JUSTICE (RHONDA) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MARCH 6, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002038-MR
RHONDA JUSTICE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN D. COMBS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00277
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; KELLER, JUDGE; HENRY,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: Rhonda Justice appeals from a Final Judgment and
Order of Imprisonment of the Pike Circuit Court entered upon a jury verdict
convicting her of second-degree manslaughter and sentencing her to a ten-year
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
term of imprisonment. Because the trial court prejudicially erred in permitting
prior bad acts evidence to be introduced against Justice, we reverse and remand for
a new trial.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2005, Justice was living in a mobile home in Pike County with
her four children, including her four-year old son, Joshua. Joshua was
developmentally slow and lagged behind normal four-year-olds in verbal and
cognitive skills. Neighbors frequently observed Joshua playing outside by himself,
unsupervised.
Joshua’s great aunt, Betty Johnson, lived two doors down from the
Justice family. Because of previous disagreements between Johnson and Justice, a
court order directing Johnson not to have contact with Justice and her children had
been placed into effect in May of 2004. According to Justice, the order was no
longer in effect in July 2005, though Johnson believed it was.
On the morning of July 10, 2005, at about 8:45 a.m. Joshua went to
Johnson’s residence and knocked on the door. Believing the no-contact order to
still be in effect, Johnson did not answer the door. Johnson watched through her
window as Joshua played in her yard. He left Johnson’s residence at about 12:00
p.m. Johnson had a video security system which recorded visits to Johnson’s
property by Joshua on July 9 and the morning of July 10. The video was shown to
the jury at trial.
-2-
At about 1:00 p.m. neighbors who lived a few houses down from the
Justice residence in the opposite direction from Johnson, Dorothy and Paul
Billitter, arrived home. Dorothy found Joshua’s red t-shirt in her front yard. She
folded the shirt, placed it on a table, and went inside. She then looked out her
window and observed Joshua floating face down in the above-ground pool located
at the next-door residence of Lee Hampton. While Dorothy called 911, Paul pulled
Joshua from the pool and began performing CPR. The ambulance arrived at 1:15
p.m. and transported the child to the hospital. The hospital staff, however, was
unable to resuscitate him. The cause of death was determined to be by drowning.
In the meantime police arrived at the scene. Despite the nearby events
and commotion involving her child, Justice was not on the scene. The police went
to her trailer and knocked repeatedly but got no response. They eventually began
beating the siding of the trailer with their batons in an attempt to get an answer.
Finally, after 10 minutes of knocking and pounding Justice answered her door.
Based upon her appearance, it was obvious to the officers that she had been
sleeping. Other than by inference, there is no evidence that the police’s difficulty
in arousing Justice was as a result of her being under the influence of alcohol or
drugs.
Justice was transported to the hospital, where she gave inconsistent
statements concerning the events leading up to the drowning. Detective Hayes of
the Pikeville Police Department attempted to interview Justice and obtain her
consent to search her trailer and determine whether she would voluntarily provide
-3-
a blood or urine sample. Justice, however, refused to consent to have her residence
searched, refused to give a biological sample, and invoked her rights to an attorney
and to remain silent. On September 23, 2005, Justice was indicted for seconddegree manslaughter, KRS 507.040, a Class C felony. The indictment, as amended
on May 30, 2007, charged “[t]hat during a period of time from on or about the 1st
day of April 2004 to on or about the 10th day of July, 2005[,]” Justice:
committed the offense of Manslaughter, Second Degree,
when she engaged in a course of conduct that continually
subjected her child, Joshua Alexandria Justice, to a
situation or situations that resulted in a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of serious physical injury or death; that
the Defendant was aware of such risk and consciously
disregarded it by failing to adequately care for or
supervise said child such that her acts constituted wanton
conduct which conduct did lead to the death of such child
on the last above-mentioned date due to drowning.
The eight-day trial in the case commenced on June 5, 2007, and
concluded on June 18, 2007. At the conclusion of the guilt phase, the jury returned
a verdict finding Justice guilty of second-degree manslaughter. The jury was
unable to reach a unanimous verdict regarding a sentencing recommendation.
Justice’s motion for a new trial was denied. The Final Judgment and Order of
Imprisonment was entered on September 6, 2007, adjudging Justice guilty of
second-degree manslaughter and sentencing her to ten-years’ imprisonment. This
appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
-4-
Before us, Justice raises four allegations of error: 1) that the trial
court abused its discretion when it permitted testimony that she had refused to
furnish a biological specimen; 2) that the trial court abused its discretion when it
permitted testimony that she had invoked her Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent; 3) that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting testimony
concerning her prior bad acts; and 4) that the trial court abused its discretion when
it permitted the child’s great-aunt to testify regarding a previous no-contact order
Justice had obtained against her. We reverse the conviction upon the issue of prior
bad acts evidence; however, we discuss the remaining issues because they may
recur upon retrial.
REFUSAL OF BIOLOGICAL SPECIMAN
Pikeville City Police Detective Hayes interviewed the appellant on the
evening of July 10, 2005, at the hospital. In the course of her interview, Detective
Hayes asked Justice if she would provide a biological specimen (blood or urine).
Justice refused to voluntarily provide a biological specimen, and police did not
seek a warrant to obtain a sample.
At trial, during direct examination by the Commonwealth, Detective
Hayes testified about Justice’s having refused to consent to having a biological
sample drawn. Justice argues that the Commonwealth referred back to the
implications of this testimony (that Justice was under the influence of alcohol or
drugs and wanted to cover it up) during its closing argument by referring to her as
“passed out” at the time of the drowning. Because of the difficulty police had in
-5-
arousing her, it is reasonable to infer that drugs or alcohol may have played a role
in Justice’s abnormally deep sleep when Joshua wandered away. But we must
agree that evidence of her refusal to voluntarily give biological samples was
improperly admitted.2
This exact issue was addressed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in
Deno v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 753 (Ky. 2005). In that case the defendant,
Deno, was charged with rape. When police questioned him prior to his arrest,
Deno refused to voluntarily give a DNA sample which could be compared to
semen samples collected from the victim. Police officers obtained a search warrant
and returned to Deno’s home the following day and collected the sample. Deno’s
DNA matched that of the samples collected from the victim, and this evidence was
admitted at the trial. In his summation, the prosecutor brought to the jury’s
attention the fact that Deno refused to voluntarily give a biological sample. The
Supreme Court cited Commonwealth v. Hager, 702 S.W.2d 431 (Ky. 1986), for the
proposition that “no Fifth Amendment or due process violation occurs when
evidence of a DUI suspect's refusal to submit to a breath or blood test is admitted
as evidence of his guilt.” Deno, 177 S.W.3d at 760. But the Court went on to hold
that it was “a violation of Appellant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment and
Section 10 of the Constitution of Kentucky” to allow the introduction of evidence
2
As the Commonwealth notes in its brief, there were a series of questions surrounding the
disclosure of this information. After Justice’s initial objection, the Commonwealth continued to
attempt to lay a foundation to admit the statement. Given Justice’s initial objection, and
additional objections as the Commonwealth continued to seek the admission of the refusal,
despite the Commonwealth’s suggestion to the contrary, we believe the issue is properly
preserved.
-6-
of Deno’s refusal to voluntarily give biological samples as evidence of his guilt.
Deno, 177 S.W.3d at 762. Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Deno, Justice’s
passive refusal to consent to give biological samples is “privileged conduct which
cannot be considered as evidence of criminal wrongdoing.” Id. (Citation omitted).
In our view, it was error under the Deno holding to allow the
introduction of evidence concerning Justice’s refusal to consent to the taking of a
biological sample. While we believe that, standing alone, the error was harmless,
upon retrial, Detective Hayes should not be permitted to testify concerning
Justice’s refusal to submit to a biological sample.
INVOCATION OF RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
In the course of her testimony, Detective Sue Hayes stated that Justice
had exercised “her rights.” This statement is somewhat ambiguous, and it is
somewhat unclear whether this was intended to specifically refer to her Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent. The Commonwealth argues that Detective
Hayes’s reference to Justice exercising her rights was not intended as a comment
on her right to remain silent but, rather, referred to her exercising her Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Though there is some ambiguity, we address the
issue as raised by Justice on the merits.
The Commonwealth is prohibited from introducing evidence or
commenting in any manner on a defendant’s silence once that defendant has been
informed of her rights and taken into custody. See, e.g., Romans v.
Commonwealth, 547 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Ky. 1977); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96
-7-
S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). The time period referred to in Detective
Hayes’s testimony, however, apparently occurred before Justice was informed of
her rights, arrested, or placed into custody. But “[t]he giving of a Miranda
warning does not suddenly endow a defendant with a new constitutional right. The
right to remain silent exists whether or not the warning has been or is ever given.”
Green v. Commonwealth, 815 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Ky. 1991). Thus, although it may
alter the section of the constitution under which the error is analyzed, see Combs v.
Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 280-283 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that prosecutor’s comment
on defendant’s silence preceding giving of Miranda warnings during case-in-chief
could not violate due process but, instead, violated Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination), similar comments have been found to be error,
regardless of whether a defendant had been given her Miranda rights. Green, 815
S.W.2d at 400. Accordingly, the fact that Justice had not been taken into custody
and been advised of her rights when she declined to speak to Detective Hayes did
not give the Commonwealth leave to comment upon her silence.
Of course, if the right is invoked post-Miranda, the same rule apples.
In Romans, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that it was error to permit the
Commonwealth to elicit from a police detective that at the time of arrest and
interrogation, and after receiving Miranda warnings, that the defendant “did not
come forth with the explanation . . . upon which he ultimately relied for his
defense.” Id. at 130. See also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611, 96 S.Ct. 2240,
2241, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n. 37, 86 S.Ct.
-8-
1602, 1624-25 n. 37, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The idea is that because Miranda
warnings implicitly assure their recipient that his silence will not be used against
him, it would be fundamentally unfair to allow a defendant’s post- Miranda silence
to be used for impeachment.
On the other hand,
[I]t [is] clear that not every isolated instance referring to
post-arrest silence will be reversible error. It is only
reversible error where post-arrest silence is deliberately
used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at
trial or where there is a similar reason to believe the
defendant has been prejudiced by reference to the
exercise of his constitutional right. The usual situation
where reversal occurs is where the prosecutor has
repeated and emphasized post-arrest silence as a
prosecutorial tool.
Wallen v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 232, 233 (Ky. 1983) (citation omitted).
Detective Hayes’s testimony concerning Justice’s exercise of her right
to remain silent was but a single, fleeting comment in an eight-day trial. It was not
repeated, emphasized, or used as a prosecutorial tool. As such, we are not
persuaded that the ambiguous reference to invoking her right to remain silent
resulted in reversible error.3 Nevertheless, upon retrial, Detective Hayes should
not be permitted to testify that Justice invoked her right to remain silent (or,
similarly, invoked her right to an attorney).
PRIOR BAD ACTS
3
As noted, the Commonwealth argues that the ambiguous testimony actually referred to an
invocation by Justice of her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
-9-
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth gave notice that, pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 404(c), it intended to introduce prior
bad acts evidence against Justice at trial. The motion listed twenty-one instances
of such acts dating back as far as 1989. Justice opposed the motion.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion to
introduce the prior bad acts evidence. A substantial portion of the incidents was
introduced through various witnesses over the course of the eight-day trial.
Without addressing the various prior bad acts objected to individually, Justice
contends collectively and generally that the admission of the prior incidents
violates the provisions of KRS 404.
DISCUSSION
In her brief, Justice cites us to eleven witnesses who testified to a host
of prior bad acts evidence. We limit our review to the instances contained in the
citations Justice provided (we note that this does not include all of the twenty-one
instances contained in the Commonwealth’s 404(c) motion; we decline, however,
to search the video recording of the eight-day trial for other instances). The
testimony contained at the citations provided by Justice are summarized as follows:
1. Social Worker Josie Wright testified that on November 4, 1991,
her office received a referral involving Justice. Upon investigation,
Wright determined that Justice had left her three-year old son, Aaron
(Aaron was born in 1988), by himself overnight. At approximately
10:00 a.m. the next day the child wandered over to his grandmother’s
trailer. Wright testified that she determined this incident to be a case
of substantiated neglect.
-10-
2. Social Worker Shawna Branham testified that on July 26, 1991,
Justice had left Aaron with a babysitter and that after about an hour
the babysitter then took the child to his grandmother; the relevant
issue here being that Justice had hired an unreliable babysitter.
Branham further testified that on August 3, 1991, Justice left Aaron
with his grandmother on a Friday and was supposed to return the next
day, but did not return until Sunday, and was then under the influence
of alcohol and with several friends who were also under the influence.
Based upon the foregoing events, the Cabinet filed a petition in
District Court, which resulted in the imposition of conditions on
Justice. Branham also testified concerning an incident that occurred
on January 28, 1993. On this occasion Justice had left son Aaron (age
5) and daughter DezzaRae (age one month) with a babysitter and did
not timely return to pick the children up. The original babysitter then
left the children with someone else, who then contacted the children’s
grandmother to pick them up. Branham’s investigation indicated that
Justice was also intoxicated on this occasion. Branham also testified
that on June 14, 1993, that Aaron and DezzaRae were in a vehicle
with a drunk driver. Justice herself was arrested for DUI on this
occasion, though she denied she was driving the vehicle; however, she
did admit that the driver of the vehicle had been drinking. Branham
also testified regarding various occasions upon which Justice was
referred for substance abuse counseling.
3. Sgt. Shaun Fearin of the Kentucky State Police testified to an
incident he responded to on August 29, 1995. A complaint was called
in to the State Police that an unsupervised child was playing in the
road. When Fearin arrived, he found two-year old DezzaRae playing
outside in Justice’s yard unsupervised. Fearin knocked on the door
and Justice answered. Fearin could smell a strong odor of alcohol on
the appellant. Justice stated that she had been asleep. She denied
having ingested any alcohol that day. Fearin called Social Services,
and when they arrived, that ended his involvement.
4. Debra Price of the Department of Social Services also testified
concerning the August 29, 1995, incident. She received a call from
Sgt. Fearin and responded to Justice’s residence. Price testified that
Justice appeared intoxicated, that she could smell alcohol on her, and
that she was belligerent and uncooperative. Justice eventually
admitted to drinking that day. Price testified that DezzaRae had bug
bites and a cigarette burn on her. As a result of this incident, the
Department of Social Services, by petition, removed the children from
Justice’s home and placed them in foster care. Price also testified that
-11-
the Department substantiated neglect as a result of the incident. She
further testified that conditions placed upon Justice as a result of the
incident included inpatient alcohol counseling, that she attend
alcoholics anonymous, and that she take parenting classes.
5. Agatha Johnson, a social worker, testified concerning an event that
occurred on July 25, 1997, at the Cumberland Valley Daycare Center.
She testified that she received a call that Justice had not shown up to
pick up DezzaRae at the scheduled time of 6:00 p.m. Johnson arrived
at 8:55 and Justice still had not arrived. When Justice finally arrived
after 9:00 p.m., she was intoxicated and admitted as much. DezzaRae
was placed in protective custody and placed in foster care. Johnson
further testified that between January 1996 and the July 1997 incident,
Justice had been late eight times picking up the children from day
care. Johnson further testified concerning the multiple conditions
imposed upon Justice necessary to obtain the return of DezzaRae.
6. Jeri Holloway, a social worker, testified concerning an event that
occurred on September 14, 1997. On that occasion, Justice was
arrested for fourth-degree assault as a result of a domestic violence
incident involving Clinton Justice, Joshua’s father. The police
contacted Holloway to inform her that they had no one with whom to
place Aaron and DezzaRae and requested that she take the children
into protective custody, which she did. The children were then placed
in foster care. Holloway further testified that she substantiated
neglect as a result of this incident. She also testified that a case on
Justice had been opened in 1990 and that since that time there had
been several removals based upon substance abuse and domestic
violence. The children were out of the home for approximately fortyfive days on this occasion. Among the conditions placed in force at
this time was for Mr. Justice to leave the home, and Justice was to be
subjected to random drug testing.
7. Estelle Mullins, a next-door neighbor of Justice in 2004, testified
concerning Joshua’s frequent unsupervised visits to her and her
mother’s residence during the period he was two and three. Estelle
also testified that Justice’s children, including Joshua, generally were
poorly supervised and that she saw them playing in the road
frequently. She principally testified concerning an incident when
DezzaRae was left unattended in a vehicle on a hot day and a visiting
relative informed Justice of the situation; when Justice was informed,
she became confrontational and stated that everybody should mind
their own business.
-12-
8. Shawna Allen testified to an incident that happened on February
20, 2005. This occasion involved an incident during which Aaron
(age 16) was seriously shot by his step-father (Joshua’s father),
Clinton Justice. Justice was present. Shawna testified that Justice
asked her to take Aaron to the hospital because she needed to get
home to the other children. Justice told Aaron to say that he had not
seen her (Justice) and that Shawna had picked him up alongside the
road. Justice did not come to the hospital during the three hours while
Aaron was there.
9. Justice provides a reference to additional testimony by Shawna
Branham with a citation to June 13, 2007, at 10:30:00 a.m. However,
on June 13, 2007, a break was taken at 10:12 and proceedings
recommenced at 10:43. Branham was not a witness either before or
after the break. As the citation is in error, we are unable to review
Justice’s attempted reference to additional testimony by Branham.
10. Debbie Stanley, a former social worker, testified regarding an
incident that occurred in August 1989. On that occasion Justice’s
mother, Hattie White, called in a referral to the Department for Social
Services, and Stanley worked the referral. The referral involved an
incident during which Justice had eight-month old Aaron in a vehicle
while she was drinking, and later left Aaron with a baby sitter with no
food, milk, or diapers. Justice left Aaron with the sitter so she could
go “partying.” When Justice finally showed up late on Sunday
evening to pick Aaron up, “she appeared dirty, beaten-up, and drunk.”
Stanley substantiated neglect based upon the foregoing.
11. Justice’s final reference is to testimony by “Paramedic
Whitehead.” His citation is to June 18, 2007, at 9:28:00 – 9:32:00.
The first witness on June 18, 2007, was Steven Heath, a private
detective. He took the stand at 9:29 a.m. As the citation is in error,
we are unable to review Justice’s attempted reference to testimony by
Whitehead.
“Although appellant has a right only to a fair trial, not a perfect one,
he is entitled to be tried for the crimes charged in the indictment and no others.”
Commonwealth v. Tamme, 83 S.W.3d 465, 471 (Ky. 2002) (Keller, J., concurring)
-13-
(citation omitted). This right is carefully protected by KRS 404. KRE 404
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character or of general moral character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if
evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of
the crime is offered by an accused and admitted under
Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of
the accused offered by the prosecution;
....
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible:
(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident; or
(2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence
essential to the case that separation of the two (2) could
not be accomplished without serious adverse effect on
the offering party.
Our principal focus concerns subsection (b) of the Rule. KRE 404(b)
has always been interpreted as exclusionary in nature.
It is a well-known fundamental rule that evidence that a
defendant on trial has committed other offenses is never
admissible unless it comes within certain exceptions,
which are well-defined in the rule itself. For this reason,
trial courts must apply the rule cautiously, with an eye
towards eliminating evidence which is relevant only as
-14-
proof of an accused’s propensity to commit a certain type
of crime.
Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 889 (Ky. 1994) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted).
In Bell, the Supreme Court set out a three-part test for determining the
admissibility of KRE 404(b) evidence. That test requires the trial court to examine
the relevance of the evidence, its probative value, and the prejudice that it may
create against the defendant. Id. at 889-91. We structure our review in accordance
with this three-part test.
1) Relevance
“With respect to the first inquiry, courts have emphasized the
importance of requiring that the ‘other crimes’ evidence be offered to prove
material facts that are in actual dispute.” Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky
Evidence Law Handbook § 2.25[3][b], at 127 (4th ed. LexisNexis 2003).
The second-degree manslaughter instruction Justice was convicted
under stated as follows:
You will find the Defendant guilty of Second-Degree
Manslaughter under this Instruction if, and only if, you
believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all
of the following:
A. That in this county on or about July 10, 2005, and
before the finding of the Indictment herein, Joshua
Justice drowned in a swimming pool.
B. That from on or about April 1, 2004, to on or about
July 10, 2005, the Defendant engaged in a course of
conduct that subjected Joshua Justice to situation that
-15-
resulted in a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death or
serious physical injury;
C. That the Defendant’s course of conduct led to Joshua
Justice’s death on or about July 10, 2005;
AND
D. That in engaging in that course of conduct, the
Defendant was acting wantonly as that term is defined
under Instruction No. 5.
Thus, the crucial facts the jury was called upon to decide were 1)
whether from on or about April 1, 2004, to on or about July 10, 2005, Justice
engaged in a course of conduct that subjected Joshua to situations that resulted in a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death or serious physical injury;
2) whether that course of conduct led to Joshua’s death; and 3) whether by
engaging in that course of conduct Justice was acting wantonly.
Of the instances set forth above, only those described in the testimony
of Estelle Mullins and Shawana Allen relate to the time period charged in the
indictment. Accordingly, we believe the evidence was properly admitted.4 All of
the remaining acts, however, occurred well before the July 10, 2005, drowning.
Moreover, those events generally occurred during the time period of 1989 through
1997 – a time frame ranging from eight to sixteen years prior to the tragedy. In
comparing those incidents to the factual determinations assigned to the jury for
resolution, we are not persuaded that the incidents were constructive in proving
any material fact that was in actual dispute.
4
We accordingly do not refer to those incidents in the discussion that follows.
-16-
Assuming that the prior bad acts occurred as described in the
testimony, they do not directly address, and thus shed little light upon, whether
from April, 1 2004, to July 10, 2005, Justice engaged in a course of conduct that
subjected Joshua to situations that resulted in a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
death or serious physical injury; whether that course of conduct led to Joshua’s
drowning; or whether by engaging in that course of conduct Justice was acting
wantonly. In summary, the prior bad acts were not useful in proving any material
fact that was in actual dispute – the touchstone for admissibility of prior bad acts.
Rather, the evidence tended only to demonstrate Justice’s traits of character for
neglecting her children, being an irresponsible parent generally, and frequently
engaging in substance abuse. Moreover, the evidence demonstrated little more
than that she acted in conformity with these negative character traits during the
time period leading up to the drowning. Such evidence is inadmissible under both
KRS 404(a) and KRE 404(b), and does not fall within any of the exceptions
contained in those subsections.
In defense of the admission of the evidence, the Commonwealth
argues that:
[t]he appellant’s prior bad acts were not admitted in this
case to show her bad character, but rather, were
introduced to show her intent, knowledge, and absence of
mistake in consciously disregarding the substantial and
unjustifiable risk of not supervising her four (4) year old
son for over five (5) hours, and, as such, were properly
admitted at trial pursuant to KRS 404(b). In this case, all
of the other bad acts evidence went to show the
Appellant had previously disregarded serious risks to her
-17-
children, and that this risks [sic] had been brought to her
attention through interventions by social services and
other actors. Without the context of these prior
occurrences, it would have been impossible for the jury
to determine whether the Appellant’s failure to supervise
Joshua that day was a one-time fluke where she
accidentally disregarded substantial and unjustifiable
risks to him, or whether her conduct was wanton and she
consciously disregarded those risks. To that extent, the
other bad acts introduced in this case went to the
Appellant’s intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake,
showing that she consciously disregarded substantial and
unjustifiable risks to Joshua’s safety by choosing to
ignore him for over five (5) hours, when she had
knowledge of those risks through these previous events.
As a result, these other bad acts were properly admitted
in this case pursuant to KRE 404(b).
Rephrased, the Commonwealth argues that the evidence was relevant
to show that Justice had the propensity to neglect her children (i.e., the July 10,
2005, incident was not a “one-time fluke.”) However, that is precisely the type of
evidence KRE 404 is designed to exclude from trial. Justice was entitled to be
tried for her conduct as it related to Joshua’s drowning. The presentation of
evidence that she, for example, left Aaron alone in November 1991 – 14 years
earlier – violates that right. We further note that “wantonness” is evaluated based
upon a “reasonable person” standard, see KRS 501.020(3), and thus the prior acts
are irrelevant in the determination of whether she acted wantonly in relation to the
drowning. That she may have had prior experience with neglecting her children
and thus may, subjectively, be more appreciative of the risks and dangers
associated with such conduct is not relevant, nor does the prior neglect implicate
any of the KRE 404(b)(1) exceptions.
-18-
Moreover, interspersed throughout the testimony cited above is
repeated testimony relating to Justice’s long history of substance abuse and
removals of the children from the home. The Commonwealth does not, in its
argument, attempt to justify the admission of this evidence, and we are aware of no
authority which would permit the introduction of, as here, pervasive evidence that
a defendant has an extensive background of alcohol and drug abuse when that is
not a fact in issue in the case. Accordingly, we believe the substance abuse and
child-removal evidence was inadmissible under KRE 404.
2) Probative Value
As evident from the discussion above, the prior bad acts evidence has
little probative value concerning the events of April 2004 through July 2005. The
issue assigned to the jury for determination was whether Justice acted wantonly in
creating circumstances which led to Joshua’s drowning within the April 2004
through July 2005 timeframe, and whether this conduct led to his death. The prior
bad acts evidence outside of this time frame has little probative value in resolving
this.
3) Prejudice
This prong of Bell applies KRE 403:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
-19-
The testimony was very prejudicial. A parade of witnesses testified and
established that since 1989, Justice had been a poor and neglectful mother, had
repeatedly engaged in drug and alcohol abuse, and had had her children repeatedly
removed from the home. She was thoroughly portrayed as a person of bad moral
character, a drunk, a drug user, and an irresponsible mother. Without question the
evidence inflamed the jury against her. As demonstrated by our previous
discussion, any probative value associated with the prior bad acts evidence is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Preservation
The Commonwealth argues that the issue is not properly preserved
because Justice failed to properly object to the prior bad acts as the incidents were
raised at trial. However, trial counsel repeatedly objected to the introduction of the
prior acts, and without nitpicking each of the instances set forth above, the record
demonstrates that trial counsel generally and vigorously sought to preclude the
introduction of prior acts by contemporaneous objection. Moreover, “[a] motion in
limine resolved by order of record is sufficient to preserve error for appellate
review.” KRE 103(d); Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14, 21(Ky. 2005).
Here, Justice opposed the Commonwealth’s KRE 404(c) motion. We believe the
argument was properly preserved.
Conclusion
The standard of review in determining whether the trial court properly
admitted prior bad acts evidence is whether there has been an abuse of that
-20-
discretion. Commonwealth. v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). The test
for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. The trial court
abused its discretion by admitting the evidence of the above instances of prior bad
acts falling outside of the period April 2004 though July 2005. Upon retrial,
testimony concerning these instances should not be introduced against Justice.
PRIOR RESTRAINING ORDER
As previously noted, Joshua’s great-aunt, Betty Johnson, lived two
doors down from the Justice family. Because of previous disagreements between
Johnson and Justice, in May 2004, a court order directing Johnson not to have
contact with Justice and her children had been placed into effect; the order,
however, was no longer in effect in July 2005, though Johnson believed it was.
It was because of her belief that the order was still in effect that Johnson did not
answer Joshua’s knocks on the morning of July 10, or otherwise seek to assist him
that morning.
During her trial testimony, Johnson testified concerning the nocontact order and gave background testimony concerning why the order was placed
in effect. Justice contends that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting
Johnson to testify concerning the order. More specifically, Justice argues as
follows:
[T]o allow Johnson to continue to portray the Appellant
as a vexatious litigant against her (when it was in fact the
Pike District Court who placed Johnson under “no
-21-
contact orders” with the Appellant and the Appellant’s
immediate family) firmly affixed the Appellant in a
harmful prejudicial position in the eyes of the jury,
especially when that portion of Johnson’s testimony was
entirely irrelevant, and nonprobative as to wanton
conduct, all of which made it highly inflammatory. KRS
403.
The Appellant simply cannot be held to have acted
wantonly, because as unfortunate circumstances did
ultimately dictate a previous/expired “no contact order”
was coincidentally issued upon the last person who could
have saved the victim. When balancing the unfair
prejudicial effect versus the possible relevancy of
Johnson’s testimony, it is clear the scales greatly favor
the Appellant on this issue.
A trial court has wide discretion regarding evidentiary matters. It is
well-settled that rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the discretion
of the trial court and should not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of
discretion. Simpson v. Commonwealth, 889 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Ky. 1994).
We are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in
permitting Johnson to testify concerning the no-contact order and the background
leading up to its issuance. Some explanation was necessary to clarify why Johnson
did not answer Joshua’s knocks or otherwise come to the assistance of her fouryear-old nephew playing unsupervised in her yard the morning of July 10th, but,
rather, merely watched the unsupervised child through her window. Because this
would normally be considered irresponsible conduct by an adult, permitting
Johnson to explain why she did not act to come to the aid of the child was not an
abuse of discretion.
-22-
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Pike Circuit Court is
reversed and the case is remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
KELLER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURRING: This tragic case
highlights the difficulty inherent in applying rules of evidence regarding character
– especially as to whether a history of prior bad acts is merely prejudicial or
whether it is, in fact, illustrative of a pattern of conduct and thereby relevant and
admissible.
This case is a very close call. It involves an area of the law where
appellate review enjoys the benefit of hindsight denied to a trial court that is
compelled to grapple with this thorny problem during the tension and emotion of
such a trial. I am persuaded that the majority opinion has diligently reviewed
every item of evidence in its thorough analysis. While there was error, it surely
was not clearly obvious or blatant. Reasonable minds continue to differ on such
outcomes.
-23-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jonah L. Stevens
Pikeville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
James C. Maxson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-24-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.