CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, COMM. OF KY VS. O. (A. M. E.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: AUGUST 1, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000123-ME
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES AS NEXT FRIEND OF
A.N.O., A CHILD; S.E.L.O., JR., A CHILD;
W.K.O., A CHILD; AND M.L.O., A CHILD
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HENRY M. GRIFFIN, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-AD-00068
A.M.E.O.; A.D.R.; S.E.L.O.; A.N.O., A CHILD;
S.E.L.O., JR.; A CHILD; W.K.O., A CHILD;
AND M.L.O., A CHILD
AND
NO. 2008-CA-000124-ME
A.M.E.O.
v.
APPELLEES
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HENRY M. GRIFFIN, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-AD-00068
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES
APPELLEES
OPINION
2008-CA-000123-ME - REVERSING AND REMANDING
2008-CA-000124-ME - AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND CLAYTON, JUDGES; GUIDUGLI, SENIOR
JUDGE.
ACREE, JUDGE: This case involves two appeals from an order of the Daviess
Circuit Court terminating the parental rights of A.M.E.O. (Mother) and S.E.L.O.
(Father) to two of their children and dismissing the petition to terminate the
parents’ rights to two other children. The Cabinet for Health and Family Services
(Cabinet) appeals from the portion of the order dismissing the petition to terminate
the parents’ rights regarding their two older children. Mother appeals from the
portion of the order terminating her parental rights to the two younger children.
Father did not participate in either appeal. We affirm the circuit court’s order in
part, reverse and remand in part.
The family in this case has a long and troubling history of
involvement with the Cabinet. The four children who were the subject of the
Cabinet’s petition are A., a daughter born June 16, 1999; S., a son born September
17, 2000; W., a son born November 20, 2001; and M., a daughter born December
20, 2002. The Cabinet first opened a child protective services case, involving
Mother and a child from a previous marriage not involved in the present action, in
1997. Less than ten months after that marriage ended, Mother gave birth to A.,
who was found to be the child of Father. Mother and Father then married and had
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three more children together. Since that time, at least five petitions alleging
dependency, abuse, or neglect of these children have been filed.
All four children suffer from asthma and, in addition, S. was born
with congenital emphysema. By the time he was three months old, a portion of
one lung had already been surgically removed. He had also experienced failure to
thrive since birth. A. is psychologically impaired and experienced developmental
delays in speech and motor skills. From the period of time between 2001 and
2003, the Cabinet made extensive efforts to intervene in an attempt to assist
parents and children in functioning as a family. The efforts included occupational
therapy and speech therapy for A. and S.
The children were first removed from the home in February 2003 after
a petition was filed alleging that their home was always unclean and smelled of
bodily waste. The petition also alleged that two year-old W. had been left
unattended in a filled bathtub for fifteen minutes, had unexplained burns on his left
inner thigh, and a severe diaper rash with blisters. S. was also alleged to have a
severe diaper rash and an unexplained burn. The petition further stated that, in
disregard of medical advice, S. was being exposed to tobacco smoke which
exacerbated his breathing problems. All four children remained in foster care until
November 2003, with their parents being allowed weekly visits. Mother continued
to rely on the foster parent to provide child care, even overnight care, after
regaining custody. The children were removed for a week in December 2003, after
a petition alleging medical neglect was filed. However, this petition was dismissed
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and the children were returned to their parents. Further petitions, which did not
result in removal, were filed in March 2004.
Throughout this period, the individuals who provided medical care
and other forms of assistance to these children noted a lack of progress while they
were in the care of their parents and a marked improvement in their condition
while they were in foster care.
In April 2004, the children were removed again after allegations were
made that Father had sexually abused A. and another child outside the family.
Although criminal charges against Father were dismissed in 2005 due to
insufficient evidence, the juvenile court found that the sexual abuse had occurred.
On August 24, 2005, the juvenile court entered findings that all four children had
been abused and neglected. Mother stipulated to the findings and agreed to work
on the case treatment plan provided by the Cabinet. Father refused to attend a
court-ordered sexual offender treatment program, expressing a fear that to do so
would amount to self-incrimination. He has had no contact with the children since
they were removed in April 2004. Father pays his child support through a wage
garnishment and expresses his intention to reunite with his children after they
reach the age of eighteen.
The Cabinet filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother
and Father on December 15, 2005. The guardian ad litem recommended
termination on August 9, 2007. The trial began four days later, but had to be
continued until October 22, 2007. Final arguments were heard in November 2007
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and, at that time, the guardian ad litem withdrew the recommendation that parental
rights be terminated. At some point during these proceedings, the parents split up
and, at the time of the hearing, Mother was in what appears a stable cohabiting
relationship with her boyfriend and his children.
The circuit court entered an order which carefully outlined the factual
circumstances surrounding the Cabinet’s petition before concluding, as a matter of
law, that there was sufficient evidence to support termination of parental rights to
all four children. The circuit court then proceeded to grant the Cabinet’s petition
as to W. and M., the two younger children, but to dismiss the petition as to the
older children, A. and S. The Cabinet and Mother each appealed from that portion
of the order adverse to their interests. These appeals have been consolidated and
will be disposed of in a single opinion.
On appeal, Mother argues that the circuit court was clearly erroneous
in finding that the Cabinet made reasonable efforts to reunite her with her children,
that she failed to complete her case treatment plan, and that she is unable to
provide a suitable home for her children. Involuntary termination of parental rights
is governed by Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 625.090 which allows a circuit
court to terminate parental rights after finding that a child has been abused or
neglected, as defined in KRS 600.020(1), and that termination would be in the
child’s best interests. KRS 625.090(1)(a) and (b).
The juvenile court made adjudicatory findings that the children had
been abused and neglected in August 2005, and Mother stipulated to the juvenile
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court’s findings. KRS 625.090(1)(a). In order to determine, pursuant to KRS
625.090(1)(b), that termination would serve the best interests of the child, the
circuit court must consider the following factors:
(a) Mental illness as defined by KRS 202A.011(9), or
mental retardation as defined by KRS 202B.010(9) of the
parent as certified by a qualified mental health
professional, which renders the parent consistently
unable to care for the immediate and ongoing physical or
psychological needs of the child for extended periods of
time;
(b) Acts of abuse or neglect as defined in KRS
600.020(1) toward any child in the family;
(c) If the child has been placed with the cabinet, whether
the cabinet has, prior to the filing of the petition made
reasonable efforts as defined in KRS 620.020 to reunite
the child with the parents unless one or more of the
circumstances enumerated in KRS 610.127 for not
requiring reasonable efforts have been substantiated in a
written finding by the District Court;
(d) The efforts and adjustments the parent has made in
his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in
the child's best interest to return him to his home within a
reasonable period of time, considering the age of the
child;
(e) The physical, emotional, and mental health of the
child and the prospects for the improvement of the child's
welfare if termination is ordered; and
(f) The payment or the failure to pay a reasonable portion
of substitute physical care and maintenance if financially
able to do so.
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KRS 625.090(2). In addition, the circuit court is prohibited from terminating
parental rights unless it also finds one or more factors listed in KRS 625.090(3),
which include:
(e) That the parent, for a period of not less than six (6)
months, has continuously or repeatedly failed or refused
to provide or has been substantially incapable of
providing essential parental care and protection for the
child and that there is no reasonable expectation of
improvement in parental care and protection, considering
the age of the child;
(f) That the parent has caused or allowed the child to be
sexually abused or exploited;
. . . ; or
(j) That the child has been in foster care under the
responsibility of the cabinet for fifteen (15) of the most
recent twenty-two (22) months preceding the filing of the
petition to terminate parental rights.
Cases involving termination of parental rights are reviewed for clear error,
pursuant to Kentucky Civil Rule 52.01. K.R.L. v. P.A.C., 210 S.W.3d 183, 187
(Ky.App. 2006). The circuit court’s order included a lengthy recitation of the
history of this family and the services they were provided by the Cabinet.
During the time these parents were married to one another, Father was
employed as a long-haul trucker, leaving Mother with virtually sole responsibility
to care for four children born within a three and one-half year period. As
previously mentioned, all four children have asthma, while the oldest two also
have serious psychological, developmental, or physical health issues. Mother has
been diagnosed with bipolar disorder since high school, low intelligence, and
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numerous other psychological problems. During the time that she had these four
children in her custody, she was not taking any medication to help control her
bipolar disorder.
Beginning in March 2001, the Cabinet arranged for “First Steps the
Early Intervention Program” to provide an occupational therapist to work with A.
and S. Dale Lynn assessed the two children and provided occupational, speech,
and physical therapy to S. Initially, these visits occurred twice a month, later
increasing in frequency to weekly visits. Due to his physical weakness, S. required
therapy to learn to eat, sit, crawl, and walk. Lynn continued to provide S. with
occupational therapy until 2006. He worked with A. for a few months in 2002,
primarily to overcome attention problems. Lynn reported that both children
seemed interested and participated in their therapy. On a less optimistic note, he
noted the unclean condition of their home.
Mary Fuqua, of Wellspring Academy, worked with A. and S. in an
attempt to oversee their developmental delays. She observed that they made
limited progress while in their Mother’s home, but their progress improved while
they were in foster care. Fuqua, who was in the home for one hour every week for
nearly three years, found it alarming that she often had to ask Mother to change the
children’s diapers and that they would bleed from blisters caused by diaper rash.
As a result, she made a referral to Helping Hands, another in-home care provider.
Fuqua stated that S. had greater improvement in six weeks of foster care than he
had in the preceding years while in his parents’ care.
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Sheila Calhoun, who provided speech therapy for A. and S., expressed
her concern that the parents did not participate in their children’s treatment
regimen. She also reported two occasions when Mother engaged in poor parenting
behavior in her presence. On one occasion Calhoun observed S. using sign
language to communicate that he was hungry. Mother’s only response was to
throw a cookie across the floor for him to pick up and eat. This incident was
particularly disturbing to Calhoun since S. was, and always had been, severely
underweight. In addition, Calhoun observed W. being left unsupervised in chesthigh water in the bathtub. She also noted the dirty condition of the home, Mother
continuing to smoke around the children, and S.’s persistent diaper rash. Within
two weeks of their entry into foster care, Calhoun noted that all four children were
clean and well fed and that S.’s verbal communication skills had improved.
The circuit court’s order also included a summary of testimony from
physicians who treated the children. Dr. Lee Clore, a pediatric allergist, treated S.
post-surgery until May 2007. S. was hospitalized several times as an infant, and
had to be repeatedly transported by air to Kosair Children’s Hospital in Louisville
in serious condition. Clore expressed concern about the number of medical
appointments S. missed, the parents’ failure to follow medical advice, their use of
tobacco in S.’s presence, and the filthy condition of all four children. He testified
that he saw them four or five times while they were in foster care and their
condition had improved dramatically. In his opinion, S. presented one of the worst
cases of medical neglect he had ever seen. Clore contacted the Cabinet numerous
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times, as well as writing to the district court to express his concerns. This was the
first time in fourteen years in practice that he had taken such actions. In his
deposition, Clore stated that he believed there was no question that S. would not
survive childhood if he were returned to his parents’ care. Prior to their final
removal in 2004, Clore became so concerned about S. that he contacted the
children’s pediatrician, Dr. Stephanie Russell, and asked her to have S. removed
from his home. Mother responded by obtaining S.’s medical records from both
physicians and firing them both.
Russell had provided pediatric care to the children, beginning in 2000
and ending in 2004. She noted that they all had frequent diaper rashes due to lack
of parental care. Mother failed to follow medical advice. She did not give A. and
S. necessary nebulizer treatments or consistently provide the children’s day care
with access to their medications. Russell testified that the parents’ poor caregiving
became worse over time. Mother endangered S.’s life when she failed to seek
immediate medical care for him while he had pneumonia in January 2004. She
also continued to smoke in his presence despite the doctor’s repeated warnings.
Russell reported to social services that the children were being medically neglected
and became involved in meetings with mother and Cabinet employees. She
expressed frustration that more was not being done to protect the children,
especially S.
The oldest child, A., suffered from asthma and developmental delays
in speech and motor skills. Her parents kept her dirty and she often had a diaper
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rash. The circuit court found that she experienced medical neglect. Further, the
juvenile court substantiated sexual abuse against A. by Father. After the children
were removed from their home in 2004, they were initially returned to the same
foster care placement in which they had spent the majority of time the previous
year. However, A. had to be removed from the foster home after threatening to
harm her siblings. She was hospitalized at Valley Institute of Psychiatry, then
placed in the Home of the Innocents in Louisville. A. was evaluated and
diagnosed with reactive attachment disorder, a serious and chronic condition
resulting from parental absence or neglect. Mark Zakem, a therapist at Home of
the Innocents, was optimistic about her prognosis in a therapeutic environment, but
expressed the opinion that she would need long-term care and treatment for her
attachment disorder. Further, he opined that even a well-meaning environment
would decrease A.’s chances of a positive outcome if it was not also a therapeutic
environment. At the time of the hearing, she maintained an awareness of Mother’s
identity. However, they had little contact, due to the distance between A.’s
placement in a therapeutic foster care program operated by the Home of the
Innocents and Mother’s home in Owensboro.
S., the oldest son, suffered from asthma and congenital emphysema.
He had experienced failure to thrive since birth, weighing only thirty pounds at age
five. S. was also removed from the foster home he shared with his siblings
because of his medically fragile condition. He was placed in a therapeutic foster
care setting where he finally showed enough progress to be measured on the low
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end of the weight percentile charts. During the times when he lived with his
parents, S. was always so underweight that he could not be measured by even the
lowest range of the charts. The circuit court noted that S. had spent the majority of
his life in foster care, but that he was not upset by visits with Mother.
W. and M., the two youngest children are also asthmatic. They have
spent most of their lives away from their parents’ care. The circuit court found that
these two children have little emotional attachment to their parents and are fearful
and upset when Mother visits them.
With regard to Mother’s caregiving abilities, the circuit court found
that she was emotionally disconnected and had to be told to do such tasks as
changing diapers. While in her care, the children missed numerous medical
appointments. When they were seen by physicians, the children were filthy and
smelled “like a barnyard.” The circuit court found that Mother failed to take any
steps to regain custody of her children for more than a year after they were
removed. She further did not attempt to participate in the case treatment plan until
after her children were adjudicated as abused and neglected by the juvenile court.
Mother also failed to attend a court-ordered sexual abuse victimization program.
Although she visited all of the children, except A., the circuit court found that the
visits were chaotic. The CASA worker who observed her visits with the children
testified that Mother was skeptical, secretive, and combative towards the Cabinet’s
efforts to assist her in improving her home conditions. At the time of the circuit
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court’s order, Mother had not had custody of these children for over three and onehalf years. Neither had she paid any child support, despite sporadic employment.
In her defense, Mother argued that Father had provided no help caring
for the children while he was on the road, nor did she have any family support.
Mother admitted that the condition of her home was poor, but contended she was
overwhelmed by A.’s and S.’s serious medical and developmental needs. She also
stated that she had not been taking any medication to treat her bipolar disorder but,
at the time of the hearing, was receiving mental health treatment. The circuit court
found that her two and one-half year relationship with her cohabiting boyfriend
was stable. Mother was employed and, in addition, cared for her boyfriend’s
daughters, participating in Little League and Junior Achievement activities. She
told the circuit court that she was doing better and hoped to soon be able to provide
a safe and healthy home for her children.
Mother’s boyfriend expressed his confidence in her ability to care for
her own children. He testified that his children had been introduced to all of her
children, except A., and that he foresaw no problems merging their families.
Mother’s sister told the court that she had improved her housekeeping and
organizational skills and was taking better care of herself. The sister also testified
that she trusted Mother’s ability to parent. This opinion was echoed by Mother’s
pastor and one of her boyfriend’s daughters.
Patricia Derosier, a licensed clinical social worker who had been
treating Mother for her mental health issues and monitoring her medications, also
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testified. Derosier believed that Mother’s prognosis was positive, but did not
support the immediate return of the children. She testified that Mother loved her
children and truly wanted to be with them.
KRS 625.090(2) prohibits a circuit court from terminating parental
rights unless it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of one or
more of the grounds enumerated in subsection (2)(a)-(j). The circuit court made
specific findings that each parent had failed to provide essential parental care and
protection for over three and one-half years and that there was no reasonable
expectation of improvement considering the ages of each child. KRS
625.090(2)(e). The order contained a further finding that Father caused A. to be
sexually abused. KRS 625.090(2)(f). The circuit court also recognized that all
four children had spent twenty of the twenty-two months preceding the order in
foster care. KRS 625.090(2)(j). The evidence clearly supports the circuit court’s
finding on each of these grounds.
KRS 625.090(3) lists six factors which the circuit court must consider
in determining the child’s best interests and the existence of grounds for
termination. The circuit court considered the fact that Mother has bipolar disorder,
but found that her mental illness did not render her incapable of caring for her
children. KRS 625.090(3)(a). Subsection (3)(b) of the statute requires the circuit
court to consider any acts of abuse or neglect toward a child in the family. The
circuit court’s order is replete with examples of abuse or neglect within the
definition of KRS 600.020(1). In addition, the circuit court concluded that W. and
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M. were thriving in foster care and had no significant attachment to their parents
due to the amount of time they had spent in the custody of the Cabinet. The order
found that W. and M. would not suffer a sense of loss if their parents’ rights were
terminated, but rather would benefit from a permanent adoptive placement. KRS
625.090(3)(e). The record established that Father’s only financial support of these
children after their removal was by payment of child support though a wage
assignment, but Mother did not contribute financially toward the children’s
support. KRS 625.090(3)(f).
Subsection (3)(d) requires the circuit court to consider “efforts and
adjustments the parent has made in his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to
make it in the child's best interest to return him to his home within a reasonable
period of time, considering the age of the child[.]” The circuit court noted that
Father had made no efforts to change his circumstances in such a way as to be able,
in the future, to provide a safe home for the children. Indeed, Father stated he
planned to wait until the children were over eighteen to resume contact with them.
In Mother’s case the record was more mixed. The circuit court noted
that she had moved on to a new relationship and made improvements in the
stability of her overall circumstances. However, Mother’s improved functioning
was found to be, at least partially, the result of not having had the stress of caring
for her children for over three and one-half years. In addition, the circuit court
pointed out that she had not completed the mental health assessment or attended
the sexual victimization program as required by her case treatment plan.
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Consequently, the circuit court made a finding that Mother could not provide a
suitable home for these children and would be unable to do so within a reasonable
time.
The most contentious finding in the order involves KRS 625.090(3)(c)
which requires the circuit court to consider “whether the cabinet has, prior to the
filing of the petition made reasonable efforts as defined in KRS 620.020 to reunite
the child with the parents[.]” The circuit court’s order contained the following
finding regarding the Cabinet’s efforts:
The Court finds the Cabinet has, prior to filing the
petition terminate parental rights, made reasonable efforts
as defined in KRS 620.020 to reunite the [children] with
the parents. The Cabinet has investigated and monitored
home conditions since 1997 in Ohio and Daviess
counties and [has] instituted juvenile court proceedings,
referred the family to Wellspring Academy for
developmental assessment and intervention for the
children, referred the children to speech therapy through
Sheila Calhoun of First Steps, provided respite foster care
during [S.’s] frequent hospitalizations, referred the
family to sexual abuse treatment, and ongoing foster care
for 3 ½ years since the sexual abuse removal. To much
[effort of] the Cabinet social workers and service
providers [Father] has been absent and [Mother] was
resistant, uncooperative, suspicious, manipulative,
secretive or combative.
(Circuit Court’s order on Cabinet’s motion to terminate parental rights, entered
December 12, 2007).
On appeal, Mother argues that the circuit court erred in finding that
the Cabinet had made reasonable efforts at reunification and, thus, it was an abuse
of discretion to terminate her rights where the majority of the Cabinet’s services to
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the family were provided before the children were removed in 2004. She points
out that, since their removal in April 2004, the children have been in foster care
where she has been permitted only supervised visitation with the three younger
children held inside a state office building. Mother has seen A. only once since she
was removed. She maintains that the Cabinet has made no efforts to reunite her
with her children. “[N]ot a single time during that period [prior to the filing of the
petition to terminate her rights] was she ever encouraged or allowed to take the
children for a walk in a park, for a visit to McDonald’s, or any other activity
outside the four walls of the office space.” (Appellant A.M.O.’s brief at page 4).
The definitions of reasonable efforts and reunification services are
found in KRS 620.020(10) and (11). Subsection (10) requires the Cabinet to
“exercise . . . ordinary diligence and care . . . to utilize all preventive and
reunification services available to the community . . . to enable the child to safely
live at home[.]” Reunification services are defined by statute as “remedial and
preventive services which are designed to strengthen the family unit, to secure
reunification of the family and child where appropriate, as quickly as practicable,
and to prevent the future removal of the child from the family[.]” KRS
600.020(11)(emphasis supplied). The circuit court’s order provides a detailed
examination of the services provided by the Cabinet during its involvement with
this family. Despite Mother’s assertion to the contrary, not all of these services
were provided prior to removal of the children from the home. The children spent
nine months in foster care in 2003, during which time the Cabinet continued to
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provide them with an array of services. Regrettably, after their return to their
parents’ custody, Mother once again proved unable to care for their needs. Even
more deplorably, Father committed sexual abuse against one of the children,
resulting in their current removal less than six months after they were returned to
their parents’ custody.
Carol Sanders, the social worker assigned by the Cabinet to assist this
family, testified to the contents of the case treatment plan and the services offered
to both children and parents. Sanders told the circuit court that Mother had access,
free of charge, to psychiatric evaluation and therapy services, child protection
classes, parenting classes, the family preservation and family reunification
programs, and other services specifically targeted to assist parents. After the
children were removed in 2004, the Cabinet arranged for visitation. Mother did
not visit at all for nearly the first three months, and visited sporadically thereafter.
According to Sanders, Mother did not stop missing visits until after the Cabinet
filed the petition to terminate her rights. Further, Sanders testified that Mother
delayed seeking therapy for a year after her children were removed. Sanders was
unaware of any additional services which the Cabinet could offer.
Derosier, Mother’s mental health worker, criticized the Cabinet’s
handling of the case, though she acknowledged never having met the children or
reviewed any documentation of the Cabinet’s efforts. Derosier believed the
Cabinet should have referred Mother to family counseling when the case was
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opened. However, she admitted that such therapy would only yield benefits in the
long term and was not guaranteed ever to succeed.
Mother argues that, because her children have been in foster care
since April 2004, “[i]t should be manifestly clear from the entire record that the
‘failure’ of [Mother] to provide care and protection to her children cannot in any
way be attributed to her.” (Appellant A.M.O.’s brief at page 4)(emphasis in
original). We simply cannot accept this characterization of events. The Cabinet
has a lengthy history of attempting to shore up this family by offering services for
both children and parents. Despite these efforts on behalf of this family, the circuit
court concluded that Mother would not be able to provide a suitable home for any
of her children for the foreseeable future. The circuit court did recognize that
Mother was finally making an effort to improve both her mental health and the
condition of her home. Unfortunately, these efforts were and are a case of too little
and too late.
The circuit court’s order is amply supported by the evidence in the
record and clearly contains findings sufficient to meet all the necessary criteria for
termination of parental rights found in KRS 625.090. Mother has failed to prove
that the circuit court erred when it found sufficient grounds to terminate the
parents’ rights to all four children. Consequently, the circuit court’s order
terminating the rights of Mother and Father to W. and M. must be upheld.
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In its separate appeal, the Cabinet argues that the circuit court’s
dismissal of its petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights as to A.
and S. was erroneous. In its order the circuit court found that
the Cabinet has presented sufficient evidence to terminate
the parental rights of both [Father] and [Mother] to all of
[their] children. The GAL for the children has
withdrawn his recommendation to terminate parental
rights apparently because he is satisfied that [Mother] is
no longer a threat to neglect the children, and he is
hopeful that if her progress continues she may one day be
able to provide them a safe and healthy home. The court
concurs that there has been some progress but the
children have already been in foster care too long to
wait any longer on [Mother’s] potential. . . . [I]n light
of the evidence of improved stability on the part of
[Mother] and pursuant to KRS 625.090(5) the Court finds
that [Mother] has proven by a preponderance of the
evidence as to [A.] and [S.] only that she will not cause
them or continue them to be abused or neglected children
as defined in KRS 600.010(1) and the Court in its
discretion elects not to terminate the parental rights; the
children should continue in their therapeutic foster
placements in the custody of the Cabinet pursuant to law.
(Circuit Court’s order on Cabinet’s motion to terminate parental rights, entered
December 12, 2007)(emphasis supplied).
The Cabinet contends that the circuit court improperly relied on the
following statute as grounds to dismiss the petition to terminate the parents’ rights
as to A. and S.:
If the parent proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that the child will not continue to be an abused or
neglected child as defined in KRS 600.020(1) if
returned to the parent the court in its discretion may
determine not to terminate parental rights.
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KRS 625.090(5)(emphasis supplied). The Cabinet notes that the circuit court
failed to find that A. and S. would not continue to be abused or neglected if
returned to Mother. Rather, the order contained findings that the children had been
out of Mother’s care for a significant period, yet she had not made sufficient
progress for them to be returned. The circuit court found that Mother had not
demonstrated her ability to provide a safe and permanent home for the children.
Finally, the order stated that she was “not currently able to provide a suitable home
for the children and will not be able to do so within a reasonable time.” (Circuit
Court’s order on Cabinet’s motion to terminate parental rights, entered December
12, 2007). Since Mother clearly did not prove that A. and S. would not continue to
be abused or neglected if they were returned to her care, the circuit court abused its
discretion in relying on KRS 625.090(5) as grounds to dismiss the Cabinet’s
petition to terminate her parental rights to these two children.
The Cabinet next argues that the circuit court erred by failing to find
that termination was in the best interest of A. and S. As we have already discussed
most of the grounds which the statute directs the circuit court to consider in
reaching a conclusion about the best interests of a child, we will not belabor the
point here. However, we will point out that the circuit court’s own factual findings
do not support its conclusion under KRS 625.090(3)(e) and, consequently, do not
support dismissal of the petition.
In deciding the outcome of a petition to terminate parental rights, the
circuit court is directed to consider the “physical, emotional, and mental health of
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the child and the prospects for the improvement of the child's welfare if
termination is ordered[.]” KRS 625.090(3)(e). With regard to the oldest child, A.,
the circuit court found the following:
[A.] would likely be unaffected by the termination of
parental rights because her contact with her parents for
the last 3 ½ years has been minimal and her attachment
disorder probably makes her in capable of feeling loss to
some degree. However the Court does not find that some
increase in contact with [Mother] would harm her and it
could prove beneficial.
(Circuit Court’s order on Cabinet’s motion to terminate parental rights, entered
December 12, 2007). The circuit court’s speculative conclusion that A. would be
neither helped, nor harmed, by termination because of her attachment disorder is
not supported by the evidence. Zakem, her therapist at the Home of the Innocents,
gave his expert opinion that A. would have a positive outcome if she continued to
receive long-term treatment for her attachment disorder in a therapeutic
environment. However, he also testified that a positive outcome would be doubtful
if she were placed in a non-therapeutic setting. The circuit court’s consideration of
all of the remaining factors listed in KRS 625.090(3) supported termination as
being in the best interests of all four children. Consequently, we agree with the
Cabinet that it was clearly erroneous for the circuit court not to find that
termination was in A.’s best interests as well.
The circuit court’s findings regarding S. present a more mixed picture
due to his ongoing relationship with Mother. The court’s order found as follows:
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[S.] is thriving in therapeutic foster care despite his
medically fragile condition. His life depends on strict
adherence to his medical regimen. As an infant, [S.’s]
life was threatened by the poor care he received from his
parents. [S.], being a little older, has some relationship
with his parents especially [Mother] as she has continued
to maintain visits with him. [S.] requires the structured
care and medical supervision he receives in the
therapeutic foster home. The same would be required for
an adoptive placement. That he is friendly and outgoing
implies that he has a desire for relationship with others.
The Court has not heard that he is otherwise with his
mother. The Court does not find that continued contact
with [Mother] would harm [S.]
(Circuit Court’s order on Cabinet’s motion to terminate parental rights, entered
December 12, 2007)(emphasis supplied). Although the circuit court opined that
continued contact with Mother would not harm S., the court’s order also
recognized that his very life depends on being in a therapeutic environment where
his medical regimen will be followed without deviation. The evidence clearly
supports a finding that, considering his physical health pursuant to KRS
625.090(3), termination is in S.’s best interests. Coupled with the circuit court’s
findings that all of the other factors in KRS 625.090(3) supported termination as
being in the best interests of all the children, we agree with the Cabinet that the
circuit court erred in failing to find that it was S.’s best interests for his parents’
rights to be terminated.
Finally, the Cabinet argues that sufficient grounds to terminate both
parents’ rights to A. and S. were supported by substantial evidence and by the
circuit court’s findings. The circuit court’s order concluded that the Cabinet had
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proven the existence of grounds for termination of parental rights to all four of the
children. However, as previously mentioned the circuit court claimed it was
entitled to exercise discretion not to terminate the parents’ rights to A. and S., and
ordered them to remain in therapeutic foster placements in the Cabinet’s custody
pursuant to law. Mother argues that KRS 625.090(6) supports the circuit court’s
decision. We disagree.
The statute in question reads as follows:
Upon the conclusion of proof and argument of counsel,
the Circuit Court shall enter findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and a decision as to each parent-respondent
within thirty (30) days either:
(a) Terminating the right of the parent; or
(b) Dismissing the petition and stating whether the child
shall be returned to the parent or shall remain in the
custody of the state.
KRS 625.090(6). Because subsection (b) allows the circuit court to dismiss the
termination petition while leaving a child in the Cabinet’s custody, Mother claims
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the Cabinet had
presented sufficient evidence to terminate her rights, yet declined to do so. This
Court has previously considered the limits placed on the circuit court’s discretion
under the statute.
In Cabinet for Human Resources v. J.B.B., 772 S.W.2d 646 (Ky.App.
1989), the Cabinet appealed from an order dismissing its petition to terminate
parental rights. The circuit court in that case had found sufficient cause to
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terminate the parents’ rights to their children, but declined to do so subject to their
compliance with the conditions set forth in the court’s order. The Cabinet
appealed, arguing that the circuit court’s order exceeded the scope of its authority.
This Court reversed the circuit court, reasoning as follows:
Although it is clear that the circuit court sought to order
what it believed would be in the best interests of all
parties, it is also clear that the circuit court exceeded the
limited authority granted it by this statute and we must
reverse. The legislature did not provide for judicial
parenting in [KRS 625.090(6)], and the Cabinet is not
equipped to provide unlimited, open-ended supervision in
this case. Most of all, the child needs some stability and
permanency. If the parents are fit to be parents, the
action by the Cabinet should be dismissed.
J.B.B., 772 S.W.2d at 647.
We have no doubt that the Daviess Circuit Court also sought to
provide for the best interests of A. and S. in the case at hand. However, these
children had been in foster care for over three and one-half years when the circuit
court’s order was issued in 2007. Even before they were removed in April 2004,
the children had spent the majority of the pervious year in foster care. Despite the
passage of all this time wherein Mother might have focused on achieving a living
situation suitable to caring for her children, the circuit court found that she still was
unable to do so. Further, the order dismissing the Cabinet’s petition to terminate as
to A. and S. contained a finding that Mother would not be able to provide a
suitable home for her children within a reasonable time considering their ages.
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This finding was coupled with the circuit court’s conclusion that grounds for
termination were sufficiently proven for all four children.
The circuit court’s order makes it clear that, considering the mental
and physical health issues of these two children and their Mother’s ongoing
inability to care for them, the Cabinet would be expected to provide the type of
open-ended supervision which we found to be inappropriate in J.B.B. Moreover,
their special needs notwithstanding, these children have a right to be placed in a
position where they can achieve stability and permanency. As the circuit court’s
own order stated, “the children have already been in foster care too long to wait
any longer on [Mother’s] potential[.]” Further, as we have previously noted,
Father told the circuit court that he did not plan to resume contact with any of his
children until after they have reached age eighteen. Consequently, the circuit court
exceeded its discretion under KRS 625.090 when it dismissed the Cabinet’s
petition to terminate parental rights as to A. and S. after finding that grounds
existed to do so and that their parents remained unable to provide them with a
suitable home within a reasonable time.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Daviess Circuit Court is
affirmed as to the termination of parental rights regarding W. and M. The circuit
court is reversed and remanded for further orders consistent with this opinion as to
the dismissal of the Cabinet’s petition to terminate parental rights as to A. and S.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT AND
APPELLEE COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR
HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE AND
APPELLANT A.M.E.O.:
William D. Nesmith
Evansville, Indiana
Kristina Abel Fulkerson
Owensboro, Kentucky
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