RIGGLE (CAROLYN L.) VS. RIGGLE (KEVIN)
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RENDERED: JANUARY 16, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002157-MR
AND
NO. 2007-CA-002284-MR
CAROLYN L. RIGGLE
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.
HONORABLE JOSEPH W. O'REILLY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-504136
KEVIN RIGGLE
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, AND
VACATING AND REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Carolyn Riggle and Kevin Riggle appeal and cross-appeal
from a judgment entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court, Family Division, in a
dissolution proceeding. For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm in part, and
vacate and remand in part.
The parties married in 1979, and separated in 2005. The trial court’s
2007 findings, conclusions, order and decree of dissolution, as amended pursuant
to both parties’ motions to alter, amend or vacate, stated in pertinent part:
The parties have three adult sons. [Carolyn]
moved out of the marital home in January 2006.
[Carolyn] now resides in a two bedroom apartment.
[Kevin] has remained in the marital home.
[Carolyn] is 50 years old. [Carolyn] is currently
employed at Stein Mart. [Carolyn] works thirty (30)
hours per week and makes $8.50 per hour. [Carolyn] has
been employed at Stein Mart since May 2007. Prior to
Stein Mart, [Carolyn] worked at Nanz & Kraft florist
from November 2006 to May 2007. [Carolyn] earned
$8.00 per hour at that position. Throughout the marriage
[Carolyn] was primarily a homemaker. [Carolyn] has a
high school education. [Carolyn] occasionally worked
outside the home while the children were in school.
[Kevin] is currently employed in commercial
lending with PBI Bank, where he has been employed
since June 19, 2006. [Kevin] earns a salary of
$75,000.00 per year. [Kevin] can also earn a bonus of up
to 11% per year, based on his performance. During the
marriage, [Kevin] was a successful real estate agent with
Semonin Realtors. [Kevin] left Semonin in October
2006, following the parties’ separation.
[Kevin] is also a member of four LLCs[1], Spalted
Investments, LLC, First Group Investments, LLC,
American Commercial Realty, LLC and Regal
Investments, LLC. [Kevin] has a one-third interest in
Spalted, First Group and American Commercial Realty.
[Kevin] has a one-half interest in Regal Investments,
LLC.
The LLCs are involved in a business using triple
leases. The LLCs buy properties and then lease them to
ResCare, a residential care provider. ResCare then leases
1
Limited Liability Corporations.
-2-
the properties to groups with special health needs. With
the exception of one, the leases with between [sic]
ResCare and the LLCs are fifteen years in length. All the
leases have less than nine years remaining. ResCare pays
the taxes, maintenance and insurance on the properties.
After expenses, the companies have an average total
monthly cash flow of $39,872.41.
In February 2006, the partners in the LLC began
receiving payments of $10,000.00 per month from the
monthly cash flow of the LLCs. While the other partners
were receiving payments directly, [Kevin’s] payments
have been going into a capital account. The balance of
the capital account is $113,313.90, as of April 1, 2007.
Of that amount, $104,750.00 is attributable to
disbursements [Kevin] should have received but were
instead deposited into the capital account. [Kevin’s]
capital account is not included on his income taxes. The
disbursements are also not included as income.
The LLCs were also involved in litigation with
SPV Green. That litigation has since been settled, with
the LLCs agreeing to pay $200,000.00 to settle the claim.
[Kevin’s] other LLC, Regal Investments, LLC,
owns one property. This property[2] is a house on
Periwinkle Drive. The home has a federal lien on it. The
home cannot be sold with a lien on it. Attorneys for
Regal Investments have requested the lien be released,
but it is unclear when it will be released. The home does
not currently generate income, but does have expenses,
such as insurance, utilities, maintenance and taxes.
The Periwinkle property was purchased using
money from the parties’ home equity line and from their
real estate bank account. A note was used to secure the
loan. The original balance on the note was $268,000.00.
The balance on the note is approximately $228,800.00.
Prior to the separation [Kevin] was receiving a
monthly interest payment on the note in amounts ranging
from $1,300.00 to $1,600.00. After the separation,
2
As amended by trial court’s order entered October 11, 2007.
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[Kevin] continued to receive monthly payments in the
amount of $1,364.00. The payments were made through
the Spalted Investment Group. The monthly payments
were discontinued in November 2006. [Kevin] and his
partner claim Regal Investments no longer has the
income to pay the interest payments or the note. Jim
Brien testified the note cannot be paid off if the lien on
the property is not released.
The value of the LLCs is in dispute. A limited
business evaluation was done by a Court appointed
evaluator, Mr. Jim Gravitt. The evaluator gave a range of
values for the business, not an exact appraisal. This
avenue was chosen by the parties because it was a less
expensive alternative to a full appraisal.
Mr. Gravitt submitted a report which found
[Kevin’s] portion of the LLCs to be valued at between
$300,000.00 to $550,000.00, as of October 1, 2006. At
the time of the valuation, the litigation with SPV Green
was still pending. This value does not include the impact
of that litigation or the Periwinkle litigation. Taking into
consideration all of the litigation involving the LLCs, Mr.
Gravitt found the range of values to be between $0 and
$325,000.00.
The marital home is currently on the market for
$575,000.00. The home is a former Homerama home in
Lake Forrest. It has six bedrooms. There have been no
offers on the home since it was listed for sale.
[Kevin] is also on the deed of the Lexington home
of the parties’ son, Tony Riggle, along with Tony. The
home was purchased in 2003 for $113,000.00 from the
parties’ home equity line. The current value on the home
is unknown. There is no note or mortgage on the home
and the current payoff is unknown. Tony previously paid
a mortgage payment to the parties in the amount of
$828.00 per month. Following the separation, Tony
made the payments to [Kevin], until such time as he
unilaterally discontinued the payments. [Carolyn] has
not received any of the money.
-4-
The parties kept a ledger on the children, recording
how much money was borrowed and paid back by each
child. According to the ledger, Tony owes a personal
loan of $26,394.00, in addition to the home loan. The
parties’ son Michael owes $4,691.00.
Following the trial in this action, [Carolyn] and
[Kevin] entered into an Agreed Order regarding personal
property. The Order resolved all issues of personal
property, with the exception of the non-marital claim
[Carolyn] asserted in the 2003 Mercedes and the ladies’
golf clubs. [Carolyn] claims these items were gifts from
[Kevin].
[Carolyn] drives a 2003 Mercedes. The current
value of the car is $15,135.00. The car was purchased
during the marriage, in December 2004.
[Kevin] drives a 2003 Lexus 430. The current
value of the car is $19,035.00. The car was purchased
using $43,000.00 from the parties’ home equity line.
....
At the time of the separation, [Carolyn] left the
home with approximately $34,000.00 in liquid assets,
including cash and a certificate of deposit. In September
2006, [Carolyn] cashed in her entire IRA account and
placed the money in her savings account. At the time
[Carolyn] cashed in the account, the account had a value
of $22,756.99. [Carolyn] currently has approximately
$8,000.00 remaining.
....
The parties have a home equity line on their house.
The balance on the equity line, as of the date of the trial,
was $518,220.36. Historically, the home equity line was
used for many things, including loans to family members,
loans to the LLCs, real estate investments, contributions
to retirement accounts, taxes, and to purchase
automobiles. Since the separation, the home equity line
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has only been used to pay Crowe Chizek for the business
range of values.
[Kevin] was initially ordered to pay maintenance in
the amount of $4,000.00 per month, effective May 10,
2006. From June 2006 through January 2007, [Kevin]
only paid maintenance in the amount of $1,424.00 per
month. Effective October 1, 2006, [Kevin’s]
maintenance obligation was reduced to $2,000.00 per
month. [Kevin] began paying the reduced amount in
February 2007. As of the date of the trial, [Kevin] had
paid maintenance totaling $22,101.68.
Prior to the separation, the parties enjoyed a nice
standard of living. They own a home in Lake Forest
worth approximately $600,000.00. They both drive
luxury cars. They belong to Oxmoor Country Club and
played golf weekly. They also dined out at nice
restaurants on a regular basis. [Carolyn] also always had
enough money to furnish the home and buy clothing for
the children, as well as take the family out for meals.
The parties also always had enough money to provide
their children with school expenses and to help them
purchase cars. The parties did not have any credit
problems during the marriage.
[Carolyn] has reasonable monthly expenses of
$4,000.00 per month. [Kevin] has reasonable monthly
expenses of $7,500.00.
[Carolyn] is seeking attorney fees. Counsel for
[Carolyn] submitted an affidavit showing attorney fees in
the amount of $33,488.64 and costs of $2,908.14.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
....
[Kevin’s] interest in the four LLCs is marital in
nature. This Court finds [Kevin’s] portion of the value of
the LLCs to be $233,396.67.[3] This value represents the
3
As amended by trial court’s order entered October 11, 2007.
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average in Mr. Gravitt’s range of values, less [Kevin’s]
portion of the SPV Green litigation settlement.
In its amended order, the court found that the effect of the SPV Green litigation
settlement was $89,333.33. Further, it found that the effect of the Periwinkle
lawsuit was $35,600, calculated by subtracting the Periwinkle note balance of
$228,800 from the $300,000 estimated effect of the lawsuit, and halving the result.
The court awarded Carolyn one-half of Kevin’s $233,396.67 interest in the LLCs,
or $116,698.34. The court then continued:
In addition, [Carolyn] is awarded $55,000,[4] onehalf the increase in [Kevin’s] capital account from
October 1, 2006 through the date of entry of this Order.
[Kevin’s] capital account was considered in the range of
values at the time of the evaluation. . . .
Each party is also awarded one-half of the value of
the note on Periwinkle Drive. The current balance on the
note is $228,800.00, with one-half being $114,400.00.
This amount shall only be due if the note to [Carolyn]
and [Kevin] is repaid. If monthly interest payments
resume, each party is awarded one-half of the monthly
interest payments.
The parties’ marital home is to be sold. Since
[Kevin] currently enjoys use of the home, [Kevin] shall
be responsible for paying the mortgage on the property
pending the sale. At the time of the sale, [Kevin] shall be
credited any mortgage payments made by him following
the entry of this decree.
....
At such time as the [marital home] is sold, the
proceeds shall be used to pay the home equity line debt,
which is a martial [sic] debt. Any proceeds after the
4
As amended by trial court’s order entered October 11, 2007.
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payment of the debt shall be divided equally between the
parties, taking into account credits to [Kevin] for home
equity line payments and mortgage payments. If the
proceeds are not adequate to pay off the debt, the parties
shall divide the shortfall equally. . . .
....
Both the Mercedes and the Lexus are marital
property. [Carolyn] is awarded the Mercedes. [Kevin] is
awarded the Lexus. Each party shall cooperate with the
other in transferring each car into the parties’ sole name.
Further, [Carolyn] is awarded $1,950.00 as an
equalization payment for the difference in marital equity
between the two cars.
....
Since the separation, [Carolyn] has received
$56,756.99 in marital assets. [Kevin] is entitled to onehalf of this sum, or $28,378.50. $11,378 shall be
deducted from [Carolyn’s] portion of the division
accounts, and $17,000.00 is deducted from the cash
payment due from [Kevin] to [Carolyn].[5]
....
[Carolyn] has an average gross monthly income of
$1,473.33, based on her current wages for a forty hour
week. [Carolyn] has reasonable monthly expenses of
$4,000.00. Before taxes, [Carolyn’s] expenses exceed
her income by $2,526.67 per month.
[Kevin] has an average gross income of $16,937.50
per month, from his salary plus bonus at his employment
and $10,000.00 per month from his LLCs. [Kevin] has
reasonable monthly expenses of $7,500.00. Before taxes,
[Kevin’s] income exceeds his expenses by $9,437.50.
5
As amended by trial court’s order entered October 11, 2007.
-8-
Noting that Carolyn sought a permanent award of maintenance, the court listed the
factors which must be considered pursuant to KRS6 403.200. The court then
concluded that Carolyn
is entitled to maintenance from [Kevin]. Therefore,
effective as of the entry of this decree, [Kevin] shall pay
[Carolyn] the sum of $3,000.00 per month in
maintenance for fifteen years.
[Carolyn] has requested attorney fees for bringing
this action. [Carolyn’s] attorney has submitted an
affidavit showing attorney fees and costs of
$36,396.78. . . .
....
This Court concludes there is a disparity in
financial resources between the parties. As such,
[Carolyn] is awarded attorney fees in the amount of
$15,000.00.
This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
First, Carolyn asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when
valuing and dividing the parties’ interests in the LLCs. We disagree.
Carolyn’s argument turns on her claim that the LLCs should be valued
by deducting the current mortgage balances from the purchase prices of the
properties held by three of the four LLCs, and then dividing the results by the
parties’ one-third ownership interest in each of those LLCs. More specifically,
she asserts that the court should base its valuation on spreadsheets introduced
through Kevin’s partner, showing that the properties held by three of the four
LLCs had a net equity of $3,103,065.67. She contends that she is entitled to
6
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-9-
receive one-half of the parties’ one-third interest in those LLCs or $517,177.65.
Carolyn’s calculations on appeal do not address the value of the Periwinkle
property held by the fourth LLC, or the significant impact of pending litigation or
other liabilities on the proposed valuations.
The court rejected Carolyn’s claim, instead relying upon the testimony
of a court-appointed evaluator who, as stated by the court, was chosen to analyze
the value of the parties’ interests in the LLCs, and to provide an estimated range of
business values. The parties selected this valuation method in lieu of paying for
the more-expensive alternative of a full appraisal. The evaluator valued the
parties’ share of the monetary interests in the four LLCs at $300,000 to $550,000 if
excluding the economic impact of pending litigation, or $0 to $325,000 if
including such economic impact. Given the range of the evidence, the trial court
did not err by valuing the parties’ share of the LLCs at $358,330 excluding
pending litigation, as that finding of fact falls within the evidence presented by the
evaluator. CR7 52.01. See Largent v. Largent, 643 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1982).
Moreover, we are not persuaded by Carolyn’s claim that the trial court
should have awarded her a one-half interest in the monthly cash flow from the
LLC properties. Although Carolyn argues that she should have been permitted to
retain an ongoing interest in the LLCs pursuant to McGinnis v. McGinnis, 920
S.W.2d 68 (Ky.App. 1995), McGinnis turned on a trial court’s decision to delay
the division of the parties’ respective interests in certain closely-held corporate
7
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure,
-10-
stock for several years, based on allegations that the stock’s true value “would not
be realized” until the stock went public. Id. at 69. On appeal, this court affirmed
the trial court’s exercise of its discretion. Here, by contrast, Carolyn made no
showing of the kinds of unusual circumstances present in McGinnis, and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by electing not to impose a delay in the division
of the parties’ interests in the LLC property. Moreover, once Carolyn received the
value of her LLC interests, she lost any right to receive a share of future LLC
disbursements since she no longer possessed an interest in the LLCs and their
proceeds.
Further, we agree with Kevin’s claim on cross-appeal that in its
amended order, the trial court miscalculated the effect of the Periwinkle lawsuit on
the value of the parties’ share of the LLCs. Gravitt estimated and the court found
that the effect of the Periwinkle lawsuit was $300,000. Because the parties owned
a one-half interest in the LLC which owned the Periwinkle property, the
Periwinkle lawsuit caused the value of the parties’ share of the LLCs to be reduced
by $150,000.
Kevin admits that the trial court properly deducted $89,333.33,
representing the effect of the SPV Green litigation, from the $358,330 which
represents the parties’ share of the four LLCs. As a result, the parties’ share of the
LLCs had a value of $268,996.67, excluding the effect of the Periwinkle lawsuit.
However, rather than subtracting the parties’ $150,000 share of the Periwinkle
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lawsuit from their $268,996.67 share of the LLCs, the court found in its amended
order that
the effect of the lawsuit related to the Periwinkle property
on [Kevin’s] one-half interest is $35,600.00. This
number represents the estimated effect of the lawsuit,
$300,000.00, less the note balance of $228,800.00,
divided in half.
This finding failed to acknowledge not only that a federal lien existed against the
Periwinkle property for the property’s full value, but also that the entire note
balance of $228,800 was an unsecured debt which, although owed to the parties,
might never be collected. Thus, the trial court clearly erred by subtracting the note
balance of $228,800 from the $300,000 estimated effect of the lawsuit. Instead, on
remand the parties’ one-half share of the Periwinkle lawsuit effect should be
subtracted from the parties’ $268,996.67 share of the LLC’s, and the balance
should be divided between the parties as marital property. Any amount which may
eventually be repaid on the Periwinkle note will be allocated pursuant to the
original order’s provision equally dividing any such proceeds between the parties.
Next, Carolyn asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to award her one-half of the capital account into which LLC payments were
deposited each month. In its amended order, the court determined that $110,000
was paid to the account over an eleven-month period, and it awarded $55,000 to
Carolyn for her one-half interest in the account. Although Carolyn contends that
additional marital funds were deposited into the capital account, evidence was
produced to show that some of the funds were used for marital debts such as those
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relating to the marital residence, and that the value of such contributions
potentially will be recaptured and divided between the parties when the marital
residence is sold. Moreover, we are not persuaded by Carolyn’s argument that
other funds, which are paid to the LLCs each month but not distributed to the
members, constitute marital property subject to division, as no evidence was
produced to show that the parties possess any ownership interests in such funds.
Finally, a different result is not compelled by Kevin’s assertion that the capital
account contained $104,750 when the hearing was conducted in May 2007, as the
trial court’s finding was based on the account’s balance when the dissolution was
entered several months later. See KRS 403.190(2).
Next, both parties contend that the trial court erred when awarding
maintenance. Carolyn claims that the amount and duration of maintenance are
insufficient, as her needs exceed the award and no grounds exist for the
termination of maintenance after fifteen years. Kevin, by contrast, claims that the
amount and the duration of maintenance are excessive, and that the court erred by
calculating maintenance based on his gross rather than net income. For the reasons
stated hereafter, the issue of maintenance is remanded to the trial court for
additional proceedings.
When examining the issue of maintenance, the trial court quoted the
provisions set out in KRS 403.200, including the threshold requirement that the
spouse seeking maintenance must be found to (1) lack sufficient property to
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provide for his or her reasonable needs, and (2) be unable to support him or herself
through appropriate employment. KRS 403.200(1).
The court found that Carolyn grossed $1,473.33 per month from her
employment, but it rejected her claim that her monthly expenses totaled $6,402.59,
including $2,000 for attorney’s fees. The court instead found that Carolyn’s
reasonable monthly expenses totaled $4,000, and that Kevin’s gross income
exceeded his reasonable expenses by $9,437.50 per month. The court directed
Kevin to pay Carolyn maintenance of $3,000 per month for fifteen years.
We agree with Kevin’s assertion that the trial court erred by relying
on the parties’ gross rather than net incomes when calculating his maintenance
obligation. Although KRS 403.200 does not address whether gross or net income
should be used when calculating maintenance, the Kentucky Supreme Court has
held that “common sense dictates that a court consider the parties’ net income
when determining whether or not the spouse seeking maintenance will be able to
meet his or her needs, as well as the payor spouse’s ability to continue meeting his
or her own needs.” Powell v. Powell, 107 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Ky. 2003). See also
Broida v. Broida, 388 S.W.2d 617 (Ky.1965).
As to the amount of maintenance, it is clear that Carolyn’s
employment income was insufficient to allow her to support herself. KRS
403.200(1)(b). However, the trial court failed to address whether she “lacks
sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to [her], to provide for
[her] reasonable needs[.]” KRS 403.200(1)(a). Moreover, the court failed to
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justify its findings as to the amount and duration of maintenance. We presume
without deciding that since the court made a separate award of attorney’s fees, it
reduced Carolyn’s monthly maintenance claim by the amount requested for
attorney’s fees, as well as by additional amounts which it may have found were
duplicative. Nevertheless, in the absence of specific findings we are unable to
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when awarding maintenance
of $3,000 per month.
Further, the court failed to make findings to justify its award of
maintenance for a period of fifteen years. More specifically, the court neither
found that Carolyn’s need for maintenance will terminate in fifteen years because
of an increased ability to meet her needs through property or employment income,
nor found that Kevin will retain his ability to pay maintenance of $3,000 per month
after the LLC property leases expire in less than nine years. On remand, therefore,
the trial court shall make additional findings pertaining to each party’s gross
income, as well as to the amount and duration of maintenance. It then shall enter
an amended order consistent with those findings and with the dictates of KRS
403.200.
Next, Carolyn raises several miscellaneous contentions, including that
the trial court erred by directing that the parties’ home equity credit debt should be
paid from the proceeds of the sale of the marital residence. More specifically, she
asserts that she has not been compensated for the fact that the equity line of credit
was used to pay a variety of personal and LLC debts, including for real estate
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investments, for the benefit of relatives, and for the purchase of the vehicle
awarded to Kevin. Even if Carolyn’s spending assertions are true, the record
indicates that the debts were incurred during the marriage as marital debts, and that
the values of the purchases and proceeds were divided equally between the parties
as marital property. Similarly, Carolyn is not entitled to relief on the ground that
the trial court abused its discretion by crediting her for the value of certain marital
assets which she already had received or utilized during the parties’ separation.
Having reviewed each of Carolyn’s arguments, we find no merit in the multiple
claims of error raised in Issue IV of her direct appeal.
Next, Carolyn contends that the trial court erred by failing to assign
the Mercedes vehicle to her as nonmarital property. However, although Carolyn
asserted that Kevin purchased the car for her as a Christmas gift in 2004, other
evidence indicated that the car was purchased as a replacement for another family
vehicle. As the trial court’s factual finding that the vehicle was marital property
rather than a nonmarital gift was not clearly erroneous, it may not be set aside on
appeal. CR 52.01.
Finally, Carolyn contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to order Kevin to pay all of her attorney’s fees, while Kevin urges this court
to find that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding an excessive amount as
attorney’s fees. We disagree with both contentions.
KRS 403.220 permits a trial court, “after considering the financial
resources of both parties” to a dissolution proceeding, to order one party to pay “a
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reasonable amount” toward the other’s costs and attorney’s fees. The allocation of
such costs falls entirely within the trial court’s discretion. Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, 521
S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1975). As noted in Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky.
1990), the trial court must be given wide latitude to sanction or discourage any
conduct and tactics which waste the time of the court and the attorneys.
Here, the court awarded Carolyn $15,000 toward her total attorney’s
fees and costs of $36,396.78. Kevin asserts, and Carolyn does not dispute, that he
previously had been ordered to pay an additional $5,000 toward her attorney’s
fees, for a total contribution of $20,000.8 Having reviewed the voluminous record
of the proceedings below, including the evidence as to the parties’ respective
financial resources, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when
awarding attorney’s fees.
The court’s judgment is affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in
part for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
MOORE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent. I cannot
agree with the majority that the findings of fact made by the family court regarding
the division of marital property are clearly erroneous.
8
Although Kevin claims that an additional $7,500 in marital funds was used to pay Carolyn’s
attorney’s fees, the court’s judgment directed Carolyn to reimburse Kevin for one-half of the
marital funds, or $28,378.50, which Carolyn took at or around the time she left the marital
residence.
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Similarly, the award of maintenance appears to comply with KRS
403.200 as the family court considered all of the statutory factors in reaching the
maintenance award. The award of maintenance is open-ended, although for a
period of 15 years, which means it is subject to modification under KRS 403.250.
The amount and duration of a maintenance award is within the sound
discretion of the family court. Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W. 2d 928 (Ky. 1990). An
award will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Perrine
v. Christine, 833 S.W. 2d 825 (Ky. 1992).
The family court made findings as to amount and duration of
maintenance in light of the statutory factors as required. There is no authority in
Kentucky that requires the family court to “justify” its findings as stated by the
majority. Rather, the findings must be sufficient to support the award, based upon
the evidence considered, and otherwise not clearly erroneous. CR 52.01. I believe
the findings were sufficient, especially given that the wife did not receive any of
the future income from the LLCs although this income stream was not apparently
considered in valuing the LLCs for division.
Accordingly, I do not believe the family court abused its discretion in
awarding maintenance in the amount and duration as ordered, especially since the
award can be modified upon a showing of changed circumstances that make the
original award unconscionable.
I would affirm the family court’s ruling in its entirety.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Nellie M. Draus-Stallings
Louisville, Kentucky
Harold L. Storment
Louisville, Kentucky
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