GRANT (KENNETH D.) VS. LYNN (RANDA)
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 17, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: OCTOBER 24, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002193-ME
KENNETH GRANT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JASON S. FLEMING, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-01216
RANDA LYNN (NOW HELTSLEY)
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE, NICKELL AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Kenneth Grant (“Grant”), pro se, appeals three orders
entered by the Christian Circuit Court on September 27, 2007, October 1, 2007,
and October 24, 2007. All three orders pertain to the court finding Randa Lynn
Heltsley (“Heltsley”) sufficiently proved grandparent visitation with Grant’s
teenage son and daughter was in the children’s best interests. After reviewing the
full record and Grant’s rambling briefs we affirm.1
This is the fourth time these parties have appeared on our docket in
Heltsley’s six-year quest for grandparent visitation. When we last reviewed the
case in 2005, we vacated and remanded the judgment of the Christian Family
Court2 which had denied visitation because Heltsley failed to prove the children
would be harmed if they could not visit with their maternal grandmother under
Scott v. Scott, 80 S.W.3d 447, 451 (Ky.App. 2002), overruled by Vibbert v.
Vibbert, 144 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Ky.App. 2004). Remand was necessary because an
en banc panel of this Court had since replaced the “harm” standard mandated by
Scott with the “best interest” standard adopted in Vibbert. After rehearing the case,
plus several new motions and a constitutional challenge filed by Grant, the trial
court found Heltsley had satisfied Vibbert and granted her visitation with the
children, now fourteen and fifteen, from 10:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. on the fourth
Saturday of each month and a thirty-minute telephone call with the children every
Tuesday evening. Grant has now appealed that ruling to us.
1
Grant unsuccessfully moved the trial court to stay enforcement of the October 1, 2007,
judgment. In March of 2008, Grant moved this Court for a stay pending appeal. That motion
was denied because Grant failed to show he or his children would be irreparably harmed by the
limited visitation awarded Heltsley during pendency of this appeal. Based upon the record
before us, Heltsley should now be enjoying visitation with her grandchildren for the first time
since 2002.
2
Lynn v. Grant, No. 2004-CA-000298-ME, (not-to-be-published, rendered June 24, 2005).
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While any wheat in Grant’s repetitive and meandering briefs is easily
lost in the chaff, we understand him to be asking us to declare KRS3 405.021
unconstitutional because it allegedly violates both the federal and state
constitutions on its face and as applied, or alternatively, to overturn Vibbert and
revert to the Scott standard. After reviewing the record we will do neither.
Rather than rewrite the long and complex history of this case anew,
we quote from the well-written and well-reasoned findings of fact, conclusions of
law and final order entered by the trial court after a final evidentiary hearing.
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF KRS 405.021
1. [Grant] has properly challenged the constitutionality
of KRS 405.021. [Grant] notified the Kentucky Attorney
General of the challenge, and the Kentucky Attorney
General’s Office declined to intervene to defend the
statute. [Heltsley] filed a response to the constitutional
challenge;
2. [Grant] argues that the statute is unconstitutional both
on its face and as applied. This Court, however,
disagrees. The Court finds that under Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49
(2000), that the statute passes constitutional muster on all
grounds alleged by [Grant]. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals in applying Troxel to KRS 405.021 has correctly
ruled that a “modified ‘best interest’ standard can be used
in cases where grandparent visitation is sought within the
constitutional framework of Troxel. What Troxel
requires us [the Court] to recognize is that a fit parent has
a superior right, constitutionally, to all others in making
decisions regarding the raising of his or her children,
including who may or may not visit them.” Vibbert v.
Vibbert, 144 S.W.3d 292, 294 (Ky.App. 2004).
Therefore, the court must give appropriate deference to
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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the parent’s wishes. However, the parent’s wishes are
only one factor that the Court must consider in
determining what is in the child’s best interest[;]
3. The Vibbert Court set forth a broad array of factors
that the Court must consider. These factors include, but
are not limited to, the following: (1) the nature and
stability of the relationship between the child and the
grandparent seeking visitation, (2) the amount of time the
child and grandparent spent together, (3) the potential
detriments and benefits to the child from granting
visitation, (4) the effect granting visitation would have on
the child’s relationship with the parents, (5) the physical
and emotional health of all the adults involved,
grandparents and parents alike, (6) the stability of the
child’s living and school arrangements, and (7) the
wishes and preferences of the child. Vibbert, at 295. The
grandparent seeking visitation must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the requested visitation is in the
best interest of the child. Id., quoting Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d
599 (1982) (“the individual interests at stake in a state
proceeding are both particularly important and more
substantial than the mere loss of money.”);
4. This court believes that the Vibbert standard in
interpreting the relevant sections of KRS 405.021 makes
the statute constitutional both on its face and as applied.
In addition, the Court finds that all other subsections of
KRS 405.021 are constitutional both on their face and as
applied. Therefore, this Court hereby upholds the
constitutionality of the statute, in toto;
B. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW
5. The procedural history of this case is long and
complicated. [Grant] was once married to [Heltsley’s]
daughter Julie Dawn Grant Latham. . . . Mr. And (sic)
Ms. Grant divorced in 1995 and the parties were awarded
joint custody of the children with Mr. Grant being the
primary residential custodian. In 1999, the Hopkins
Circuit Court changed custody of the children to Ms.
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Latham. This matter went to the Kentucky Court of
Appeals (2000-CA-002636-MR)[;]
6. In July 2002, [Heltsley’s] husband, Sammy Lynn,
passed away from an illness. Six days later, Ms. Latham
died during an unrelated surgery. At that point,
[Heltsley] sought an ex parte order from the Hopkins
Circuit Court granting her emergency custody of the
children. [Grant] and [she] engaged in a heated custody
action in Hopkins County which resulted in [Grant] being
awarded sole custody of the children. In August 2002,
[Heltsley] filed a “Petition to Establish Visitation Rights”
in the Christian Circuit Court, Family Court Division.
[Heltsley] has been actively pursuing visitation with the
children since that time[;]
...
10. . . . . Since the undersigned Judge took over this
case, [Grant] has engaged in a repeated course of conduct
aimed at preventing the Court from conducting a final
hearing on this matter. . . . The Final (sic) hearing was
scheduled on September 21, 2007. On September 12,
2007, the Court held oral arguments on the above
constitutional challenge of KRS 405.021. The parties
decided to allow the constitutional arguments to be
submitted on the record of their written memorandums.
The Court also used this opportunity to conduct a pretrial
on this matter. Neither party raised any real issues
regarding the final hearing;
11. On September 19, 2007, [Grant] is (sic) another
effort to prevent the final hearing filed an “Objection” to
the hearing taking place on September 21, 2007, due to
the pending constitutional challenge. In addition on the
same date, [Grant] filed a “Notice” which [Grant]
informed the parties and the Court that he would be two
hours late to the hearing on September 21, 2007, and
wanted the hearing started late or continued. [Grant]
argued in his motion that [his] daughter had a shot
scheduled for that date and he had to take her to the
doctor. [Grant] stated that this shot had been scheduled
for three (3) months. It should be noted that on August
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15, 2007, [Grant] filed a “Notice” objecting to the
untimeliness of the [Heltsley’s] notice of a hearing. The
court granted [Grant’s] motion to continue the hearing
due to untimely filing and set the September 12, 2007,
hearing. [Grant] clearly understood that motions have to
be timely filed and that motions can be overruled due to
lack of timeliness[;]
12. The court commenced the hearing at (sic) September
21, 2007, at the scheduled time. The Court overruled
both motions as untimely filed. The Court had given
[Grant] the opportunity at the September 12, 2007,
hearing to tell the court about any issues and [Grant]
never raised his daughter’s alleged doctor’s appointment.
In addition, [Grant] did not make a requisite showing to
the Court that the doctor’s appointment could not have
been rescheduled for an earlier or later time. The Court
chose to start the hearing at the scheduled time and when
[Grant] appeared, the Court chose not to charge or hold
him in contempt for his tardiness. In fact, the Court let
[Grant] take part in the rest of the hearing and gave him
the opportunity to call any witnesses or testify on his own
behalf. [Grant] never stated any objection to the previous
testimony before he arrived at the hearing. [Grant]
merely asked that the Court consider his testimony given
in his Deposition of August 3, 2006. [Heltsley] did not
object, so the court will consider the testimony of record.
[Grant] could have called [Heltsley] in his case in chief if
he wished or any other witness of his own, but he chose
not to to his own peril. After the hearing, [Grant] filed
another untimely “Objection” to the Court having the
hearing earlier that day. The court hereby overrules that
objection as untimely and moot. [Grant] had the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and voluntarily chose
not to appear on time for the scheduled hearing. [Grant]
also filed an “Objection” dated September 28, 2007,
which reiterates his previous objections and motions and
makes additional arguments. The Court overrules this
“Objection.” In light of the latest two “Objection[s]”
filed by [Grant], the Court is convinced that this was a
conscious effort of [Grant] to try to have another
appellate issue;
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13. The Court will now turn to the main issue at bar:
Whether Ms. Heltsley has met her burden to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that visitation with her
minor grandchildren is in their best interests[;]
14. The first factor the Court must consider is “the
nature and stability of the relationship between the child
and the grandparent seeking visitation.” The Court finds
that from the time the children were born in 1992 and
1994, respectively, the children lived in Ms. Heltsley’s
rental house on her property. The children lived there
with Mr. Grant and Ms. Latham until the parents
divorced in 1995. During that period, Ms. Heltsley saw
the children almost every day with the consent of both
parents. When the parents divorced, Mr. Grant was
awarded primary custody of the children and continued
to live in Ms. Heltsley’s rental house with the children.
Ms. Heltsley testified that she would babysit the children
when [Grant] was at work; and if she could not babysit
them, then she would pay for the babysitter. She
continued to see the children nearly every day.
When Ms. Latham was awarded custody of the
children in 1999, then Ms. Latham moved back into Ms.
Heltsley’s rental house with the children and remained
there until she died. The children continued to see Ms.
Heltsley nearly every day during that period. She would
take the children on vacation with her and they celebrated
Christmas and birthdays primarily at her house. In fact,
the children were staying in their bedrooms at Ms.
Heltsley’s house when Ms. Latham had her surgery
which resulted in her death. She was the one who had to
inform the children that their mother had died. Ms.
Heltsley, after losing emergency custody of the children
to Mr. Grant, continued to send the children cards and
letters. She seemed very loving and concerned for her
grandchildren. The Court finds that this factor strongly
weighs in favor of [Heltsley] in support of continued
contact with the children being in their best interests;
15. The second factor the court must consider is “the
amount of time the children and grandparent spent
together.” The Court reiterates the findings contained
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above in Paragraph 14 as if set forth herein in its entirety.
The Court finds that prior to the filing of this action in
2002, the children and their grandmother spent a great
deal of time together. The court finds that based on the
testimony, the relationship the children had with their
grandmother was about the only stability the children had
for a period of time. The children had a tumultuous few
years. First, they lived with both their parents. Then
they lived with just their father, [Grant]. Finally, they
lived with their mother, their step-father (Steve Latham)
and their half-sister, Stephanie Latham. Throughout all
these changes, they continued to live in Ms. Heltsley’s
rental house and continued to have extensive contact with
Ms. Heltsley. The Court finds that this factor strongly
weighs in favor of [Heltsley] in support of continued
contact with the children being in their best interests;
16. The next factor the Court must consider is “the
potential detriments and benefits to the children from
granting visitation.” The court finds that the only real
detriment to the children from having visitation with their
grandmother is that it may cause strife between the
children and their father. Due [to] the father’s vehement
defense of this case, the Court does believe that visitation
with the grandmother could cause stress to the children
and strife between them and their father. However, the
Court finds that the benefits to the children would be
immense. The children had a very close relationship
with their grandmother prior to the filing of this action as
shown above. In addition, the children have a half-sister
. . . which they were close to until they were cut off from
contact by [Grant]. [Heltsley] has visitation with [this
child] on every other weekend. In addition, [this child]
still lives in [Heltsley’s] rental house. It is in their best
interest to have contact with their half-sister through their
grandmother. It is also important and in their best
interests for the children to have contact with their
deceased mother’s side of the family. The Court finds
that this factor strongly weighs in favor of [Heltsley] in
support of continued contact with the children being in
their best interests;
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17. The fourth factor for the Court to consider is “the
effect granting visitation would have on the children’s
relationship with the parents.” In the present case, it is
clear from the record that any effect the visitation would
have on the children’s relationship with their one
remaining parent would be negative. [Grant] has
vigorously fought visitation with the children and their
grandmother. It is still questionable as to what caused
the fallout between the parties. [Heltsley] testified that
she believes it was either over her unwillingness to
ultimately co-sign a loan to allow [Grant] and her
daughter to open a chicken farm or over her fighting
[Grant] for custody of the children when Ms. Latham
died. [Grant] in his deposition indicates that it was either
over [Heltsley’s] unwillingness to follow his parental
rules in the one visit he allowed in December 2002 or
over an alleged affair between him and [Heltsley] many
years ago. Whatever the reason, the parties’ relationship
has broken down and any contact would cause turmoil
between the children and their father. Therefore, this
factor weighs strongly against the children having
visitation with [Heltsley];
18. The next factor the Court has to consider is “the
physical and emotional health of all the adults involved,
grandparents and parents alike.” There is nothing in the
record which gives the court concern over either
[Heltsley’s] or [Grant’s] mental or physical health, so the
Court considers this to be inconsequential in determining
whether it would be in the children’s best interests to see
their grandmother;
19. The sixth factor the court must consider is “the
stability of the children’s living and schooling
arrangements.” There is nothing in the record which
gives the Court concern over either their living or
schooling arrangements. [Heltsley] did raise a concern as
to both of these issues, but stated that because she has not
been able to have contact with the children that she has
nothing to present to contradict that the children are in a
stable living and schooling environment. Therefore, the
Court considers this to be inconsequential in determining
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whether it would be in the children’s best interests to see
their grandmother;
20. The final factor that the court must consider is “the
wishes and preferences of the child.” In the present case,
neither party called the children to testify. Therefore,
there is no information in the record as to what the
children’s preferences would be. Therefore, the Court
considers this to be inconsequential in determining
whether it would be in the children’s best interests to see
their grandmother;
21. When weighing all the factors, and giving due
deference to the father’s wishes in this case as required
under the Vibbert standard, the Court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the
children to have visitation with their grandmother. Up
until just before the filing of this action, [Heltsley] was
an integral part of the children’s lives. This was with the
consent of [Grant] during the years that [Grant] lived on
[Heltsley’s] property – both while married to Ms. Latham
and after their divorce. In addition, [Grant] in his
deposition when asked if a half day visitation per month
would be harmful to the children stated “I would
probably consent to a half day a month.” Deposition of
[Grant], p. 41, line 7. When asked whether telephonic
communication with the children would harm him or his
relationship with the children, [Grant] replied, “As long
as they weren’t harassing phone calls constantly and as
long as nothing was said that upset the children or things
of that nature and she’s not wanting to call my house
every day or every other day. I mean if she acts
respectful and decent and proper.” Id., at p.42, lines 3-7;
22. Moreover, it is in the children’s best interest to have
contact with their deceased mother’s side of the family.
The children have a half-sister which they were close to
when Ms. Latham was still alive. The children need to
revive the contact with their half-sister to allow them to
have as normal a relationship as possible under the
circumstances. The Court is going to limit contact to one
phone call a week and one half day visitation per month.
The court does not believe with such limited contact that
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[Heltsley] can do anything which would interfere with
[Grant’s] ability to raise and nurture the children as he
wishes.
...
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS
FOLLOWS:
a. [Heltsley’s] “Petition to Establish Visitation Rights” is
GRANTED. [Grant] is ordered to meet with [Heltsley]
the fourth Saturday of the month at 10:00 AM C.S.T., at
the gas pumps at the Hopkinsville Wal-Mart on Clinic
Drive. The children are to be the only ones to get out of
the vehicle and any instructions as to the children’s
medical needs or dietary needs is to be in writing and
transferred to [Heltsley] by the children in an envelope.
[Heltsley] is to return the children to [Grant] at 5:00 PM
C.S.T., at the same location and any information that
[Heltsley] needs to get to [Grant] shall be in the same
manner as above;
b. [Heltsley] shall have the right to contact the children
by telephone for a period of thirty minutes every Tuesday
evening at 7:00 PM C.S.T. [Grant] shall make the
children available for this phone conversation. If the
children are unable to take the phone call due to an
extracurricular activity, then the phone call shall take
place the next evening at the same time (Wednesday);
c. At no time shall either party discuss this litigation
with the children nor shall they criticize or talk
negatively about the other party in front of the children.
Any limited contact that the parties may have as a result
of the visitation exchanges or over the phone shall be
cordial and not abusive or harassing. [Heltsley] is
ordered to follow the medical and dietary directives of
[Grant] relative to the children;
d. [Grant’s] oral “Motion to Dismiss for Failure of
[Heltsley] to Meet her Burden” made at the Final
Evidentiary Hearing is hereby OVERRULED[;]
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e. [Grant] made a Motion at the Final Hearing for an
Injunction staying the Court’s ruling if the Court granted
[Heltsley] relief. The Court has considered [Grant’s]
Motion and OVERRULES the Motion. The Court finds
that due to the limited amount of contact in the above
order that there is no irreparable injury to allow the
visitation to take place. In fact the Court finds the
opposite. Due to the amount of time this litigation has
taken to make it to this point, the children may suffer
irreparable injury if they do not begin having some
contact with [Heltsley] and their half-sister. Therefore,
the injunction is denied;
f. The phone calls shall commence on Tuesday, October
16, 2007, and the first visit shall commence on Saturday,
October 27, 2007;
g. The Court has considered all other Motions and
arguments of the parties, and any motion or argument not
addressed specifically by the court has been considered
and is hereby OVERRULED;
THERE BEING NO JUST CAUSE FOR DELAY, THIS
IS A FINAL AND APPEALABLE DECISION.
First we comment on whether this appeal is properly before us. CR4
76.12 establishes various requirements for briefs filed in this Court. They are to be
a maximum of twenty-five pages and double-spaced with a left side margin of one
and a half inches and a one inch margin on all other sides. The statement of the
case is to cite relevant documents in the record and identify their precise location
by page number or citation to the video record. Similarly, the argument is to
reference supporting documents in the trial court record.
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Grant is a pro se litigant. As such, he has asked us to hold him to a
lesser standard than the one we apply to practicing members of the bar. See
Million v. Raymer, 139 S.W.3d 914, 920 (Ky. 2004). Grant’s brief is deficient in
many ways. While it is twenty-five pages in length, it is also hand-written, singlespaced without regard for margins, and contains wholly inadequate citation to the
record. We respect Grant’s choice to represent himself and recognize our custom
of relaxing the rules for pro se litigants within reason. However, Grant’s woefully
deficient briefs border on being abusive to us and unfair to Heltsley. Grant has
completed some college coursework and has demonstrated familiarity with the
civil rules. While we would be well within our authority to strike his briefs for
noncompliance with CR 76.12, Elwell v. Stone, 799 S.W.2d 46, 47-8 (Ky.App.
1990) (citing 7 Bertelsman and Phillips (sic), Kentucky Practice, CR
76.12(4)(c)(iv) [now (v)], Comment 4 (4th ed. 1989 PP)) and CR 61.02, or to order
him to file a corrected brief, or to review his arguments solely for manifest
injustice, we will impose none of these sanctions at this time. However, we do
place Grant on notice that submission of any future filings not conforming to the
rules of court in general, and to CR 76.12 in particular, may result in dismissal of
his appeal or the striking of his briefs.
On appeal, Grant contends the trial court misapplied the seven factors
enumerated in Vibbert, supra, and alleges KRS 405.021 is unconstitutional on
many grounds besides the due process challenge discussed in Vibbert and Troxel.
In contrast, Heltsley urges us to affirm the award of grandparent visitation because
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the trial court correctly applied the Vibbert factors and required her to clearly and
convincingly prove visitation was in the grandchildren’s best interest. Heltsley
also argues KRS 405.021 has survived all prior constitutional attacks and Grant’s
current challenge should be rejected because it presents nothing new.5
We will not reverse a trial court’s award of visitation unless it
constitutes “a manifest abuse of discretion, or [was] clearly erroneous in light of
the facts and circumstances of the case.” Drury v. Drury, 32 S.W.3d 521, 525
(Ky.App. 2000) (citing Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 504 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Ky. 1973)).
After reviewing the entire record, we see no basis for holding the trial court abused
its discretion or committed clear error in allowing Heltsley to visit with her
grandchildren from 10:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. one day a month and to speak with
the children by telephone for half an hour one evening each week.
Grant first argues he is a fit custodial parent and should be permitted
to raise his children sans contact with or interference by his former wife’s family.
No one has argued Grant is an unfit parent and no such finding was made by the
trial court. The court simply found it would be in the best interests of the children
to have contact with the family of their late mother, especially since they had spent
much time in the care of their maternal grandmother until Grant ceased all contact
in 2002 and Heltsley was the one stabilizing factor in their lives. Further, the
5
Since 2004, only one case, VanWinkle v. Petry, 217 S.W.3d 252 (Ky.App. 2007), has been
published on grandparent visitation. In that case we declined to address a claim that KRS
405.021 was unconstitutionally vague because we vacated the case on other grounds. We held
the trial court had erroneously granted additional grandparent visitation absent a request,
evidence or a finding that extra time with them was in the best interests of the children.
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children’s once strong bond with a younger half-sister was broken by Grant’s
refusal to allow them to see one another.
Contrary to Grant’s view, both the United States Supreme Court in
Troxel, supra, and this Court in Vibbert, supra, have upheld the award of
grandparent visitation. Grant’s argument has not persuaded us to reconsider
Vibbert or to revert to Scott. Furthermore, in reading the trial court’s thorough
opinion, we are convinced our mandate in Vibbert was followed in full and all
seven factors enumerated in our opinion were considered and correctly applied.
We construe the trial court’s use of the word “inconsequential” in describing its
evaluation of three of the factors as meaning evidence of those factors was
considered, but not deemed strong enough to sway the court one way or another.
After reviewing the entire record, including Grant’s deposition in which he
acceded to limited visitation between Heltsley and the children, and the trial
court’s well-turned opinion, we are confident the court’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence and the visitation terms are sufficiently tailored to preserve
Grant’s desire to raise his children as he sees fit but to also allow the children to
renew contact with their late mother’s family, especially their younger step-sister.
Grant’s second argument is KRS 405.021, which authorizes a court to
award visitation to a grandparent when it is in the child’s best interest to do so, is
unconstitutional. Vibbert and Troxel address grandparent visitation primarily in
terms of due process, but Grant alleges the statute is unsound, both facially and as
applied, for many more reasons. In his brief he asks us to declare the statute:
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unconstitutional under both federal and state
constitutional articles and amendments (1) (2) (3) (5) (9)
and (14) as a whole or individually, both facially and
applied, further violative of Due Process, privacy,
privileges and immunities, confrontation, as well as
impermissibly vague, overly broad and void as a matter
of public policy, and even further failing substantially to
advance any legitimate state interest or in the alternative
unreasonable means of advancing any interest as related
to otherwise fit parents.
He also suggests the statute fails to provide equal protection and does not allow fit
parents to raise their children and determine with whom their children associate.
From our review of Grant’s muddled allegations, it appears he has combed dozens
of legal opinions and strung together a jumble of sentences that do not warrant
striking down a statute that has previously withstood constitutional muster,
especially when Grant offers no explanation as to how KRS 405.021 supposedly
violates any of the quoted constitutional provisions. While we are willing to
overlook inartful pleading by a pro se litigant, we are not willing to create an
argument for him. A shotgun blast of random legal jargon and indiscriminate
reference to a hodgepodge of legal authority does not a focused or articulate
argument make, and such abusive practice misses any reasonable appellate mark or
purpose.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the findings of fact, conclusions
of law and final order of the Christian Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth D. Grant, Pro se
Hopkinsville, Kentucky
Duncan Cavanah
Hopkinsville, Kentucky
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