RESERVE ESTATES, LLC VS. BERKEMEIER (DAVE)
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 25, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002444-MR
RESERVE ESTATES, LLC
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00554
DAVE BERKEMEIER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND DIXON, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: In this appeal, Reserve Estates, LLC, contends the Oldham
Circuit Court erred by rendering a declaratory judgment in favor of Dave
Berkemeier, which granted him the right to construct a detached garage on his
property. Finding no error, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
21.580.
Reserve Estates, LLC, is a real-estate development company, and
Tom Borntraeger is its president.2 Borntraeger developed a subdivision in Oldham
County, Kentucky, known as the Reserve Estates of Sleepy Hollow. In July 2003,
Borntraeger filed a deed of restrictions for the subdivision with the Oldham County
Clerk. Section 3.5 provides:
Garages; Carports. All Lots shall have at least a two-car
garage. The openings or doors for vehicular entrances to
any garage located on a Lot shall include doors. No
detached garages are allowed. Garages, as structures,
are subject to prior plan approval under Section 3.1. No
carport shall be constructed on any Lot. There shall be
no front-entry garages. (emphasis added).
In August 2003, Berkemeier purchased a lot in the subdivision. In
addition to building his own home in the subdivision, Berkemeier worked as a
construction project manager on several other houses in the neighborhood. As a
result, Berkemeier and Borntraeger became well acquainted.
In late 2004, Berkemeier had plans drawn for a two-story detached
garage. According to Berkemeier, in early 2005, Borntraeger visited his home,
reviewed and approved the plans, and helped him place stakes on the lot pursuant
to the blueprint.3 Berkemeier then sought estimates for the construction of the
garage, but ultimately decided to put the project on hold for a short time. In the
following months, the relationship between Berkemeier and Borntraeger
2
Throughout this opinion, we refer to the actions of “Borntraeger,” rather than the corporate
entity, Reserve Estates, LLC.
3
Borntraeger denied the meeting occurred.
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deteriorated rapidly, and they became involved in litigation unrelated to the case at
bar.
In early 2006, Berkemeier submitted the garage plans to Borntraeger,
with the intent of moving forward with construction. Borntraeger, however,
denied Berkemeier’s request, stating the deed of restrictions prohibited detached
garages. Berkemeier submitted his garage plans a second time, in June 2006,
which Borntraeger again denied.
On August 9, 2006, Berkemeier filed a complaint in Oldham Circuit
Court seeking a declaratory judgment that he was entitled to construct his garage
pursuant to Borntraeger’s prior approval. The court held a bench trial on October
12, 2007, and heard testimony from Berkemeier; his wife, Christine Berkemeier;
the Berkemeiers’ neighbor, Stephen Camiolio; and Borntraeger. The court
rendered its findings and judgment in favor of Berkemeier on October 31, 2007.
This appeal followed.
Since this case was tried before the court without a jury, we will not
disturb the court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. A finding of fact is not clearly erroneous if it
is supported by substantial evidence, which is “evidence of substance and relevant
consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable
men.” Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky.
1998). In our review, we are mindful that the trial court is in the best position “to
determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence.”
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Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Garland, 805 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Ky. 1991) (citation
omitted). The trial court’s conclusions of law, including the “[i]nterpretation or
construction of restrictive covenants,” are reviewed de novo. Colliver v. Stonewall
Equestrian Estates Ass'n, Inc., 139 S.W.3d 521, 523 (Ky. App. 2003).
The first argument raised by Borntraeger is that Section 3.5
unambiguously prohibits detached garages, and the trial court erred by concluding
otherwise. After thorough review, and despite the language of the restrictions, we
conclude Borntraeger waived his right to enforce Section 3.5 against Berkemeier.
As this Court noted in Colliver, supra,
The rule of law in regard to waiver of restrictions was
succinctly stated in Bagby v. Stewart's Ex'r, 265 S.W.2d
75, 77 (Ky. 1954):
A change in the character of the
neighborhood which was intended to be
created by restrictions has generally been
held to prevent their enforcement in equity,
where it is no longer possible to accomplish
the purpose intended by such covenant. . . .
Arbitrary enforcement of covenants does not necessarily
render covenants unenforceable. Instead, when arbitrary
enforcement has resulted in a fundamental change in the
character of a neighborhood, the purpose of the
covenants may be defeated and accordingly become
unenforceable.
Colliver, 139 S.W.3d at 525 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Colliver, like the case at bar, addressed a subdivision’s deed of
restrictions regarding detached garages. Id. at 523. The Colliver restrictions,
however, provided that detached garages were allowed with the approval of the
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homeowner’s association. Id. at 523-24. The Collivers argued that lax
enforcement of “other” restrictions regarding swimming pools and fences
constituted waiver of the detached garage restriction. Id. at 525. The Court
disagreed, concluding, “although the covenants have not been strictly enforced in
reference to pools and fences, we cannot say that a fundamental change in the
neighborhood defeating the purpose of the covenants has occurred.” Id.
Here however, the deed of restrictions clearly prohibits detached
garages, unlike Colliver, where the restrictive covenants provided for the
integration of detached garages in the neighborhood. In contrast, the covenants at
issue here do not contemplate the existence of detached garages in the
neighborhood, and any deviation from that clear directive fundamentally changes
the character of the neighborhood and defeats the purpose of the covenant. At
trial, Borntraeger testified that, despite the language of the restrictions, detached
garages are allowed with his approval, and owners must submit architectural plans,
landscape design plans, and the name of the proposed contractor. Borntraeger
admitted that he had specifically approved a detached garage for another home in
the subdivision, and he acknowledged that there were times when he had not
strictly enforced the restrictions. Furthermore, the trial court was in the best
position to weigh the evidence, and the court concluded Borntraeger approved
Berkemeier’s garage plans. In light of the facts and circumstances of this case, we
believe that Borntraeger’s actions constituted a waiver of Section 3.5, and public
policy dictates that the non-waiver clause cannot preclude waiver based on
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Borntraeger’s words and conduct. Accordingly, we believe Borntraeger is
precluded from enforcing Section 3.5 against Berkemeier.
Borntraeger next points out that the deed of restrictions includes a
non-waiver clause, and he contends it applies here to preclude a finding of waiver.
Specifically, Section 7.1(d) states:
Waivers. Declarant reserves the right to waive any
obligation or violation of any Lot owner under the terms
of this Declaration upon Declarant’s determination, in its
sole and absolute discretion provided that such waiver
shall be express and in writing. Failure of any party to
demand or insist upon observance of any of these
restrictions or covenants, or to proceed for a restraint of
violations, shall not be deemed a waiver of the violation,
or the right to seek enforcement of these restrictions.
Under the circumstances presented here, we are not persuaded that
Borntraeger’s conduct falls under the protection of the non-wavier clause. “[I]t is
contrary to equity and good conscience to enforce rights under restrictive building
covenants where the [property owner] has been led to suppose by word, conduct,
or silence . . . that there are no objections to his or her operations.” 20 Am. Jur. 2d
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 229.
Finally, we note that Borntraeger raised an alternative argument
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence at trial. As previously noted, appellate
review of factual findings is limited and we will not disturb a trial court’s judgment
as to the credibility of witnesses unless it is clearly erroneous. Our review of the
record establishes that the trial court’s ruling was not clearly erroneous, as it was
amply supported by substantial evidence.
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For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Oldham Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Galen L. Clark
Louisville, Kentucky
Michael J. Kitchen
Louisville, Kentucky
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