BURBERRY (DARRELL WAYNE) VS. BURBERRY (JANE WOZNICK)
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RENDERED: AUGUST 21, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002391-MR
DARRELL WAYNE BURBERRY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOURBON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TAMRA GORMLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00255
JANE WOZNICK BURBERRY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, MOORE AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Darrell Wayne Burberry appeals from an order of the
Bourbon Circuit Court dividing his marital property and sustaining an earlier ruling
precluding Darrell from introducing evidence except in rebuttal. Because the trial
court’s rulings were supported by substantial evidence and did not constitute an
abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Darrell and Jane were married on October 26, 1996. On August 19,
2003, Darrell filed a petition for the dissolution of the marriage. On November 14,
2003, the circuit court issued a bifurcated decree dissolving the marriage and
reserving the division of marital property.
On March 30, 2005, the trial court issued a discovery order requiring
lists of witnesses and exhibits to be disclosed and exchanged by May 23, 2005.
The order further provided that “[n]o discovery shall be propounded that will be
due after May 23rd and no discovery shall be attempted after May 23rd.” The final
hearing was scheduled for June 6, 2005. Subsequently, this hearing was
rescheduled due to Darrell’s failure to comply with the discovery order.
On June 6, 2005, Jane filed a motion requesting the trial court to
prohibit Darrell from producing evidence and calling witnesses at the final hearing
due to his failure to comply with the discovery order. On July 11, 2005, the DRC
issued a report and recommendation to the trial court sustaining Jane’s motion to
prohibit Darrell’s introduction of evidence not disclosed prior to the discovery
deadline. The DRC found that Darrell’s failure to comply prejudiced Jane.
On July 15, 2005, Darrell filed exceptions to the DRC’s report and a
motion to reopen or extend discovery due to his excusable neglect in failing to
comply with the discovery order. He contended that the discovery sanction was
inappropriate because he did not act in bad faith, had no history of being dilatory,
and no prejudice occurred. He cited a printer malfunction and a misunderstanding
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with opposing counsel as his reasons for failing to provide Jane with the requested
discovery.
On September 26, 2005, the trial court issued an order closing
discovery pursuant to its order entered on March 30, 2005. The matter was
referred to the DRC for a final hearing on the division of the parties’ marital
property. On January 13, 2006, the DRC held the final hearing. During the
hearing, Jane and Darrell stipulated to the value and marital interest of many of
their assets but disagreed about other assets. Darrell was not permitted to
introduce evidence or witnesses except for the purpose of rebuttal.
The significant point of contention concerned the number and value of
the parties’ cattle. Jane introduced a spreadsheet and other documentation listing
the value of the cattle at $98,728.74 on the date of the parties’ divorce decree. She
calculated that this value included 53.5 stock cows1 and 124 heifers and steers.
She further introduced a financing statement signed by Darrell in which he claimed
ownership of Black Angus cattle valued at $75,000. However, Darrell testified
that the parties owned only forty cows constituting a value of $20,000 and were
subject to a $13,000 marital debt. However, he did not offer expert testimony
against Jane’s valuation evidence.
After the hearing, the DRC was replaced by another DRC who, in
turn, was replaced after the establishment of a family court in Bourbon County.
After these various changes, on October 23, 2007, the trial court issued its findings
1
This reflects a fractional ownership in the stock cows.
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of fact, conclusions of law, and order. In its findings of fact, the trial court valued
the parties’ marital estate at $262,986.93 which it equally divided. Prominently,
the trial court adopted Jane’s valuation of the cattle, which added over $90,000 to
the marital estate. Further, Jane was awarded rehabilitative maintenance at a rate
of $1,000 a month for a period of two years and attorney’s fees of $18,000. This
appeal followed.
Darrell contends that the trial court erred when it imposed sanctions
against him for failing to comply with the discovery deadline. He contends that the
trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting him from introducing evidence
disclosed subsequent to the discovery deadline. Because the trial court’s discovery
sanction was reasonable, we disagree.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 37.02(2)(b) provides that a
trial court may refuse to admit a party’s evidence to support or oppose a claim if
the party has failed to comply with a discovery order. This provision permits
courts to ensure that legal actions are not impeded by delay tactics which
inevitably impose injustices on citizens. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Carrier, 426
S.W.2d 938, 941 (Ky. 1968). The principal purpose of our rules of civil procedure
is to provide litigants with an opportunity for simple and speedy relief. Id.
When a trial court issues sanctions pursuant to CR 37.02(2), an
appellate court reviews the decision for abuse of discretion. Morton v. Bank of the
Bluegrass and Trust Co., 18 S.W.3d 353, 360 (Ky.App. 1999). The test for abuse
of discretion is whether the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,
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or unsupported by sound legal principles. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v.
Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court’s order
sustaining the recommendation of the DRC prohibiting Darrell’s introduction of
evidence not disclosed prior to the discovery deadline was not erroneous. Darrell’s
central contention was that a printer malfunction prevented him from providing
discovery to Jane. While technological glitches may justify the temporary failure
to comply with a discovery order, Darrell completely failed to comply with the
discovery order, including through the conclusion of the hearing, which occurred
over seven months after the discovery deadline.
Darrell’s failure to comply with the discovery order is more troubling
considering that the final hearing scheduled for June 6, 2005, was canceled and
continued due to his failure to comply with discovery. A printer malfunction
cannot justify an almost eight-month delay and total failure to comply with
discovery requests. This delay required Jane to subpoena numerous documents
from third-party sources to obtain the quantity and value of the parties’ marital
assets. Put simply, Darrell’s discovery violation impeded Jane from obtaining a
simple and speedy conclusion of her case, which is the hallmark purpose of our
civil rules. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Carrier, 426 S.W.2d at 941.
Finally, with regard to sanctions, Darrell did not attempt to call any
experts to refute Jane’s evidence regarding the valuation of the cattle. While
Darrell’s evidentiary options were limited by the discovery sanction, he was more
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than free to introduce expert testimony to rebut Jane’s vast evidence regarding the
valuation of the cattle. Because he failed to introduce any expert rebuttal evidence,
he was not prejudiced regarding the cattle valuation. Accordingly, we cannot
conclude that the trial court abused its wide discretion. M.P.S. v. Cabinet for
Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Ky.App. 1998).
Beyond its discovery sanction, the trial court’s factual findings and
order were supported by substantial evidence. Jane’s evidence regarding the cattle
included spreadsheets, bills of sale, copies of checks, deposit slips, and Darrell’s
prior estimate valuing their cattle at $75,000. While Darrell disputed Jane’s
numbers and valuation, the trial court was free to adopt her valuation of the cattle,
which was within the range of the values stated during the hearing. Bailey v.
Bailey, 231 S.W.3d 793, 796 (Ky.App. 2007). Further, the other findings
regarding the valuation of the parties’ marital estate were supported by substantial
evidence. Id.
Finally, although mentioning the attorney’s fees and maintenance
awards, Darrell’s brief contains no sufficient argument to permit us to conclude
that the trial court abused it broad discretion in these areas. Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, 521
S.W.2d 512, 514 (Ky. 1975) (in divorce cases, the awarding of an attorney’s fee is
discretionary); and Platt v. Platt, 728 S.W.2d 542, 543 (Ky.App. 1987)
(maintenance decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court). Thus,
the trial court’s decision was not erroneous.
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For the foregoing reasons, the Bourbon Circuit Court’s findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and order is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brian K. Privett
Paris, Kentucky
Suzanne Baumgardner
Lexington, Kentucky
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