MILLER (JONATHON) VS. MASSEY (GERALD CLARK)
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RENDERED: JANUARY 16, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002347-MR
JONATHON MILLER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEFFREY T. BURDETTE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00158
GERALD CLARK MASSEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; KELLER, JUDGE; HENRY,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
KELLER, JUDGE: Jonathon Miller (Miller) sued Gerald Clark Massey (Massey)
and others alleging they were responsible for numerous defects in the construction
of Miller’s house. Miller and the other defendants reached a settlement. The
Pulaski Circuit Court then granted Massey’s motion for summary judgment. It is
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
from this summary judgment that Miller appeals. On appeal, Miller argues: (1)
the circuit court prematurely entered summary judgment before any discovery had
been undertaken; and (2) the circuit court erred when it found a contract between
Miller and Massey relieved Massey from any liability for defects in construction of
the house. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
FACTS
The trial court granted summary judgment before any discovery had
taken place; therefore, our recitation of the facts is based on the trial court’s
findings of fact; the complaint filed by Miller; the parties’ motions, responses, and
replies; the parties’ briefs; and various documents attached to the preceding.
Miller and Massey agree that they entered into a contract regarding
the construction of a house on land owned by Miller in Somerset, Kentucky.
However, they disagree regarding what that contract entails and it is that
disagreement which is at the heart of this appeal. According to Miller, the contract
called for Massey to construct a single-family house on Miller’s land. According
to Massey, the contract simply called for him to “oversee the construction and
facilitate the completion of the” house. It did not call for him to actually construct
the house or to ensure that the construction was consistent with applicable building
codes or done in a workmanlike manner. According to Massey, those duties fell to
J. Forrest Cooper and/or Cooper Property Inspections, Inc. (hereafter collectively
referred to as Cooper).
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Following completion of construction, Miller had the house inspected
by a third party, who allegedly determined that the house was not constructed in a
workmanlike manner and that construction was not in compliance with the
building code. Miller then filed suit against Massey and Cooper alleging that they
breached their duties to construct the house in a workmanlike manner, to use
suitable materials, and to comply with the building code. Miller also alleged
Massey, as a “construction professional,” was liable for any acts or omissions “of
his agents, employees, or subcontractor [sic]” under Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS) 411.256.
Cooper and Miller reached a settlement and the trial court dismissed
all of Miller’s claims against Cooper. Although the time line is not clear, it
appears Miller changed attorneys approximately eight months after reaching the
settlement with Cooper. More than thirteen months after Miller filed his
complaint, his new attorneys propounded interrogatories and requests for
production of documents to Massey. This appears to have been the first attempt at
formal discovery by any party to this action. Before responding to Miller’s written
discovery, Massey filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing primarily that his
contract with Miller relieved him of any liability for faulty construction. In his
response, Miller argued, as he does in part before us, that the parties should be
permitted to conduct discovery prior to any summary judgment. Miller also argued
Massey, by operation of law, had provided a non-delegable warranty of
workmanlike construction.
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The trial court, after reviewing the pleadings, granted Massey’s
motion for summary judgment. Miller timely filed a motion to alter, amend, or
vacate, which the trial court denied. It is from these orders that Miller appeals.
As to the contract, Miller argues that it consists of a type-written
document designated as a “Construction Agreement” that was generated by his
then-attorney and signed only by Miller. Massey argues that the contract consists
of a number of handwritten pages that contain various dates and that are initialed
or signed by both Miller and Massey. According to Massey, the Construction
Agreement is not part of the contract.
The Construction Agreement designates Massey as “lender” and
Miller as “buyer” and sets forth: the amount Massey lent to Miller; the payment
schedule for repayment of that loan; Massey’s responsibility for overseeing
construction and facilitating completion of the house; Cooper’s responsibility to
“actively and regularly review the ongoing construction of the” house; that there
are attachments including certain handwritten agreements and modifications; and
specifications regarding construction, such as materials, closet shelving, solarium
size, etc.
Unlike the Construction Agreement, the handwritten notes are
initialed, dated, and signed by the parties. The notes have different dates, all of
which precede the Construction Agreement and contain specifications regarding
construction materials, etc., similar to those in the Construction Agreement.
Because the contents of these handwritten notes are dispositive to our opinion, we
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set forth the pertinent parts below. A note, signed by both parties, which appears
to be dated May 7, 2004, states:
11 – Repeat – Clark2 is not the general contractor and is
not responsible for the construction of the bldg. –
Cooper Home Inspection is responsible for this. Clark is
the “bank” & will try to keep contractors working to
complete the house in a reasonable time frame. – See
item #2 on sheet C-8.3
[Illegible] Clark M. has no insurance – J. Miller and his
insurance co. will be responsible to replace any and all
items in case of theft or vandelism [sic]– material and
labor.
What appears to be “sheet C-8” referred to above states:
Clark is not the general contractor – Clark is the “bank”
and is loaning J.M. some of the money to build this
house.
Clark does not know the bldg. codes or requirements.
Clark will do whatever is reasonable to try to keep the
job moving until completion.
Forrest Cooper of Cooper Home Insp. has been hired and
is being paid by J.M. to oversee, inspect, and make sure
the house is built correctly – Mr. Cooper is responsible
for this....
The page containing this language appears to be initialed by the parties and is
dated July 12, 2004. There is no explanation in the record regarding the apparent
discrepancy in the dates between the two pages.
2
Although referred to as Clark in the handwritten documents, the reader should note that this is
Gerald Clark Massey, the appellee.
3
It appears to us that the document makes reference to page “I-8”. However, in his motion for
summary judgment, Massey states the reference is to page “C-8.” Therefore, we will use that
alpha-numeric reference herein.
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As noted above, the circuit court granted Massey’s motion for
summary judgment, finding the Construction Agreement was not a contract.
However, the court found the handwritten notes did constitute a contract. Based on
that contract, the court found Miller and Massey “agreed that the liability for the
building would be placed on Defendant Cooper.” Furthermore, the court found the
contract did not explicitly relieve Massey from liability that might arise under any
implied warranty of workmanlike construction. However, the language allocating
the responsibility for “mak[ing] sure the House is built correctly” to Cooper
“amount[ed] to an assignment of the implied warranty . . . .”
The court recognized that Cooper was not a party to the contract and
could not be bound by any terms in the contract. Nevertheless, the court noted
Miller was free to relieve Massey of liability under the contract, which he did.
Whether Miller then chose to enter into a contract with Cooper was essentially
irrelevant to the agreement between Miller and Massey. Finally, the court, noting
the equal bargaining power of the parties, found that absolving Massey from future
liability did not violate public policy.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether
the circuit judge correctly found that there were no issues as to any material fact
and that the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Pearson
ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Systems, Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky. 2002).
Summary judgment is only proper when "it would be impossible for the respondent
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to produce any evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor." Steelvest,
Inc., v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). The word
“'impossible' is used in a practical sense, not in an absolute sense." Perkins v.
Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ky. 1992).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court is required to
construe the record "in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion . . .
and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor." Steelvest, Inc., 807 S.W.2d. at 480.
A party opposing a summary judgment motion cannot rely on the hope that the
trier of fact will disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact, but must present
affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 481.
With the above standards in mind, we will address the issues raised by
Miller in the order set forth above.
ANALYSIS
1. Whether Summary Judgment was Prematurely Granted
Miller argues that the circuit court improperly granted summary
judgment before completion of discovery. This argument takes three different
tacks: (1) Massey did not support his motion with any evidence; (2) if Miller had
been able to conduct discovery, he could have proven his claims; and (3) any
dilatoriness is the fault of his first attorney and should not be imputed to Miller.
As to the first tack, Miller argues the circuit court erred when it found
the contract between Massey and Miller consisted of the handwritten documents
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only. According to Miller, there was no evidence to support this finding by the
circuit court. We disagree.
Rule 56.02 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) provides
that a defending party seeking summary judgment “may, at any time, move with or
without supporting affidavits” for that relief. Miller is correct that there must be
some evidence in the record supporting the movant’s position. However, an
exhibit to a motion, that is evidentiary in character and sufficient to support the
motion “may be properly regarded the same as would be an uncontradicted
supporting affidavit.” Daniel v. Turner, 320 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Ky. 1959). The
Construction Agreement, the handwritten notes attached to that Agreement, and
Miller’s admission that the parties had a contract are sufficient documentary
evidence to support Massey’s motion. Therefore, there is evidence in the record
sufficient to support the circuit court’s findings.
As to the second tack, Miller is correct that summary judgment should
not be granted before a party has had the opportunity to conduct discovery.
However, “[i]t is not necessary to show that the respondent has actually completed
discovery, but only that respondent has had an opportunity to do so.” Hartford
Ins. Group v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 579 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Ky. App.
1979). In Hartford, this Court noted that the respondent did not conduct any
discovery during the six months following the filing of the complaint.
Furthermore, the evidence filed by the movant favored summary judgment, and the
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respondent did not file any evidence in contradiction of the movant’s. Under those
circumstances, the Court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate.
Miller cites to Pendleton Bros. Vending, Inc. v. Com. Finance and
Admin. Cabinet, 758 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1988); Suter v. Mazyck, 226 S.W.3d 837 (Ky.
App. 2007); and to two unpublished opinions, Hassler v. Paramount Arts Center,
Inc., 2007 WL 1954095 (Ky. App. 2007), and Dawson v. Combs and Wilbert, Inc.,
2003 WL 1893269 (Ky. App. 2003), to support his argument that the trial court
prematurely granted summary judgment. A reading of those cases leads us to the
conclusion that whether “a summary judgment was prematurely granted must be
determined within the context of the individual case.” Suter v. Mazyck, 226
S.W.3d 837, 842 (Ky. App. 2007). As noted in Suter, the more complex the case,
the more time the trial court should allot to discovery. The case herein is not
complex; therefore, thirteen months was more than enough time for Miller to
conduct discovery.
Even absent discovery, thirteen months was more than enough time
for Miller to generate some evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, to
contradict Massey’s motion. This he failed to do. Furthermore, Miller failed to set
forth what additional evidence he could have developed through discovery and
why that evidence could not have been developed outside of discovery.
Finally on this issue, Miller argues that any dilatoriness in conducting
discovery is the fault of his first attorney and he should not be prejudiced thereby.
“[A] litigant may not employ an attorney and then wash his hands of all
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responsibility. The law demands the exercise of due diligence by the client as well
as by his attorney in the prosecution or defense of litigation.” Gorin v. Gorin, 167
S.W.2d 52, 55(Ky. App. 1942). Miller has not offered any evidence, by way of
affidavit or otherwise, indicating that his first attorney failed to prosecute the case
in compliance with his instructions. Furthermore, Miller has not offered any
evidence explaining why he failed to exercise due diligence in prosecuting his
claim.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not
prematurely address Massey’s motion for summary judgment.
2. Whether the Trial Court Correctly Interpreted the Contract and
Correctly Applied the Law
As with the discovery issue, Miller’s argument takes several tacks:
(1) the trial court erred when it interpreted the contract as assigning liability to
Cooper; and (2) the parties could not, as a matter of law, make such an assignment.
We will address these in order.
The trial court found the handwritten notes constituted a contract, but
the Construction Agreement did not. We agree with the trial court. The
handwritten notes, although somewhat confusing in their organization and
containing arguably inconsistent dates, are signed or initialed by the parties. The
Construction Agreement is certainly easier to decipher; however, it is signed only
by Miller. As noted by the trial court, in order for a contract to exist, there must be
an offer and acceptance of that offer. See General Steel Corp. v. Collins, 196
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S.W.3d 18, 21 (Ky. App. 2006). While the Construction Agreement may
constitute an offer by Miller, there is no indication Massey accepted that offer.
Therefore, the Construction Agreement is not an enforceable contract. On the
other hand, the signatures and initials of the parties on the handwritten notes are
indisputable indicia that an offer was made and accepted.
Having determined what writing reflects the parties’ contractual
agreement, we must determine the scope of that agreement. The plain language of
the contract establishes that Massey “is not the general contractor and is not
responsible for the construction of the” building. (Emphasis in original.) The
contract puts the responsibility for construction on Cooper. Massey is designated
as “the bank” and although he “will try to keep contractors working to complete
the house in a reasonable time frame,” Cooper “has been hired and is being paid by
[Miller] to oversee, inspect, and make sure the house is built correctly.” Therefore,
by its terms, the contract relieves Massey of any liability related to the actual
construction of the building. This disposes of the first part of Miller’s argument.
However, our analysis cannot end there because Miller argues Massey
provided an implied and non-assignable warranty of workmanlike construction.
We agree with Miller that “in the sale of a new dwelling by the builder there is an
implied warranty that in its major structural features the dwelling was constructed
in a workmanlike manner and using suitable materials.” Crawley v. Terhune, 437
S.W.2d 743, 745 (Ky. 1969). If there were any evidence Massey was “the
builder,” then he might be bound by that warranty. However, the plain language of
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the contract is that Massey is not responsible for construction of the building;
therefore, Massey is not the builder and Crawley does not apply.
Miller has cited to authority from other jurisdictions in support of his
warranty argument. However, that authority is distinguishable and not beneficial
to Miller’s argument. In Park v. Sohn, 89 Ill.2d 453, 433 N.E.2d 651 (Ill. 1982),
Sohn and his wife, who were part-time builders, built a house, lived in the house
for two years, and then sold the house to the Parks. The Parks discovered a
number of construction defects and sued the Sohns, in pertinent part, for breach of
the implied warranty of habitability. The Sohns argued the implied warranty of
habitability applied only to “mass producers” of homes, not to part-time builders.
However, the court determined the warranty applied to anyone in the business of
building a house for sale. Id. at 461-62, 655. Park is distinguishable from the case
herein because the contract specifically states that Cooper, not Massey, is the
builder. Therefore, any implied warranty of habitability attached to Cooper, not
Massey.
In Mazurek v. Nielsen, 42 Colo.App. 386, 599 P.2d 269 (Colo. App.
1979), the Nielsens hired an architect, contractors, and sub-contractors to design
and build a house for them on property they owned in the mountains. There was
some evidence the Nielsens unsuccessfully attempted to sell the house before
completion of construction; however, it was not disputed the Nielsens lived in the
house for two years before selling it to the Mazureks. After purchasing the house,
the Mazureks discovered the well on the property was inadequate, and they sued
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the Nielsens claiming breach of the implied warranty of habitability. The Nielsens
argued they were not builder/vendors and therefore not subject to that warranty.
The court held that, by hiring an architect, contractors, and sub-contractors the
Nielsens could be deemed to be general contractors. However, the court stated the
Mazureks also had to establish that the Nielsens primary reason for constructing
the house was to sell it. Id. at 388, 271. Because the jury instructions did not take
this factor into consideration, the court remanded the case for a new trial.
Mazurek is easily distinguishable from the case herein. As noted
above, the evidence establishes that Cooper was the builder, not Massey.
Furthermore, the evidence establishes Miller owned the land on which the house
was constructed, and there is no evidence Massey retained an architect, contractor,
or any sub-contractors. Finally, the evidence establishes Massey did not own the
house but simply acted as “the bank,” financing the project. Therefore, Mazurek is
not persuasive.
In Rogers v. Lewton, 570 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. App. 1991), Lewton
purchased plans, hired subcontractors, and performed some of the actual
construction on a house he later sold to the Rogers. When the health department
determined the septic system was illegal, the Rogers sued Lewton. In his defense,
Lewton argued he did not build the septic system; therefore, he could not be held
liable under an implied warranty theory for its deficiencies. The court determined
that Lewton acted as a general contractor. Therefore, he had liability under an
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implied warranty of workmanlike construction, whether he built the faulty septic
system or not.
As with Park and Mazurek, Rogers is distinguishable. There is no
evidence Massey performed any construction, hired any contractors or subcontractors, or provided oversight of any part of the project except for timeliness of
completion. In the absence of that evidence, Massey cannot be deemed a general
contractor and is not subject to an implied warranty of workmanlike construction
or of habitability.
Based on the above, we hold that the circuit court properly granted
summary judgment. However, we do so for a different reason. While the circuit
court found the contract acted as an assignment of the implied warranty of
workmanlike construction to Cooper, we hold that Massey was never subject to
that warranty. Therefore, whether the contract acted as an assignment is irrelevant.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Miller had sufficient time to
conduct discovery prior to the circuit court’s summary judgment. Therefore, the
circuit court did not prematurely issue that judgment. Furthermore, we hold that,
in the absence of any evidence that Massey was a builder, the circuit court
correctly found he has no liability under the implied warranty of workmanlike
construction. Therefore, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert E. Maclin, III
David A. Cohen
Lexington, Kentucky
John T. Mandt
Somerset, Kentucky
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