ERVIN (JANA) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 8, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001965-MR
JANA ERVIN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GARRARD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: VANMETER AND WINE, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Jana Ervin appeals from a judgment of the Garrard Circuit
Court after the court denied her motion to suppress evidence and she entered a
conditional guilty plea. We affirm.
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
In November 2006, Ervin was standing near a pay phone outside a
laundromat in Lancaster, Kentucky when she was approached by Garrard County
Sheriff’s Deputy Keith Addison. Addison pulled his cruiser near the pay phone,
where he asked Ervin if she needed assistance. Ervin replied in the negative and
said she was using the phone to try to get a ride. At that point Addison drove
away, parking within viewing distance of the pay phone in order to observe Ervin.
After several minutes Addison became suspicious, so he pulled up beside the pay
phone again and asked Ervin if she was having any luck finding a ride. She said
she was not. Addison then requested Ervin’s identification, which she provided,
and asked whether she had any warrants out for her arrest. Ervin stated that she
did not think so, and Addison checked, confirming that no warrants were out for
Ervin. After returning her identification, Addison asked Ervin if she had ever been
arrested, to which she admitted a previous arrest for possession of drug
paraphernalia. At this time Addison exited his cruiser and asked Ervin if she
would consent to a search of her person. She gave her consent and Addison
conducted a search, finding no contraband. Addison then requested and was
granted Ervin’s permission to search her purse. As Addison was opening the
purse, Ervin admitted that it contained a crack pipe. Addison then found the crack
pipe, two brillo pads, and a metal antenna, all of which were confiscated. After
Ervin agreed to cooperate with the police, Addison left without arresting her.
A warrant was later issued for Ervin, and she was arrested three weeks
after the night in question. Ervin was arraigned in February 2007 and subsequently
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filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the purse. The trial court denied
the motion after conducting a hearing and reviewing memoranda from defense
counsel and the Commonwealth. Ervin later entered a conditional guilty plea
preserving the suppression issue, and she was sentenced to five years’
imprisonment. This appeal followed.
The standard of review for a trial court’s suppression decision requires
us initially to
determine whether the trial court's findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence. If they are, then they
are conclusive. Based on those findings of fact, we must
then conduct a de novo review of the trial court's
application of the law to those facts to determine whether
its decision is correct as a matter of law.
Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky.App. 2002) (internal citations
omitted).
Ervin claims that the trial court erred by failing to find that her
encounter with Addison constituted a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The United States Supreme Court has held that not every encounter between an
individual and a police officer rises to the level of a seizure. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 n.16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Instead, “[o]nly
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen may [a court] conclude that a ‘seizure’ has
occurred.” Id. In United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64
L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), the Court elaborated on what activities might constitute a
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seizure, stating that examples of such circumstances, “even where the person did
not attempt to leave,” would include
the threatening presence of several officers, the display of
a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the
person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of
voice indicating that compliance with the officer's
request might be compelled. In the absence of some such
evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact between a
member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter
of law, amount to a seizure of that person.
466 U.S. at 554-55, 100 S.Ct. at 1877 (internal citations omitted). While such
examples do not provide an exhaustive list, they do indicate the level of contact
between an officer and a citizen which transforms a mere encounter into a seizure.
The evidence presented at the suppression hearing supported the trial
court’s finding that there was no point at which the conversation between Addison
and Ervin escalated into a seizure. Addison was by himself, and he remained in his
police cruiser throughout most of the questioning. No evidence showed that
Addison used an aggressive tone with Ervin, touched her person without
permission, or went beyond asking her questions and, eventually, requesting her
identification and consent to search.
Ervin urges us to decide that a seizure occurred when Addison asked
for and took her identification. However, according to the evidence presented
below, Addison’s request did not rise to the level of a seizure under Drayton v.
Ohio, 536 U.S. 194, 202, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002), which
states that “[e]ven when law enforcement officials have no basis for suspecting a
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particular individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request
consent to search luggage - provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive
means.” Moreover, a seizure occurs only when a reasonable person, given the
surrounding circumstances, would not feel free to leave. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at
554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877. Here, no evidence of coercion or inability to leave was
introduced at the suppression hearing. The trial court did not err by finding that
Addison’s request for Ervin’s identification did not amount to a seizure.
Finally, Ervin argues that the trial court erred in finding that she
voluntarily consented to the search of her person and purse. The voluntariness of a
consent to search “is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041,
2048, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Additionally, “[t]he Commonwealth must prove, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the appellant voluntarily consented to the
search[.]” Anderson v. Commonwealth, 902 S.W.2d 269, 271-72 (Ky.App. 1995)
(citing Cook v. Commonwealth, 826 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1992)). Whether consent
was intelligently given is not a factor in the determination. See Cook, 826 S.W.2d
at 331. Here, no facts were adduced during the suppression hearing to show that
Addison coercively obtained Ervin’s consent to the searches. The trial court did
not err by finding that Ervin’s consent was voluntary, and by denying her motion
to suppress evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Garrard Circuit Court
is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Linda Roberts Horsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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