UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, INC. VS. BEGLIN (MICHAEL G.), ET AL.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JANUARY 16, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000018-MR
AND
NO. 2007-CA-000133-MR
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER,
INC. D/B/A UNIVERSITY OF
LOUISVILLE HOSPITAL
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENISE CLAYTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-01605
MICHAEL G. BEGLIN, EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF JENNIFER W.
BEGLIN; MICHAEL G. BEGLIN,
INDIVIDUALLY; MICHAEL G.
BEGLIN, PARENT AND NEXT
FRIEND OF THE MINORS,
WILLIAM PATRICK BEGLIN
AND KELLY ANN BEGLIN1;
WILLIAM PATRICK BEGLIN,
INDIVIDUALLY; KELLY ANN
BEGLIN, INDIVIDUALLY
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
1
At times, Kelly Ann Beglin is referred to as Kelly Ann Beglin Hamilton.
BEFORE: VANMETER AND WINE, JUDGES; GUIDUGLI,2 SENIOR JUDGE.
VANMETER, JUDGE: University Medical Center, Inc. d/b/a University of
Louisville Hospital (the Hospital), appeals from the Jefferson Circuit Court’s
judgment awarding appellees/cross-appellants $9,047,003.09 after a jury found that
the Hospital, or its employees and agents, acted negligently in causing the 2003
death of Jennifer Beglin.3 We affirm. As a result, we need not reach the merits of
the protective cross-appeal filed by appellees/cross-appellants from the same
judgment.
I.
General Facts
Beglin suffered from Crohn’s disease since the birth of her first child
in 1987. Due to the effects of this disease, Beglin underwent an ileocolic resection
in 1989 and an angular anoscopy in 1998. During the latter surgery, Dr. Susan
Galandiuk removed Beglin’s abdominal colon and connected the end of her small
bowel to a discharge bag. Beglin suffered significant blood loss during this
surgery. Her blood was typed and screened during the surgery, and she received a
blood transfusion after the surgery. After Beglin was discharged from the hospital,
she developed coagulopathy,4 which required readmission to the hospital and
another blood transfusion.
2
Senior Judge Daniel T. Guidugli sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
3
The jury found that Dr. Susan Galandiuk and Dr. Guy Lerner, other defendants below, were not
negligent in causing Beglin’s death. These two defendants are not parties to this appeal.
4
Coagulopathy is a “[d]efect in the blood clotting mechanisms.” Taber’s Cyclopedic Medical
Dictionary 374 (16th ed. 1989).
-2-
On July 14, 2003, Beglin reported to the Hospital in anticipation of
undergoing a complete proctectomy. She discussed her bleeding history with some
nurses and Dr. Guy Lerner, the chief anesthesiologist. Dr. Lerner discussed the
matter with Dr. Galandiuk, who was to perform Beglin’s surgery, and the doctors
agreed that it was unlikely Beglin would experience another surgical bleeding
episode. Indeed, Dr. Galandiuk had previously independently determined that it
was unnecessary to type and cross-match Jennifer’s blood in preparation for the
surgery, which was expected to last 2.5 to 3 hours, with a loss of approximately
400 cc’s of blood.
Unfortunately, by 1.5 hours into the surgery, at 6:30 p.m., Beglin had
already lost 500 cc’s of blood. Albumin and other fluids were ordered from the
blood bank and transfused into Beglin. Dr. Lerner subsequently noticed a decrease
in Beglin’s pulse and ordered that a blood sample be taken for typing and crossmatching in the event a blood transfusion was needed. However, conflicting
testimony was adduced at trial as to when this order was given. Dr. Lerner
testified that he gave the order before he left the operating room, and that he
returned to the operating room and the sample then was sent between 7:30 and
7:45.5 Similarly, Dr. Ozan Akca testified that he drew the blood sample between
7:30 and 7:40 and gave it to Nurse Barbara Cantrell to send to the blood lab before
7:45. Dr. J. Cheng placed the timing slightly later, testifying that Dr. Lerner gave
the order after he returned to the operating room at 7:45, that Dr. Akca took the
5
Dr. Lerner acknowledged, however, that he earlier testified by deposition that he ordered the
sample to be drawn when he returned to the operating room between 7:30 and 7:45.
-3-
blood sample, and that it was sent for testing within ten minutes of the order, i.e.,
by 7:55. Cantrell placed the timing even later, testifying that when Dr. Lerner
initially stated at 7:45 that he needed blood, she called the blood bank to see if
Beglin had a sample on file. However, Beglin’s drawn blood sample was not
given to Cantrell until 8:05. Cynthia Williams in the blood bank entered Beglin’s
sample information into the computer at 8:20, after it was processed through a
centrifuge for eight minutes.
In any event, it was undisputed that the process of typing, crossmatching, and obtaining blood for a transfusion takes 45 to 50 minutes. Thus,
relying on the range of times provided in the testimony as to when Beglin’s blood
sample was drawn, the blood for Beglin’s transfusion was expected to arrive in the
operating room at some point between 8:15 and 8:55.
Meanwhile, at 8:12 or 8:15 it was determined that Beglin’s hemotacrit
and hemoglobin levels were extremely low. Cantrell told Dr. Lerner that they were
ten minutes away from receiving units of Beglin’s blood type, or they could obtain
units of universal blood in the same amount of time,6 and Dr. Lerner opted to wait
for units of Beglin’s blood type. Dr. Lerner testified at trial that he ordered
universal blood, stat, when units of Beglin’s blood type did not arrive by 8:25,
although he acknowledged that he testified by deposition that he did not order
6
The parties indicate in their briefs that to obtain universal blood, it took either ten minutes, or
one minute per unit, up to ten minutes maximum.
-4-
universal blood until 8:35. Dr. Akca testified, by contrast, that universal blood was
ordered between 8:15 and 8:25.
The Hospital’s blood bank records indicate that units of universal
blood were released at 8:46, and the anesthesia log indicates that the transfusion
began between 8:47 and 8:50. At around 8:50, Beglin experienced dilutional
coagulopathy7 and more blood loss. She suffered cardiac arrest, was given CPR,
was resuscitated, and eventually was sent to recovery. Unfortunately, Beglin
incurred brain damage due to a lack of oxygen-carrying blood. She died October
9, 2003, after life support systems were withdrawn.
Beglin’s husband, Michael G. Beglin, filed suit against the Hospital
individually, as executor of the Estate of Jennifer W. Beglin, and as parent and
next friend of minors William Patrick Beglin and Kelly Ann Beglin. After a trial,
the jury found that the Hospital acted negligently in treating Beglin and awarded
the following damages: $1,922,102.00 for the destruction of Jennifer Beglin’s
power to labor and earn money; $367,358.09 for medical expenses incurred;
$7,543.00 for funeral and burial expenses; and $1,500,000.00 for each child’s loss,
until age 18, of their mother’s love, affection, guidance, and services. The jury
also awarded $3,750,000.00 in punitive damages, resulting in a total award of
$9,047,003.09. The trial court entered judgment accordingly; this appeal followed.
II.
Spoliation/Missing Evidence Instruction
7
“Dilutional coagulopathy” means that blood is diluted to the extent that there is not a sufficient
amount of platelets to allow the blood to clot. In re Nance, 143 S.W.3d 506, 509 (Tex. App.
2004).
-5-
The Hospital’s first argument is that the trial court erred by giving the
following missing evidence instruction to the jury:
If you find from the evidence that an incident
report was in fact prepared by Nurse Barbara Cantrell
recording material information about Mrs. Beglin’s
surgery, and if you further find from the evidence that
University Medical Center, Inc. d/b/a University of
Louisville Hospital, intentionally and in bad faith lost or
destroyed the incident report, you may, but are not
required to, infer that the information recorded in the
incident report would be, if available, adverse to
University Medical Center and favorable to the plaintiffs.
We disagree.
The Kentucky Supreme Court declined to create a new cause of action
for “spoliation of evidence” in Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky.
1997), a products liability action. Instead, the court explained that “[w]here the
issue of destroyed or missing evidence has arisen, we have chosen to remedy the
matter through evidentiary rules and ‘missing evidence’ instructions.” Id.
“[A]bsent some degree of ‘bad faith,’ [a criminal] defendant is not
entitled to an instruction that the jury may draw an adverse inference from that
failure.” Estep v. Commonwealth, 64 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Ky. 2002). The Hospital
argues that Beglin was not entitled to a missing evidence instruction because there
was no evidence of bad faith regarding the missing incident report; instead, the
report was, at most, lost. In support, the Hospital describes and relies upon
Cantrell’s trial testimony as follows:
During trial, [Cantrell] testified that she completed an
“incident report” at the suggestion of Elaine Strong, the
-6-
charge nurse, following Jennifer’s surgery. [Cantrell]
testified that the only information she would have
recorded in the report was that CPR was performed in the
OR. [Cantrell] acknowledged that in an earlier
deposition she had testified that she did not believe she
had completed an incident report, but if she had she
would have included a chronology and her perception of
events that occurred during surgery. [Cantrell] testified
at trial that she placed the report in the bin at the front
desk.
(Internal footnotes omitted.) Appellees argue, on the other hand, that the very
nature of the incident report is such that the Hospital would not want it available
for litigation.
Regardless of whether the trial court was persuaded that the Hospital
acted in bad faith in causing the incident report to not be produced, the court did
not err by instructing the jury as it did. Simply put, the court left the decision as to
whether the Hospital acted in bad faith up to the jury. It instructed that if the jury
found that Cantrell recorded in a report material information about Beglin’s
surgery, and if the jury found that the Hospital intentionally and in bad faith lost or
destroyed the report, it could, but was not required to, infer that the information if
available would be adverse to the Hospital/favorable to the plaintiffs. Thus, the
jury was not required to weigh the evidence at all, much less in favor of appellees.
III.
A.
Punitive Damages
Jury Instruction
The jury awarded Beglin $3,750,000 after receiving the following
punitive damages instruction:
-7-
[I]f you are further satisfied from clear and convincing
evidence that University Medical Center, Inc. d/b/a
University of Louisville Hospital, acted in reckless
disregard for the lives, safety or property of others,
including Jennifer Beglin, during the operation from the
time blood was ordered until it was delivered, you may in
your discretion award punitive damages against this
defendant in addition to the damages awarded under
Verdict Form A [regarding compensatory damages].
Clear and convincing evidence means that you must be
persuaded that the truth of the contention is highly
probable. The evidence must be substantially more
persuasive than a preponderance of the evidence, but it
does not have to be beyond a reasonable doubt. You are
not required to award punitive damages.
Your discretion to determine and award an
amount, if any, of punitive damages is limited to the
following factors:
the harm to Jennifer Beglin as measured by the
damages you have awarded under Verdict Form A; and
the degree of reprehensibility, if any, of the
defendant’s conduct. This includes whether the conduct
evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the
health and safety of others and whether the harm was the
result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere
accident.
“Punitive damages” are damages awarded against
a defendant for the purpose of punishing the defendant
for its misconduct in this case and deterring it and others
from engaging in similar conduct in the future.
If you award punitive damages, they must [be]
fixed with calm discretion and sound reason, and must
never be either awarded, or fixed in amount, because of
any sympathy, or bias, or prejudice with respect to any
party to the case.
If you award punitive damages, you will state the
amount separately from the sum or sums awarded under
-8-
Verdict Form A. You may not award punitive damages
against one defendant because of the conduct of any
other defendant. You must judge each defendant
individually based on its own independent acts or
conduct. To award punitive damages against University
Medical Center, Inc. d/b/a University of Louisville
Hospital, you also must find by clear and convincing
evidence that University Medical Center (1) should have
anticipated the conduct in question, or (2) that it
authorized the conduct in question, or (3) that it ratified
the conduct in question. The amounts of the punitive
damages award, if any, must represent the degree of
punishment, if any, that you believe is appropriate for the
defendant based on that defendant’s own conduct and not
the conduct of any other defendant.
The Hospital argues that the trial court erred by so instructing the jury. We
disagree.
The well-established common law standard for awarding punitive
damages is gross negligence. Kinney v. Butcher, 131 S.W.3d 357, 358-59
(Ky.App. 2004) (quoting Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1998)). Gross
negligence is defined as “a ‘wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of other
persons.’” Id. at 359 (quoting Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46, 52
(Ky. 2003)). In order to recover punitive damages, a plaintiff must prove his case
by clear and convincing evidence. KRS 411.184(2).
Here, the jury was instructed to award punitive damages only if it
found that the Hospital acted recklessly with regard to Beglin’s safety “during the
operation from the time blood was ordered until it was delivered[.]” The Hospital
argues in its brief, however, that there was no evidence that Cantrell either (1)
delayed taking action regarding the blood sample for 20 minutes even though she
-9-
knew it was a “stat” order, or (2) “kept the anesthesiologists in the dark the entire
time they were demanding updates.” Rather, the Hospital argues that Cantrell was
performing many tasks in the operating room, including calling the blood bank,
and that at worst, there was a lack of communication in the operating room as to
when Beglin’s sample was sent to the blood bank.
However, “[a] party is entitled to have the jury instructed on the issue
of punitive damages ‘if there was any evidence to support an award of punitive
damages.’” Thomas v. Greenview Hospital, Inc., 127 S.W.3d 663, 673 (Ky.App.
2004) (overruled on other grounds) (quoting Shortridge v. Rice, 929 S.W.2d 194,
197 (Ky.App. 1996)). Here, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of
appellees, Thomas, 127 S.W.3d at 673, we conclude that the trial court did not err
by instructing the jury on punitive damages. From the testimony, the jury could
have inferred that Beglin’s blood sample was drawn between 7:30 and 7:40, but
that Cantrell did not send the sample to the blood bank until 8:05. Moreover, the
jury could have inferred that Cantrell informed Dr. Lerner at 8:15 that they were
ten minutes away from receiving Beglin’s blood type, even though she knew that
she did not send the sample until 8:05, and it took 45 to 50 minutes to type, crossmatch, and obtain blood.
Additionally, evidence was introduced that while universal blood was
ordered as early as 8:15, and it took up to ten minutes to receive universal blood,
universal blood was not released from the blood bank until 8:46. The evidence
also showed that Cantrell made twelve to eighteen calls to the blood bank but did
-10-
not respond to a technician’s statement that emergency release blood was
available. The jury also heard evidence that Beglin’s blood order form said that
the blood was needed in endoscopy at 8:20, and that there were some irregularities
in the execution of the Hospital’s blood policies. Such evidence clearly warranted
a punitive damage instruction.
B.
Principal/Employer Liability
Next, the Hospital argues that even if a punitive damages jury
instruction was warranted, the Hospital was not liable for these damages as it
neither authorized, ratified, nor should have anticipated any grossly negligent
conduct by its agents or employees. We disagree.
Pursuant to KRS 411.184(3), punitive damages shall not be assessed
“against a principal or employer for the act of an agent or employee unless such
principal or employer authorized or ratified or should have anticipated the conduct
in question.” Here, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of appellees,
Simpson County Steeplechase Ass'n, Inc. v. Roberts, 898 S.W.2d 523, 527
(Ky.App. 1995), the trial court did not err by instructing the jury on punitive
damages against the Hospital. Simply put, the jury could have believed that the
Hospital should have anticipated a mishap in light of evidence that there were
some irregularities in the execution of the Hospital’s blood policies. Further, the
jury could have believed that the Hospital ratified the conduct by failing to perform
an adequate investigation following Beglin’s surgery, as evidenced by the fact that
-11-
the Hospital did not uncover in its investigation that there was a delay in getting
blood to the operating room.8 As appellees argue, a jury need only find one of
authorization, ratification, or anticipation in order to award punitive damages
against a principal or employer.
C.
Constitutionality
Next, the Hospital argues that the jury’s punitive damages award was
grossly excessive or arbitrary, in violation of the Due Process Clause. We
disagree.
A punitive damages award may “enter the zone of arbitrariness
that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” only when it
may be categorized as “grossly excessive” in relation to a State’s legitimate
interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition. BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1595, 134 L.Ed.2d 809
(1996). In reviewing a punitive damages award, we must consider: “(1) the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between
the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury
and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” State Farm v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 1520, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003).
8
While the jury instructions required the jury to find evidence of “reckless disregard for the
lives, safety or property of others . . . during the operation from the time blood was ordered until
it was delivered,” the instructions did not require the jury to find evidence of ratification in that
same time period.
-12-
Appellate courts must “conduct de novo review of a trial court’s application” of
these three factors to a jury’s award. 538 U.S. at 418, 123 S.Ct. at 1520.
The first factor, the “degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
misconduct,” is the “most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive
damages award[.]” 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. at 1521 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at
575, 116 S.Ct. at 1599). In Campbell, the United States Supreme Court set forth
five factors for determining the reprehensibility of a defendant’s misconduct.9 We
conclude that the facts in the matter sub judice meet two of the five factors for
reprehensibility in that physical harm resulted to Beglin, and the jury found that the
conduct evinced the “indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety
of others.” As such, the first factor of three factors shows that some
reprehensibility is present. See Steel Technologies, Inc. v. Congleton, 234 S.W.3d
920, 931 (Ky. 2007) (where harm was physical and the conduct in question
involved reckless disregard for the lives or safety of others, some reprehensibility
was present). See also 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. at 1521 (“[t]he existence of any
one of these [five] factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff may not be sufficient to
sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all of them renders any
award suspect”).
9
The five factors are whether “the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the
tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of
others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated
actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or
deceit, or mere accident.” 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. at 1521.
-13-
With regard to the second factor, the disparity between the harm
suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award, the jury here awarded
$3,750,000.00 in punitive damages and $5,297,003.09 in compensatory damages,10
resulting in a ratio of 0.7 to 1. The United States Supreme Court has declined to
“impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed.” Id. at
425, 123 S.Ct. at 1524. However, it has opined that “[s]ingle-digit multipliers are
more likely to comport with due process . . . than awards with ratios in range of
500 to 1, [Gore, 517 U.S.] at 582, 116 S.Ct. 1589, or in this case, of 145 to 1.” 538
U.S. at 425, 123 S.Ct. at 1524. Here, the ratio of less than one to one clearly
supports a finding that the punitive damage award is not excessive. Such is the
case even in light of the fact that the compensatory damage award in this matter
was substantial. See 538 U.S. at 425, 123 S.Ct. 1524 (“[w]hen compensatory
damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory
damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee”).
Finally, although we are unaware of any penalties for comparable
behavior suitable for comparison to the punitive damages award herein, for
purposes of the third factor, we simply conclude that the award was not excessive
under the guidelines of State Farm v. Campbell and its progeny.
IV.
Damages for Loss of Services
10
The Hospital argues that we should not consider the $1,500,000 damages awarded to each of
Beglin’s two children for their loss of their mother’s love, affection, guidance, and services until
age 18. However, since we hold that the trial court did not err in its instruction on this item of
damages, see infra Part IV, we consider this measure of damages to be part of the ratio of
compensatory damages to punitive damages.
-14-
The trial court instructed the jury that it could award money to each of
Beglin’s two children “for the loss of love, affection, guidance and services, of
Jennifer Beglin from the date of her injury until the age of eighteen not to exceed
$5,000,000.00, the amount claimed.” Based upon this instruction, the jury
awarded $1,500,000 to each child. The Hospital argues that the trial court erred by
instructing the jury that it could award the children damages for the loss of their
mother’s services.11 We disagree.
KRS 411.145(2) provides that a spouse may recover from a third
person damages for “loss of consortium.” “Consortium” is expressly defined as
“the right to the services, assistance, aid, society, companionship and conjugal
relationship between husband and wife, or wife and husband.” KRS 411.145(1)
(emphasis added). The Kentucky Supreme Court held in Giuliani v. Guiler, 951
S.W.2d 318, 319 (Ky. 1997), that a child’s loss of parental consortium claim arises
in Kentucky from the common law; however it appears that the court’s definition
of “parental consortium” in that case did not include, as does KRS 411.145, the
right to recover for the loss of services. See id. at 322 (right to parental consortium
is different from the wrongful death statutes because such statutes are generally
limited to economic loss; parental consortium is based on the loss of love and
affection). The parties have not cited, nor have we found, any express authority for
a child’s claim for the loss of his parent’s services.
11
Evidence was introduced that the children sustained an $80,000 loss in the form of Jennifer’s
household services.
-15-
Still, in Schulz v. Chadwell, 558 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Ky.App. 1977),
this court held that the plaintiff could recover “$3,230.38 for the expense of
persons employed by her to come into her home to perform housework and to
provide for her personal needs[,]” reasoning as follows:
If a person is disabled from performing essential
household tasks as a direct result of a tortious injury, the
injured person should be able to recover the reasonable
expense of hiring substitute help. See Chavez v. United
States, 192 F.Supp. 263, 272-73 (D.Mont.1961).
When the injured person is married, the spouse’s
claim for loss of consortium includes the loss of the
household services of the wife or husband. Beauchamp
v. Davis, 309 Ky. 397, 217 S.W.2d 822, 825 (1948). See
also Kotsiris v. Ling, Ky., 451 S.W.2d 411, 412 (1970).
In the Restatement (Second) of Torts s 693, comment f,
the rule is explained as follows:
The traditional action running to the
husband has included recovery for loss of services
of the wife in the home on the theory that he was
legally entitled to them. Less attention is given
today to the question of whether there is a formal
legal right to household services, the emphasis
being placed upon those mutual contributions that
are normally expected in the maintenance of a
household.
If Mr. Chadwell had paid for the expense of
household help and filed a claim for loss of consortium,
he would have been entitled to recover for that expense.
Because Mrs. Chadwell actually paid for the expense of
additional household help, we cannot see any reason why
she should not be permitted to recover for that expense.
Her recovery for that item of expense would, in effect, be
for the benefit of the family unit.
-16-
Id. Applying this rationale to the matter sub judice, where the jury was not
instructed as to any damages for Michael Beglin individually, we hold that the trial
court did not err by instructing the jury that it could award money to Beglin’s
children for, the loss of, inter alia, services. Certainly these services would have
benefited the entire family unit.
V.
Doctors’ Insurance
Finally, the Hospital argues that the trial court erred by failing to
permit it to introduce, under KRE12 41113 as proof of the doctors’ bias, evidence
that Dr. Galandiuk and Dr. Lerner were insured by the same malpractice carrier.
We disagree.
This court held in Wallace v. Leedhanachoke, 949 S.W.2d 624, 628
(Ky.App. 1996), a medical malpractice action, that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by ruling inadmissible evidence that the defendant-physician and his
expert shared the same liability carrier. Deciding that trial courts facing this issue
should balance the probative value of this evidence against the prejudicial effect it
might have, we explained that, in that case,
[t]he mere fact that the two physicians shared a common
insurance carrier-absent a more compelling degree of
connection-does not clearly evince bias by the expert,
and its arguable relevance or probative value is
insufficient to outweigh the well-established rule as to
12
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
13
KRE 411 provides in part: “Evidence that a person was . . . insured against liability is not
admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This
rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for
another purpose, such as proof of . . . bias or prejudice of a witness.”
-17-
the inadmissibility of evidence as to the existence of
insurance.
Id. at 628. The Kentucky Supreme Court subsequently approved the use of this
balancing test when dealing with the issue of commonality of insurance carriers.
Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439, 447 (Ky. 2005).
We hold that this balancing test is applicable in the matter sub judice,
where the Hospital sought to introduce evidence that two co-defendant doctors
shared the same insurance carrier. To that end, since the Hospital has not alleged
“a more compelling degree of connection” than simply that the doctors shared a
common insurance carrier, the trial court did not err by ruling the evidence
inadmissible. Nor is there reversible error even if the trial court failed to engage in
the balancing test in ruling the evidence inadmissible. See Bayless, 180 S.W.3d at
447 (court could not analyze whether trial court’s failure to engage in balancing
test was prejudicial because there was “no evidence in the record, even by avowal,
of commonality of insurance carriers”).
VI.
Conclusion
The Jefferson Circuit Court’s judgment is affirmed.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS.
WINE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART
AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
WINE, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART: Having considered the record of the skillfully tried case as well as the
meticulously written briefs and ably argued positions of the parties, I respectfully
-18-
dissent as to that portion of the majority opinion relating to the appropriateness of
the missing evidence instruction and the subsequent effect on the award of punitive
damages. I do, however, concur with the balance of the majority opinion as to the
remaining issues.
The appellant Hospital argues that it was reversible error for the trial
court to give a spoliation (missing evidence) instruction and to have allowed
testimony concerning a missing postoperative incident report prepared by Nurse
Barbara Cantrall following the tragic death of Ms. Beglin. Both parties agree that
Cantrall prepared the report as instructed by her superiors and she placed it in the
appropriate area for maintenance of hospital records. For unexplained reasons, the
postoperative report could not be located. More importantly, no one accuses the
Hospital or any agent of intentionally destroying the report or exercising bad faith
in making the report unavailable. The Beglin Estate insinuates the Hospital
intentionally “lost” the postoperative incident report because it was not happy with
the information contained therein. Cantrall was deposed prior to and testified
during trial. Further, a perioperative log report prepared by Cantrall contained
some of the critical information, including when a blood sample was received from
one of the attending physicians.
While the Hospital argues that such an instruction, not premised on
any evidence of intentional misconduct or bad faith, created a prejudicial result
when the jury considered punitive damages, the Beglin Estate disagrees. The
-19-
Hospital further argues that the appellee fails to demonstrate how it was actually
prejudiced by the absence of the report.
Alleged errors regarding jury instructions are questions of law and
must be examined using a de novo standard of review. Hamilton v. CSX
Transportation, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 272, 275 (Ky.App. 2006). “Each party to an
action is entitled to an instruction upon his theory of the case if there is evidence to
sustain it.” Farrington Motors, Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 303 S.W.2d
319, 321 (Ky. 1957).
In Drury v. Spalding, 812 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Ky. 1991), with a
quotation from Prichard v. Kitchen, 242 S.W.2d 988 (Ky. 1951), the Court held:
The rule is that generally an erroneous instruction is
presumed to be prejudicial to appellant, and the
burden is upon appellee to show affirmatively from
the record that no prejudice resulted; and when the
appellate court cannot determine from the record
that the verdict was not influenced by the erroneous
instruction, the judgment will be reversed.
Generally, an error in the instructions is grounds for reversal, unless it
affirmatively appears that it was not prejudicial.
“
Since the early 17th century, courts have admitted evidence tending
to show that a party destroyed evidence relevant to the dispute being litigated.”
Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 78 (3rd Cir. 1994), citing
Jamie S. Gorelick, Steven Marzen and Lawrence Solum, Destruction of Evidence,
§ 2.1 (1989). “Such evidence permitted an inference, the ‘spoliation inference,’
-20-
that the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the position of the
offending party.” Id.
Consistently the appellate courts in Kentucky have limited the
application of missing evidence instructions to intentional misconduct or bad faith.
A party seeking an adverse-inference instruction or other sanctions for
the spoliation of evidence must establish the following elements:
(1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to
preserve it at the time it was destroyed;
(2) that the records were destroyed with a culpable state of mind; and
(3) that the destroyed evidence was relevant to the party’s claim or
defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that
claim or defense.
Accordingly, an instruction regarding spoliation of evidence is proper
when a party has “deliberately destroyed evidence or has failed to either produce
relevant evidence or explain its nonproduction.” 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1100
(2007) (emphasis added). To be entitled to a jury instruction on lost or destroyed
evidence, a defendant must show that the lost or destroyed evidence would have
played a significant role in his or her defense and that comparable evidence could
not be obtained elsewhere. To play a significant role, the exculpatory nature and
value of the evidence must be apparent before the evidence was lost. Estep v.
Commonwealth, 64 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Ky. 2002).
-21-
A defendant’s right to an instruction “permitting the jury to draw a
favorable inference for the defendant from the destruction of [exculpatory]
evidence” was recognized by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Ky. 1988), overruled on other grounds by
Hudson v. Commonwealth, 202 S.W.3d 17, 22 (Ky. 2006). Further, “absent some
degree of bad faith a defendant is not entitled to an instruction that the jury may
draw an adverse inference from the failure to preserve or collect any evidence.”
Peak v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 536, 545 (Ky. 2006).
While the missing evidence instruction has its origins in criminal law,
our courts have applied the same standards to civil cases as well. See Monsanto
Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. 1997).
In making the determination of whether to give these instructions, trial
courts should decide if the failure to produce the evidence “will substantially
prejudice appellant’s right to fair trial.” Tinsley v. Jackson, 771 S.W.2d 331, 332
(Ky. 1989). However, before a “missing evidence” instruction can be given, there
must be some intentional conduct to hinder discovery on the part of the party who
is unable to produce the requested evidence. Estep, supra.
The Sixth Circuit has defined spoliation of evidence as “the
intentional destruction of evidence that is presumed to be unfavorable to the
party responsible for the destruction.” Beck v. Haik, 377 F.3d 624, 641 (6th
Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
-22-
Clearly the Hospital should have preserved the postoperative report.
For unexplained reasons, it was lost or destroyed.
The appellant’s request for a missing evidence instruction was
based upon the supposition alone that the postoperative report must have
contained damaging information that the Hospital desired to withhold. There is
no testimony to support that supposition. If the intent of such an instruction is to
punish conduct such as intentional destruction of evidence or to fail to preserve
such evidence, the remedy would not be appropriate under these circumstances.
The appellee does not show by any affirmative evidence the information
contained on the postoperative form could not be obtained from any other
source. To the contrary, the perioperative log report and Cantrall’s testimony
supported the appellee’s contention that the blood sample had not been
submitted in a timely manner. While I do not agree with the Hospital that the
punitive damages award was excessive, I cannot find that the supposition the
Hospital intentionally destroyed the postoperative record had no influence on the
award.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court
and remand this matter for a new trial.
-23-
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
Raymond G. Smith
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT MICHAEL G.
BEGLIN:
F. Thomas Conway
Chadwick N. Gardner
Louisville, Kentucky
-24-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.