COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY , ET AL. VS. HOME FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION , ET AL.
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 31, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
SUPREME COURT GRANTED DISCRETIONARY REVIEW:
FEBRUARY 11, 2009
(FILE NO. 2008-SC-0877-DG)
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002353-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
EX REL. THE OFFICE OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS; CORDELL G. LAWRENCE,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (OFI)1
v.
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00737
HOME FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION; MEMBERS CHOICE
CREDIT UNION; BEACON CREDIT UNION;
SERVICE ONE CREDIT UNION; C&O
CREDIT UNION; GREATER KENTUCKY
CREDIT UNION, INC.; KENTUCKY
EMPLOYEES CREDIT UNION
AND
APPELLANTS
APPELLEES
NO. 2007-CA-002384-MR
MEMBERS CHOICE CREDIT UNION;
BEACON CREDIT UNION; SERVICE ONE
CREDIT UNION; C&O CREDIT UNION;
1
By Order entered on September 29, 2008, Charles A. Vice, Commissioner of The Office of
Financial Institutions (n/k/a Department of Financial Institutions), was substituted for Cordell G.
Lawrence, Executive Director of The Office of Financial Institutions.
GREATER KENTUCKY CREDIT UNION,
INC.; KENTUCKY EMPLOYEES CREDIT
UNION
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00737
HOME FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND WINE, JUDGES; LAMBERT,2 SENIOR JUDGE.
WINE, JUDGE: The Commonwealth of Kentucky, ex rel. The Office of Financial
Institutions (OFI), appeals from a declaratory judgment of the Franklin Circuit
Court which rejected the agency’s interpretation of Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 286.6-107 as allowing community or geographic charters for state credit
unions. OFI and the intervening credit unions now appeal, arguing that Home
Federal Savings and Loan (Home Federal) lacked standing to bring this action and
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. We agree with the trial court that
Home Federal had standing to bring this action and was not required to pursue this
matter through administrative proceedings. We further find Home Federal is not
2
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
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barred from bringing this action by the doctrine of laches, and that there were no
relevant issues of fact which precluded summary judgment. On the substantive
issue, we conclude that the trial court’s interpretation of KRS 286.6-107 is more
consistent with the plain language of the statute than OFI’s interpretation.
Therefore, the trial court correctly found that OFI is not authorized to grant
community- or geographic-based charters to state credit unions. Hence, we affirm.
The relevant facts of this action are not in dispute. OFI charters,
regulates, and supervises banks, trust companies, savings and loan associations,
consumer loan companies, investment and industrial loan companies, and credit
unions in Kentucky. In 1984, the General Assembly enacted the current version of
KRS 290.107 (now KRS 286.6-107), which defines membership for credit unions
chartered and regulated by the OFI. Since the enactment of the statute, OFI has
allowed community and geographic fields of membership for credit unions.
On May 31, 2006, Home Federal filed a declaratory judgment action
against OFI in Franklin Circuit Court. Home Federal is a federally chartered thrift
located in Ashland, Kentucky. Home Federal alleged that OFI has acted outside of
the scope of its authority by allowing community-based charters because
community (or geographic) fields of membership are not authorized under KRS
286.6-107. Home Federal further alleged that this action in excess of its authority
violates the separation of powers doctrine by allowing OFI to exercise legislative
power in violation of Sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky Constitution. OFI filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that Home Federal lacks standing to challenge the
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agency’s statutory interpretation allowing geographic fields of membership. The
trial court denied the motion on October 26, 2006.
Thereafter, a number of credit unions regulated by OFI collectively
filed a motion for leave to intervene as defendants. The credit unions, namely
Members Choice Credit Union; Greater Kentucky Credit Union, Inc.; Beacon
Credit Union; C&O Credit Union; Service One Credit Union; and the Kentucky
Employee’s Credit Union, alleged that the OFI had previously granted each of
them permission to amend their charters to provide geographic fields of
membership. Thus, they asserted that they would be adversely affected by the
declaratory relief sought by Home Federal. Home Federal did not object to the
motion to intervene, which the trial court granted on March 19, 2007.
The matter then proceeded to cross-motions for summary judgment.
In an order entered on November 2, 2007, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Home Federal. The court first found that Home Federal was
not required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing this action. The
court further found that OFI’s interpretation of KRS 286.6-107 was not supported
by the plain language of the statute or its legislative history. Consequently, the
court concluded that OFI was not authorized to allow state-chartered credit unions
to have geographic fields of membership.
Thus, the court prospectively enjoined OFI from approving credit
union bylaws allowing geographic fields of membership. The court further
enjoined the intervening credit unions from “accepting new members whose only
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basis for membership is a ‘common bond of interest’ that is based on geography.”
However, the court also stated that this injunction does not apply to any credit
union members who joined the credit unions prior to the entry of the order. OFI
appealed from this order, and the intervening credit unions filed a separate notice
of appeal. These appeals are now consolidated before this Court.
In its appeal, OFI first argues that Home Federal lacked standing to
bring this action. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130,
119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), the United States Supreme Court set out the “irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing” in three elements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in
fact”-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or
imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of - the injury has to be “fairly . .
. trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of
some third party not before the court.” Third, it must be
“likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the
injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (internal citations omitted).
Similarly, Kentucky Courts have held:
In order to have standing in a lawsuit “a party must
have a judicially recognizable interest in the subject
matter of the suit.” Healthamerica Corp. v. Humana
Health Plan, Ky., 697 S.W.2d 946 (1985). The interest
of a plaintiff must be a present or substantial interest as
distinguished from a mere expectancy. Winn v. First
Bank of Irvington, Ky.App., 581 S.W.2d 21 (1979). The
issue of standing must be decided on the facts of each
case. Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., Ky.,
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790 S.W.2d 186 (1989); City of Louisville v. Stock Yards
Bank & Trust, Ky., 843 S.W.2d 327 (1992). Simply
because a plaintiff may be a citizen and a taxpayer is not
in and of itself sufficient basis to assert standing. There
must be a showing of a direct interest resulting from the
ordinance. Cf. Carrico v. City of Owensboro, Ky., 511
S.W.2d 677 (1974); York v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Railroad Co., 240 Ky. 114, 41 S.W.2d 668 (1931).
City of Ashland v. Ashland F.O.P. No. 3, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Ky. 1994).
OFI contends that the fact that Home Federal is a competitor of the
regulated credit unions is not sufficient to establish standing. Under the specific
facts of this case, we disagree. As OFI correctly points out, fear of competition is
not injury which would afford Home Federal standing to bring this action.
Healthamerica, 697 S.W.2d at 948. However, Healthamerica dealt with
competition in the context of public contracts, holding that “a disappointed
competitor has no standing to judicially contest the award of a public contract to
another entity.” Healthamerica, 607 S.W.2d at 947. Similarly, in Lexington Retail
Beverage Dealers Association v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
Board, 303 S.W.2d 268 (Ky. 1957), the plaintiffs, who held liquor licenses,
attempted to challenge an agency’s increase in the quota for liquor licenses in
Fayette County. The former Court of Appeals held that the licensees had no
contract or property rights, and thus could not show any injury to their private
rights. Id. at 270. “The only possible basis of plaintiffs’ claim is that their
competitive position in the liquor business may be adversely affected. This is not
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only remote and speculative and a normal business risk, but they have no right to
be free from competition.” Id.
In contrast, this case involves OFI’s administration of its regulatory
authority. See Humana of Kentucky, Inc. v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 751 S.W.2d 369,
372 (Ky. 1988). Where the proposed competition is unlawful by reason of
arbitrary and capricious administrative action or abuse of discretion, the competitor
may possess sufficient standing to sue. See First National Bank of Buffalo v.
Peoples State Bank, Inc., 574 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Ky. 1978), citing Warren Bank v.
Camp, 396 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1968). The credit union statutes in KRS Chapter
286.6 strictly regulate the operations of Kentucky-chartered credit unions. OFI is
charged with administering those statutes, including the statutory limitations on
membership in such credit unions. Home Federal alleges that OFI has exceeded its
statutory authority by granting geographic- or community-based charters to credit
unions. Consequently, we find that Home Federal has shown an actual, justiciable
injury which would afford it standing to bring this action.
OFI also argues that this action should be barred because Home
Federal failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. However, exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not required when an agency acts in excess of its
powers. Adkins v. Commonwealth, 614 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Ky. App. 1981). Nor is
exhaustion of administrative remedies required where the complaint raises an issue
of jurisdiction as a mere legal question, not dependent upon disputed facts, so that
an administrative denial of the relief sought would be clearly arbitrary. Franklin v.
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Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, 799 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ky.
1990). See also Goodwin v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 11, 15, 215 S.W.2d 557,
559 (1948).
Furthermore, OFI does not identify any administrative remedies
which Home Federal would be entitled to pursue. Home Federal is not an entity
that is regulated by OFI. In fact, OFI concedes that Home Federal would have no
basis to intervene in an administrative hearing pursuant to KRS 286.6-012.
Therefore, we agree with the trial court that Home Federal was not required to
exhaust any administrative remedies before bringing this action.
The central issue in this case concerns OFI’s interpretation of KRS
286.6-107. In its separate appeal, Beacon Credit Union also argues that Home
Federal should be barred by the doctrine of laches from bringing this action due to
its unreasonable delay in bringing this action. We agree with the trial court’s
analysis on these issues and adopt the following portion of its opinion:
OFI is required to interpret the statutes it is
charged to administer. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).3 OFI’s interpretation of law concerning the
scope of its own authority, however, is subject to
legislative limits and judicial review. OFI is created by
statute, and its power to act is limited to the delegation of
legislative authority conferred on it by the General
3
In its amicus brief, the Credit Union National Association challenges the application of the
Chevron test to review OFI’s interpretation of KRS 286.6-107. However, the Kentucky Supreme
Court applied the Chevron analysis in Board of Trustees of Judicial Form Retirement System v.
Attorney General, 132 S.W.3d 770, 787 (Ky. 2003). Furthermore, while we agree with the
amicus that the Chevron doctrine does not expressly apply or preempt state law, we find no
indication that the general principles set out in Chevron are inconsistent with Kentucky law in
this area.
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Assembly. Van Hoose v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d
389 (Ky. App. 1999) (internal citation omitted). OFI’s
interpretation of its enabling statute is entitled to
deference only when it is supported by the language of
the statute. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; Camera
Center, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 34 S.W.[3d] 39, 42 (Ky.
2000) (“the agency cannot by its rules and regulations,
amend, alter, enlarge or limit the terms of legislative
enactment.”).
As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained,
interpretations contained in an agency’s internal policy
which have not been promulgated through formal rulemaking or adjudication, “do not warrant Chevron-style
deference.” Christiansen v. Harris County, 529 U.S.
576, 587 (2000). OFI cannot implement, by internal
policy or regulation, an expansion of its legislative
mandate. See KRS 13B.130. Unless OFI’s interpretation
of the statute is supported by the language enacted by the
legislature, OFI cannot expand its power to approve
community fields of membership without violating the
restrictions of Section 27 and 28 of the Kentucky
Constitution, which confer constitutional status on the
doctrine of separation of powers in Kentucky. Robertson
v. Shein, 204 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1947). See also
Legislative Research Commission v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d
907 (Ky. 1984).
This Court must discharge its constitutional duty to
enforce the boundaries of the separation of powers when
an agency seeks to act beyond the scope of its authority
by expanding its legislative mandate without
authorization. Although OFI’s interpretation of this
statute is longstanding, it is supported by neither the plain
language of the statute nor the legislative history of the
statute. As the Kentucky Supreme Court has held, “an
erroneous interpretation or application of the law is
reviewable by the court which is not bound by an
erroneous administrative interpretation no matter how
longstanding such an interpretation.” Camera Center v.
Revenue Cabinet, 34 S.W.3d 39, 41 (Ky. 2000). Here,
the legislature considered and rejected the option of
allowing community based, or geographic, fields of
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membership for credit unions. OFI cannot expand its
legislative mandate by administrative fiat.
KRS 286.6-107
The Kentucky statute governing membership of
state credit unions reads as follows:
(1) The membership of a credit union shall
be limited to and consist of the subscribers
to the articles of incorporation and such
other persons within the common bond set
forth in the bylaws as have been duly
admitted members, have paid any required
entrance fee or membership fee, or both,
have subscribed to one (1) or more shares,
and have paid the initial installment thereon,
and have complied with such other
requirements as the articles of incorporation
or bylaws specify.
(2) Credit union membership shall be
limited to persons having a common bond of
similar occupation, association, or interest.
(Emphasis supplied).
This statute was patterned after the Model Act of
1979. The first section of Kentucky’s statute is a
verbatim adoption of the model language. The second
section of Kentucky’s statute, however, deleted the
portion of the model language that specifically authorized
geographic fields of membership. The Model Act
provided as follows:
(2) Credit Union membership may include,
but is not necessarily limited to groups
having a common bond of similar
occupation, association, or interest, or to
groups who reside within an identifiable
neighborhood, community, or rural district,
or to employees of a common employer, or
to persons employed within a defined
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business district, industrial park or shopping
center, and members of the immediate
family of such persons.
(Emphasis added).
The defendants [OFI and the intervening credit
unions] argue that the Kentucky statute, by deleting the
language authorizing the various geographic or economic
categories for membership, somehow created a broader
range of permissible membership than the Model Act.
The Court must examine the language and structure of
the Model Act for support for this position.
The structure of the Model Act itself is instructive
on the question of whether the concept of “common
interest” includes a common geographic location. Under
the Model Act membership may be limited to (1) groups
with “similar occupation, association, or interest;” or (2)
groups who reside within an identifiable geographic area.
The act clearly lists these as two different types of
groups. Defendants’ interpret the second alternative
(geographic area) as duplicative but more restrictive.
However, the structure of the paragraph does not suggest
that the subsequent clauses are examples of
implementing the first, “common bond” clause. If a
common geographic area qualifies as a common bond of
similar interest, then the use of the second clause in the
Model Act would be entirely redundant. Statutes are to
be interpreted so that no part is meaningless or
ineffectual. Potter v. Bruce Walters Ford Sales, Inc., 37
S.W.3d 210 (Ky.App. 2000).
Moreover, a review of the Kentucky legislation
supports the conclusion that residence in an identifiable
geographic location is not adequate as a common bond to
support membership in a credit union. The 1984
Kentucky legislation that defines credit union
membership provides that “credit union membership
shall be limited to persons having a common bond of
similar occupation, association or interest.” 1984 Ky.
Acts, c. 408, Sec. 11. It is noteworthy that the
legislation, as originally introduced in Senate Bill 255,
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explicitly provided for residence in related geographic
areas to qualify as a basis to support credit union
membership. The geographic area provisions were
deleted from the bill before final passage. The definition
of membership in the legislation, as originally
introduced, closely tracked the Model Act:
Credit union membership shall be limited to
persons having a common bond of similar occupation,
association or interest, or to persons who reside within an
identifiable neighborhood, community, rural district, or
to employees of a common employers [sic], or to persons
employed within a defined business district, industrial
park or shopping center, and members of the immediate
family of such persons.
Senate Bill 255, Section 11(2) (1984 General
Assembly; BR 1518)4 (Introduced February 14, 1984).
(Emphasis supplied).
The bill was amended in the Senate Committee
Substitute on February 28, 1984.5 The Senate Committee
Substitute deleted all of the definition set forth above
following the word “interest.” This definition (“Credit
union membership shall be limited to persons having a
common bond of similar occupation, association or
interest.”) remains unchanged in the statute today. KRS
286.6-107(2). Thus, it is clear that the legislature
considered and rejected the proposal to allow for
geographic fields of membership in credit unions.
Courts are required to construe statutes by
examining the plain language of the statute. Bowling
Green v. Board of Ed., 443 S.W.2d 243 (Ky. 1969):
Kentucky Indus. Util. Customers, Inc. v. Kentucky
Utilities Co., 983 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Ky. 1998). An
agency’s construction of a statute it administers must be
upheld if it is a permissible construction. Chevron
4
Copy on file with Legislative Research Commission. [Footnote in original].
5
See Legislative Record, Final Legislative Action, 1984; General Assembly Copy of S.B. 255
(1984) (Copy on file, Legislative Research Commission). [Footnote in original].
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U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
Defendant OFI interprets “interest” to “necessarily
entail” community fields of membership. Numerous
definitions of interest are offered, none of which clearly
entail a geographic field. Defendants argue that persons
living in the same community “travel the same roads and
frequent the same schools, churches, shopping centers,
and other facilities.” All proposed examples of
community interest suggest very defined communities
that do not comport with those previously chartered: for
example, paying taxes to the community would not
support expansion of Fancy Farm [Credit Union’s]6
charter to a tri-county area since that is not a single
taxing district; there is no single leader elected for that
tri-county area; and there are likely people in that
community who do not own the real property on which
they reside. The examples offered for a common interest
in a geographic field actually illustrate how poorly the
concepts converge.
Nor can the common bond of geographic interest
be that everyone in the community wants affordable
financial services. Again, such a common bond would be
limitless: everyone wants affordable financial services.
Nor can a similar interest in seeing that a community
credit union is well-managed be the common interest
because that would allow the bond of being in the credit
union to suffice for the common bond required to join in
the first place. Under the statute, the “common interest”
is a prerequisite to membership; it is the threshold that
must be reached before membership can be conferred.
The defendants’ interpretation of the statute would vitiate
6
Earlier in its opinion, the trial court noted OFI’s argument that Fancy Farm Credit Union has
been chartered with a geographic field of membership since 1957. However, the court also
pointed out that its charter had been issued under a prior version of the statute, and that “the
small rural western Kentucky community of Fancy Farm has many unique social, religious,
educational and political characteristics that could give rise to a ‘common bond of interest’
irrespective of geography.”
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the statutory requirement that makes a common bond the
prerequisite for membership.7
Defendants argue that geographic based charters
must be included in the concept of a “common bond of
similar . . . interest” for the requirement of “an
identifiable neighborhood, community, or rural district”
to act as a limit. If the term “common bond of interest”
includes geographic charters, then removal of the
limitation of the Model Act would allow Kentucky to
charter credit unions geographically within the
Commonwealth without any meaningful limit. The
common bond of interest could be as broad as residence
in the Commonwealth or even an interest in residence in
the Commonwealth. Under this interpretation, the
concept of “common bond of interest” would be
limitless.
The defendants argue that altering the language of
the Model Act from “groups” having a common bond to
“persons” having a common bond indicates intent to
open membership rather than limit membership.
However, Senate Bill 255 - prior to its amendment - used
the term “persons” (rather than “groups”) in reference to
the geographic field of membership, and that entire
clause was deleted from the final legislation. Kentucky’s
alterations from the Model Act also include removal of
the language that membership “may include” to language
that membership “shall be limited to” members having a
common bond of similar occupation. This Kentucky
7
The credit unions further argue that the membership limitations in KRS 286.6-107 must be
interpreted in light of other sections in the Act, particularly KRS §§ 286.6-070, 286.6-085, and
286.6-095. KRS 286.6-070 provides that the executive director of OFI shall have supervisory
authority over state-chartered credit unions; KRS 286.6-085 allows credit unions to exercise
“such incidental powers as are granted corporations;” and KRS 286.6-095 provides that
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the executive director may make reasonable rules
authorizing credit unions to exercise any of the powers conferred upon federal credit unions, if
he deems it reasonably necessary for the well-being of such credit unions.” The credit unions
contend that these sections, when read together, allow OFI to authorize geographic or
community fields of membership to place state credit unions in parity with federal credit unions.
We disagree. These sections specifically address the powers which credit unions may exercise
as corporate bodies. See also KRS 286.6-075. These sections do not give OFI’s executive
director unlimited discretion to expand the permissible fields of membership in credit unions as
set out in KRS 286.6-107.
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change clearly narrows the Model language. The Model
Act specifically does “not necessarily limit[]”
membership, while Kentucky unequivocally limits
membership. It is nonsensical to interpret the Kentucky
Act to be broader than the Model Act.
Defendants argue that “[t]he fact that the
legislature did not use exclusionary language indicates an
intention not to limit.” (OFI’s Response to Motion for
Summary Judgment, p. 8, citing Camera Center, Inc. v.
Revenue Cabinet, 34 S.W.3d 39, 43 (2000)). This is no
disagreement with this canon of construction. However,
the Court finds it is not applicable here. The Kentucky
legislature did use exclusionary language: “membership
shall be limited to” certain persons. The Court may not
disregard the words enacted by the legislature. AK Steel
Corp. v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 15 (Ky.App. 2002).
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting
the corresponding federal act governing federal credit
unions, has also held that the statute must be interpreted
to impose limits on membership, in interpreting the
meaning of the phrase “shall be limited” - which is
common to the federal and Kentucky statutes. In
National Credit Union Administration v. First National
Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 502-5[] (1998), the
Court addressed § 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act,
which stated “membership shall be limited to groups
having a common bond of occupation or association, or
to groups within a well-defined neighborhood,
community, or rural district.” The Court addressed
whether the common bond must unite all members of a
credit union or whether the common bond must unite the
members of each unrelated group, as in a conglomerate.
Id. at 502.
The Supreme Court observed that an interpretation
that allowed a conglomerate credit union with unrelated
groups “cannot be considered a limitation on credit union
membership if at the same time it permits such a limitless
result. Id. at 502-503. The Court stated that such a broad
interpretation, where “it would be permissible to grant a
charter to a conglomerate credit union whose members
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would include the employees of every company in the
United States” would effectively read the words “shall be
limited” out of the statute. Id.
The relevant language is identical between the
Kentucky and federal statutes: membership “shall be
limited.” The Supreme Court found that the same
common bond must unite all members for this language
to have effect. The same rationale is true for a
geographic limitation. If the clause regarding an
identifiable geographic area is a limitation on an
otherwise broad and encompassing concept of interest,
then interest would become such a limitless concept that
the provisions stating membership “shall be limited”
would become a nullity. The legislature could have
retained [the] model act’s language that membership may
be, but is not necessarily, limited. Having consciously
chosen to alter the language to explicitly provide for
limitation of membership, the Court cannot interpret the
term enacted by the legislation (“shall be limited”) to
have no actual or practical effect.
Further, in National Credit Union Administration
the Supreme Court examined the common bond phrase
by comparison to the geographic phrase, pursuant to the
canon that similar language within the same section
should be given a consistent meaning. Regarding the
federal geographic limitation, the Court stated “[t]he
reason that the NCUA has never interpreted, and does not
contend that it could interpret, the geographical limitation
to allow a credit union to be composed of members from
an unlimited number of unrelated geographic units, is
that to do so would render the geographic limitation
meaningless.” Id. at 502 (emphasis in original). The fact
that the federal statute speaks of “groups” rather than
“persons” does not change the wisdom of this analysis.
Of course, some common interests may correlate
to geography. The unique nature of Fancy Farm is a
perfect example of a community that arguably has a
common bond of similar interests because the individuals
and families who live in that small rural community share
social, economic, school, church, recreational, civic and
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other interests in addition to their geographic connection.
However, it is the common bonds rather than mere
geographical proximity that makes [sic] it an appropriate
“group” to form a credit union.
In addition, the defendants note that the current
incarnation of Kentucky’s credit union statute provides
for “similar occupation, association, or interest” rather
than “identity” of profession or employment, as
previously required. The Court finds that this change
simply reflects a common sense legislative determination
that proving “identical” interests for purposes of
establishing eligibility for credit union membership is too
onerous a burden. This legislative change is in no way
related to the issue of whether community based charters
are authorized.
The statute makes no mention of geographic fields
of membership. OFI has interpreted this silence as
authorizing geographic fields of membership,
notwithstanding the clear legislative history that
demonstrates that geographic fields of membership were
proposed and rejected by the General Assembly. In these
circumstances, the agency’s interpretation of the statute
is clearly erroneous, and “the court . . . is not bound by
an erroneous administrative interpretation no matter how
long standing [sic] such an interpretation.” Camera
Center v. Revenue Cabinet, 34 S.W.3d 39, 41 (Ky. 2000).
See also St. Luke Hospitals, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 186
S.W.3d 746, 751 (Ky.App. 2005). However, where a
party has acted in reliance upon a longstanding [sic]
administrative interpretation of the law, it is within the
discretion of the court to apply its decision correcting the
erroneous administrative interpretation prospectively to
avoid injustice. Hagan v. Farris, 807 S.W.2d 488, 490
(internal citations omitted).
Finally, the Court finds this case is not barred by
the doctrine of laches. As guidance, the Court notes that
in the substantially similar case of Independent Bankers
Association of America v. Heimann, 627 F.2d 486, 487
(D.C. Cir 1980), that court did apply the doctrine of
laches in a dispute between a bankers association and the
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Comptroller of the Currency over the meaning of the
term “branches” as used in 12 U.S.C. s 36(f) (1976). In
that case, the banking association brought its action
twelve years after the Comptroller first promulgated a
ruling that loan production offices engaging in limited
activities were not branches. Id. at 488. The Court noted
that the banking association had waited past the time it
had begun to feel competition due to the ruling. Id. The
Court further opined that the delay allowed banks to
make investments that could not be recouped if the loan
production offices were closed; if these costs were
recouped it would be through increased cost to
customers. Id.
The Court stated the Comptroller’s ruling was
erroneous, but refused to allow the suit because it was
contrary to public policy. Id. Significantly, the Court
then stated, “we do not believe that we in any way are
hindering individual banks, even if IBAA members, from
seeking redress from the Comptroller, or, if necessary,
the courts should the banks be faced with competition
from LPO’s [Loan Production Offices] that actually are
‘branches.’” Id. The reasoning in this case is persuasive
and is directly analogous to the present situation. Home
Federal, whose competitor was not chartered using the
geographic field until December 22, 2005, cannot be
barred from asserting its rights in this matter, regardless
of whether other financial institutions may have delayed
in initiating a challenge to OFI’s statutory interpretation.8
In these circumstances, it would be error for the
Court to allow an erroneous interpretation of the statute
to continue.9 In order to avoid any hardship on credit
8
The Court notes that the record here reflects only five credit unions have been chartered using
a geographic field of membership since enactment of Senate Bill 255 in 1984. See OFI
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, p. 2 (July 26, 2006). This supports a finding that
any delay in [bringing] a challenge has had minimal impact. [Footnote in original].
9
Moreover, it appears that an additional impetus for bringing this action was the aborted
administrative rulemaking process in which OFI sought to promulgate an administrative
regulation codifying its interpretation of the statute allowing geographic fields of membership.
See Administrative Register of Kentucky, Feb. 1, 2006. The proposed administrative regulation,
808 KAR 3:070, was withdrawn without comment or explanation prior to its consideration by
the Administrative Regulations Review Subcommittee of the Legislative Review Commission,
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union members or existing credit unions that have
previously obtained approval from OFI for by-laws [sic]
allowing a geographic field of membership, the Court’s
ruling on these issues will be applied prospectively.
Hagan v. Farris, 807 S.W.2d 488 (Ky. 1991).
Finally, four of the intervening credit unions, Greater Kentucky, C&O
United, Service One, and Kentucky Employees, argue that summary judgment was
inappropriate because there were disputed issues of fact. Specifically, they assert
that factual findings are necessary to determine whether their geographic fields of
membership reflect common bonds of similar occupation, association or interest.
We disagree.
The only question before the trial court in this declaratory judgment
action concerned OFI’s legal interpretation of KRS 286.6-107. No factual issues
were in dispute. The credit unions intervened as party defendants pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 24.01, asserting that their interests would
be affected by a judgment against OFI. In support of their motion to intervene, all
of the credit unions asserted that they had “received a charter from the Office of
Financial Institutions or its predecessor, permitting each credit union to serve a
community field of membership.” And none of the credit unions filed crosscomplaints for declaratory judgment seeking an adjudication of their rights under
the statute. Consequently, we conclude that the factual issues raised by the credit
unions were outside of the scope of this action.
on February 21, 2006. The fact that OFI first proposed and then abandoned the administrative
regulation is further indication that OFI itself recognized it lacked statutory authority to adopt
such a regulation. [Footnote in original].
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Accordingly, the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS,
COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY, EX REL. THE
OFFICE OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS; CORDELL G.
LAWRENCE, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR (OFI):
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE, HOME
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION:
Stuart E. Alexander, III
William J. Walsh
Kathleen M. W. Schoen
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEEE, HOME FEDERAL
SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS, COMMONWEALTH
OF KENTUCKY, EX REL. THE OFFICE
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS;
CORDELL G. LAWRENCE,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (OFI):
Lewis Paisley
Lexington, Kentucky
F. Ryan Keith
Public Protection Cabinet
Frankfort, Kentucky
Thomas L. Canary, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
Burl McCoy
Lizbeth Ann Tully
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANTS/APPELLEES,
MEMBERS CHOICE CREDIT UNION;
BEACON CREDIT UNION; SERVICE
ONE CREDIT UNION; C&O CREDIT
UNION; GREATER KENTUCKY
CREDIT UNION, INC.; KENTUCKY
EMPLOYEES CREDIT UNION:
David T. Wilson II
Radcliff, Kentucky
-20-
BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE,
KENTUCKY CREDIT UNION
LEAGUE:
BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE,
CREDIT UNION NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION:
Alice G. Keys
Covington, Kentucky
-21-
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