HOWARD (KIMBERLY ANN) VS. HOWARD (MARTIN SHANE)
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RENDERED: AUGUST 8, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002445-ME
KIMBERLY ANN HOWARD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CLARK CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEFFREY M. WALSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00003
MARTIN SHANE HOWARD
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: VANMETER AND WINE, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Kimberly Ann Howard appeals from an order entered by
the Clark Circuit Court, Family Division, regarding matters relating to child
custody. We affirm.
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Kimberly and Martin Shane Howard (Marty) married in 1999, and
their only child was born in 2000. When the parties divorced in 2005, the decree
of dissolution provided for joint custody with equal time sharing arrangements.
The issue of who would have primary residential custody when the child reached
school age was specifically reserved for later determination.
In April 2006, Marty filed an ex parte motion seeking temporary
custody of the child based on the following allegation:
2. That [Kimberly] contacted him at 1:15 a.m. on Sunday
morning, April 16, 2006 and stated her new husband had
beaten her and was taken to jail. She asked [Marty] to
come pick up the minor child to ensure her safety. She
further stated her husband would be released at 7:00 a.m.
and she did not know where she would be when he
arrived at home.
Marty stated that although he agreed Kimberly acted properly by calling him and
removing the child “from the violence,” he believed it was “in the child’s best
interest for her to remain in his temporary custody until a final hearing can occur.”
The trial court awarded Marty temporary custody of the child and scheduled a
hearing some two weeks later. Kimberly did not attend the hearing, evidently due
to car problems. On May 12 the court awarded temporary custody of the child to
Marty, ordered that the child should have no contact with Kimberly’s husband, and
directed the parties to “mediate the issues of custody and timesharing before filing
a motion for a final hearing on the matters.”
Some fourteen months later, in July 2007, Kimberly filed a motion
seeking child custody, stating that mediation had been unsuccessfully attempted.
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The court conducted a hearing on October 8 and ordered the parties to share joint
custody. The court further established a timesharing schedule, and directed that
“the child shall not be around” Kimberly’s husband. This appeal followed.
First, Kimberly in essence contends that the trial court erred by
adopting findings of fact which were prepared by Marty’s attorney and which were
unsupported by the evidence. We disagree.
The court and the parties clearly viewed this matter as the resolution
of the custody issue reserved at the time of dissolution, rather than as a proceeding
to modify custody. Thus, when addressing the issues before it, the court
considered the child’s best interests and relied on the factors set out in KRS
403.270(2). Those factors include in pertinent part:
(a) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents . . .;
(b) The wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with
his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other
person who may significantly affect the child’s best
interests;
(d) The child’s adjustment to his home, school, and
community;
(e) The mental and physical health of all individuals
involved; [and]
(f) Information, records, and evidence of domestic
violence as defined in KRS 403.720[.]
The record shows that although both parties submitted proposed
findings and conclusions to the court before the hearing, the trial court accepted
neither version. Instead, during the hearing the court made numerous findings and
conclusions on the record in accordance with the factors set out in KRS
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403.270(2). Indeed, the court specifically noted that the only statutory factor
favoring Kimberly was the child’s alleged relationship with the other children in
Kimberly’s home. Moreover, for lack of proof, the court rejected Kimberly’s
allegations that Marty was not responding appropriately to the child’s allergies and
asthma. Although the court opined that it probably would be beneficial if Marty
was employed more hours, the court also voiced that having Marty at home as a
full time parent may have worked in the child’s favor. After describing
Kimberly’s husband as an alcoholic and wife-abuser based on his several DUI
convictions and the April 2006 incident, the court expressed its concern over
Kimberly’s decision to marry the husband despite knowing that he was not to be
around the child. The court also noted that despite Kimberly’s assertions that no
further incidents had occurred, no evidence had been presented to show that the
husband had sought help. Indicating a willingness to attempt joint custody despite
some apprehension over its feasibility, the court named Marty as the primary
residential custodian. The court ordered that Kimberly’s husband should have no
contact with the child, but left open the possibility that such condition could be
modified in the future.
The trial court subsequently entered findings, conclusions and an
order which Marty’s counsel prepared after the court made verbal findings and
conclusions on the record during the hearing. Such order differed significantly
from the proposed orders submitted by the parties before trial. Thus, unlike the
situations in Callahan v. Callahan, 579 S.W.2d 385 (Ky.App. 1979), and Brunson
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v. Brunson, 569 S.W2d 173 (Ky.App. 1978), the court clearly made independent
findings of fact and conclusions of law rather than simply adopting an order
prepared by counsel. No error occurred in this regard. See, e.g., Bingham v.
Bingham, 628 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. 1982); Prater v. Cabinet for Human Resources,
954 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1987). Additionally, after reviewing the record we cannot
say that the trial court’s findings were unsupported by the evidence and therefore
erroneous. CR2 52.01.
Next, Kimberly in essence contends that the trial court erred by failing
to find that the introduction of evidence of her husband’s past criminal record was
barred by res judicata. However, this affirmative defense was waived when it was
not raised in a responsive pleading. CR 8.03. See Independent Order of Foresters
v. Chauvin, 175 S.W.3d 610 (Ky. 2005); Bailey v. Bailey, 231 S.W.3d 793
(Ky.App. 2007). In any event, the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable to bar
the evidence in question since the current husband’s criminal record apparently has
not been, nor could have been, a subject of litigation during the parties’ earlier
dissolution proceedings. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Wheeler, 154 S.W.3d 291 (Ky.App.
2004); Huntzinger v. McCrae, 818 S.W.2d 613 (Ky.App. 1990).
Finally, Kimberly asserts that the trial court erred by entering the
temporary custody order in May 2006. Simply put, as a temporary custody order is
a nonappealable interlocutory order, see, e.g., Knight v. Knight, 419 S.W.2d 159
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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(Ky. 1967), the terms of the May 2006 order are not properly before this court on
appeal.
The court’s order is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William D. Elkins
Winchester, Kentucky
Kimberly Carter Blair
Winchester, Kentucky
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