C.W.C.S. VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 20, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002040-DG
C.W.C.S., A CHILD UNDER EIGHTEEN
v.
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM POWELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE FRANK FLETCHER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-XX-00001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND VANMETER, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: C.W.C.S., a child under eighteen, and the appellant herein,
appeals from the Powell District Court’s order denying his motion to suppress
incriminatory statements and from an order denying his motion to strike his
juvenile sexual offender evaluation. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
21.580.
C.W.C.S. was fourteen years old and a student at the Powell County
Middle School when his younger brothers accused him of forcing them to perform
oral sex on him. On November 17, 2006, Detective Tim Gibbs and Teresa Brand,
a representative from the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, went to the
middle school to interview C.W.C.S. about the allegations. Detective Gibbs and
Ms. Brand went to the office and a school official went to get C.W.C.S. from class.
C.W.C.S. was taken to the school counselor’s office where Detective Gibbs and
Ms. Brand were waiting.
According to the district court, C.W.C.S. did not have a guardian
present and was alone with Detective Gibbs and Ms. Brand. Detective Gibbs
identified himself as a police officer, although he was not in uniform but was
wearing a gun and badge. Before any questions were asked, Detective Gibbs told
C.W.C.S. that he did not have to speak with him or answer any questions and was
free to return to class. Detective Gibbs explained that if C.W.C.S. refused to speak
with them, he and Ms. Brand would leave the school premises. C.W.C.S. said he
was willing to speak with them. Detective Gibbs did not read C.W.C.S. his
Miranda rights at any time. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The questioning lasted approximately twenty minutes,
during which time C.W.C.S. made incriminating statements. At the end of the
questioning, Detective Gibbs and Ms. Brand left the school, and C.W.C.S. returned
to class. He was arrested later that day and charged with two counts of sodomy in
the first degree.
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Shortly after arraignment, C.W.C.S. moved to suppress the
unrecorded incriminating statements made during the interrogation at the school,
arguing that he was in custody for Miranda purposes and as such his statements
were inadmissible. C.W.C.S. claimed he was in custody because he was not free to
leave the school during school hours, and that neither he nor any other fourteenyear-old boy would have felt free to leave a closed room and walk out on the
police. The district court rejected these arguments, finding that whether or not he
was free to leave the school was not relevant to a determination of whether
Miranda applied. The court found that the issue was instead whether C.W.C.S.
was in police custody at the time and the court found that he was not.
C.W.C.S. entered a conditional guilty plea to the charges, which were
amended to two counts of sexual misconduct, class A misdemeanors under
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 510.140. His plea was conditional upon his
right to appeal the district court’s ruling on his motion to suppress his statements to
Detective Gibbs and Ms. Brand. Since C.W.C.S. was over the age of thirteen and
had admitted guilt to two misdemeanor sexual offenses under KRS 510, the district
court ordered that a juvenile sex offender evaluation be performed by the
Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) to aid the court in determining whether to
declare C.W.C.S. a juvenile sex offender.
The report, which was filed with the court on May 8, 2007, found that
C.W.C.S. was at moderate to high risk to reoffend. On June 26, 2007, the district
court committed C.W.C.S. to the DJJ as a juvenile sex offender. C.W.C.S. moved
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to suppress the DJJ report, arguing that it was prepared by an unlicensed DJJ
employee who had only reviewed two documents and had not spoken with his
family members or his counselor.
The Commonwealth called the evaluator who conducted the DJJ
evaluation. She testified that she had been a DJJ employee for seven years and that
her qualifications included a bachelor’s degree in social work, a master’s degree in
counseling, and continuing education through DJJ which included a two-week
course on preparing evaluations of juvenile sexual offenders. While she was not
individually qualified to perform psychological diagnosis, she worked under the
supervision of a licensed psychologist at DJJ who read and approved her report.
The report included two instruments considered standard in preparing
juvenile sexual offender assessments (JSOA): the JSOA and Estimate of Risk of
Adolescent Sexual Offense Recidivism (ERASOR). These instruments are to be
used in conjunction with other information to reach a clinical judgment.
Additionally, the evaluator reviewed C.W.C.S.’s records and spoke with school
employees, his paternal grandmother, mother, social worker, school employees,
and Detective Gibbs. The report was reviewed by a licensed psychologist before it
was submitted to the court.
The court granted a continuance following the evaluator’s testimony
and sought information from the counselor working with C.W.C.S., which
indicated that C.W.C.S. was denying the sexual abuse despite having admitted it to
the court. The district court then denied C.W.C.S.’s motion, committed him to
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DJJ, and placed him in the least restrictive inpatient sexual offender treatment
program available.
C.W.C.S. then sought review by the Powell Circuit Court, which
found that the district court’s decisions were supported by substantial evidence and
affirmed. This Court granted discretionary review and C.W.C.S. now asks this
Court to consider three central issues.
First, C.W.C.S. argues on appeal that he was in custody for purposes
of Miranda and that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
incriminating statements made during his interview. Particularly, C.W.C.S. asks
this Court to determine the standard for when a child, particularly a young
teenager, is in custody for purposes of Miranda and to determine to what extent the
fact that a child is interviewed at school during school hours influences that
decision.
The trial court’s conclusion that C.W.C.S. was not in custody at the
time that his statements were made is an issue of mixed law and fact that is
reviewed de novo. Commonwealth v. Lucas, 195 S.W.3d 403, 405 (Ky. 2006).
The trial court’s findings of fact are binding so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.78; Harris v.
Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Ky. 1990). We find nothing in the record
that indicates that the trial court’s findings of fact were inaccurate or incomplete.
The findings are taken directly from the testimony presented at the suppression
hearing and the circuit court properly refused to disturb these findings.
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Accordingly, they are not appropriately disturbed on appellate review, and we will
proceed with a de novo review of the legal issues C.W.C.S. presents.
Kentucky courts have consistently interpreted Section Eleven of the
Kentucky Constitution to be coextensive with the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. E.g., Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Ky. 1995). In
Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution may not use
statements:
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective
to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
activity in any significant way.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. (emphasis added). It has always been
held that the Miranda warning is not necessarily required absent the prerequisite of
custodial interrogation. We agree with the Commonwealth that C.W.C.S’s
assertion that he was in custody while he was at school confuses physical custody
with police custody as it is defined in Miranda. “In determining whether an
individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there
[was] a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114
S.Ct. 1526, 1528-29, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463
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U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam)).
The determination is based on objective circumstances, not the subjective belief of
the defendants or the officers. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323, 114 S.Ct. at 1529. The
court must “examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” and
the relevant inquiry is how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would
have understood the situation. Id. at 322.
C.W.C.S. argues that a reasonable person in his position would have
believed he was not free to leave the interrogation because it was taking place in
school, a place he was required to be during school hours. If we were to adopt his
reasoning, we would essentially be holding that every child that is attending school
experiences a restriction of movement akin to an arrest. That is simply not the
case. We do not see how C.W.C.S.’s freedoms were any more restricted than any
other student at the school. Detective Gibbs directly stated that C.W.C.S. did not
have to speak with them, that he was free to return to class, and that the officers
would leave the school premises if he so chose. Thus, he was told that he was
voluntarily speaking with them, and it was clear he was not in police custody at
this time. Since his movements were not restricted in a degree associated with
arrest, C.W.C.S. was simply not in custody for Miranda purposes.
Other jurisdictions have held that a juvenile interviewed in school is
not per se in custody simply because he or she happens to be at a school facility.
See State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah County v. Loredo, 865 P.2d 1312
(Or.Ct.App. 1993) (Court held that child was not in police custody for Miranda
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purposes because officer told child that he could leave and the school policy was to
allow students to refuse interviews with officers); see also State v. Budke, 372
N.W.2d 799 (Minn.Ct.App. 1985) (interview of eighteen-year-old suspect at
school principal’s office did not amount to a custodial interrogation).
C.W.C.S. asks this Court to compare the situation in the case at bar to
cases in which courts have held that defendants in custody for one offense were in
custody for purposes of Miranda. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct.
1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968). We agree with the Commonwealth that those cases
are distinguishable from the case at bar. Inmates have been arrested and are
incarcerated due to allegations stemming from criminal offenses. They are not free
to move around within the facility and may not leave the facility at the end of the
day. We decline to hold that students at school are comparable to jail and prison
inmates for purposes of Miranda.
C.W.C.S. also compares the case at bar to cases such as Welch v.
Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 407 (Ky. 2004), wherein the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that statements made by a child in a juvenile sex offender treatment
program were made while the child was in custody under Miranda. Again, we find
that a juvenile sex offender treatment program is akin to a juvenile detention
facility, and that children are there as a result of adjudications, not simply to
receive an education.
Because C.W.C.S. was told he was free to leave and not required to
discuss the sexual misconduct allegations, we hold that he was not in custody and
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no Miranda warnings were required. Thus, the district court properly denied
C.W.C.S.’s motion to suppress his incriminating statements made during the
school interview.
Second, C.W.C.S. argues that the district court erred when it admitted
the juvenile sexual offender evaluation during the disposition proceeding in his
case and asks this court to determine who qualifies as a “qualified professional
approved by the [sex offender treatment] program” under KRS 635.510(3).
Because C.W.C.S. raises questions of law, our review is again de novo. Carroll v.
Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484, 489 (Ky.App. 2001). See also A & A Mechanical, Inc.
v. Thermal Equipment Sales, Inc., 998 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Ky.App. 1999); Aubrey v.
Office of the Attorney General, 994 S.W.2d 516, 518-19 (Ky.App. 1998); and
Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky.App. 1998).
KRS 635.505(2) defines a juvenile sexual offender as:
an individual who was at the time of the commission of
the offense under the age of eighteen (18) years who is
not actively psychotic or mentally retarded and who has
been adjudicated guilty of or has been convicted of or
pled guilty to:
(a) A felony under KRS Chapter 510;
(b) Any other felony committed in conjunction
with a misdemeanor described in KRS Chapter
510;
(c) Any felony under KRS 506.010 when the crime
attempted is a felony or misdemeanor described in
KRS Chapter 510;
(d) An offense under KRS 530.020;
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(e) An offense under KRS 530.064(1)(a);
(f) An offense under KRS 531.310; or
(g) A misdemeanor offense under KRS Chapter
510.
KRS 635.510(1) states that “[a] child thirteen (13) years of age or older at the time
of the commission of the offense, shall be declared a juvenile sexual offender if the
child has been adjudicated guilty of an offense listed in KRS 635.505(2)(a), (b),
(c), (d), (e), or (f).” C.W.C.S. was charged with sodomy but pled guilty to two
counts of sexual misconduct, class A misdemeanors. Class A misdemeanors are
not included in KRS 635.505(2)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f). Thus, C.W.C.S.’s plea
bargain prevents the application of the mandatory language in KRS 635.510(1).
However, KRS 635.510(2)(b) states that “[a]ny child, thirteen (13) years of age or
older may be declared a juvenile sexual offender if the child has been adjudicated
guilty of an offense listed in KRS 635.505(2)(g).” (emphasis added). Given the
language of these statutes, the district court expressly had discretion to declare
C.W.C.S. a juvenile sexual offender.
In order to aid the district courts in making appropriate determinations
when the designation of juvenile sexual offender is permissive rather than
mandatory, the legislature has required the courts to utilize a JSOA. See KRS
635.510(3). The Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that this procedure is one of
disposition (akin to sentencing for an adult) rather than part of the adjudication
process. W.D.B. v. Commonwealth, 246 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2007). In considering
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the validity of instruments used to assess a juvenile as part of the JSOA, the Court
stated that the assessments are not used for “adjudicatory purposes” as the
juveniles are adjudicated before the assessments are ordered. Id. at 458. Instead of
being affirmative evidence of guilt, the assessments are used to guide the district
court in determining the proper disposition.
Juveniles who are designated as juvenile sexual offenders are
“committed to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice and shall receive
sexual offender treatment.” KRS 635.515(1). C.W.C.S. takes issue with the
qualifications of the evaluator who conducted his JSOA. As stated above, the
record indicates that the evaluator was approved by the DJJ and had been preparing
JSOAs for seven years. She had a bachelor’s degree in social work and a master’s
degree in counseling. In addition to her education, she received ongoing training
provided by the DJJ, and her work was reviewed and approved by a licensed DJJ
psychologist.
KRS 635.510(3) requires that the juvenile sexual offender assessment
be performed by a “qualified professional approved by the program.” C.W.C.S.
asks this court to declare that the JSOA evaluator should always be a licensed
practicing psychologist. Initially, we note that the statute does not require a
psychologist to perform the assessment and instead clearly states that the evaluator
simply be approved by the DJJ. Further, in a similar case, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky found no fault with the qualifications of a JSOA evaluator who held a
master’s degree in the field and reviewed her findings with a licensed psychologist.
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W.D.B., 246 S.W.3d at 457. While the qualifications of the evaluator were not
specifically at issue in that case, the Court directly stated that the trial court did not
need to conduct a Daubert hearing to test the scientific validity of a JSOA, since
the assessment was not evidence of guilt and instead was used for sentencing or
disposition purposes. As such, the court found that the opportunity for crossexamination provided at the disposition was sufficient to protect a juvenile’s due
process right. The trial court is always free to reject an opinion that it deems
questionable or inaccurate.
We agree with the Commonwealth that the district court did not err in
admitting the JSOA performed by the evaluator in this case. We decline to hold
that the JSOA must be performed by a licensed psychologist, as that would be
reading language into the statute that simply is not there. Because the JSOA is part
of the disposition, akin to sentencing for adults, the district court has wide
discretion in determining what is the appropriate sentence and detention facility for
a defendant. It is not the place of this Court to disturb the court’s sentencing
absent a clear abuse of discretion.
Third, C.W.C.S. argues that the district court abused its discretion in
declaring him a juvenile sex offender, arguing that the evidence showed that he
was doing well in treatment at home. We find this argument completely
unpersuasive, as the evidence shows that C.W.C.S. was not making progress in his
counseling and immediately after being placed in his grandmother’s care,
committed contempt of the court by constructing a weapon and getting expelled
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from school. A trial court has wide discretion in sentencing, and sentencing
decisions are only reviewed for an abuse of that wide discretion. Murphy v.
Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 173 (Ky. 2001). As stated above, the district court
had discretion based on C.W.C.S’s offenses to declare him a juvenile sex offender.
The court’s decision to do so was based on statutory provisions and substantial
evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Powell Circuit Court’s
judgment affirming the order of the Powell District Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Timothy G. Arnold
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Heather M. Fryman
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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