BAMBERGER (RONALD J.) VS. HINES (LESLIE K.)
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RENDERED: APRIL 17, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000933-MR
AND
NO. 2007-CA-000992-MR
RONALD J. BAMBERGER, EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES T.
HINES, JR.
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00307
LESLIE K. HINES
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT, WINE, AND CLAYTON, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Ronald J. Bamberger, executor of the estate of James T.
Hines, Jr. (Jim) appeals from an order of the Daviess Circuit Court upholding the
Domestic Relations Commissioner’s (DRC) recommendation to award Leslie K.
Hines (Leslie) pendente lite maintenance. Leslie has filed a cross-appeal
challenging the ruling that found the antenuptial agreement valid and enforceable
and the ruling determining that the horse, Leslie’s Lady, was Jim’s property.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties met and began dating in 1992. At the time they met,
Leslie was separated from her second husband and living with her two daughters.
Jim had been married twice. After they began dating, Jim hired Leslie to be the
manager of his property, the Athenian Racket and Fitness Center. Later, he sold
the fitness center, constructed the Hines Wellness Center, which Leslie then
supervised. She worked for Jim the entire time that they lived together and were
married. During some periods, her actual work requirements were more symbolic
than actual.
In April 1993, Leslie and Jim began living together with Leslie’s two
daughters. They became engaged in May 1994. After moving out of Jim’s home
so that it could be renovated, they lived together in another home. But when the
original home was completed in October 1997, Leslie did not move back into the
home with Jim. According to Leslie’s testimony, she did not want to move into the
home until they were married. Subsequently, after some apparent persuasion by
friends, Jim did agree to marry Leslie, and they set the wedding date (December 7,
1997). Meanwhile, Jim contacted his attorney to prepare an antenuptial agreement,
which was then sent to Leslie’s attorney. Upon learning of the proposed
antenuptial agreement, Leslie attempted through her attorney to negotiate the
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terms. Jim was not willing to negotiate, and Leslie said she would not sign the
agreement.
Leslie states that friends of the couple again intervened and
encouraged her to sign the agreement on December 4, 1997. After listening to
them and Jim, she did sign the agreement against the advice of her own attorney.
Three days later, Leslie and Jim were married. The marriage experienced
problems almost immediately. As early as February 1998, Jim filed his first
petition for dissolution of the marriage. Ultimately, on February 27, 2004, Jim
filed the petition for the dissolution that resulted in the parties’ divorce. On
February 7, 2005, the trial court entered a decree of dissolution of marriage,
reserving all other issues.
Following the filing of the final petition, Leslie contested the validity
of the antenuptial agreement. The DRC held an evidentiary hearing on December
2 and 9, 2004, to ascertain the validity of the agreement. Following the July 1,
2005, DRC’s recommendations holding the agreement to be a valid contract and
the trial court’s adoption of the recommendations on August 22, 2005, Leslie and
Jim appealed and cross-appealed the decision. Thereafter, our Court, on January
11, 2006, dismissed the action as interlocutory (2005-CA-001976).
Another disputed issue between the parties was the DRC’s
recommendation to award pendente lite maintenance to Leslie and the court’s
incorporation of the recommendation in an order, which required Jim to pay Leslie
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$6,000 per month in pendente lite maintenance. Jim believed that the antenuptial
agreement waived all maintenance including temporary maintenance.
Finally, following a hearing May 23, 2006, to resolve additional
issues related to the dissolution of the marriage, the DRC determined with regard
to one of those issues that the horse, claimed by Leslie, was owned by Jim. Leslie
asserted that the horse, named “Leslie’s Lady” and purchased prior to the marriage
by Jim, had been a gift to her from Jim. As Jim died on February 20, 2006, during
the pendency of the action, Bamberger, the executor of the estate, has no personal
knowledge as to whether Jim gave Leslie the horse. The DRC outlined the known
facts in his recommendation and noted that Leslie’s Lady was purchased on
September 27, 1997, with two other animals from the Keeneland Association, Inc.
The invoice was made out to James T. Hines, Jr. Leslie had no evidence that Jim
ever transferred the horse to her. The DRC, based on the evidence, found that Jim
was the owner of the horse. The circuit court upheld the DRC’s recommendation
in its order of October 30, 2006.
This appeal and cross-appeal follow. In summary, the issues appealed
are as follows: Jim’s executor is appealing the decision to award pendente lite
maintenance, and Leslie is appealing the decisions that the antenuptial agreement
was valid and that the horse, “Leslie’s Lady,” was Jim’s property.
ANALYSIS
1. Antenuptial Agreement
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The unconscionability of a prenuptial agreement is a question of law
to be determined by the court. 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife, § 136 (2008).
Moreover, the fairness of antenuptial agreements must be considered on a case-bycase basis. Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 946 (Ky. 1990).
Cognizant of the fact that “[t]he construction as well as the meaning and legal
effect of a written instrument . . . is a matter of law for the court[,]” we will
scrutinize it in light of this condition proviso. Morganfield Nat. Bank v. Damien
Elder & Sons, 836 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Ky. 1992).
Unquestionably, in Kentucky, it is well-settled that, upon dissolution
of marriage, antenuptial agreements are permitted. Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d
928 (Ky. 1990). Antenuptial agreements, however, may be invalid if certain legal
criteria are not met. Id. To determine the validity of such an agreement, a court
must consider whether: (1) the agreement was obtained through misrepresentation
or nondisclosure of material facts; (2) the agreement was unconscionable when
executed; and (3) the facts and circumstances have changed since the agreement
was executed so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable. Id. at 936.
In the case at hand, the DRC determined that the antenuptial
agreement was not the result of fraud, duress, mistake or nondisclosure of material
facts, that the agreement was not unconscionable when it was executed, and that
the circumstances had not changed so as to make its enforcement unfair and
unreasonable.
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Leslie challenged the enforceability of the agreement because,
according to her, the agreement was obtained by fraudulent inducement, duress,
and misrepresentation. She based her claim on Jim’s action in procuring the
antenuptial agreement. The DRC, however, resolved that this was not the case.
First, Leslie had a copy of the antenuptial agreement before the wedding and
discussed it with her attorney. And, even though the attorney on two separate
occasions advised Leslie not to sign it, she did sign it. Second, nothing exists on
the record to show that she did not do so voluntarily and intelligently. Thus, with
regard to the first criteria for analyzing the validity of an antenuptial agreement,
the DRC found no fraud, duress, misrepresentation, nondisclosure or mistake.
The next criterion is whether the agreement was unconscionable when
executed. Again, the Kentucky Supreme Court “has embraced the view that antenuptial agreements are not per se invalid as against public policy[,]” but “that
courts retain the right to analyze such agreements for unconscionability at the time
of enforcement.” Lane v. Lane, 202 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Ky. 2006) (internal citations
omitted). Under the second prong of the Gentry analysis, an antenuptial agreement
is void if its provisions were unconscionable at the time the agreement was
executed.
Here, the antenuptial agreement applies to both Jim and Leslie and
reflects that both parties made a full and complete disclosure of their respective
financial situations. Further, in the agreement they acknowledge that they had the
opportunity to consult independent counsel, and in addition, the agreement
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represented all that they agreed to do. We simply can find nothing that suggests
the agreement was unconscionable when executed. Therefore, we agree with the
trial court that the agreement was not unconscionable at the time of its execution.
The final criterion of the Gentry analysis is whether the facts and
circumstances of the parties when they entered into the agreement have changed so
that enforcement of the agreement at this time would be unfair. The type of
changed facts and circumstances contemplated under the third criterion are
primarily those that are dependent upon the passage of time. Here, Leslie provided
no evidence that the facts and circumstances have changed profoundly from the
date of marriage to the date of the dissolution petition. As observed by the DRC,
the only change in circumstance, as established by the proof, is that Jim’s assets
have declined and Leslie’ assets have appreciated. And we would be remiss to not
point out that Jim’s health has declined in the years following the marriage.
Therefore, no facts or circumstances have occurred since the execution of the
antenuptial agreement that would now render it unfair. Thus, conclusively, the
DRC found that the agreement was valid and enforceable after reviewing the three
Gentry criteria for evaluation of an antenuptial agreement. The trial court adopted
his recommendations, and we agree with the court.
Additional guidance in reviewing other issues concerning the validity
of antenuptial agreements has been provided by Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W.3d 585 (Ky.
App. 2001). Following that Court’s reiteration of the three criteria, it elucidated
additional standards for assessing the enforceability of antenuptial agreements. It
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explained that an agreement is subject to review at the time enforcement is sought;
it may be set aside if the court decides it is manifestly unfair and unreasonable;
and, the party seeking to overturn the enforceability of the agreement has the
burden of proof to demonstrate that the agreement is invalid or should be modified.
Id. at 589. Leslie suggests that Jim did not meet his burden of proof. But, with
regard to burden of proof, Blue states: “[t]he opponent of the agreement has the
burden of proving the agreement is invalid or should be modified.” Id.
Furthermore, Leslie contends, based on a Florida case (Lutgert v.
Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111(Fla. App. 1976)), that Jim had to exercise the “highest
degree of good faith, candor and sincerity in all matters bearing on the terms and
execution of the proposed agreemen[t].” Id. at 1115. Leslie maintains, based on
Lutgert that the DRC erred in finding the antenuptial agreement enforceable as he
neglected to make findings about Jim’s behavior in obtaining the antenuptial
agreement. She asserts his behavior did not meet that standard, and therefore, the
agreement is not enforceable. In fact, Leslie has provided no Kentucky
jurisprudence that has this requirement nor has she established that Jim’s behavior
did not meet the standard. In addition, the DRC correctly used the Kentucky cases
of Gentry and Blue to analyze the enforceability of the agreement. We shall now
specifically consider the maintenance provision of the antenuptial agreement. Was
the provision denying maintenance in the agreement against public policy and,
hence, unconscionable? Waiver of maintenance provisions have been recognized
as enforceable. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d at 945. Hence, a maintenance provision
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in an antenuptial agreement is not void against public policy, and we find no
rationale or evidence to support that the waiver of maintenance in the parties’
antenuptial agreement is void. We concur in the analysis and hold that the
antenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable.
2 Pendente Lite Maintenance
The purpose of temporary alimony is to provide for the support of a
spouse, while living apart from the other spouse, pending a determination of the
case, and maintain the status quo between the spouses. Such allowance is based on
a spouse's obligation to support the other spouse until there is a divorce. Coffee v.
Coffee, 247 S.W.2d 501 (Ky. 1952).
Turning to the case at hand, Jim contends that the antenuptial
agreement prohibited temporary maintenance. Whereas, Leslie contends that
Paragraphs G and H specify that the rights regarding maintenance will only be
assessed “upon termination of their marriage” or “upon legal separation.”
Antenuptial Marital Property Agreement, Page 2. She argues that because the
parties were still married, Jim had a duty to support her during the pendency of the
action.
Jim’s response to her reliance on Paragraphs G and H of the
agreement is that these paragraphs are preliminary paragraphs and should be
ignored. And he argues that Paragraph Six of the agreement, titled “Waiver of
Maintenance,” (Id. at Page 5) unambiguously states maintenance is waived. Yet,
while the language of that paragraph definitely waives maintenance when the
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marriage terminates, it never directly addresses temporary maintenance. Given
that Paragraph Six of the agreement does not specifically mention pendente lite
maintenance, we concur with the reasoning of the DRC. In other words, since the
introductory paragraphs of the agreement designate that the agreement becomes
operative upon the dissolution of the marriage and because Paragraph Six does not
prohibit temporary maintenance, we concur that the agreement allows for an award
of pendente lite maintenance.
Moreover, in determining the amount of the temporary support, the
DRC did not abuse his discretion as he adequately reviewed Leslie’s expenses, and
concluded that $6,000 per month rather than $10,000 per month was an appropriate
amount for pendente lite maintenance. As a matter of fact, Jim’s brief even said
“[h]e realized that Leslie may be entitled to maintenance for a period of time but
for different reasons that the Commissioner determined.” Appellant’s Brief, Page
3. And his claim that the pendente lite maintenance order is not fair because the
temporary support could last longer than was equitable is not persuasive.
Pendente lite maintenance is a temporary order and a motion to rescind or change
it can be made. Indeed, such a motion was made and Leslie’s temporary support
was ordered terminated in May 2006.
3. Disposition of “Leslie’s Lady”
Ownership of the horse, “Leslie’s Lady,” was an issue at the May 23,
2006, hearing. Leslie said she did not contest the ownership of the horse earlier
because she was waiting until the validity of the antenuptial agreement was
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decided. Nonetheless, with regard to her claim of ownership of the horse, Leslie
was never able to prove the transfer of ownership of the horse from Jim to her. To
support her claim of ownership, Leslie provided photos of her and Jim with the
horse in the winners’ circle at a couple of races. On the other hand, Jim
established his ownership by providing a duplicate copy of the Certificate of
Registration listing him as the owner. Likewise, he provided his 1997, 1998, 1999,
and 2000 tax returns, which contained the information on them that he depreciated
the horse, included the horse’s race income and deducted the horse’s expenses.
Based on these factors, the DRC found that Jim was the owner of “Leslie’s Lady,”
and the trial court adopted the finding. We find no abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Daviess Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Phillip G. Abshier
Owensboro, Kentucky
Charles E. Moore
Owensboro, Kentucky
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