MR
WILLIAM PORTER and
BARBARA PORTER
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES J. HICKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00702
SHELBYVILLE CEMETERY COMPANY
aka GROVE HILL CEMETERY
COMPANY; CHARLES T. LONG;
J. ROBERT WALTERS; GUTHRIE
GOODMAN, III; ANN KINSOLVING;
ELLEN TOPMILLER; and
EDGAR VAUGHN, III
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; CAPERTON AND CLAYTON, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: William Porter and Barbara Porter appeal from an
opinion and order of the Shelby Circuit Court that dismissed their complaint
against Shelbyville Cemetery Company (d/b/a Grove Hill Cemetery Company) and
six members of its board of trustees. At the time they filed the complaint,
Appellant Barbara Porter was acting as a de facto trustee of Grove Hill, but neither
of the Porters was a member of the nonprofit corporation. Nevertheless, the
Porters filed a derivative action on behalf of Grove Hill alleging numerous
breaches of the articles of incorporation by Barbara’s fellow board members.
The sole issue properly before us is the argument raised by the Porters
in the trial court: that Barbara’s role as a corporate fiduciary entitles her to the
same standing that a stockholder of a private business corporation would have to
bring a derivative action to enforce the rights of the corporation. The trial court
was not persuaded and dismissed the complaint. After our review, we affirm.
Shelbyville Cemetery Company is a nonprofit corporation governed
by the provisions of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) Chapter 273. It was
chartered by the Commonwealth on March 1, 1854. At that time, the Kentucky
Constitution of 1850 was in effect. The General Assembly amended the
cemetery’s articles of incorporation in 1871 to provide for corporate governance by
nine trustees, each of whom had to own at least one burial plot in the cemetery.
Pursuant to the 1871 amendment, three of these trustees were to be elected
annually by the plot owners. The amendment also provided that Grove Hill:
shall be constituted and composed only of those persons
who have heretofore purchased and paid, and who may
hereafter purchase and pay for lots, and have received
certificates of ownership therefor in the cemetery
grounds owned and held by said corporation.
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1871 Ky. Acts, Ch. 1547 §§3-4. Finally, the articles provided for the board of
trustees to retain an accountant to audit the company’s accounts at least once per
year.
When Kentucky’s current Constitution was adopted in 1891, the
Constitution of 1850 was effectively repealed. At Section 59(17), the new
Constitution prohibited the General Assembly from chartering private
corporations. All existing corporations were statutorily mandated to amend their
charters to comply with Chapter 32 of the Kentucky Statutes, which established
Kentucky’s first uniform corporate code. All corporations pre-dating the 1891
Constitution were also required to adopt a corporate resolution accepting the new
Constitution and to designate a registered agent in the office of the Secretary of
State.
Grove Hill failed to comply with any of the requirements of Chapter
32 and accordingly suffered the revocation of its corporate charter in 1897. As
appellant’s brief aptly observes, Grove Hill has operated as a de-chartered
corporation continually since 1897 – neither de jure nor de facto as a matter of law.
Appellant’s brief at p. 4, citing 19 Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 2885 (1986).
When Grove Hill was originally incorporated in 1854, its charter
recited that it was a “body politic and corporate . . . .” Section 1, Charter of 1854.
As noted during oral arguments, Grove Hill attempted to amend its charter in 1910
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– the same charter that had been revoked in 1897 and which has never been
brought into conformity with the laws under the present Constitution.
Grove Hill has continued to operate regardless of its actual corporate
status. It has often functioned as a matter of actual practice rather than in
conformity with its by-laws as originally chartered and amended over the years.
Grove Hill contends that it is a private, not-for-profit corporation. Barbara
contends that it is a public – or at least a quasi-public – corporation.
Since 1959, it has been the practice of the board to appoint trustees
rather than to elect them as provided in its original articles of incorporation. In
March 1975, the board voted to amend the by-laws to reduce the number of
trustees from nine to seven. As of the time that the record in this case was
complied, none of the board members has been duly elected by the lot owners
since 1959. Pursuant to the appointment process, Barbara Porter was appointed
trustee by the board in October 1998.
In 2005, the board decided to condemn a portion of the Porters’
property for expansion of the cemetery.1 The Porters objected to this decision. In
an action contesting the cemetery’s condemnation proceedings, the Porters asked
the trial court to order the de facto members of the board to announce and to
conduct a proper election of trustees. Presumably, the Porters anticipated that a reconstituted board might reconsider the decision to condemn the Porters’ property.
However, the court declined to consider the Porters’ motion and held that issues
1
The Porters note that by exercising the power of eminent domain in the condemnation action,
Grove Hill is demonstrating its “quasi-public” – if not public – status.
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related to the composition and administration of the board were not matters to be
considered in conjunction with the condemnation action. The Porters did not
pursue an appeal as to the de facto composition of the Grove Hill board in the
context of the condemnation proceedings but instead have filed this separate
lawsuit on behalf of the corporation.
In their complaint, the Porters alleged that none of the trustees has
been validly elected to serve on the board. They also charged that the board has
ignored their demand for it to schedule and conduct a valid election of its trustees.
As a consequence, they sought to have the de facto board members immediately
removed from office and a proper election held under the supervision of the court.
In addition, they sought a court order compelling the board to submit to an annual
audit and to prepare and to publish an annual report. At a meeting of the board
held on January 16, 2007, Barbara Porter was removed from office.
On January 22, 2007, Grove Hill filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of standing. The board contended that Barbara Porter was
estopped from attacking the validity of its makeup because she had been appointed
pursuant to the same process that she was now challenging and because she had
served for ten years without complaint in her capacity as board member without
the benefit of an election. Furthermore, Grove Hill argued that since she had been
duly removed from office, she could no longer claim any judicially recognizable
interest in the subject of the action. With respect to William Porter, the board
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reiterated that he was neither a board member nor a property owner and that he had
never had any judicially recognizable interest in the board or its composition.
On February 5, 2007, the Porters filed a motion requesting the court to
rescind the board’s decision to remove Barbara from office. Additionally, with
respect to the board’s motion to dismiss, they explained that “in an effort to get
past the issue of standing,” they had each tried to become members of the
corporation by purchasing cemetery plots. The board refused to sell them the
requested plots. The Porters argued that this refusal amounted to yet another
instance of wrongdoing. They then requested the court to compel the cemetery to
sell two burial plots to them, arguing that its status as a public corporation
precluded the decision to refuse to sell burial plots to them.
In an order entered February 28, 2007, the trial court dismissed the
Porters’ action. With respect to William Porter, the trial court concluded that he
had no standing whatsoever to pursue an action on behalf of the corporation. As to
Barbara Porter, the court held that she, too, lacked a judicially recognizable interest
sufficient to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.
In a carefully reasoned analysis, the court concluded that the precisely
circumscribed, statutory authority of de facto board members to act on behalf of a
corporation was insufficient to serve as a basis for a derivative action brought to
enforce the rights of a corporation. Although there is well accepted authority that a
de facto trustee binds a corporation in its transactions with innocent third-parties,
the trial court reasoned that a de facto trustee had no legal relationship whatsoever
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with the corporation itself. According to the trial court, Barbara was never a
member of the corporation because of her failure to own a burial plot; she was no
longer a trustee either in law or in fact. Therefore, she lacked the necessary
present, substantial, and judicially recognizable interest in the action to invoke
jurisdiction and to maintain this action. Finally, the court observed that the Porters
could not be affected personally by any judgment that the court might arguably
pronounce. Since neither of them could cast a vote with respect to any issue
concerning the cemetery and neither of them could lawfully serve on its board, the
court’s decision – regardless of its outcome – was legally irrelevant to them. Thus,
the court concluded that the Porters were legal strangers to the corporation who
could not invoke the court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, their action was dismissed.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, the Porters contend that the trial court erred by concluding
that Barbara lacked standing to bring a civil action to enforce Grove Hill’s
corporate rights. They argue that Barbara’s status as a de facto trustee alone is an
interest sufficient to justify their maintaining an action. They contest the common
law’s limitations on the authority of de facto directors to act and contend that the
circumstances surrounding her inappropriate appointment to the board are not
relevant. The Porters contend that as long as the interests of the public and third
persons are involved, any and all of Barbara’s actions as de facto trustee are
authorized by law, and the court must redress their grievances.
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The Porters contend that Grove Hill’s de facto trustees “long ago shut
off any measure of accountability to [the corporation’s] burial lot owners.”
Appellants’ Brief at 17. They allege that the de facto trustees “have kept the lot
owners in the dark for many years” and that the board’s chairman has been
permitted to “establish his fiefdom over Grove Hill which he has ruled with an iron
fist.” Id. The Porters argue that Barbara is a suitable advocate to enforce the
interests of Grove Hill’s shareholders. They contend that Barbara is the only
person who has shown any concern for the best interests of the cemetery’s plot
owners. Invoking public policy and equitable principles, they urge this court to
hold that a board member has the right to bring a derivative action for the same
reasons that stockholders of a for-profit corporation are authorized to do so.
Since the court’s judgment in this case involves a question of law, we
review the decision de novo. We agree with the trial court that the power of de
facto directors to act on behalf of a corporation is much more narrowly limited
than the Porters acknowledge. However, we do not believe that an exhaustive
discussion on that point is necessary. Rather, we believe it is sufficient to say that
even if she were a duly elected, de jure director of Grove Hill, Barbara Porter
would nevertheless lack the standing necessary to pursue the derivative claims that
she has asserted on behalf of the corporation.
In order to invoke the jurisdiction of the court to enforce a claim, the
plaintiffs must show that they have standing to do so. J.N.R. v. O’Reilly, 264
S.W.3d 587 (Ky. 2008). Standing to bring an action requires a personal interest,
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often referred to as a “substantial” interest in the subject matter of the litigation as
distinguished from a “mere expectancy.” Housing Authority of Louisville v.
Service Employment International Union, 885 S.W.2d 962, 965 (Ky. 1994).
The issue of standing is concerned only with the question of who is
entitled to mount a legal challenge rather than with the merits of the subject matter
of the controversy. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947
(1968). It is a concept utilized to determine whether a party has shown a personal
stake in the outcome sufficient to insure that a justiciable controversy is adequately
presented to the court. Black's Law Dictionary 1405 (6th ed.1990). State courts
apply the concept of standing as a matter of self-restraint to avoid rendering
advisory opinions on matters instigated by parties who are merely “intermeddlers.”
59 Am.Jur.2d Parties § 36 (2002). Since the jurisdiction of the court is a
prerequisite to commencement of any action, standing must exist at the time the
action is filed. Id. at §37.
Standing for shareholders of private business corporations in
derivative actions evolved from equitable principles. 19 Am.Jur.2d Corporations
§1948 (2004). Where a corporation possessed a cause of action that it either
refused or was unable to assert, equity permitted a stockholder to sue in his own
name for the benefit of the corporation. Id. at §1946. The shareholder was
authorized to pursue the action for the purpose of preventing injustice when it was
apparent that the corporation's rights would not be protected otherwise. Id.
However, derivative actions have not been traditionally favored in the law, and
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eventually state legislatures began to enact various statutory requirements in order
to regulate recourse to derivative actions as a remedy. Id. at §1959.
The General Assembly expressly provided in KRS Chapter 271B for
derivative proceedings by shareholders against their for-profit corporations:
[a] person shall not commence a proceeding in the right
of a domestic or foreign corporation unless he was a
shareholder of the corporation when the transaction
complained of occurred or unless he became a
shareholder through transfer by operation of law from
one who was a shareholder at that time. (Emphasis
added.)
However, nothing in KRS Chapter 273 governing nonprofit corporations
expressly authorizes derivative actions by either members or directors.
Nevertheless, the Porters argue that the court should recognize
Barbara’s right to sue since she is in the best position to know the facts and to be
able to make allegations against the board. Regardless of any arguably equitable
merit in their conviction, the fact remains that the General Assembly has spoken
clearly and has exercised its plenary power over the issue. In light of the specific
limitations enacted by our legislature, this court has no authority to recognize the
right of a corporate director – acting in that capacity – to invoke the jurisdiction of
the court by bringing an action on behalf of the nonprofit corporation in the name
of or for the sake of its member. In two cases, Willis v. Davis, 323 S.W.2d 847
(Ky. 1959) and Hollis v. Edmonds, 616 S.W.2d 80 (Ky.App. 1981), our Supreme
Court held that an action for injunctive relief is the proper remedy by which to
enforce duties owed by officers of a nonprofit corporation to its members.
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In light of disposition of this appeal, we refrain from analyzing the
Porters’ other contentions except to address a matter emphasized during oral
argument. The Porters protest Grove Hill’s refusal to sell cemetery plots to them
so that they could “get past the issue of standing.” They contend that Grove Hill is
a public corporation and that, therefore, its refusal to sell them plots is arbitrary
and illegal, thereby compelling a reversal of the trial court’s decision that they
lacked standing to pursue the derivative action.
The public versus private status of Grove Hill is not at all dispositive
of (albeit decidedly distracting from) the heart of the standing issue. Nonetheless,
we have carefully analyzed the few Kentucky cases that discuss the public or
private characterizations of cemeteries, and they are contradictory and internally
divided.
Both Grove Hill Cemetery in Louisville and the Lexington Cemetery
were incorporated by a special act of the General Assembly in 1848 – as was
Grove Hill in Shelbyville in 1854. All three cemetery charters recited that they
were “a body politic and corporate.” Their character as a public versus private
entity, however, cannot be readily ascertained from language that on its face would
seem to indicate more of a public purpose.
The two Kentucky cases construing these issues both involved the
taxable nature of funds dedicated to cemetery maintenance and embellishment.
Under Section 170 of our current Constitution, a private entity can be taxed while
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its public counterpart is exempt from taxation. The courts have been clearly
divided as to whether burial of the dead constitutes a public or private purpose.
In Commonwealth v. Lexington Cemetery, 70 S.W. 280 (Ky. 1902),
our former Court of Appeals declined to equate the obviously public need to bury
the dead with a purely public purpose. In finding the Lexington Cemetery to be a
private entity subject to taxation, it reasoned as follows in a 5-2 decision:
Whilst we fully appreciate and approve the well-nigh
universal sentiment that the graves of the dead should be
decently and tenderly cared for, there can be no escape
from the conclusion that appellee is not an institution of
purely public charity, as contemplated by the constitution
and statute.
Id. at 281.
The opposite result was reached in Cave Hill Cemetery Company v.
Scent, 352 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1961), in which the Court rendered a 4-3 decision
declaring the language “body politic and corporate” to indicate a public
corporation having a public purpose.
In creating Cave Hill Cemetery Company as a “body
politic,” the Legislature recognized the public nature of
the Cemetery, recognized it public purpose, authorized its
maintenance and development by the financial means
mentioned, and retained unto itself the legislative power
to alter or modify the legal structure as the public
interest may require, even to the point of authorizing
the levy of taxes for its preservation and maintenance in
case the presently established methods of financing the
Cemetery prove inadequate. In the peculiar factual
situation before us for consideration, it seems to us that
permitting the collection of an ad valorem tax by the
Department of Revenue on any of the funds involved
would tend to thwart the obvious purpose of the
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Legislature – to make this public cemetery selfsustaining, and thus avoid the need of granting it
support from public taxation. For these reasons we
conclude that the funds involved are public property used
for a public purpose within the meaning of Section 170
of the Constitution, and therefore exempt from taxation.
(Emphasis added.)
Id. at 64.
Thus, the more recent judicial pronouncement on this issue would
indicate that the operation of a cemetery is a public purpose regardless of how the
cemetery itself characterizes its activity. Barbara urges that the public nature of
Grove Hill requires that it sell a plot to her or to anyone demanding a sale. After
reviewing the reasoning of the trial court, we agree that there is no precedent
requiring a cemetery to sell a plot to an individual – with the clear caveat that “a
public cemetery may not refuse to sell a plot on the basis of racial discrimination or
discrimination of another protected class. Terry, et al. v. Elmwood Cemetery, 307
F.Supp 369 (D.C. Ala. 1969).” Opinion of the trial court at p. 7.
Thus, Barbara cannot compel Grove Hill to confer upon her standing
to sue by forcing it to sell her a burial plot. However, even if she could leverage
such an outcome, she still would not have standing at present to bring the action
currently before us. Standing cannot be later acquired and then applied
retrospectively to validate a cause of action originally lacking justiciabilty because
of the absence of standing. The trial court expressed this concept more succinctly
as follows: “Standing is required to bring a law suit and can not be acquired
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midstream to create a present and substantial interest in the subject matter of the
suit.” Opinion of the trial court at p. 9.
We affirm the judgment of the Shelby Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
Alan N. Linker
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEES:
C. Gilmore Dutton, III
Shelbyville, Kentucky
Ray Roelandt
Crestwood, Kentucky
Donald T. Prather
Shelbyville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:
Alan N. Linker
Louisville, Kentucky
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