COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY VS. OUTLAND (REBECCA DEE)
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 7, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000073-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00525
REBECCA DEE OUTLAND
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; STUMBO, JUDGE; GUIDUGLI,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
STUMBO, JUDGE: The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Suppressing Evidence of the McCracken
Circuit Court sustaining the motion of Rebecca Outland to suppress the
introduction of evidence obtained during a traffic stop. It argues that the circuit
1
Senior Judge Daniel T. Guidugli sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
court erred in concluding that the police did not have reasonable suspicion
sufficient to detain Outland, and that her observed nervous behavior alone did not
create reasonable suspicion. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the order on
appeal and remand the matter for trial.
On July 21, 2007, Outland’s vehicle was stopped by the McCracken
County sheriff’s office after the vehicle was observed speeding and failing to
signal a turn. At the time of the traffic stop, Outland was the subject of a drug
investigation and was being observed as part of that investigation. After Outland
was stopped, she was given a courtesy warning ticket. According to the record, it
took approximately 10 - 15 minutes for this to occur. After the ticket was issued,
she was asked to step out of the vehicle. Outland complied, and according to the
record was cooperative and agreed to talk. During the course of the stop, two
additional police units arrived at the scene. Testimony was later adduced that the
entire stop lasted between 15 and 30 minutes.
While Outland was standing outside her vehicle, she was asked if she
would consent to a search of her vehicle. She appears to have responded
affirmatively, with the caveat that she did not want to do it if it would take too
long. After consent was given, a search was conducted whereupon the deputies
found a marijuana roach in the vehicle, and methamphetamine, marijuana and a
methamphetamine pipe on her person. Outland was later indicted by the
McCracken County grand jury on one count each of possession of
methamphetamine, possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia.
Outland subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained
during the search of her vehicle and of her person. As a basis for the motion, she
argued that she was unlawfully detained after the traffic stop was concluded; i.e.,
that she should not have been detained after the basis for the stop - the traffic
violations - was resolved by the issuance of the warning ticket. A hearing on the
motion was conducted on November 28, 2007, where Detective Matt Carter
testified that after the warning ticket was issued, Outland was no longer being
detained and was free to leave. Carter, however, never told Outland that she was
free to go, and Outland later stated that after the ticket was issued she still did not
feel free to leave. A passenger in the vehicle, Tera Smith, testified that she
regarded as a command Detective Carter’s statement to Outland asking her to exit
the vehicle.
The corpus of Outland’s argument was that she was improperly
detained after the ticket was issued because there was no reasonable suspicion to
justify the detention. The Commonwealth maintained that there was probable
cause for the traffic stop (i.e., the observation of the vehicle speeding and failing to
signal a turn), and that it was otherwise permissible to request Outland’s consent to
search after the ticket had been issued.
After considering the testimony and memoranda, the circuit court
rendered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Suppressing
Evidence on December 28, 2007. It found in relevant part that Outland was
properly stopped for the moving violation; that the stop and citation lasted
approximately 10 minutes; that during the course of the stop, two other police units
arrived, including a K-9 unit; and, that there were no reasonable grounds to detain
Outland after she was issued the ticket. The court went on to conclude that though
Detective Carter’s suspicion allegedly arose from Outland’s nervous behavior,
nervousness or restlessness alone does not create reasonable suspicion. The court
did not address whether Outland had given consent, nor whether the purported
unlawful detention had the effect of rendering Outland’s consent involuntary. It
sustained Outland’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search,
and this appeal followed.
The Commonwealth now argues that the circuit court erred in
sustaining Outland’s motion to suppress. While noting that the court did not
address the effect of Outland’s consent, the focus of its argument is that the court
improperly concluded that Outland was unlawfully detained after the ticket was
issued. It points to the brief time between the conclusion of the stop - i.e., the point
at which the ticket was issued - and the giving of consent, and further notes that no
evidence exists nor argument was made that the consent was not voluntary. The
Commonwealth contends that the purported detention was not unreasonable for a
traffic stop, and that the totality of the circumstances does not support a finding of
unlawful detention. It analogizes the post-ticket questioning of Outland to the
legitimate practice of “knock and talk” as recognized by this Court and others, and
maintains that it is not unlawful or otherwise improper to ask a person if he or she
will consent to a search. In sum, the Commonwealth contends that the suppression
order was not supported by the facts and the law, and should be reversed. Outland
has not filed a responsive brief.
We have closely examined the record and the law, and must conclude
that the circuit court erred in sustaining Outland’s motion to suppress the evidence
obtained during the search of her vehicle and person. In a matter remarkably
similar to the one at bar, a panel of this Court previously held that when consent is
given during detention not justified by reasonable suspicion, the sole question for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment is the voluntariness of the consent and not the
lawfulness of the detention. Commonwealth v. Erickson, 132 S.W.3d 884 (Ky.
App. 2004). In Erickson, as in the matter at bar, a vehicle was stopped in
McCracken County, Kentucky, after a sheriff’s deputy observed the vehicle
committing a traffic violation. A conversation described as cordial ensued, after
which the driver was issued a verbal warning. After the driver’s documents had
been returned to him and the warning was issued, the deputy continued to talk to
the driver for a few minutes and eventually asked for consent to search the vehicle.
The driver complied, whereupon drugs were found in the vehicle.
The McCracken County grand jury indicted Erickson on drug
possession and trafficking charges, and he subsequently filed a motion to suppress
the evidence obtained during the search. Like Outland, he argued that the purpose
of the traffic stop was completed at such time the warning was issued, and any
detention thereafter was necessarily unlawful. Pointing to U.S. v. Mesa, 62 F.3d
159 (6th Cir. 1995), Erickson claimed that the alleged unconstitutional detention
should bar the Commonwealth from introducing any evidence obtained during that
period of detention.
The McCracken Circuit Court was persuaded by this argument and
sustained Erickson’s motion to suppress. On appeal, a panel of this Court
determined that the dispositive inquiry for purposes of the Fourth Amendment was
not whether the detention was supported by reasonable suspicion, but rather
whether the consent was voluntary. Relying on United States v. Burton, 334 F.3d
514, 518 (6th Cir. 2003), we stated that,
In harmony with the argument advanced by the
Commonwealth throughout this litigation, Burton holds
that where a motorist is initially stopped for a valid
purpose and subsequently gives consent to a search of his
vehicle, the voluntariness of his consent is the only issue
to consider for purposes of the Fourth Amendment - and
not whether the continued detention was justified by
reasonable suspicion. [Citation omitted]. Accordingly,
we are compelled to agree with the Commonwealth that
the McCracken Circuit Court erred in suppressing the
evidence absent a specific finding that Erickson’s consent
was not voluntary after engaging in an analysis of all of
the circumstances surrounding his encounter with Deputy
Archer.2
Erickson at 889.
In the matter at bar, the Commonwealth claims that the period of
interaction between Outland and the sheriff’s deputies and detective did not
constitute detention. While this argument is not persuasive, it is also not relevant
for purposes of applying Erickson. The period of detention followed what was
clearly a lawful period of detention (the traffic stop), and the presence of three
2
For a complete summary of the development of this rule, see Erickson, supra.
police units and a K-9 unit would reasonably cause Outland to believe that she was
not free to leave. As noted in Erickson, however, the constitutionality - or lack of
constitutionality - of this detention has no bearing on whether the evidence
obtained from Outland’s vehicle and person must be suppressed. The sole issue is
whether Outland’s consent was voluntary, even if that consent was made during a
period of unlawful detention.
Again, just as in Erickson, the McCracken Circuit Court made no
findings of fact or conclusions of law as to whether Outland’s consent was
voluntary. And just as in Erickson, Outland’s motion to suppress centered on the
constitutionality of the detention and not the voluntariness of the consent. The
consent issue was not raised below nor adjudicated in the order on appeal. Since
the involuntariness of the consent would be the sole basis for suppressing the
evidence arising therefrom, and because the circuit court did not find that
Outland’s consent was not voluntary, the order suppressing the evidence was in
error. Outland apparently consented to the search, and nothing in the record leads
to a different conclusion. According to Erickson, this resolves Outland’s motion to
suppress in favor of the Commonwealth.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the McCracken
Circuit Court sustaining Outland’s motion to suppress, and remand the matter for
trial.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
No Brief for Appellee
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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