C.A.R.S. PROTECTION PLUS, INC. VS. CAPPS (STEVE)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 18, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001542-MR
C.A.R.S. PROTECTION PLUS, INC.
v.
APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODNEY BURRESS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00452
STEVE CAPPS
AND
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
NO. 2007-CA-001821-MR
LARRY STIGERS EQUIPMENT,
TRAILERS & TRUCKS, LLC
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODNEY BURRESS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00452
STEVE CAPPS, AND
C.A.R.S. PROTECTION PLUS, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND NICKELL, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc. (C.A.R.S.) and Larry Stigers
Equipment, Trailers & Trucks, LLC (Stigers) appeal from a judgment of the Bullitt
Circuit Court in favor of Steve Capps (Capps). In a dispute over the purchase of a
used vehicle and its accompanying warranty, the circuit court held Stigers and
C.A.R.S. violated both the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act (KCPA)2 and the
terms of the used vehicle warranty and entered judgment for Capps. We vacate the
judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Facts
Capps purchased a vehicle from Stigers and a warranty from C.A.R.S.
We rely on the following facts as found by the trial court. On February 24, 2003,
Capps visited Stigers’ dealership looking to buy a pick-up truck for his son. Capps
showed interest in a 1998 Dodge 3500 diesel truck but, due to a dead battery, could
not take a test drive. Capps also noticed the truck was leaking oil. When he called
this to the attention of one of Stigers’ employees, he was told the oil leak was a
known issue and was the result of a faulty gasket in the motor which was to be
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
Codified at KRS Chapter 367.
-2-
replaced. Capps also discovered the truck was low on brake fluid. The employee
informed Capps that, if he would return the next day, they would have the truck
fixed.
Capps returned the next day and test-drove the truck. Although now
drivable, Capps was wary of potential trouble with the truck and hesitant to make
the purchase. Stigers then told Capps about a used vehicle warranty offered by
C.A.R.S. that Capps could purchase to ease his concerns about buying the truck.
Stigers further represented to Capps that if anything was wrong with the truck the
warranty would cover the cost of repairing the problems. Capps was shown a
brochure describing the warranty term as 48-months with unlimited miles for a
price of $995.00.
Still hesitant about the quality of the vehicle and the validity of the
warranty, Capps asked that Stigers contact C.A.R.S. and confirm the warranty did,
in fact, cover diesel trucks. C.A.R.S. affirmed the warranty covered diesel trucks
and Stigers further assured Capps the warranty would cover any problems listed in
the warranty once the truck was taken off the lot. In the end, Capps purchased the
truck and the warranty and drove the vehicle home.
The agreement to purchase the truck was contained in a purchase
order prepared by Stigers’ wife. According to the purchase order, the price of the
truck was $16,900.00. Capps was credited $6,900.00 for trading in his truck and
was to pay the remaining balance of $10,000.00. Although the purchase order
contained a warranty disclaimer, in the warranty field of the purchase order was
-3-
written “4 yr unlimited” and “$995.” Capps signed both the purchase order and the
warranty disclaimer but admitted he did so without reading either document.
When Capps reached his home, he checked the oil level of the truck
and discovered it was a gallon low even though it had been at the proper level
when he left the dealership. He called Stigers who told him not to worry and to
drive the truck as he had purchased a warranty. The next day, after having driven
the truck approximately 140 miles, the truck lost oil pressure and the engine began
to knock. Capps took the truck to Shelbyville Chrysler which inspected the motor,
found it to be “trashed,” and told Capps the motor needed to be replaced. Capps
contacted Stigers who told him to call C.A.R.S. because the truck was under
warranty.
C.A.R.S. inspected the truck and denied coverage to Capps. The
company relied on a clause in the warranty stating “component failures which
occur prior to the acceptance of this limited warranty are not covered.” C.A.R.S.
deemed the problems with the truck to pre-exist3 the purchase of the warranty.
Once C.A.R.S. denied coverage, Capps never picked up the truck from Shelbyville
Chrysler. To date, $13,000.00 in storage fees (at $10.00 a day) has accrued, which,
along with the hourly labor incurred by Shelbyville Chrysler in tearing down the
engine, remains unpaid.
3
The C.A.R.S. adjuster and the Shelbyville Chrysler mechanic agreed the extensive damage to
the truck did not happen “overnight” and was present when Capps purchased the vehicle.
-4-
The circuit court found generally that the dealership’s
misrepresentations and omissions in selling the truck to Capps violated the KCPA.4
The court relied on KRS 186A.500 and KRS 186A.540 for the proposition that
dealerships or individuals must disclose prior severe damage to buyers of
automobiles if the damage exceeds more than $1,000.00. The Court found the
truck’s damage was clearly more than $1,000.00 and the dealership breached its
duty to inform Capps of the damage because it had superior knowledge of the
truck’s condition and the statutory requirements of disclosure.5 The court found
Stigers merely disclosed to Capps that the truck had problems and by omitting the
severity of the damage and known problems with the truck, misled and deceived
Capps about the truck’s real condition. The court also found Capps was not
interested in buying the truck after discovering its problems and Stigers deceitfully
used the C.A.R.S. warranty as a sales tool to manipulate Capps into buying a truck
that was a “lemon.”6
The court noted C.A.R.S. claimed the exclusionary language
contained in the warranty insulated C.A.R.S. from liability because that language
meant pre-existing conditions at the time the warranty was purchased would not be
4
The court did not address specific omissions and/or misrepresentations.
5
The Court did not specify the damages that totaled over $1,000.00. The Court further did not
disclose why it found that Stigers had “special knowledge” concerning the condition of the truck
and/or what role that played in the outcome of this case.
6
The Court did not indicate what role Capps’s initial hesitation in buying the truck played in
this litigation, nor did it rely on specific events to show Stigers’ use of the C.A.R.S. warranty
was a sales tool.
-5-
covered. The court found a plain language reading of the clause meant
components of the truck that have not actually and fully failed before the warranty
has been accepted and the vehicle has been driven off the lot are to be covered by
the warranty. Relying on this interpretation, the court found the components
covered by the warranty did not actually and fully fail until after the warranty was
accepted and the vehicle was driven off the lot.7
Relying on the KCPA, the circuit court awarded Capps a total of
$40,201.008 including storage costs and engine replacement costs in the amount of
$33,169.00 and attorney fees of $7,032.00.9 The Court found Stigers and C.A.R.S.
were jointly and severally liable for this amount.10 This appeal followed.
On appeal, Stigers and C.A.R.S. have filed separate briefs but their
alleged errors are consistent with each other. Stigers maintains that it did not
violate the KCPA, the trial court wrongly awarded damages to Capps, and the
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment and
motion to alter, amend or vacate the judgment.11 C.A.R.S. maintains it did not
7
The Court did not specifically find which truck components failed and when.
8
The court pointed specifically to KRS 367.200, which permits a trial court to make orders or
judgments as necessary to restore to plaintiffs any moneys or property that may have been paid
as a result of conduct by the dealership declared unlawful by KRS 367.130 to KRS 367.300.
Specifically, KRS 367.220 authorizes a court to award actual damages, punitive damages,
attorney’s fees, court costs and other damages the court may deem equitable.
9
The court did not disclose how it arrived at these figures.
10
The court did not apportion fault in imposing joint and several liability, but stated the
judgment was proper under the KCPA.
11
The court judgment mentioned neither a motion to dismiss nor a motion for summary
judgment.
-6-
violate the KCPA, the trial court miscalculated the damages and the court
misinterpreted the operative language of the warranty. C.A.R.S. believes the
warranty should be construed to exclude coverage for pre-existing conditions; the
engine trouble of which Capps complains was, in fact, pre-existing; and, therefore,
it properly denied him coverage. For the reasons discussed below, this matter is
remanded for specific findings of fact regarding both Stigers and C.A.R.S.
Standard of Review
When reviewing questions of fact, appellate courts set aside a trial
court’s factual findings only if clearly erroneous. Medley v. Board of Educ.,
Shelby County, 168 S.W.3d 398, 402 (Ky. App. 2004). A factual finding is not
clearly erroneous if it is supported by “substantial evidence” which is evidence of
substance and relevant consequence sufficient to induce conviction in the minds of
reasonable people. Id.
In contrast, we review questions of law de novo. New v.
Commonwealth, 156 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Ky. App. 2005). As such, they are
reviewed without deference to the trial court’s interpretation. Cinelli v. Ward, 997
S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. App. 1998).
Argument
We review first the common claims raised by C.A.R.S. and Stigers
before addressing their separate claims.
I. Did Stigers and C.A.R.S. violate the KCPA?
-7-
The trial court found that both C.A.R.S. and Stigers violated the
KCPA by inducing Capps to purchase the truck in question. The controlling
language of the KCPA is contained in KRS 367.220(1), which provides in
pertinent part:
[a]ny person who purchases or leases goods or services
primarily for personal, family or household purposes and
thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or
property, real or personal, as a result of the use or
employment by another person of a method, act or
practice declared unlawful by KRS 367.170,12 may bring
an action . . . to recover actual damages.
Thus, to recover under the KCPA, Capps would have to prove: (1) he bought the
truck primarily for personal, household, or family purposes; (2) Stigers and
C.A.R.S. engaged in an unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive act; and (3) Capps
suffered actual damages as a result of the violation of the KCPA.
A. Did Stigers violate the KCPA as a matter of law?
The trial court found Stigers violated the KCPA based upon his
misrepresentations and omissions in selling the truck to Capps. Specifically, the
court found that by disclosing to Capps only that the truck “had problems,”
mislabeling the warranty, and, downplaying the severity of the truck’s problems,
Stigers violated the KCPA. The court further found Stigers had a duty to inform
Capps about the truck’s quality because of his superior knowledge of the truck and
the statutory requirements of disclosure. The court cited KRS 186A.500 and KRS
12
KRS 367.170(1) states: “[u]nfair, false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby unlawful.” KRS 367.170(2) provides: “[f]or
purposes of this section, unfair shall be construed to mean unconscionable.” (footnote added).
-8-
186A.540 as the basis for finding a statutory requirement of disclosure. These
sections provide:
KRS 186A.500. Legislative Finding . . . Purchasers when
buying vehicles are entitled to know if the vehicle has
sustained prior severe damage.
KRS 186A.540. Written disclosure of damages to motor
vehicle: An individual or dealer . . . shall disclose all
damages to a motor vehicle which result in repairs or
repair estimates that exceed three hundred dollars ($300)
and that occur while the motor vehicle is in his
possession and prior to delivery to a purchaser.
Disclosure shall be in writing and shall require the
purchaser’s signature acknowledging the disclosure of
damages.
While these two statutes create a statutory duty to disclose damages to
a vehicle, they apply only when the damage occurs while the vehicle is in the
possession of the individual or dealership. The trial court made no finding as to
when the vehicle was damaged, and specifically made no finding as to whether the
vehicle was damaged while in Stigers’ possession. Further, the trial court made no
finding as to the purpose for which Capps bought the truck, nor did the court find
or identify any ascertainable loss suffered by Capps. To impose liability under the
KCPA, these elements must be established. The trial court made no such findings.
Therefore, the judgment against Stigers must be vacated and the
matter remanded for the trial court to make specific findings of fact as to all of the
KCPA elements and to enter judgment based upon those further factual findings.
B. Did C.A.R.S. violate the KCPA as a matter of law?
-9-
The trial court also found that C.A.R.S. violated the KCPA.
However, the record is unclear as to the basis for imposing liability against
C.A.R.S. The court found C.A.R.S. to be jointly and severally liable to Capps
under the KCPA, but this is the sole mention of C.A.R.S. in relation to the KCPA.
Again, the trial court made no findings as to the three required elements under the
KCPA. Therefore, the judgment against C.A.R.S. under the KCPA must also be
vacated and the matter remanded for further specific findings as to all of the
elements of the KCPA and to enter judgment accordingly.
II. Was the award of damages imposed against Stigers and C.A.R.S.
erroneous?
The trial court found Capps incurred damages in the amount of
$40,201.00 based upon a finding that Capps incurred storage costs and engine
replacement costs in the amount of $33,169.00 and attorney fees in the amount of
$7,032.00. The court stated in its judgment that this damage award was based
upon the KCPA.13 However, as we are vacating the judgments premised on the
KCPA, any further discussion regarding the calculation of damages based thereon
is unwarranted.
III. Should Stigers have been awarded summary judgment?
The standard of review for a motion granting summary judgment is
“whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any
13
KRS 367.220 provides that a court may award actual damages, punitive damages, attorney’s
fees, courts costs, and other damages the court may deem equitable.
-10-
material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). On review, the
record must be initially viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion for summary judgment and all doubt is to be resolved in its favor.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).
Summary judgment is proper only when there are no disputed factual issues and
the adverse party could not prevail under any circumstances. Id. (citing Paintsville
Hospital Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Ky. 1985)).
After careful review of the record, we hold the trial court’s decision to
deny Stigers’ motion for summary judgment was proper. The facts of this case are
not only disputed by all parties involved, but also bear substantially upon the
outcome of the case.14 Because the case at bar is based almost entirely on factual
disputes, the trial court correctly denied Stigers’ motion for summary judgment.
IV. Did the trial court correctly deny Stigers’ motion to dismiss?
It is well-established that a court should not dismiss an action for
failure to state a claim unless the pleading party appears not to be entitled to relief
under any set of facts. Weller v. McCauley, 383 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Ky. 1964). In
ruling on a motion to dismiss, the pleadings should be liberally construed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff with all allegations being taken as true. Mims
v. Western-Southern Agency, Inc., 226 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Ky. App. 2007).
14
There is substantial dispute about what, if any, representations and omissions were made to
Capps by Stigers and C.A.R.S.
-11-
Therefore, “the question is purely a matter of law.” James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d
875, 884 (Ky. App. 2002). Accordingly, the trial court’s decision will be reviewed
de novo. Revenue Cabinet v. Hubbard, 37 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Ky. 2000).
We believe the trial court properly denied Stigers’ motion to dismiss.
The outcome of this case is wholly dependent upon the facts. Several different
factual scenarios, if proven, could entitle Capps to relief. This is especially true
when construing the facts in a light most favorable to Capps and taking all
allegations as true. As there was at least one set of facts under which Capps could
obtain relief, we hold that Stigers was not entitled to dismissal as the trial court
correctly found.
V. Did the court correctly deny Stigers’ motion to amend, alter or vacate the
judgment?
Stigers further contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to
alter, amend or vacate the judgment against him. However, as we are vacating the
judgment and remanding the matter to the trial court, this argument is rendered
moot.
VI. Did the court correctly interpret the C.A.R.S. warranty?
At trial, C.A.R.S.’ main defense was that it was not required to honor
the warranty entered into between it and Capps because the damages to the truck
for which Capps sought to use the warranty for repairs were pre-existing and,
therefore, excluded from coverage. C.A.R.S. argued the terms of the warranty
specifically stated “[c]omponent failures which occur prior to the acceptance of
-12-
this limited warranty are not covered.” It contends this language indicates
conditions existing at the time the warranty was signed were excluded from
coverage. C.A.R.S. argued this militated against liability to Capps under the
warranty contract. The trial court disagreed.
Interpreting the four corners of the document and invoking common
maxims of contract interpretation, the trial court found a plain reading of the
contract meant components of the truck that had not actually and fully failed until
after the warranty had been accepted and the vehicle driven off the lot were
covered by the warranty. The court found the truck components at issue had not
actually and fully failed at the time Capps purchased the truck and executed the
warranty, and, therefore, they should have been covered by the warranty.
Our reading of the contract supports the trial court’s interpretation.
When a contract is free from ambiguity, it needs no construction and its express
terms will be enforced. First Commonwealth Bank of Prestonsburg v. West, 55
S.W.3d 829, 836 (Ky. App. 2000) (citing Johnson v. Edwards, 230 Ky. 485, 20
S.W.2d 76, 77 (1929)). The warranty refers to “component failures” and makes no
mention of the term “pre-existing.”
The trial court did not find C.A.R.S. had represented to Capps that
component failures pre-dating the warranty purchase were not covered. The fact
that one party (C.A.R.S.) may have intended different results is insufficient to
construe a contract at variance with its plain and unambiguous terms. Cantrell
Supply, Inc, v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 94 S.W.3d 381, 385 (Ky. App. 2002). Thus,
-13-
we cannot say the trial court erred in interpreting the contract in accordance with
its express terms.
Conclusion
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Bullitt
Circuit Court is vacated and the matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR
APPELLANT/APPELLEE, C.A.R.S.
PROTECTION PLUS, INC.:
Mark B. Wallace
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, STEVE
CAPPS:
Louis E. Reinhart III
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT, LARRY
STIGERS EQUIPMENT, TRAILERS
& TRUCKS, LLC:
Paul C. Harnice
David S. Sullivan
Frankfort, Kentucky
-14-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.