PRATHER (SAMUEL RAY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 21, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001910-MR
SAMUEL RAY PRATHER, II
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00047
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; STUMBO, JUDGE; GUIDUGLI,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
GUIDUGLI, SENIOR JUDGE: Samuel Ray Prather, II,2 appeals the order of
vehicle forfeiture entered by the Mason Circuit Court on September 6, 2007.
1
Senior Judge Daniel T. Guidugli sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
Prather is referred to in the record as either Samuel Ray Prather, II, or Samuel Ray Prather, Jr.
Pursuant to said order, Prather’s brown 1975 Camaro was ordered to be sold at
public auction and the proceeds to be distributed to the Buffalo Trace Narcotics
Task Force and the Commonwealth Attorney’s office for the 19th Judicial Circuit.
We affirm.
Prather was indicted in a five-count indictment returned by the Mason
County grand jury on May 27, 2005. The indictment alleged that on April 11,
2005, Prather was driving on a suspended license (KRS 186.620), was trafficking
in a controlled substance, cocaine (KRS 218A.1412), was in possession of drug
paraphernalia while in possession of a firearm (KRS 218A.500), was in possession
of a handgun by a convicted felon (KRS 527.040), and was a persistent felony
offender in the second degree (KRS 532.080). Prather filed a motion to suppress,
to exclude the handgun enhancement, and to sever the possession of a handgun
charge. The trial court denied his motions to suppress and to exclude the handgun
enhancement.
Following the court’s rulings in these matters, Prather entered a
conditional guilty plea on December 22, 2005. Pursuant to the plea agreement,
Prather pled guilty to trafficking in a controlled substance, possession of a handgun
by a convicted felon, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving on a suspended
license. The PFO II offense was dismissed. He was sentenced to ten years, five
years, one year, and ninety days, respectively, with all time running concurrently
for a total sentence of ten years. Final judgment and sentence on plea of guilty was
entered on February 27, 2006.
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Prather appealed his case to this Court. In a not-to-be-published
opinion rendered February 27, 2007 (Appeal No. 2006-CA-000649-MR), another
panel of this Court affirmed the judgment of the Mason Circuit Court. Thereafter,
on May 30, 2007, Prather filed a motion to release “the 2 door brown Chevrolet
Camaro, VIN 1Q87D5N622455, being held by the Buffalo Trace Task Force as
evidence in the above styled case [05-CR-00047] unto the defendant’s father,
Samuel Ray Prather, Sr.” The motion alleged that Prather’s father had a property
interest in the vehicle. The next day (May 31, 2007), the Commonwealth filed a
motion captioned Renotice of Commonwealth’s Motion for Forfeiture. In the
motion, the Commonwealth stated that a hearing had been scheduled to address the
forfeiture of the vehicle in question for November 20, 2006, but was continued
“due to the lack of presence of the Defendant.”
On June 6, 2007, the Commonwealth noticed the filing of the affidavit
of Kelly Flora. Flora alleged that she had been the owner of the 1975 Camaro and
that she sold the vehicle to Samuel Prather II, who was personally known to her,
for $1800, and that the vehicle was transferred through the Fleming County Clerk
to Samuel Prather II, whose social security number is ***-**-25733 and whose
date of birth is June 7, 1974, on October 8, 2004. Flora stated that she was now
residing in Idaho. After several continuances, the matter was set for a hearing on
the motions on August 29, 2007.
3
In order to protect Prather’s privacy, we have not included his complete social security number.
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At the hearing, Prather’s father testified that the vehicle was registered
in his name and that he gave his son $600 to purchase the vehicle. He claimed he
spent approximately $200 to fix the car up, and paid the taxes and insurance on the
vehicle. He stated that he has several vehicles that are registered in his name but
with his son’s social security number. He stated that he is Samuel Raymond
Prather, Sr., but also goes by S.R. Prather, while his son goes by Ray. He stated
that the vehicle was his, that he had no knowledge of any illegal activity, and that
he wanted the vehicle returned to him. He acknowledged that his son actually gave
the money to Flora, that he was not present when it was purchased or transferred at
the clerk’s office, and that the social security number and the signature were his
son’s.
Prather also testified at the hearing. He confirmed his father’s
testimony that the vehicle was his father’s, but that he actually purchased the
vehicle and that he signed the paperwork and used his social security number. He
admitted that he pled guilty to the trafficking charge in the indictment but denied
knowledge of any illegal activity.
The next witness to testify was the Fleming County Clerk, Mr. Jarrod
Fritz. He presented the court with copies of the transfer of title by owner, dated
October 8, 2004, and two registrations for the vehicle. Finally, Tim Fegan, special
agent with the Buffalo Trace Narcotics unit, testified. Agent Fegan testified as to
the circumstances surrounding Prather’s arrest and the entry of the conditional
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guilty plea. He also testified that the vehicle had been impounded as evidence and
could not be released without a court order.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court verbally made the
following findings: that the vehicle was transferred to S.R. Prather on October 8,
2004; that the defendant signed the paperwork transferring the vehicle; and that the
defendant’s social security number was used. Based upon these findings, the court
ordered the vehicle to be forfeited and sold at public auction pursuant to KRS
500.090. On September 5, 2007, the circuit court entered a written order of vehicle
forfeiture. In its order, the court held:
This Court finds that on October 4, 2004, the
defendant Samuel Ray Prather, Jr., went to the Fleming
County Clerk’s office to transfer a brown, 1975 Camero
[sic], VIN # 1Q87D5N622455 into his name; That the
defendant, Samuel Ray Prather, Jr., gave his name, social
security number and signed the transfer of title before the
Fleming County Clerk; That the defendant’s social
security number is [***-**-2573]. That the Certificate of
Registration, which expired on March 1, 2005, shows the
name of Samuel Ray Prather, Sr., but Samuel Ray
Prather, Sr. did not sign the transfer of title; That on April
11, 2005, the defendant utilized the 1975 Camero [sic] as
a conveyance for the illegal drug cocaine and the
defendant later entered a guilty plea in this case to the
charge of Trafficking in a Controlled Substance First
Degree.
The Court believes that the Certificate of Title is
the only document that can truly show who is the rightful
owner of this 1975 Camero [sic] and Samuel Ray
Prather, Sr. testified that he had the title for the vehicle
but he had left it at home.
This Court further finds that Samuel Ray Prather,
Sr. is not the rightful owner of the 1975 Camero [sic]
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vehicle. This is based upon the Certificate of Title
Transfer documents indicating the social security number
of the defendant, Samuel Ray Prather, Jr.
This Court finds that the forfeiture provisions of
KRS 218A.410 and 218A.415 have been met and
complied with;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named
defendant, Samuel Ray Prather, Jr. hereby forfeits,
pursuant to KRS 218A, the following property:
1975 Camero [sic], VIN # 1Q87D5N622455
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the abovementioned property be sold at public auction and the
proceeds of that sale are to be distributed IAW KRS
218A.435(12) to the Buffalo Gateway Narcotics Task
Force and the Commonwealth’s Attorney for the 19th
Judicial Circuit.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Prather argues that the circuit court erred in finding that he
was the owner of the 1975 Camaro when in fact his father owned the vehicle.
Prather also contends that there was insufficient evidence that the car was used to
traffic drugs. The second issue was not raised at the trial court level and thus not
properly before this Court. However, even if it had been preserved, it would be
easily disposed of since Prather entered a guilty plea to the trafficking in a
controlled substance charge that began with the stop of the 1975 Camaro he was
driving while his license was suspended. His motion to suppress was denied and
his guilty plea to the charged offenses negates any argument to the contrary that
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the use of the vehicle was not traceable to the trafficking charge. See Brewer v.
Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343 (Ky. 2006).
We also believe that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when
it found, based upon the evidence, that Prather was the owner of the vehicle. The
trial court is vested with the discretion to determine whether the burdens contained
in KRS 218A.410 are met as well as discretion in ordering the forfeiture. Gray v.
Commonwealth, 233 S.W.3d 715, 717 (Ky. 2007), citing Brewer v.
Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 313, 325. “The test for abuse of discretion is whether
the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by
sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.
1999) (citations omitted). While there was conflicting testimony and both Prather
and his father testified as to who they believed owned the vehicle, there was
sufficient proof that Prather actually purchased it, signed the transfer of title, used
his social security number on the title, and exercised dominion and control over the
Camaro from the date of purchase until his arrest.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently addressed the issue of
ownership and forfeiture in Commonwealth v. Coffey, 247 S.W.3d 908 (Ky. 2008).
It held:
In this way, a transfer of title simply to avoid the
potential effects of forfeiture statutes works an inequity
and cannot be asserted to avoid the forfeiture. Thus,
since the forfeiture portion of the controlled substances
chapter contains its own definition, it is not appropriate
to look to the licensing chapter to define “owner.” At the
same time, under KRS 218A.410(1)(h)(2), if a title
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holder can establish that he or she acts as an owner of the
property through dominion and control of the vehicle,
and that he or she had no knowledge of or did not
consent to use of the vehicle for illegal drug activity, then
he or she has the innocent owner defense. The facts
specific to each claim of ownership will determine who
the owner is for purposes of forfeiture, and the statute
does require an innocent owner to establish his or her
status, not the Commonwealth.
While forfeiture statutes do have certain punitive
aspects that often make their application harsh, they also
serve important nonpunitive goals. Smith v.
Commonwealth, 205 S.W.3d 217 (Ky.App. 2006). When
it comes to drug trafficking, the preventive aspect is
clear. If one stands to lose valuable property, then one
should think twice about using it in the commission of a
drug crime. If that property has been obtained as the
fruits of criminal drug related activities, then those illgotten gains should not be left to the benefit of the
criminal. Given that the very purpose of Chapter 218A is
to curb misuse of controlled substances, defining
“owner” as one who has an interest in property when title
is being held by another appropriately prevents a drug
dealer from titling vehicles or other property in someone
else's name in order to use the property in illegal activity
and yet escape forfeiture. At the same time, in factual
scenarios where there is bona fide ownership in another
person, such as when a mother loans her son a car that
she exercises general dominion and control over, which
he then uses to traffic drugs without her knowledge, the
innocent owner defense offers protection.
Under this definition, while Geralean [Coffey’s
sister] held legal title, the real interest in the property
came from Coffey who exercised dominion and control
over the vehicle. It must be noted here that Geralean
produced no evidence of treating the car as if it were
hers, or in any way exercised the rights and obligations of
ownership. In fact, the record indicates that she
professed no knowledge as to why the vehicle had been
titled in her name-until her brother got caught selling
drugs in it. The Malibu was thus subject to forfeiture,
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which was appropriately ordered by the trial court. The
fact that this definition comes from the controlled
substances chapter makes this definition appropriate, but
necessarily narrow. It is not intended to apply outside the
chapter or when innocent ownership can be established.
Id. at 911-12.
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Prather
was the true owner of the vehicle and that the 1975 Chevrolet Camaro was subject
to forfeiture based upon his criminal actions. Therefore, the order of vehicle
forfeiture entered by the Mason Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Julie K. Pearson
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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