TUCKER (CHRISTOPHER) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 25, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001545-MR
CHRISTOPHER L. TUCKER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WASHINGTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ALLAN RAY BERTRAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00091
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
WITH INSTRUCTIONS
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; THOMPSON, JUDGE; HARRIS,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE: Christopher L. Tucker appeals from a judgment and
sentence on plea of guilty dated July 5, 2007, and entered in the Washington
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Circuit Court on July 6, 2007, sentencing him to two years in prison for Flagrant
Non-support. After carefully reviewing the briefs, record, and oral arguments, we
reverse and remand this case to the Washington Circuit Court with directions to
dismiss the indictment and list this case as “Dismissed-Diverted” pursuant to KRS
533.258. We do so because we are persuaded that in the absence of a motion to
revoke being filed before Tucker’s pretrial diversion term expired on March 31,
2007, the Washington Circuit Court lacked authority to revoke Tucker’s Class D
Felony Pretrial Diversion after that date.
Tucker was indicted on a single charge of Flagrant Non-support, a
Class D felony. KRS 530.050(6). On April 1, 2004, Tucker entered a plea of
guilty, and on the same date the trial court entered an order placing him on Class D
Felony Pretrial Diversion (KRS 533.250 - .260) for three years; i.e., through March
31, 2007. One of the conditions of pretrial diversion was payment of child support.
The pretrial diversion order also scheduled a “final disposition” for April 5, 2007.
Although there were some proceedings in the trial court regarding Tucker’s
payment of child support as noted below, the Commonwealth never applied to the
trial court for a hearing to determine whether Tucker’s pretrial diversion should be
“voided” and whether the trial court should proceed on Tucker’s plea of guilty.
Such an application would have been authorized by KRS 533.256(1) and could be
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described as a “motion to revoke,” although the statute uses the terms “application”
and “voided.”
It appears from the record that in the spring of 2005, it came to the
trial court’s attention that Tucker was not paying his child support. Following a
child support review on February 10, 2005, at which Tucker was not present, the
trial court issued a bench warrant, with bail set at “cash for arrearage” in the sum
of $3,747. Tucker was arrested on that bench warrant on March 10, 2005, and was
brought before the trial court for a further child support review on the same date.
The notation on the trial court calendar for that event indicated that Tucker was
employed and that a child support wage assignment had been issued. Bail was
amended to $2,500 unsecured and Tucker was released on bail. A further review
was held on May 5, 2005, resulting in a notation that the matter would be
“redocket[ed] upon new motion.” Nothing else transpired of record2 until April 5,
2007, five days after the three-year pretrial diversion period had expired. The case
came up on the calendar for “final disposition” in accordance with the April 1,
2004, pretrial diversion order. The event was rescheduled to April 12, 2007, at
which time Tucker and his counsel appeared and advised the trial court that Tucker
was incarcerated on other charges and that nothing had been served upon Tucker
regarding revocation of his pretrial diversion in the present case. Tucker’s counsel
argued that the pretrial diversion had expired as of March 31, 2007, and that it was
too late for the trial court to consider any revocation motion which the
2
Tucker had been convicted on an assault charge in another county on July 1, 2006, and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
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Commonwealth might make after that date. The trial court disagreed, and even
though the Commonwealth still had not filed any motion to “void” or “revoke”
pretrial diversion, a final proceeding was held on July 5, 2007. As noted above, on
that date the trial court effectively revoked Tucker’s pretrial diversion and
sentenced him to two years in prison.
While we note that counsel have set forth a number of arguments, we
believe this case can be resolved merely by noting that the Commonwealth had the
means readily at hand to seek to have Tucker’s pretrial diversion revoked if it
believed his failure to pay child support, or his assault conviction, or any other
alleged violation of his pretrial diversion conditions justified such action. Those
means are found in KRS 533.256(1). We need not concern ourselves with why the
Commonwealth failed to act to have Tucker’s pretrial diversion revoked before it
expired. The fact is that it did not do so.
It should be remembered that Class D Felony Pretrial Diversion is a
unique statutory creature, neither fish nor fowl. Although it has obvious
similarities to them, as recognized by KRS 533.254, it differs from probation,
probation with an alternative sentencing plan, shock probation, or conditional
discharge in that it provides one of the few opportunities under Kentucky law for a
qualified3 defendant to enter a guilty plea or an Alford plea to a qualified4 felony
3
KRS 533.250(1) imposes limitations governing which defendants are eligible to seek pretrial
diversion.
4
KRS 533.250(1)(a) limits pretrial diversion to Class D felonies.
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charge and yet, upon successful completion of the pretrial diversion period, not be
branded with a felony conviction for the rest of his days.5 KRS 533.258 clearly
provides the carrot component of the “carrot and stick” formula. KRS 533.256
provides the converse by outlining possible consequences for one who fails to
satisfactorily complete the pretrial diversion.
Given the unique nature of Class D Felony Pretrial Diversion, and the
profound significance to a defendant placed on Class D Felony Pretrial Diversion
of possibly losing his opportunity to avoid a felony conviction, it is not illogical
that the General Assembly opted to provide a specific method by which the
Commonwealth can seek to have Class D Felony Pretrial Diversion voided. Nor is
it illogical that any such effort by the Commonwealth be required to be made
before expiration of the pretrial diversion period. We so hold, and thus conclude
that the revocation of Tucker’s pretrial diversion was error.
We note that the Commonwealth has heavily relied upon Hawley v.
Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 130 (Ky. App. 1995), for the proposition that
Tucker’s pretrial diversion period should be deemed extended by the period of
time during which he failed to pay child support so as to render the
Commonwealth’s effort at revocation timely. This reliance is misplaced. Hawley
is distinguishable from the case at bench because there the trial court made a
5
Class D Felony Pretrial Diversion also differs from the less structured pretrial diversion
practice authorized by Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.04 (now limited to misdemeanants,
KRS 533.262(2)) by requiring the defendant to enter a guilty plea or an Alford plea as a
prerequisite to pretrial diversion. KRS 533.250(1)(e).
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finding that the defendant had violated his probation, imposed a specific jail
sentence for that violation, and reinstated the probation at the end of the jail
sentence, thereby bringing the case within the purview of KRS 533.040(2). In the
present case, the trial court never made an express determination that Tucker had
violated his pretrial diversion conditions, never expressly revoked or modified
pretrial diversion, never imposed any sanction for failure to pay child support, and
never “reinstated” pretrial diversion.
For the reasons noted above, we reverse the judgment and sentence on
plea of guilty entered on July 6, 2007, and remand this case to Washington Circuit
Court with directions to dismiss the indictment with prejudice and list this case as
“Dismissed-Diverted” pursuant to KRS 533.258.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lisa Bridges Clare
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
M. Brandon Roberts
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Julia K. Pearson
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
M. Brandon Roberts
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