CROSSLAND (MARK L.) VS. KELLY-CROSSLAND (IRIS D.)
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RENDERED: AUGUST 8, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001889-MR
MARK L. CROSSLAND
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CYNTHIA E. SANDERSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00651
IRIS D. KELLY-CROSSLAND
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; GUIDUGLI,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: Mark Lee Crossland (Mark) brings this appeal from an
August 16, 2007, judgment of the McCracken Family Court, whereby the court
entered its final decree on the disposition of martial property. After a thorough
Senior Judge Daniel T. Guidugli sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
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review, we affirm the Hon. Cynthia E. Sanderson, Judge, McCracken Family
Court.
The parties were married for under two years when Iris D. KellyCrossland (Iris) filed for divorce. At that time the parties reconciled and then
proceeded to separate in November 2005. On November 30, 2005, Iris again
informed Mark that she was going to see her lawyer to file for divorce. The next
day while Iris was at work, the home that she and Mark had shared, which was a
premarital asset from Iris’s prior marriage, caught fire. The majority of the
contents were destroyed and Iris’s pet died in the house fire. The investigators
determined that the cause of the fire was arson. Mark was found in possession of
items from the home. Since Mark was incarcerated, the court appointed a guardian
ad litem to represent his interest in the dissolution of marriage proceedings. The
court entered an interlocutory decree of dissolution of marriage and reserved a
final ruling on property distribution until resolution of Mark’s criminal charges.
Mark was convicted of second-degree arson, first-degree burglary, theft by
unlawful taking over $300, and theft by unlawful taking firearm enhanced.
In the final decree, the court awarded Iris her entire retirement
pension, including a martial share of $10,288.55, based on the dissipation of
martial assets and non-martial assets, including the death of her pet, from Mark’s
criminal actions. The court then awarded the parties their respective vehicles. Iris
was then awarded all insurance proceeds in connection with the destruction of the
home. The court found that Iris had a non-martial interest in the residence which
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was greater than the equity at the time of the fire and that she was assuming
responsibility for the additional debt placed against the residence during the course
of the marriage. The court further found that based on Mark’s arson conviction he
was not entitled to any insurance proceeds, although any personal property of his
within the home that was salvaged would be restored to him. It is from this
Judgment that Mark appeals.
Mark presents three arguments on appeal. One, the trial court abused
its discretion in failing to apply applicable law in determining and equitably
dividing martial and non-martial property. Two, Iris misrepresented to the court an
accurate accounting of martial property. Three, the trial court abused its discretion
by allowing a biased and prejudicial attitude to sway its decision.
A trial court has wide latitude in dividing marital property and debt
equitably and absent an abuse of discretion we shall not disturb the trial courts
ruling. See Smith v. Smith, 235 S.W.3d 1 (Ky.App. 2006) and Neidlinger v.
Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513 (Ky. 2001). Abuse of discretion is that which is
arbitrary or capricious, or at least an unreasonable and unfair decision. See Sexton
v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 272 (Ky. 2004).
We do not agree that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing
the marital property. KRS 403.190 sets out the procedure a court is to follow in
the disposition of property. While fault is not generally considered, a party may
not dissipate marital assets. Brosick v. Brosick, 974 S.W.2d 498 (Ky.App. 1998).
As stated in Brosick,
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The court may find dissipation when marital property is
expended (1) during a period when there is a separation
or dissolution impending; and (2) where there is a clear
showing of intent to deprive one's spouse of her
proportionate share of the marital property.
Id. at 501 (internal citations omitted).
We agree with the trial court that the burning of the home resulted in
dissipation of both marital and non-martial assets. Given that Iris assumed the
resulting increase in debt against the house during the marriage which, based on
the record, significantly outstrips the award of the marital share of the pension
plan, we do not find an abuse of discretion in the court’s award.
Further, the trial court correctly determined that public policy
prohibited Mark from receiving any of the insurance funds. It has long been a
maxim of law that a tortfeasor may not benefit from his wrong to the determinant
of the other party. Burke Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, 700 S.W.2d 789 (Ky. 1985)
and Krahwinkel v. Commonwealth Aluminum Corp., 183 S.W.3d 154 (Ky. 2005).
Generally one who intentionally sets fire to his property may not recover insurance
proceeds based on public policy. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell,
870 S.W.2d 783 (Ky. 1993). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that Mark’s arson conviction prohibited him from recovering any of
the equity in the home. We also do not find it an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to offset the loss of irreplaceable items by awarding Iris the entire pension.
Evidence in the record indicates that the insurance on the house may not have been
sufficient to compensate for all property destroyed by the fire. The court could
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certainly view Mark’s arson, destruction of irreplaceable items and dissipation of
assets as an offset against Mark’s interest in the pension and equity in the home.
As to Mark’s second argument, that Iris misrepresented to the court an
accurate accounting of martial property, we likewise disagree that the trial court
abused its discretion. There was ample evidence in the record for the trial court to
base its decision. The trial court as finder of fact is given great deference to judge
the creditability of witnesses and the evidence presented to it. See Ghali v. Gahli,
596 S.W.2d 31 (Ky.App. 1980); Adkins v. Meade, 246 S.W.2d 980 (Ky. 1952).
Lastly, Mark argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing a biased and prejudicial attitude to sway its decision. While appellant
makes a blanket assertion that due to the alleged errors the court must have been
biased, there is no such indication in the record. Where the record is silent we
presume that the evidence supported the findings of the court. See Porter v.
Harper, 477 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1972).
We find no error in the judgment of the Honorable Cynthia E.
Sanderson, Judge, McCracken Family Court, and accordingly affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Mark Lee Crossland, Pro Se
Tiffany Gabehart Poindexter
Paducah, Kentucky
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