I. (J.) VS. B. (J.)
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RENDERED: MAY 30, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002428-ME
J.I.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAULA SHERLOCK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-J-502251
J.B.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Appellant J.I. appeals from an order of the Jefferson Circuit
Court, Family Division, dismissing his paternity action for lack of jurisdiction. For
the reasons stated, we affirm.
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
1
A.D.S., the minor child, subject of this action, was born on May 15,
1998, in Jeffersonville, Indiana. In January 1998, J.I. (Appellant) and J.B.
(Appellee/mother) entered into a personal relationship, which was five and onehalf months prior to the child’s birth. Beginning in June 1998, until February
2002, J.I. and J.B. lived together. In October 2001, they married, and in September
2002, they divorced in Jefferson County, Kentucky (Case No. 02-CI-501825). The
property settlement agreement in that dissolution action made no mention of a
minor child born of the couple. Furthermore, the Decree of Dissolution, entered on
September 12, 2002, states “[t]here were no children born of the marriage.”
Although Appellant acknowledged paternity on the child’s birth certificate, and
therefore, contends he is the “legal father,” it is uncontroverted that Appellant is
not the biological father of the child in this paternity action.
Appellant filed a verified petition for the establishment of paternity on
May 3, 2007. Appellee filed her answer on July 16, 2007. In her answer, she
characterized her appearance as a “special appearance” and claimed that the family
court did not have jurisdiction to decide the issues raised in Appellant’s petition.
Although the Appellant asserts that no formal motion to dismiss was
filed, the Appellee counters that Appellee made a motion to dismiss at a case
management conference on August 15, 2007. Thereupon, the court ordered the
parties to submit memorandums of law. At that time, the Appellee asked the court
whether a formal motion to dismiss was required. The court indicated that a
formal motion was not necessary, and Appellant’s counsel did not object.
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Following both parties’ submission of memorandums of law, the court
issued its September 15, 2007, order which dismissed the action. The order held,
without indicating precise reasons, that the court did not have the requisite
jurisdiction to adjudge Appellant as the child’s legal father. This appeal followed.
The issue here is whether or not the Jefferson Family Court has
jurisdiction to decide the case. Appellant informed the family court, in his petition,
that Appellee and he had executed a Paternity Affidavit when A.D.S. was born and
that they followed the requirements set forth in Indiana Code (“IC”) 31-14-7-3 and
IC 16-37-2-2.1. IC 31-14-7-3 states “[a] man is a child’s legal father if the man
executed a paternity affidavit in accordance with IC 16-37-2-2.1 and the paternity
affidavit has not been rescinded or set aside under IC 16-37-2-2.1.” Because
Appellant allegedly executed such an affidavit and his name is on the birth
certificate, it appears that Appellant is already the “legal father” under Indiana law.
IC 16-37-2-2.1 provides explicit instructions for establishing a
paternity affidavit. One requirement is found under IC 16-37-2-2.1(e) wherein:
A paternity affidavit executed under this section must
contain or be attached to all the following:
(1) The mother’s sworn statement asserting that a person
described in subsection (b)(1)(B) is the child’s biological
father.
(2) A statement by a person identified as the father under
subdivision (1) attesting to a belief that he is the child’s
biological father.
[Emphasis added.]
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Clearly, in the situation at hand, Appellant and Appellee had been less than truthful
in executing the supposed paternity affidavit because they knew Appellant was not
the biological father of A.D.S. Furthermore, the statute itself, in IC 16-37-2-2.1(i),
provides the legal mechanism for rescinding a paternity affidavit:
A paternity affidavit that is properly executed under this
section may not be rescinded more than sixty (60) days
after the paternity affidavit is executed unless a court:
(1) has determined that fraud, duress, or material mistake
of fact existed in the execution of the paternity affidavit;
and . . .
[Emphasis added.]
Thus, if the parties executed the paternity affidavit, as stated by the
Appellant, they did so with the knowledge that the Appellant was not the
biological father. This Court would find it extremely troubling to recognize
Appellant as the “legal father” under the Indiana statutes because we also know
that he is not the biological father.
Next, since we are not able to confer the status of “legal father” upon
Appellant under the Indiana statutory scheme, we must consider the Kentucky
statutes, KRS 213.046 and KRS 406.021, which Appellant suggests in his Petition
are the corollary of the above-cited Indiana statutes.
Initially, we point out that KRS 406.021(1) allows a paternity
complaint to be made “upon the complaint of the mother, putative father, child,
person, or agency substantially contributing to the support of the child.” We will
not address the second prong concerning whether or not the Appellant was
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substantially contributing to the support of the child as that is not argued here. But
we will consider the term “putative father.” “Putative father” is not defined in
KRS Chapter 406, but “putative” is defined in the dictionary as “supposed,
reputed.” Funk & Wagnall’s Standard Dictionary (2d ed. 1993). Here, the record
is replete with information that demonstrates Appellant is not the putative father of
this child. For instance, when he began dating the child’s mother, she was already
pregnant; when the child was born, he was not married to the mother; when he
married the mother, he became the step-father; and, when he was divorced, his
divorce decree states that “there were no children born of the marriage.”
Second, Kentucky has a genetic testing presumption (KRS 406.011),
as well as the marital presumption. Generally, case law reflects that paternity
determinations are a function of biological connection to the child. 16 Louise E.
Graham & James E. Keller, Kentucky Practice - Domestic Relations Law § 23.5
(3d ed. 2008). Therefore, KRS 406.021(1) does not give Appellant standing to file
a complaint. Appellant cannot be considered the “putative” father because neither
presumption fits his relationship to the child. At most, his only status, during the
parties’ marriage, was that of step-father, which has no bearing in Chapter 406.
Moreover, KRS 406.021(4) says that “[v]oluntary acknowledgment of
paternity pursuant to KRS 213.046 shall create a rebuttable presumption of
paternity.” Notwithstanding that KRS 213.046 provides that voluntary
acknowledgment-of-paternity forms have the same weight and authority as a
judgment of paternity, Appellant has already admitted he is not the biological
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father of A.D.S., so the presumption of paternity has been rebutted. Finally, KRS
406.021 goes on to say that “[t]he action shall be brought by the county attorney or
by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services or its designee upon the request of
complainant authorized by this section.” Thus, Appellant, in this jurisdiction, must
bring the action through the above government entities. The paternity statutes
were designed to determine the biological father of a child in order to establish and
enforce the biological father’s duty to support his children. These statutes as
adopted in Kentucky contain no definition and make no provision for the status of
“legal father.” Hence, the Appellant does not have the ability to be named the
“legal father” under Kentucky statutes.
Next, where in personam jurisdiction is at issue, the applicable longarm statute for paternity actions in Kentucky is KRS 454.210(2)(a)(8), which states
as follows:
(2)(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim
arising from the person’s:
(8) Committing sexual intercourse in this state which
intercourse causes the birth of a child when:
(a) The father or mother or both are domiciled in this state;
(b) There is a repeated pattern of intercourse between the
Father and mother in this state; or
(c) Said intercourse is a tort or a crime in this state[.]
In this case, the statute is not applicable because the Appellant is admittedly not
the biological father of this child. The statute specifically requires a repeated
pattern of intercourse between the father and mother in this state, which results in
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the birth of the child. This case does not represent these factors. Appellant is not
the biological father, and therefore, the statutory language conferring personal
jurisdiction is not applicable. Moreover, Appellant’s line of reasoning would result
in the ludicrous proposition that any time a person has sex with another person in
the Commonwealth of Kentucky, they could sue that person for paternity of any
child.
Undoubtedly, Appellant’s suggestion that jurisdiction is conferred
because Appellee was both domiciled and engaged in sexual intercourse in
Kentucky resulting in the child’s birth, is fallacious. The child’s conception did
not result from the Appellee and Appellant’s relationship. The child’s biological
father is someone else. Chapter 406, the Uniform Act of Paternity, is about
determining the biological father of a child. Interestingly, the respondent herein is
not a putative father but the mother, whose biological relationship with the child is
unquestioned.
For his contention that KRS 454.210(2)(a)(8) confers jurisdiction, the
Appellant relies on Davis-Johnson ex rel. Davis v. Parmelee, 18 S.W.3d 347 (Ky.
App. 1999). He quotes the following language:
KRS 454.210(2)(a)(8) provides for personal jurisdiction
over some nonresidents. A nonresident may be subject to
a paternity action in Kentucky if two conditions are met.
First, the child must have been conceived in Kentucky.
Second, the act of intercourse causing conception must
meet one of three subconditions: (1) it must have
occurred while either party was a Kentucky
domiciliary. . . .
-7-
Yet the Appellant’s own selected quotation defeats his reasoning. Note the words,
“[s]econd, the act of intercourse causing conception.” [Emphasis added.] The
parties, by Appellant’s own admission, did not have a relationship until Appellee
was already pregnant. As noted before, the child in question was born five and
one-half months after the parties’ relationship began. Thus, the act of intercourse
causing the child’s conception occurred before the two parties were involved.
Additionally, the Parmelee Court’s decision was based on a factual scenario where
there was no doubt as to the biological parentage of the child in that situation or
where it occurred– the two parties therein had engaged in a sexual relationship in
Kentucky that resulted in the conception of the child whose paternity was at issue
there.
We would be remiss not to address Kentucky’s Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) found in Chapter 403
because, according to the Verified Petition, Appellant is seeking the status of
“legal father” in order to establish visitation with A.D.S. (a custody issue not a
support issue). KRS 403.822 is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making child
custody determinations in Kentucky courts. KRS 403.822(1) states “a court of this
state shall have jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:
(a) This state is the home state of the child on the date of
the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home
state of the child within six (6) months before the
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent
from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent
continues to live in this state[.]
-8-
Additionally, paragraph (2) states that “Subsection (1) of this section is the
exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court
of this state.”
KRS 403.800(7) defines “home state” as “the state in which a child
lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six (6) consecutive
months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.”
According to Appellant, the child has been in Texas since spring 2003, therefore
Kentucky is not the child’s “home state” and cannot exercise jurisdiction under this
statutory proviso.
We affirm the decision of the family court that it lacked requisite
jurisdiction to adjudge the paternity of the subject child because J.I., the Appellant,
acknowledged that he is not the biological father thus obviating any possibility of
the long-arm statute conferring personal jurisdiction. Similarly, because
Kentucky’s paternity statutes have no designation for the status of “legal father,”
and since Kentucky is not the home state of A.D.S., the family court also lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this case.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Katie Marie Brophy
Louisville, Kentucky
Paul C. O’Bryan
George R. O’Bryan
Louisville, Kentucky
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