BLAIR (DAVID LEE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 14, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002477-MR
DAVID LEE BLAIR
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. DAVID HAGERMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00194
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, KELLER, AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
KELLER, JUDGE: David Lee Blair, proceeding pro se, has appealed from the
Boyd Circuit Court’s November 19, 2007, order denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02. Blair
was sentenced to seventy years’ imprisonment for his convictions on eleven counts
of rape, one count of sexual abuse, and for being a Second-Degree Persistent
Felony Offender. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed Blair’s conviction on direct
appeal, and we adopt that Court’s recitation of the facts from its opinion affirming
the conviction:
Appellant was married to Vicky Lynn Blair and
resided with her and her two daughters from a previous
marriage, A.F., born November 30, 1988, and C.F., born
May 12, 1993. In February 2000, the family moved from
an apartment to a home in Boyd County. In April 2000,
Vicky obtained employment as a bus monitor for the
Boyd County Schools. That date corresponds with the
date when, according to A.F., Appellant began subjecting
her to sexual intercourse. A.F. testified that Appellant
had sexual intercourse with her more than twenty times
between April 2000 and August 2001 without specifying
which incidents of sexual intercourse occurred prior to
November 30, 2000, A.F.'s twelfth birthday, and which
occurred thereafter. Six of Appellant's eleven rape
convictions were premised upon his having sexual
intercourse with A.F. when she was under the age of
twelve, and Appellant does not claim that the evidence
was insufficient to support those convictions. C.F.
testified that Appellant had sexual intercourse with her
on more than ten occasions. The remaining five rape
convictions were premised on those incidents. The dates
of those incidents are not crucial because C.F. was still
under the age of twelve at the time of her testimony.
Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883, 885-86
(1997). A.F. and C.F. both testified that Appellant
threatened to harm them and other family members if
they told anyone about the intercourse.
In August 2001, A.F. began suffering from nausea
and vomiting. After A.F. vomited while riding the
school bus, Appellant and Vicky took A.F. to the
Catlettsburg Outreach Center, where Dr. Cynthia Pinson
examined her and found her to be pregnant. Appellant
and Vicky remained in the waiting room during the
examination. Dr. Pinson subsequently summoned Vicky
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to the examination room but asked Appellant to remain in
the waiting room. Instead, Appellant left the Center
without explanation and subsequently departed Kentucky
for Ohio. A.F. told Dr. Pinson and Vicky that Appellant
was the father of the fetus. The result of a subsequent
paternity test confirmed that fact to a 99.99% probability.
On September 19, 2001, a physical examination of
C.F. at Hope's Place, a child advocacy center for sexually
abused children, revealed that her hymen was worn in a
manner inconsistent with a pre-pubescent eight-year-old
child. The examining physician opined that C.F. had
experienced recurring digital or penile penetration.
Blair v. Commonwealth, 2005 WL 387274, *1-2 (Ky. 2005). Following a trial, the
jury convicted Blair on all charges, including six counts of rape related to A.F., as
well as five counts of rape and one count of sexual abuse related to C.F. After
finding him guilty of the status offense of being a persistent felony offender, the
jury recommended fifty-year sentences on each rape conviction and a ten-year
sentence on the sexual abuse conviction, all to be served consecutively for a total
of 560 years. The trial court reduced Blair’s penalty to the maximum aggregate
sentence of seventy years pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
532.110(1)(c).
On direct appeal, Blair raised five issues: 1) that his constitutional
rights were violated when the trial court allowed the child victims to testify outside
of his presence; 2) that the trial judge abandoned his role as a neutral arbiter during
in camera interviews with the child victims; 3) that a witness for the
Commonwealth improperly commented on his right to remain silent; 4) that the
chain of custody related to A.C.’s blood sample was violated; and 5) that the
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Commonwealth improperly informed the jury of the details of his prior conviction
for child sexual abuse during the penalty phase.1 The Supreme Court of Kentucky
affirmed Blair’s conviction. Regarding the fourth argument, the Supreme Court
noted that the laboratory results were admitted without objection and that Blair did
not challenge the integrity of the fetal sample or his own blood sample, which were
the samples used to prove paternity.
While his direct appeal was pending, Blair filed a pro se motion for
relief pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. In his
motion, Blair argued that the trial judge should have recused himself, as he had
prosecuted Blair when he was the Commonwealth’s Attorney; that a police
detective violated the chain of custody for two vials of his blood; and that certain
misconduct took place during his trial. The trial court denied Blair’s motion
without an evidentiary hearing on January 10, 2005, noting that his motion did not
conform to the requirements of RCr 11.42. In an opinion rendered November 22,
2006, this Court affirmed Blair’s appeal from the order denying relief. See Blair v.
Commonwealth, No. 2005-CA-000229-MR. The Court held that Blair should have
raised the recusal issue as soon as the facts necessitating disqualification were
discovered; that the chain of custody evidentiary issue would not be reconsidered,
as it was unsuccessfully argued on direct appeal; and that the misconduct issues
should have been raised on direct appeal, not in a post-conviction proceeding.
1
Blair was convicted in 1988 of two counts each of Second-Degree Rape and Second-Degree
Sodomy, and he was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. He was released in 1998. The
victims in that case were Blair’s biological daughters.
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Furthermore, the Court held that Blair failed to demonstrate that he had suffered
any prejudice due to the alleged errors.
On June 5, 2007, Blair filed a pro se CR 60.02 motion for relief that
was neither signed nor verified. In support of his motion, Blair included an
unsworn statement of Timothy Enyart dated October 24, 2003, which named
Blair’s cousin, Keith Blair, as the perpetrator of the crimes against A.F. and C.F.
While his motion is somewhat difficult to understand, Blair appeared to be again
raising the chain of custody issue, this time stating that the laboratory analyst
refused to testify about the chain of custody and asserted her Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Our review of this witness’s trial testimony
does not support Blair’s assertion. Blair also made brief arguments asserting that
he was prejudiced by the “Duplicitous Indictment” and by the trial court’s failure
to ask the potential jurors about any racial prejudice. However, the basis for
Blair’s motion is Enyart’s unsworn statement, with which Blair was attempting to
prove his innocence. In its response, the Commonwealth objected to Blair’s
motion as time-barred, in that the motion, which sought relief solely on the basis of
newly discovered evidence, was not filed within one year of the entry of the final
judgment of conviction.
On November 19, 2007, the trial court entered an order denying
Blair’s requested relief, without an evidentiary hearing. Because of the nature of
this case, we shall set out the trial court’s ruling in its entirety:
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The Movant, David Lee Blair, seeks a new trial
pursuant to CR 60.02 claiming that he is entitled to relief
as a result of newly discovered evidence. The motion is
not well taken for several reasons.
On June 5, 2002 the Movant was convicted by a
jury following a trial on eleven counts of First Degree
Rape, one count of First Degree Sexual Abuse, and of
being a Persistent Felony Offender in the Second Degree.
The jury recommended a sentence of 560 years which
was reduced to a term of 70 years by operation of law
pursuant to KRS 532.110(1)(c). Movant impregnated his
stepdaughter, and after the pregnancy was terminated
DNA analysis conducted on the tissue established
conclusively that the Movant had in fact been the person
who impregnated the child. The testimony of the
witnesses called, including that of the child, was
overwhelming as to the Movant’s guilt. Movant had
been convicted approximately 14 years earlier of raping
his own biological daughters and had only been out of
prison a relatively short period of time when the
aforementioned rapes against a stepdaughter began.
CR 60.02 states that a motion made under
subsections (a)[,] (b) and (c) are to be filed within one
year after the date of judgment. The motion before the
court at this time was filed slightly more than five years
after the judgment. Moreover, the affidavit submitted in
support of the motion was executed on October 29, 2003
and therefore didn’t even exist at the time the case was
tried. The affidavit bears no notary seal. The affidavit
consists of a handwritten statement in which the Affiant
claims that Movant’s cousin supposedly told him one
time that it was he that actually raped the child. The
motion does not address the question of why the aborted
fetal tissue was conclusively linked to Movant by DNA
analysis.
Possibly the most disturbing aspect of the affidavit
is the identity of the Affiant, one Timothy Lee Enyart.
Mr. Enyart is a person well known to the criminal justice
system in Boyd County, Kentucky. In 1979 Mr. Enyart
was convicted of three counts of Burglary in the Third
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Degree and two counts of felony Theft in the Boyd
Circuit Court. The following year in 1980, he was
convicted of Second Degree Escape in the Fayette
County Circuit Court. In 1982 he was convicted of two
counts of felony Receiving Stolen Property in the Allen
Circuit Court and shortly thereafter convicted of Escape
in the Second Degree in the Elliott Circuit Court. After a
Third Degree Burglary charge was dismissed in 1984 he
was convicted the following year in the Boyd Circuit
Court of felony Receiving Stolen Property. In 1988 he
was convicted in the Boyd Circuit Court of Receiving
Stolen Property and being a Persistent Felony Offender
in the Second Degree. In 1992 he was convicted of
felony Theft in the Daviess Circuit Court and the
following year convicted in the Daviess Circuit Court of
felony Theft by Unlawful Taking and Burglary in the
Third Degree. As part of his plea agreement a count of
First Degree Persistent Felony Offender was dismissed.
One must keep in mind that all of these felony
convictions are resulting in parole revocations for the
multitude of previous felonies. In 1997 he was again
convicted of Receiving Stolen Property in the Daviess
Circuit Court. In 2002 Enyart was once again convicted
of felony Receiving Stolen Property in the Boyd Circuit
Court and to the beset of the knowledge of the
undersigned Mr. Enyart currently resides at the Eastern
Kentucky Correctional Complex in West Liberty,
Kentucky.
Mr. Enyart has a long and well established history
of filing pro se civil suits which are frivolous and usually
fail to even state a cause of action under CR 12.
The undersigned has served the court system as a
Public Defender, Commonwealth Attorney, and Circuit
Judge for almost thirty years and is well acquainted with
Timothy Lee Enyart. In fact, of the thousands of
defendants encountered by the undersigned down
through the years, Mr. Enyart is probably the most
inherently dishonest person ever dealt with. One cannot
even believe the date on the affidavit as to it’s [sic] time
of execution since it was not signed before a notary. The
notion that such a dubious document executed by a
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pathological liar who is a career felon would entitle
Movant to a new trial after he was buried beneath an
avalanche of very compelling evidence is ridiculous.
And, as stated above, the motion was filed over five
years after the final judgment rather than within one year
as mandated by CR 60.02.
For the reasons stated above, the motion for relief
pursuant to CR 60.02 is denied.
This appeal followed.
In his brief, Blair accuses the trial judge of having a personal bias
against him, based upon the language contained in the order denying CR 60.02
relief and the trial judge’s previous prosecution of him.2 Blair also argues that he
should have been permitted to have the DNA samples used by the Commonwealth
at trial, as well as a sample from himself, tested by an independent laboratory to
establish that he was not the perpetrator. Blair asserts that the statement he
attached to his motion as well as the chain of custody problems support this
request. In its brief, the Commonwealth asserts that Blair should not prevail on
appeal for three reasons: 1) the CR 60.02 motion represents a successive postconviction motion for relief; 2) the recusal issue was raised, and rejected, in Blair’s
RCr 11.42 proceeding; and 3) Blair’s entitlement to an independent DNA test
should have been raised on direct appeal. We agree with the Commonwealth;
hence, we affirm.
2
The record contains the transcript from the October 31, 2001, court appearance, at which time
the trial judge, Judge Hagerman, reminded Blair that he had prosecuted him on similar charges
several years earlier. Judge Hagerman indicated that although he did not have a problem sitting
on the case, he would recuse if Blair wanted another judge to sit on his case. Blair responded
that he had no problem with Judge Hagerman staying on his case.
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In Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856-57 (Ky. 1983), the
Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed the proper method for conducting postconviction proceedings in Kentucky:
The structure provided in Kentucky for attacking
the final judgment of a trial court in a criminal case is not
haphazard and overlapping, but is organized and
complete. That structure is set out in the rules related to
direct appeals, in RCr 11.42, and thereafter in CR 60.02.
CR 60.02 is not intended merely as an additional
opportunity to raise Boykin defenses. It is for relief that
is not available by direct appeal and not available under
RCr 11.42. The movant must demonstrate why he is
entitled to this special, extraordinary relief. Before the
movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he must
affirmatively allege facts which, if true, justify vacating
the judgment and further allege special circumstances
that justify CR 60.02 relief.
CR 60.02 was enacted as a substitute for the
common law writ of coram nobis. The purpose of such a
writ was to bring before the court that pronounced
judgment errors in matter of fact which (1) had not been
put into issue or passed on, (2) were unknown and could
not have been known to the party by the exercise of
reasonable diligence and in time to have been otherwise
presented to the court, or (3) which the party was
prevented from so presenting by duress, fear, or other
sufficient cause. Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition,
487, 1444.
In Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 296 S.W.2d 700
(1956), this court held that 60.02 does not extend the
scope of the remedy of coram nobis nor add additional
grounds of relief. We held that coram nobis “is an
extraordinary and residual remedy to correct or vacate a
judgment upon facts or grounds, not appearing on the
face of the record and not available by appeal or
otherwise, which were not discovered until after
rendition of judgment without fault of the party seeking
relief.”
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In Jones v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 779, 108
S.W.2d 816, 817 (1937), this court held that the purpose
for the writ is to obtain a new trial in situations in “which
the real facts, as later presented on application for the
writ, rendered the original trial tantamount to none at all,
and when to enforce the judgment as rendered would be
an absolute denial of justice and analogous to the taking
of life or property without due process of law.”
Thus, while the remedies formerly available in
criminal cases by writ of coram nobis have been
preserved by CR 60.02 (Balsley v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
428 S.W.2d 614, 616 (1967)), the remedies have not been
extended, but have been limited by the language of that
rule.
CR 60.02 limits relief in these particulars:
1) The first three grounds specified in the rule [ (a)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, (b)
newly discovered evidence, (c) perjury] are limited to
application for relief “not more than one year after the
judgment.”
2) The additional specified grounds for relief are
(a) fraud, (b) the judgment is void, vacated in another
case, satisfied and released, or otherwise no longer
equitable, or (c) other reasons of an “extraordinary
nature” justifying relief. These grounds are specific and
explicit. Claims alleging that convictions were obtained
in violation of constitutionally protected rights do not fit
any of these grounds except the last one, “any other
reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.” In
Copeland v. Commonwealth, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 842
(1967), we refused to grant CR 60.02 relief where the
alleged constitutionally impermissible act (failure to
provide counsel when taking a guilty plea) could have
been raised in an earlier proceeding. This establishes as
precedent that such grounds are not automatic, but
subject to the qualification that there must be
circumstances of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.
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3) CR 60.02 relief is discretionary. The rule
provides that the court “may, upon such terms as are just,
relieve a party from its final judgment . . .” (emphasis
added).
4) CR 60.02 further provides, as a threshold to
relief, that “the motion shall be made within a reasonable
time. . . .”
We hold that the proper procedure for a defendant
aggrieved by a judgment in a criminal case is to directly
appeal that judgment, stating every ground of error which
it is reasonable to expect that he or his counsel is aware
of when the appeal is taken.
Next, we hold that a defendant is required to avail
himself of RCr 11.42 while in custody under sentence or
on probation, parole or conditional discharge, as to any
ground of which he is aware, or should be aware, during
the period when this remedy is available to him. Final
disposition of that motion, or waiver of the opportunity to
make it, shall conclude all issues that reasonably could
have been presented in that proceeding. The language of
RCr 11.42 forecloses the defendant from raising any
questions under CR 60.02 which are “issues that could
reasonably have been presented” by RCr 11.42
proceedings.
We adopt in this case, from the opinion in Alvey v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 858 (1983), published
this day, the following:
“(W)e should not afford the defendant a
second bite at the apple. Moreover, we fail
to perceive that there is any constitutional
impediment in following such a course since
we do not believe that the persistent felony
offender type of situation was anticipated or
was it meant to be encompassed in Boykin v.
Alabama.” (Citation omitted)
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Based upon our review of the record, we hold that the trial court did
not abuse its considerable discretion in denying Blair’s CR 60.02 motion for relief.
First, we note that Blair spent a considerable portion of his brief arguing that the
trial judge was biased; that issue was not argued below in Blair’s CR 60.02 motion
and was in fact addressed, and rejected, in his earlier RCr 11.42 proceeding.
Accordingly, we shall not address that portion of Blair’s brief. Furthermore, we
hold that Blair’s request for independent testing should have been raised before the
trial court and, if necessary, by direct appeal to the Supreme Court. See Sanders v.
Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380 (Ky. 2002); Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975
S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1998). Finally, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting the unsworn statement Blair submitted with his CR 60.02
motion. The jury clearly rejected Blair’s attempt during the trial to place blame for
the crimes on Keith Blair. In their recorded testimony, A.F. and C.F. clearly
identified Blair as the perpetrator of the crimes, even after being asked about Keith
Blair on cross-examination. In conclusion, we hold that Blair’s motion is time
barred under CR 60.02(b) and that he has not established any other reason of an
extraordinary nature supporting his motion under CR 60.02(f).
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Boyd Circuit Court
denying Blair’s CR 60.02 motion is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David Lee Blair, pro se
Sandy Hook, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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