CALDWELL (KWAME) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 20, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002128-MR
KWAME CALDWELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00582
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND NICKELL, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ACREE, JUDGE: Kwame Caldwell appeals from a Hardin Circuit Court
judgment sentencing him to fifteen years’ imprisonment after a jury found him
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute
21.580.
guilty of first degree trafficking in a controlled substance and being a first degree
persistent felony offender (PFO). We affirm.
A Hardin County Grand Jury indicted Caldwell for complicity to
commit trafficking in marijuana, more than eight ounces but less than five pounds,
with a firearm enhancement; fourth degree assault; and for being a first degree
PFO on October 31, 2006. A jury acquitted Caldwell on the assault charge and the
firearm enhancement and convicted him of trafficking and being a PFO. On
October 1, 2007, the trial court entered a final judgment sentencing Caldwell to
fifteen years’ incarceration. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Caldwell alleges that the trial court erred by overruling his
challenge to the jury composition pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106
S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). We disagree.
Following voir dire, Caldwell challenged the Commonwealth’s use of
peremptory strikes to excuse four of seven African-American members from the
jury panel. The trial court found Caldwell had not made a prima facie showing
that the strikes were based on race, but nevertheless asked the Commonwealth if it
would like to explain its basis for the strikes. The Commonwealth stated that it
struck one juror because he had a sister-in-law that had been charged with
possession, and that sister-in-law resided with the prospective juror. A second
juror was struck because a relative had been convicted of murder and the juror’s
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mother had been a victim of domestic violence. The remaining prospective jurors
were struck because they were non-responsive during voir dire and appeared
uninterested in the proceedings. The Commonwealth noted that Caucasian jurors
were struck for the same reason.
While the trial court reiterated that it overruled Caldwell’s objection
because there was no showing of prima facie discrimination, it also stated that the
Commonwealth provided race-neutral reasons for the strikes. The trial court
concluded that non-interest and unresponsiveness were race-neutral reasons that
withstood Caldwell’s challenge.
Batson outlined a three-step process for evaluating claims that a
prosecutor used peremptory challenges in a manner violating the Equal Protection
Clause. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor
has exercised peremptory challenges based on race. Second, if the required
showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a raceneutral explanation for striking the particular jurors. Third, the trial court has the
duty to evaluate the credibility of the proffered reasons and determine if the
defendant has established purposeful discrimination.
Great deference is given to the trial court in determining whether the
strikes by the prosecutor are racially motivated. Commonwealth v. Snodgrass, 831
S.W.2d 176, 179 (Ky. 1992). The trial court may accept at face value the
explanation given by the prosecutor depending upon the demeanor and credibility
of the prosecutor. Snodgrass, supra; Stanford v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 112,
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114 (Ky. 1990). The explanation does not have to rise to the level sufficient to
satisfy a strike for cause. Snodgrass, supra. On appeal, the standard of review is
whether the finding of the trial judge that the prosecutor articulated a race-neutral
explanation for exercising the strikes was clearly erroneous. Snodgrass; Stanford,
supra.
The preliminary issue of whether Caldwell established a prima facie
case of discrimination under Batson is moot because the prosecutor offered
purportedly race-neutral explanations for the peremptory challenges and the trial
judge ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination. Hernandez v.
New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). We therefore
need only address the sufficiency of the prosecutor’s explanations for the exercise
of the two peremptory strikes of the non-responsive African-American jurors.2
Caldwell claims that the Commonwealth used demeanor as a pretext
for racial discrimination in excusing two of the African-American jurors. As
evidence, Caldwell notes that a Caucasian juror who was also non-responsive
during voir dire was not struck. We find this argument uncompelling. The third
step in Batson alleviates the risk that a prosecutor theoretically could fabricate a
demeanor-based pretext for a racially-motivated peremptory strike by permitting
the court to determine whether it believes the prosecutor’s reasons. Thomas v.
Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Ky. 2004).
2
Caldwell does not take issue in this appeal with the Commonwealth’s reasons for striking the
other two African-American jurors.
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The trial court found that the non-interest and unresponsiveness of the
stricken jurors, regardless of race, was a sufficient race-neutral reason for using the
preemptory strikes. Unless the trial court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous,
they must be accepted. There is nothing in the record upon which to base a finding
of clear error. Thus, Caldwell has failed to satisfy the clearly erroneous standard.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Samuel N. Potter
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Heather M. Fryman
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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