JAMIE ROBERT WADE III VS. FARMERS NATIONAL BANK
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 20, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001791-MR
JAMIE ROBERT WADE III
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGHLAS M. GEORGE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00171
FARMERS NATIONAL BANK
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Jamie Wade (“Jamie”) has appealed pro se from the Marion
Circuit Court’s default judgment in favor of Farmers National Bank (“Farmers”)
and against Jamie. After careful review of the record and the applicable law, we
affirm.
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case was commenced on August 15, 1997, by Star Bank, N.A.
(“Star’) against Jamie and Farmers resulting from Jamie’s default under the terms
of various loan and security documents executed by Jamie in favor of Star. Star
included Farmers as a defendant in the action because it believed that Farmers
might have a security interest in some of the same property in which Star held a
security interest. Jamie was represented by counsel, and filed an answer to Star’s
complaint. Farmers asserted a cross-claim against Jamie, alleging default under
two promissory notes, one of which was co-signed by his aunt, Sharon Wade
(“Sharon”), and security documents granting Farmers security interests in Jamie’s
equipment and other assets. Jamie also filed an answer to this cross-claim.
On May 6, 1998, the Marion Circuit Court entered an order granting
Star a judgment against Jamie in the sum of $101,884.47 and adjudicated Star’s
lien against Jamie’s assets as valid and enforceable, subject only to Farmers’
claims if later found to be prior and superior to those of Star. Thereafter, Jamie’s
attorney requested leave to withdraw as his counsel, stating that Jamie had
obtained new counsel. The court permitted the withdrawal and gave Jamie
fourteen days to have his new counsel make an entry of appearance. No entry of
appearance was ever made.
Thereafter, Jamie filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, which was
subsequently converted to a Chapter 11. Additional activity in the trial court was
stayed while Jamie and his creditors, including Farmers, litigated numerous claims
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in the bankruptcy proceeding. Ultimately, Jamie’s plan of reorganization was
confirmed by the bankruptcy judge following two amendments. Concerning
Farmers’ claims, the plan provided as follows:
D. Class 5 of the Amended Plan consists of the
allowed secured claim of [Farmers] in the sum of
$95,146.00. This is a fully secured claim, collateralized
by a security interest in [Jamie’s] equipment and
accounts receivable. Interest shall accrue on the
outstanding balance at the rate of 10.25% and payments
of $1,456.37 per month will commence thirty (30) days
after the Effective Date of the Amended Plan for a term
of ninety-six (96) months. This claimant’s lien shall
remain on its collateral until the indebtedness is satisfied
in full.
Jamie never appealed any aspect of the plan, and thus became final.
Jamie subsequently defaulted under the plan. Consequently, on May
31. 2001, Farmers filed an amended cross-claim against Jamie detailing his default
and an amended counterclaim against Star asserting Farmers’ claim of a superior
lien. The trial court gave Jamie and Star twenty days to file responsive pleadings.
Neither party filed a response, and on September 21, 2001, the Marion Circuit
Court granted Farmers’ motion for default judgment against Star, thus adjudicating
the liens held by Farmers as superior to any interest of Star.
Meanwhile, Sharon was made a party to Farmers’ cross-claim and
first amended cross-claim on August 8, 2001. On February 18, 2002, Farmers
and Sharon entered into an agreed order that Farmers would recover $48,207.22
from Sharon, and that Farmers was entitled to an order directing the sale of Jamie’s
equipment to satisfy the judgment, which was approved by the trial court. The
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Marion Circuit Clerk issued a writ of possession on November 21, 2002,
authorizing the Sheriff of Marion County to seize certain property securing
Farmers’ loan. Those items were eventually repossessed and sold by Farmers.
Almost six years after Farmers filed its first amended cross-claim
against Jamie, and due to the lack of any filing by Jamie of a response to the crossclaim, on May 26, 2007, Farmers moved for a default judgment or, alternatively, a
summary judgment. A hearing on the motion was held, and Jamie appeared at the
hearing with counsel and was granted twenty additional days to file a response to
the motion. Jamie did not file a response. Accordingly, seventeen days after
Jamie’s response was due, the Marion Circuit Court issued a default judgment in
favor of Farmers. Although it granted a default judgment, the trial court also found
that Farmers would prevail on a summary judgment as well because of Jamie’s
failure to establish the existence of any issue of material fact. The judgment
endorsed Farmers’ secured status, confirmed the appropriateness of Farmers’
repossession and sale of its collateral, and awarded Farmers the balance payable by
Jamie.
On August 25, 2006, Jamie filed this appeal from the trial court’s
default judgment. Throughout the pendency of this appeal, Jamie filed over twenty
procedural motions, including three motions pending before the Court: a motion to
amend his pre-hearing statement, a motion for enlargement of time to amend his
pre-hearing statement, and a motion requesting the Court to review and consider
the amended pre-hearing statement. In addition to filing a response and objection
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to these motions, Farmers made a motion to strike Jamie’s brief and to dismiss the
appeal. We will address these motions at the conclusion of this opinion.
ANALYSIS
Because Jamie is appealing directly from a default judgment, the only
issue which may be considered by this Court is whether the pleadings are sufficient
to support the judgment. Jeffrey v. Jeffrey, 153 S.W.3d 849, 851-52 (Ky. App.
2005). Our review of the pleadings in this case shows them to be more than
sufficient to uphold the default judgment. Farmers alleged in its amended crossclaim that Jamie was indebted to Farmers, that Farmers was the holder of a valid
security interest in Jamie’s business equipment which, upon Jamie’s default, was
lawfully possessed and sold. Farmers’ pleadings also showed that Jamie, without
any cause shown, failed to respond to Farmers’ claims, even when he appeared
personally and with counsel at the hearing in which the trial court allowed him
twenty days to respond to Farmers’ motion for default judgment. Therefore, the
pleadings were sufficient to support the default judgment.
Even if Jamie’s claims of error by the Marion Circuit Court were a
proper subject for this Court’s review, in not a single one of the claims does Jamie
provide a citation to the record illustrating whether and in what method the issue
was preserved for review. None of the arguments he advocates in his brief was
presented to and ruled on by the lower court, although Jamie was presented with
multiple opportunities to do so. The foundation of appellate review is based on the
principle that the lower court has first had a chance to deliberate and decide upon
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the issues. Florman v. MEBCO Ltd. Partnership, 207 S.W.3d 593, 607 (Ky. App.
2006). As stated by this Court:
The Court of Appeals is one of review and is not to be
approached as a second opportunity to be heard as a trial
court. An issue not timely raised before the circuit court
cannot be considered as a new argument before this
Court.
Lawrence v. Risen, 598 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. App. 1980). Jamie has failed to
preserve any of his claims of error in the lower court, thus none can be considered
for the first time in this appeal.
The only claim that may be subject to appellate review without
preserving the issue at the trial court level is Jamie’s claim that the default
judgment is null and void because the agreed order entered into between Sharon
and Farmers resulted in manifest injustice towards Jamie. An error under
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 61.02 to avoid "manifest injustice" does
not have to be preserved to be subject to appellate review. CR 61.02. The rule is
applied sparingly and only to exceptional situations affecting the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Deemer v. Finger, 817 S.W.2d
435 (Ky. 1990). The rule is inapplicable to a situation such as this, in which
Sharon was merely satisfying that portion of Jamie’s debt which she had
personally guaranteed, thereby securing her financial wellbeing.
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Marion Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ORDER
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Jamie filed a motion to amend his pre-hearing statement, a motion for
enlargement of time to amend his pre-hearing statement, and a motion requesting
the Court to review and consider the amended pre-hearing statement. Additionally,
Farmers filed a motion to strike Jamie’s brief and to dismiss the appeal. The
Court, having considered such motions, and the responses thereto, ORDERS that
the foregoing motions are hereby DENIED AS MOOT.
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ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: November 20, 2009
/s/ Denise G. Clayton
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jamie R. Wade, III
Lebanon, Kentucky
Joseph H. Mattingly, III
Lebanon, Kentucky
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