JONES (KATHY) VS. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF LAUREL COUNTY, KENTUCKY , ET AL.Annotate this Case
RENDERED: OCTOBER 31, 2008; 10:00 A. M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-01124
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
LAUREL COUNTY, KENTUCKY; AND
DAVID YOUNG, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT
OF THE LAUREL COUNTY SCHOOLS
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND VANMETER, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ACREE, JUDGE: Kathy Jones appeals from an Opinion and Order of the Laurel
Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees, David Young,
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
Superintendent of the Laurel County Schools, and the Laurel County Board of
Education. We affirm.
Jones was hired by the Laurel County Board of Education for the
2001-02 school year. For the next three years she worked in the Headstart
Program. During the 2004-05 school year, she taught preschool at Hunter Hill
Elementary School. On April 26, 2005, Jones was notified that her teaching
contract would not be renewed the following year. The Laurel County School
System changed the preschool program from full day to half-day. Seven other
preschool teachers’ contracts were not renewed. Jones applied for and received
unemployment compensation. Jones was interviewed for several teaching
positions in the Laurel County School System, but was not hired.
On September 26, 2005, Jones was hired as a substitute within the
Laurel County School System. During the 2005-06 school year, she substituted for
two different teachers and worked for over 140 days. During that time, Jones
applied for teaching positions, but was not hired. In May 2006, Jones again
applied for and received unemployment compensation benefits.
Jones filed this action alleging she was denied a continuing service
contract in violation of KRS 161.740. Upon motions for summary judgment by
both parties, the trial court found Jones did not meet the specific requirements of
KRS 161.740 because she was not “currently employed” by the school system
when she was rehired as a substitute teacher. Summary judgment was entered in
favor of the Appellees. This appeal followed.
In reviewing a summary judgment, we must determine “whether the
trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact
and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v.
Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996). Our review is de novo since we
analyze solely questions of law rather than of fact. Blevins v. Moran, 12 S.W.3d
698, 700 (Ky.App. 2000). We must view the record in a light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment, and all doubts are to be resolved in favor of
that party adversely affected. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Ser. Ctr., Inc., 807
S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). Summary judgment is appropriate only when “it
appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at the
trial warranting a judgment in his favor.” Id. The issue of impossibility is viewed
in a practical sense - not an absolute one. Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652,
654 (Ky. 1992).
Jones argues that the trial court erroneously construed the phrase
“currently employed” contained in KRS 161.740, leading it to a conclusion
contrary to the legislative intent behind the statute. We disagree.
KRS 161.740(1)(b) mandates that “[w]hen a currently employed
teacher is reemployed by the superintendent after teaching four (4) consecutive
years in the same district . . . the superintendent shall issue a written continuing
contract if the teacher assumes his duties[.]” Jones clearly was employed by the
superintendent for four (4) consecutive years. It is equally clear that the
superintendent notified Jones that her employment would not continue for a fifth
year, thereby ending her then-current employment by the superintendent. Her
employment with the district thus ended. She was subsequently employed in a
different capacity – as a substitute teacher. Therefore, Jones was not currently
employed when the offer of employment as a substitute teacher was extended.
The statute does not apply.
Nevertheless, Jones claims her circumstances do satisfy the statutory
requirement that she was “currently employed[,]” then “reemployed.” As support,
she cites a 1972 opinion from the Office of the Attorney General of Kentucky.
Ky. OAG 72-664. In the circumstances of that opinion, a teacher who was
employed under a limited contract completed her fourth continuous year in the
same district. The teacher was asked to resign at the end of her fourth year by the
superintendent and was assured that in doing so she would be rehired on a limited
contract for her fifth year. She did so and was rehired under a limited contract as
The Attorney General opined that the teacher had acquired tenure
under KRS 161.740 despite the superintendent’s attempt to thwart the mandatory
requirements of the statute. We believe the facts here are distinguishable.
Notably, as the trial court pointed out, the superintendent’s actions in the case sub
judice “do not evidence an attempt by the School to evade the statute.”
Jones’ contract was not renewed because changes in the curriculum of
the Laurel County School System necessitated the elimination of several teaching
positions. Jones was never given any indication by her school or the
superintendent that she would be rehired for the 2005-06 school year. One month
after the school year started, a substitute teaching position opened at the school due
to the unexpected illness of another teacher. Jones was hired to take the position as
a substitute. Jones’ substitute teacher position was temporary but, owing to the
long-term nature of the teacher’s illness, Jones continued in the substitute teacher
position for some time. The pregnancy of another teacher allowed Jones to take a
subsequent substitute teaching position replacing that teacher. The effect was that
Jones was employed in different capacities for, in effect, the entire school year. At
the end of that year, Jones was not offered a teaching position in the next year and
chose to resign her substitute position so that she could collect unemployment
The Opinion of the Attorney General stated that “[a] superintendent
cannot decide which teachers he wants to have a continuing service contract and
which teachers he wants to deny such a contract.” Ky. OAG 72-664. We believe
this statement is consistent with the legislative intent behind KRS 161.740.
However, we find it is the job of a superintendent to decide whether a non-tenured
teacher will be reemployed the following year. Under the circumstances of this
case, we cannot find an ulterior motive solely because the superintendent rehired a
non-tenured teacher to fill an unanticipated and temporary position after the school
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Laurel Circuit Court is
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
J. Follace Fields
Carrie C. Mullins
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
Larry G. Bryson
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
J. Follace Fields