GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. COMPENSATION CONDER (CATHERINE A.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: AUGUST 8, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002058-WC
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-03-96980
CATHERINE A. CONDER; HON. LANDON
OVERFIELD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, THOMPSON, AND WINE, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: General Electric Company appeals a decision of the
Workers' Compensation Board affirming an Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ)
decision. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
Catherine Conder, who was employed as a computer programmer for
General Electric, filed a workers' compensation claim for hypersensitivity
pneumonitis. General Electric denied liability for Conder’s claim. After a benefit
review hearing, the ALJ awarded Conder permanent partial disability payments
due to her occupational disease (hypersensitivity pneumonitis) but decided against
applying the 3-multiplier under KRS 342.730(1)(c) to her award. Specifically, the
ALJ found the following:
Based on the opinions of Dr. Wintermeyer and the
testimony of the Plaintiff, I find that Plaintiff does retain
the physical capacity to return to the type of work she
was performing at the time of her injury. Plaintiff is
physically capable of performing the work. She cannot,
however, return to the type of environment in which the
work was performed. Therefore, I find that... Plaintiff’s
permanent partial disability benefits will not be
enhanced.
After both parties appealed, the Workers’ Compensation Board issued
an order affirming the ALJ’s decision with respect to every issue except its
application of the 3-multiplier. In Case No. 2005-CA-002504-WC, this Court
affirmed the Board’s decision. In our opinion, this Court wrote the following:
Despite ruling favorably for Conder on the work-relateddisability issue, the ALJ found that, based on the
testimony of her own expert witnesses, Conder still
“retains the physical capacity to return to the type of
work she was performing at the time of her injury, just
not in the same work environment.” Consequently, the
ALJ did not apply a 3-multiplier to Conder's disability as
required under KRS 342.730(1)(c) 1 for an employee that
“does not retain the physical capacity to return to the type
of work that the employee performed at the time of the
injury.”
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In pertinent part, KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 states:
If, due to an injury, an employee does not retain the
physical capacity to return to the type of work that the
employee performed at the time of injury, the benefit for
permanent partial disability shall be multiplied by three
(3) times the amount otherwise determined ....
And, in Ford Motor Co. v. Forman, 142 S.W.3d 141, 145
(2004), the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that:
[B]oth the 1996 and 2000 versions of KRS 342.730(1)(c)
1 provide an enhanced benefit for those who lack the
physical capacity to return to the type of work performed
at the time of injury. When used in the context of an
award that is based upon an objectively determined
functional impairment, “the type of work that the
employee performed at the time of injury” was most
likely intended by the legislature to refer to the actual
jobs that the individual performed.
Moreover, the Court further held that proof of a
claimant's ability to perform some jobs within a specific
job classification does not necessarily indicate that he
retains the physical capacity to perform the same type of
work that she performed at the time of injury. In
applying these two controlling authorities, we find that
the Board correctly remanded the ALJ's decision on the
3-multiplier issue. Indeed, under these authorities, the
question is whether Conder retains the capacity to return
to the actual jobs she performed at the time of injury or,
stated another way, whether Conder can continue in the
specific livelihood at General Electric to which she
devoted 17 years of her career. [Emphasis added].
Here the record shows that, though Conder is generally
trained as a computer programmer, her actual job duties
at the time she contracted an occupational lung disease
were those of a manufacturing machine programmer
working in the aircraft engine manufacturing industry,
which is a very specialized career niche that she held for
17 years. Consequently, the Board has correctly
indicated that the question that the ALJ needs to answer
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on remand is not whether Conder can work as a computer
programmer in a different environment than at General
Electric but rather whether Conder now retains the
capacity to work in the same or similar manufacturing
environment in the aircraft engine manufacturing
industry performing the same duties as those performed
at General Electric. See Ford Motor Co. v. Forman, 142
S.W.3d 141, 145 (2004) (construing KRS 342.730(1)(c)
1.).
On remand, the ALJ found that Conder could not perform the same or
similar duties as she did in her previous work with General Electric. Accordingly,
the ALJ found that Conder “should be awarded enhanced benefits based on the fact
that she cannot return to a manufacturing environment in [the] aircraft engine
manufacturing industry as to do so would require her to be exposed to metal
working fluids,” which caused her occupational disease. Accordingly, the ALJ
enhanced Conder’s permanent partial disability benefits by the 3-multipler
pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(c)1. The Board affirmed the ALJ, and this appeal
followed.
General Electric contends the ALJ’s decision to alter his original
decision to find that Conder was entitled to benefits pursuant to KRS
342.730(1)(c)1 was improper. General Electric contends there is absolutely no
evidence that Conder cannot perform the essential functions of her previous job.
Additionally, General Electric contends that Conder can perform her previous job
at a different location than General Electric and, thus, the 3-multiplier was
inapplicable to her case. We disagree.
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We review workers’ compensation cases in accordance with the
standard stated in Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-688
(Ky. 1992). Under this standard, an appellate court cannot correct the Board
unless its assessment of the evidence is so flagrant as to cause gross injustice. Id.
at 688. Further, in workers’ compensation cases, an appellate court gives no
deference to the Board’s and ALJ’s application of the law. Newberg v. Thomas
Industries, 852 S.W.2d 339, 340 (Ky.App. 1993).
In our previous opinion in this case, we stated that the ALJ was
required to determine “...whether Conder can continue in the specific livelihood at
General Electric to which she devoted 17 years of her career.” If Conder could
not continue in the specific livelihood as she maintained at General Electric, the 3multiplier would be applied to enhance her award. If she could continue in the
specific livelihood as she maintained at General Electric, the 3-multiplier would
not be applied to her award. While General Electric contends that the legal
question should be whether Conder can perform the “essential functions” of her
previous position, we have previously decided this exact legal question and the
“law of the case” doctrine instructs us to adhere to our prior decision unless we are
compelled to change course. Williamson v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 323, 325
(Ky.1989).
After reviewing this case, the ALJ was within his discretion when he
found that Conder did not retain the physical capacity to return to the type of work
that she performed at the time of her injury. The ALJ relied heavily on the medical
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opinion of Dr. Wintermeyer that Conder acquired hypersensitivity pneumonitis due
to her workplace exposure to metal working fluids at General Electric. Although
General Electric contends that the ALJ ignored Dr. Burki’s medical opinion
contradicting Dr. Wintermeyer, an “ALJ may pick and choose among conflicting
medical opinions and has the sole authority to determine whom to believe.”
Copar, Inc. v. Rogers, 127 S.W.3d 554, 561 (Ky. 2003). Accordingly, the ALJ
was free to rely on Dr. Wintermeyer’s medical opinion in determining whether
Conder retained the physical capacity to return to her prior employment.
General Electric also contends that the ALJ erred by awarding Conder
benefits based on one hundred (100%) percent of the state average weekly wage
rather than seventy-five (75%) percent of the state average weekly wage.
However, after carefully reviewing the record, the ALJ awarded Conder benefits
based on seventy-five percent (75%) of the state average weekly wage pursuant to
KRS 342.730(1)(b). That is, the ALJ multiplied seventy-five percent of $550.66
(the state average weekly wage at the time of her occupational disease) by 40.5
percent (her permanent impairment rating), and then multiplied the product by 3
(3-multiplier found in KRS 342.730(1)(c)), which resulted in a weekly benefits
award of $501.81. Therefore, the ALJ’s calculation of Conder’s weekly benefits
award was proper.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael W. Alvey
Owensboro, Kentucky
M. Michele Cecil
Owensboro, Kentucky
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