BAIZE (MARK) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 26, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000139-MR
MARK BAIZE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OHIO CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00229
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: STUMBO AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; GUIDUGLI,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
STUMBO, JUDGE: Mark D. Baize appeals from an order of the Ohio Circuit
Court denying his motion for RCr 11.42 relief from judgment. He contends that
the circuit court erred in failing to conclude that his trial counsel did not properly
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Senior Judge Daniel T. Guidugli sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
investigate the facts of his case, and committed fraud by directing Baize to plead
guilty with the knowledge that Baize was under the influence of mind-altering
drugs at the time of the plea. He also argues that he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on the motion. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the order on
appeal.
On December 29, 2003, the Ohio County grand jury indicted Baize on
fleeing and evading police in the second-degree, criminal trespass in the thirddegree, possession of a prescription controlled substance in a container other than
its original container, two counts of criminal mischief in the third-degree, and
possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container with the intent to
manufacture methamphetamine. The indictment also alleged that Baize was a
persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first-degree. The indictment resulted from
events occurring on November 10, 2003, when officers of the Beaver Dam police
department responded to a call regarding suspicious activity at Felty’s Crop
Service. Upon arriving, officers observed a man wearing a black hat and black
jacket who was carrying a propane tank and walking along a ditch. The man, Mark
Baize, began running, and shortly thereafter was apprehended. Officers recovered
a black hat and propane tank from the route Baize had taken while fleeing. He was
found to be in possession of prescription drugs, and subsequently was arrested.
Baize received appointed counsel, who filed a motion seeking a
psychiatric evaluation for purposes of determining whether Baize was competent
to stand trial. The motion was sustained, and Baize received a psychiatric
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evaluation which determined that he was competent. Baize’s appointed counsel
was then replaced by private counsel, after which the circuit court found that Baize
was competent to stand trial.
On February 10, 2006, Baize accepted a plea offer from the
Commonwealth and tendered a motion to enter a guilty plea. Under the terms of
the plea, the count of theft by unlawful taking was amended to attempted theft by
unlawful taking, with a recommended sentence of 10 years; the possession of
anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container charge would carry a
recommended sentence of 5 years; and, the remaining counts would be dismissed,
with a recommended total sentence including PFO-enhancement of 15 years. On
February 16, 2006, the plea was accepted and a judgment was rendered, and on
May 12, 2006, Baize was sentenced in accordance with the terms of the
Commonwealth’s recommendation.
On October 24, 2007, Baize filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion to vacate
his sentence based on ineffective assistance of counsel. As a basis for the motion,
Baize claimed that counsel failed to investigate the case; failed to ensure that the
terms of the plea were incorporated into the sentence; improperly advised him to
enter a plea while knowing that Baize was under the influence of drugs; failed to
challenge the indictment; and, improperly advised Baize to tell the court that he
fully understood the charges and that the plea was voluntary. Baize also sought
appointed counsel and a hearing on the motion.
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After considering the motion and the parties’ memoranda, the circuit
court rendered an order on November 2, 2007, summarily denying the relief
sought. This appeal followed.
Baize now argues that the circuit court erred in denying his RCr 11.42
motion to vacate, correct or set aside the judgment. He first contends that the court
improperly failed to find that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel to
which he was entitled when counsel “failed to investigate the facts of appellant
[sic] case and prepare for trial.” Specifically, Baize maintains that his trial counsel
did not review discovery with him, and that such failure prejudiced the proceedings
against him.
We have closely examined Baize’s argument, and find no error on this
issue. The standard for addressing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984). In order to be found ineffective, counsel’s performance must be below the
objective standard of reasonableness and must be so prejudicial as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial and a reasonable result. Id. In considering an appeal from
the denial of a claim of ineffective assistance, the reviewing court must focus on
the totality of evidence before the lower court and assess the overall performance
of counsel throughout the case in order to determine whether the identified acts or
omissions overcome the presumption that counsel rendered reasonable professional
assistance. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d
305 (1986). And finally, in determining whether counsel was ineffective, a
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reviewing court must be highly deferential in scrutinizing counsel’s performance
and the tendency and temptation to second-guess should be avoided. Harper v.
Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1998).
Under Strickland, the movant must show that but for the alleged
ineffective assistance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceeding would not only have been different, but would have been more
favorable to the movant. Strickland, supra. In the matter at bar, nothing in the
record supports Baize’s claim that but for counsel’s purported failure to discuss
discovery with him the outcome of the proceeding against him would have been
both different and more favorable to him. Baize makes the unsupported assertion
that counsel failed to discuss discovery with him, but does not demonstrate how
this discussion would have positively affected the outcome of the action against
him. There is nothing in the record which reasonably supports either his general
claim that counsel failed to properly investigate the case or his specific assertion
that he was not apprised of the results of discovery and that counsel’s purported
failure on this issue led to a less favorable outcome. Accordingly, we find no
error.
Baize also argues that he did not receive effective assistance of
counsel when counsel directed him to plead guilty while knowing that he was
under the influence of “mind-altering drugs” at the time of the plea. He contends
that the jail’s medication log, which was made part of the record, indicates that he
was administered the prescription drugs Xanax and Seroquel by the jail’s medical
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staff on the same day the plea was entered. He argues that these medications so
altered his cognitive ability that he was unable to think clearly and was not capable
of entering an intelligent plea. He claims that his counsel knew that he was taking
this prescription medication, and that her act of allowing him to enter a plea while
under the influence of these medications constituted ineffective assistance. He
seeks an order reversing the order on appeal and vacating the judgment.
We find no error on this issue. The record reveals that Baize
requested and received a psychiatric evaluation, which found him competent to
stand trial. Similarly, the medications which Baize was taking were prescribed by
a medical doctor and administered in jail by a nurse. Nothing in the record
suggests that these medications adversely affected Baize’s ability to enter a
voluntary guilty plea. To the contrary, Baize might have a more persuasive
argument on this issue had he not been receiving his medication. Since Baize was
evaluated and found competent to stand trial, and because the medication he
received was prescribed by a medical doctor and administered by the jail’s medical
staff, we cannot conclude that his unsupported claim on this issue - taken alone forms a sufficient basis for finding error.
Baize’s final argument is that the circuit court erred in denying his
motion for a hearing on these issues. As the parties are well aware, an RCr 11.42
movant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the motion where the
allegations contained in the motion are justiciable by reference to the record.
Hodge v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 338 (Ky. 2001). In Hodge, the Supreme
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Court of Kentucky held that the dispositive inquiry on the issue of whether a
hearing is required is whether the record refutes the allegations raised. In the
matter at bar, the record is sufficient to dispose of Baize’s claims of ineffective
assistance. Accordingly, we find no error.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Ohio Circuit
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Mark D. Baize, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Louis F. Mathias, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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