BIRDSONG (RONALD) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JANUARY 16, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000941-MR
RONALD BIRDSONG
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00142
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, MOORE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Ronald Birdsong (Birdsong) appeals the April 17, 2007,
judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court in Indictment No. 06-CR-00142, following a
jury trial, which adjudged him guilty of second-degree robbery and being a firstdegree persistent felon. Birdsong was sentenced to a twelve-year term of
imprisonment. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 23, 2005, the Fayette Grand Jury handed down
Indictment No. 05-CR-01079 charging Birdsong with second-degree robbery and
with being a second-degree persistent felon. Subsequently, this indictment was
dismissed and replaced by superseding Indictment 06-CR-00142 wherein he was
charged with second-degree robbery and with being a first-degree persistent felon.
Birdsong pled not guilty and a jury trial was held on February 14 and 15, 2007.
Several witnesses testified about a robbery at the Fifth Third Bank at
Bryant Station Road in Lexington, Kentucky, on June 21, 2005. According to the
video recording of the trial, their testimony recounted that a man with a bandana
over his face rushed into the bank, slammed open the door into the teller area
behind the counter, and screamed “Get up! Give me the money! Open the drawer!
Get up!” He then took the money from two drawers, and after a teller told him that
was all the money, he jumped over the counter and fled out the door. Witnesses
described the scene as one with a lot of noise and pandemonium including the
robber knocking over a computer monitor upon jumping over the counter. Later,
during an interview with Lexington police, Birdsong confessed to being the man
who had taken the money, over $6,000, from the Fifth Third branch.
During the trial, Birdsong represented himself and the Fayette County
Legal Aid acted as stand-by counsel. Birdsong claimed throughout the jury trial
that he used no force to facilitate the robbery, and thus, both he and counsel moved
for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, based on the fact that Birdsong’s
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actions during the bank robbery did not meet the elements for robbery seconddegree. Additionally, during voir dire, a potential juror informed counsel that his
nephew was currently serving time in a federal penitentiary following a robbery
conviction. Even though the juror contended that his relative’s conviction and
incarceration would not affect his ability to serve as a juror, the prosecution used a
peremptory challenge to exclude him from the panel. After hearing all the
evidence, the jury found Birdsong guilty of second-degree robbery and of being a
first-degree persistent felon, resulting in a twelve year prison term. On April 17,
2007, the Fayette Circuit Court entered its final judgment, sentencing him in
accordance with the jury verdict. Thereafter, Birdsong appealed.
ANALYSIS
1. Directed Verdict
Birdsong moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the offense of
second-degree robbery, claiming that the prosecution did not provide evidence as
to the use of force, and therefore, the robbery charge should have been amended to
a theft offense. The judge, however, overruled the motion for directed verdict.
On a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth and
assume that the Commonwealth’s evidence is true, reserving questions of weight
and credibility to the jury. Slaughter v. Com., 45 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Ky. App.
2000). Furthermore, the trial court may only enter a directed verdict of acquittal
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only if the prosecution produces no more than a “mere scintilla” of evidence.
Com. v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). As a reviewing Court,
we will reverse only if it was “clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt” under
the evidence as a whole. Id. In other words, review of a case does not allow us to
substitute our view of the evidence for that of the trial court but merely consider
the decision of the trial judge in light of the proof presented. After considering the
evidence, we affirm as to this issue.
The elements of robbery in the second-degree are found in Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 515.030(1) wherein it is stated “[a] person is guilty of
robbery in the second degree when, in the course of committing theft, he uses or
threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person with the intent
to accomplish theft.” “‘Physical force’ means force used upon or directed toward
the body of another person.” KRS 515.010.
Here, the Commonwealth presented far more than “mere scintilla” of
evidence. As previously recounted, Birdsong rushed into the bank with a
bandanna over his face and slammed open the door to enter the area behind the
teller counter, thereby creating a large, crashing sound. Witnesses testified that
there was a lot of noise and pandemonium as Birdsong kept yelling “Get up! Give
me the money! Open the drawers! Get up!” Birdsong pulled a printer out from
under the teller counter, and pieces of the monitor and the pull rope were knocked
on the floor behind the teller counter. Witnesses stated that Birdsong’s tone of
voice was intimidating.
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Kentucky courts have recognized that “intent may be inferred from
the actions of a defendant or from the circumstances surrounding those actions.”
Marshall v. Com., 60 S.W.3d 513, 518 (Ky. 2001). Clearly, in the case at hand,
more than a “scintilla of evidence” existed for a reasonable jury to determine that
Birdsong’s behavior constituted the force necessary for robbery in the seconddegree. While victims’ testimony of fear of assault is relevant, the law requires a
showing that the defendant threatened immediate use of physical force. The jury,
in the case at hand, found that Birdsong’s actions including the bandana over his
face and his loud, vocal demands for money constituted a threat of immediate use
of physical force upon the clerk. The jury is the finder of fact. Robinson v. Com.,
572 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Ky. App. 1978) (overruled on other grounds.) Thus, the
circuit court did not err when it declined to direct a verdict of acquittal on the
second-degree robbery charge.
2. Batson challenge
Birdsong also claims that the Commonwealth purposefully excluded
an African-American juror from the panel of potential jurors on the basis of race in
violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 54
USLW 4425, (1986). In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that
peremptory challenges could not be used to purposefully exclude a potential juror
on the basis of race. Upon raising an objection that a juror has been unlawfully
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excluded, a defendant must make a prima facie showing of purposeful
discrimination by showing facts and other circumstances that raise an inference
that the prosecution unlawfully struck the potential juror because of that person's
race. Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Once the defendant successfully makes the prima
facie showing, the burden is then on the prosecution to demonstrate a race-neutral
reason for exercising its peremptory challenge. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. When
reviewing a ruling on a Batson challenge, the appellate Court will not disturb the
trial court's decision unless it is found to be clearly erroneous. Washington v.
Com., 34 S.W.3d 376 (Ky. 2000). After reviewing all of the circumstances
surrounding Birdsong’s challenge of the Commonwealth's peremptory strike of the
juror in question, the trial court found that no Batson violation occurred. We
agree.
At the trial, immediately before the judge announced the numbers of
the thirteen jurors for the case, the prosecution asked to approach. A bench
conference ensued between the judge, the two prosecutors, and the two defense
attorneys. The prosecution explained that it was using a peremptory challenge to
strike Juror No. 94. The prosecution’s rationale for striking the juror was because
his nephew was serving time in the federal penitentiary following a conviction for
strong-arm robbery, and therefore, the prosecution believed the juror might have an
affinity for the defendant. Despite the juror’s statement during voir dire that he
could be unbiased, the prosecution believed the familial relationship was
problematic and could create bias. Significantly, the prosecution chose to use a
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peremptory strike rather than one for cause. Thereafter, the defense observed that
they could raise a Batson challenge to the prosecution’s use of the peremptory
strike. But the trial court ascertained that no Batson violation occurred and the
reason given for striking the juror was race-neutral.
It is undisputed that a peremptory challenge cannot be used merely to
exclude member of the venire from the jury based solely on race. Washington, 34
S.W.3d 376. Here, however, before the defense objected to the challenge, the
prosecutor had offered his explanation for the peremptory challenge. The
prosecution explained its peremptory challenge was based on the fact that the juror
might be influenced by his nephew’s incarceration. At this point, the trial court
must conduct an inquiry into the ultimate question of whether the party making the
Batson challenge has met his burden of proving “purposeful discrimination.”
Chatman v. Com., 241 S.W.3d 799, 804 (Ky. 2007). And after the trial court
inquired about discriminatory intent on the part of the prosecution, it decided none
existed. As far as Birdsong’s contention that the trial judge did not make a
“meaningful inquiry,” the judge fully considered and rejected Birdsong’s
contention that the prosecution peremptorily struck this juror for racial reasons.
In his Batson challenge, Birdsong also suggests that, because the trial
court denied the defense’s request to strike Juror No. 207 for cause because he had
been robbed by a black man thirty years ago and did not reject the prosecution’s
peremptory challenge of Juror No. 94, a racial pretext existed in the peremptory
challenge. But, we fail to see how juxtaposition of the acceptance of the
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peremptory strike of Juror No. 94 and the denial of the challenge for cause of Juror
No. 207 supports this proposition. First, the two challenges are substantively
different as one was for cause and one was peremptory. Second, and most
noteworthy, the defense provided nothing to show racial bias on the prosecution’s
part when they peremptorily struck Juror 94. As a matter of fact, both jurors were
ultimately discharged peremptorily – one by the defense and one by the
prosecution. Given these circumstances, we find nothing to support Birdsong’s
allegation that the trial court's actions were clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
In sum, we find no error in the trial court's decision to denying
Birdsong’s motion for directed verdict of acquittal on the offense of second-degree
robbery, as well as overruling Birdsong’s objection to the prosecution's use of a
peremptory challenge to strike an African-American juror. Therefore, finding that
Birdsong’s conviction for second-degree robbery and first-degree persistent felony
offender was sufficiently supported by the evidence adduced at trial, we affirm the
April 17, 2007, judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Linda Roberts Horsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General of
Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
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