STIDHAM (BRENDA) VS. COMPENSATION HAZARD ARH , ET AL.
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RENDERED: MAY 16, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000215-WC
BRENDA STIDHAM
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-97-02667
HAZARD ARH; CENTRAL BAPTIST HOSPITAL;
BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM; DR. WILLIAM
SKINNER; DR. C. KRISHNASWAMY; APPLACHIAN
HEART CENTER; KENTUCKY MEDICAL SERVICES
FOUNDATION; ROCK MOUNTAIN HOLDINGS, LLC,
SE; CARDIOLOGY ASSOCIATES OF KENTUCY;
CENTRAL KENTUCKY ANESTHESIA, P.S.C.;
ARH HOMPLACE CLINIC; HON. LANDON
OVERFIELD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF, JUDGE, NICKELL, JUDGE; GRAVES,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
GRAVES, SENIOR JUDGE: Brenda Stidham petitions for review from an opinion of the
Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) which affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s
(ALJ) determination that Stidham’s present and continuing heart treatment requirements
Senior Judge John W. Graves sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
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are not related to a 1996 work-related heart attack for which she was awarded
permanent partial disability benefits. Stidham contends that the ALJ too broadly
foreclosed the possibility that future medical expenses connected with the 1996 heart
attack would be required. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Stidham suffered a work-related heart attack on May 6, 1996, while
employed by Hazard ARH. She subsequently underwent heart surgery and was
eventually awarded total permanent occupational disability benefits. In connection with
the award, Stidham was also awarded a medical coverage benefit to pay for any future
expenses associated with the 1996 heart attack.
Beginning in the spring of 2006, Stidham was required to undergo multiple
hospitalizations and continuing treatment for cardiac-related illness. She sought
payment for the hospitalizations and treatment based upon her prior workers’
compensation award. In response, on September 1, 2006, Hazard ARH filed a medical
fee dispute contesting the compensability of Stidham’s continued heart treatment. A
“second notice” contesting expenses was filed by Hazard ARH on May 22, 2007.
On June 8, 2007, the ALJ issued an opinion and order finding that the
contested medical expenses were not compensable because the expenses were not
associated with the 1996 heart attack but, rather, was related to atherosclerosis, a heart
condition separate and apart from the 1996 heart attack. The opinion and order also
indicated that any continuing expenses would not be considered as related to the May
1996 heart attack. Stidham filed a motion for reconsideration seeking clarification that
“the opinion and order be corrected to clarify that the defendant-employer is absolved of
responsibility for continuing cardiac care related to the atherosclerosis, but that the
defendant-employer would still remain responsible for any treatment related to the May
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6, 1996, heart attack should any be necessary in the future.” On July 6, 2007, the ALJ
entered an order denying the motion.
Stidham subsequently appealed to the Board. On January 3, 2008, the
Board entered an opinion affirming the ALJ’s determinations. This petition for review
followed.
Before us, Stidham does not contest the ALJ’s determination that the
expenses under consideration in the present fee dispute are not compensable. Rather,
she argues that the ALJ “should not have found the defendant-employer absolved of
liability for all future cardiac care.”
The ALJ addressed the issues before us, in relevant part, as follows:
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
In the reopening, Defendant Employer has submitted
opinions from Daniel Wolens, M.D., an occupational
medicine specialist, William H. Skinner, M.D., Plaintiff’s
treating cardiologist, and Stephen Wagner, M.D., a board
certified cardiologist and associate professor of medicine in
the Department of Cardiology at the University of Louisville
Medical School.
Dr. Wolens reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and
authored a report on September 25, 2006. It was his opinion
that the treatment resulting in the medical expenses which
have been contested is treatment “directed at atherosclerotic
disease” and underlying conditions which caused Plaintiff’s
atherosclerosis, all of which are completely unrelated to the
May 6, 1996 work-related incident.
Defendant Employer has also submitted a medical
questionnaire completed on January 19, 2007 by Plaintiff’s
treating cardiologist, Dr. Skinner. Dr. Skinner, through the
questionnaire, gave the opinion, with reasonable medical
probability, that Plaintiff’s cardiac problems resulting in her
hospitalization in April 2006 and subsequent treatment were
not caused by the May 6, 1996 work-related incident. It was
his opinion that the cardiac problems requiring her treatment
beginning in April 2006 were atherosclerosis with acute
coronary syndrome, a condition which was the natural
progression of her disease process. Dr. Skinner had
continued to follow Plaintiff after her discharge from Central
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Baptist Hospital in May of 1996 and it was his opinion that
Plaintiff’s ongoing cardiac problems and need for ongoing
treatment since May of 1996 were not related to the incident
work [sic] of May 6, 1996. Plaintiff’s current cardiac
problems, according to Dr. Skinner, are caused by her nonwork-related factors and her tobacco abuse. (Emphasis
added).
Pursuant to K.R.S. 342.315, Plaintiff was evaluated in April
1998 by Dr. Wagner at the University of Louisville Medical
School. Dr. Wagner’s Form 108-OD was submitted in the
underlying claim. Defendant Employer had Plaintiff reevaluated by Dr. Wagner on January 8, 2007. Dr. Wagner
also reviewed Plaintiff [sic] medical records, including those
which resulted from her hospitalization and medical care
beginning in April 2006. Dr. Wagner was of the opinion that
any treatment of plaintiff’s cardiac problems after 2002 was
not related to the May 6, 1996 work-related incident.
Continuing cardiac problems and treatment for those
problems “are related to non-work-related factors.” Dr.
Wagner testified to those same opinions in a deposition
taken February 9, 2007. (Emphasis added).
There is no medical evidence to rebut the opinions of Drs.
Wolens, Skinner and Wagner. . . .
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The medical expenses contested by Defendant
Employer and any medical expenses for continuing
treatment of Plaintiff’s cardiac conditions are not reasonably
necessary for the cure and relief of the effects of Plaintiff’s
May 6, 1996 work-related injury. In making this finding, I
have relied on the opinions of Drs. Wolens, Skinner and
Wagner.
2. Pursuant to K.R.S. 342.020, the contested medical
expenses and continuing medical expenses for treatment of
plaintiff’s cardiac condition are not compensable and are not
the responsibility of Defendant Employer.
It is well settled that “the ALJ, as fact-finder, has the sole authority to judge
the weight, credibility and inferences to be drawn from the record.” Miller v. East
Kentucky Beverage/Pepsico, Inc., 951 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Ky. 1997).
The unrebutted medical evidence was that Stidham’s present heart
problems requiring treatment are not connected with the work-related heart attack.
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Stidham does not even contest this. Further, however, that ALJ drew a reasonable
inference from the medical evidence that the full-range of effects relating to the 1996
heart attack have been fully resolved, and that there is no reasonable medical possibility
that any additional treatment for that attack will be incurred in the future. The medical
evidence, as set forth above, fully supports this inference and, indeed, this result is
compelled by the record before this Court. As such, we will not disturb the ALJ’s
determination upon this issue. With the foregoing said, however, had the medical proof
established that the 1996 heart attack made Stidham more susceptible to an early onset of atherosclerotic disease, or had the evidence suggested that future medical
expenses could be incurred as a result of the 1996 attack, we may well have reached a
different result.
Stidham also contends that the cause should be remanded to the ALJ to
permit her to “respond to the second medical dispute” filed by Hazard ARH on May 22,
2007. However, a review of Stidham’s Petition for Reconsideration reflects that this
issue was not raised therein.
KRS2 342.281 has been construed as the statutory counterpart of CR3
52.04, requiring that an issue be raised in a petition for reconsideration to be filed in
order to preserve a patent error or omission of fact for judicial review. See Osborne v.
Pepsi Cola, 816 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1991); Hall's Hardwood Floor Co. v. Stapleton, 16
S.W.3d 327 (Ky.App. 2000). Hence, this issue is not properly preserved for our review.
In any event, we agree with the Board’s discussion of the issue, and adopt its reasoning
as follows:
The filing of this notice did not constitute as separate and
distinct medical fee dispute. 803 KAR 25:012 Sec. 1
provides that a single Form 112 may encompass
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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statements, services, or treatment previously rendered as
well as future statements, services, or treatment of the same
nature or for the same condition if specifically stated. . . .
Stidham’s continuing cardiac care was already an issue
before the ALJ at the time Hazard filed the notice of
continued medical expense controversy. Since the employer
was contesting ongoing treatment, Stidham should have
been aware the treatment extending from March 4, 2007
through March 29, 2007 would be contested as well.
Medical records from the treatment were attached to the
notice of continued medical expense controversy. Again, we
note Stidham points to nothing in the medical evidence that
would support a finding in her favor.
When reviewing one of the Board's decisions, this Court will only reverse
the Board when it has overlooked or misconstrued controlling law or so flagrantly erred
in evaluating the evidence that it has caused gross injustice. Western Baptist Hosp. v.
Kelly, 827 S.W .2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992). Such not having occurred here, we will not
disturb the Board’s determination upon the issue.
For the foregoing reasons the opinion of the Workers’ Compensation
Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE HAZARD, ARH:
Monica Rice Smith
Hyden, Kentucky
Joe W. Aubrey
Louisville, Kentucky
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