KNIGHT (DELORES MARIE) VS. YOUNG (LINDA)
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RENDERED: MAY 2, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001850-ME
DELORES MARIE KNIGHT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C.A. WOODALL, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00003
v.
LINDA YOUNG
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: Delores Marie Knight appeals from a judgment of the Lyon
Circuit Court of July 25, 2007, finding her to be an unfit parent and awarding custody of
her minor child, H.L.K., to the child’s paternal grandmother, Linda Young. We affirm.
H.L.K. was born in Virginia on August 4, 2000, to Delores Marie and Jerry
Knight.1 Three years later, they divorced by decree of the Vigo Superior Court in Terre
Haute, Indiana. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Indiana court declined to award
Some of the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing referred to Ms. Knight as “Delores” others
referred to her as “Marie.” We shall refer to Ms. Knight as “Marie.”
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custody of the child to Marie and instead awarded her periods of visitation. The court
found that Jerry was willing to facilitate a relationship between H.L.K. and her halfsiblings (other children of Marie with whom Marie had maintained only minimal contact).
The court also found that Jerry had a meaningful relationship with his own family that
could be beneficial to H.L.K. Marie had little contact with her own family. The court
considered evidence tending to suggest that Marie was mentally and emotionally
unstable.
Jerry was awarded physical and legal custody of the child, and Marie was
ordered to pay weekly child support. Following the divorce, Marie moved to Tiffin, Iowa.
She did not regularly exercise her right to visitation nor did she pay child support as
ordered by the court.
In 2004, Jerry moved with H.L.K. from Indiana to Kentucky. In November
2006, Jerry and H.L.K. moved in with Jerry’s mother, Linda Young, at her home in Lyon
County, Kentucky. On December 22, 2006, Jerry was killed in a motorcycle accident.
Young moved immediately for an order of emergency, temporary custody of H.L.K. The
Indiana court transferred jurisdiction to Kentucky, and, on January 9, 2007, Young filed
a verified petition for permanent custody in the Lyon Circuit Court. In her petition,
Young alleged that she was the fit and proper person to have custody of H.L.K. and that
Marie was not capable of caring for the child. Marie filed a response to the petition and
sought custody of the little girl.
An evidentiary hearing was held on July 17, 2007, at which the circuit
court found that Marie was an unfit parent and awarded custody of the child to Young.
Marie was granted limited, supervised visitation. No provisions were made for the
payment of child support. This appeal followed.
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Marie contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by awarding
custody of H.L.K. to Young. She argues that she was entitled to custody under the
provisions of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 405.020 and that the circuit court’s
finding that she was unfit was not supported by properly admitted, clear and convincing
evidence. We shall address each contention.
First, Marie contends that the court erred by admitting the deposition
testimony and counseling records of Mary Fran Davis, a licensed clinical social worker.
We disagree.
On April 25, 2007, through counsel, Young filed in the record a report
prepared by Davis. The report covered several sessions conducted in Davis’s office
and contained her professional evaluation of the relationship between Young and H.L.K.
Also on that date, Young filed a notice indicating that Davis’s deposition would be taken
in Hopkinsville on May 2, 2007. Marie’s counsel had been permitted by the court to
withdraw in February 2007; substitute counsel was later permitted to withdraw in early
April. Therefore, Young’s certificate of service indicates that a copy of the notice to take
Davis’s deposition was mailed directly to Marie at her home in Iowa. The deposition
was taken as scheduled on May 2, 2007. Marie did not attend – nor was she
represented at – the deposition.
Marie’s present counsel gave notice that he had assumed her
representation on May, 4, 2007. After hiring her lawyer, Marie immediately filed a
response to Young’s previous motion to compel discovery responses and filed a motion
for visitation. On May 8, she appeared in Lyon Circuit Court for a hearing. Marie did
not raise any objection to the deposition that had been conducted as scheduled on May
2, 2007.
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The record indicates that after Davis completed her evaluation of the
relationship between H.L.K. and Young, Davis became H.L.K.’s treating therapist. On
June 22, 2007, Young filed a notice of intent to rely on Davis’s counseling records at the
final hearing. On July 16, 2007, Marie filed a motion in limine to exclude from evidence
Davis’s deposition testimony and counseling records. Marie contended that since
Davis’s opinions had been derived from conversations that she had with H.L.K., H.L.K.’s
statements to Davis were inadmissible hearsay. In response, Young argued that the
records were admissible because the statements had been made for purposes of
medical treatment. The motion in limine was not resolved prior to the hearing.
During the evidentiary hearing, Marie objected to the admission of Davis’s
deposition testimony on relevancy grounds. The trial court agreed that the testimony
was not relevant to a determination regarding Marie’s fitness. However, it ruled that the
deposition was admissible because of the limited purpose set forth at Kentucky Rule of
Evidence (KRE) 803(4), which provides an exception to the hearsay rule for “statements
for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis.”
On appeal, Marie contends that Davis’s deposition testimony should not
have been admitted into evidence since the deposition was taken without proper notice.
She alleges that Young knew that at the time that she served the notice of deposition on
April 26, 2007, it was highly unlikely that Marie would be able either to appear or to
retain counsel to appear on her behalf. Under these circumstances, she argues that the
trial court erred by permitting Young’s use of the deposition testimony against her.
We are not persuaded that this argument has been properly preserved for
our review. Regardless of the preservation problem, however, we have examined her
argument. We disagree. Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 30.02(1) provides that
“a party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give
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reasonable notice in writing to every other party to the action.” CR 32.01 provides for
the use of depositions at trial. The rule authorizes the use of “any part or all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence . . . against any party who
was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable
notice thereof. . . .” Marie received reasonable notice that Davis’s deposition was to be
taken in this matter. There is no evidence to support Marie’s contention that Young
deliberately scheduled Davis’s deposition in a manner calculated to exclude Marie from
participating.
Although Marie refers to the provisions of CR 30.02(2)(b) in support of her
argument, these provisions apply only where a party demonstrates that he was served
with notice according to the provisions of CR 30.02(2)(a).
(a) Leave of court is not required for the taking of a
deposition by plaintiff if the notice (i) states that the person to
be examined is about to go out of state and will be
unavailable for examination unless his deposition is taken
before expiration of the 30-day period, and (ii) sets forth
facts to support the statement. The plaintiff’s attorney shall
sign the notice, and his signature constitutes a certification
by him that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief the statement and supporting facts are true. The
sanctions provided by Rule 11 are applicable to the
certification.
(b) If a party shows that when he was served with notice
under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph (2) he was unable
through the exercise of diligence to obtain counsel to
represent him at the taking of the deposition, the deposition
may not be used against him.
The provisions of CR 30.02(2)(b) become pertinent only when a plaintiff anticipates the
examination of a witness who is about to go out of the state and will be unavailable for
examination unless his deposition is taken before the expiration of the 30-day period
following the service of the summons upon the defendant. Under these special
circumstances, counsel is not required to obtain leave of court as normally required
when the plaintiff seeks to take a deposition prior to the expiration of the thirty (30) days
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following service of the summons. Since Young did not seek to take Davis’s deposition
until long after the expiration of the thirty-day period following service of the summons,
leave of court was not required. Thus, the cited provisions are not applicable to the
facts before us.
In a separate argument, Marie contends that Davis’s deposition and
counseling records should have been excluded because the opinions and statements
contained in them were based on hearsay testimony elicited from the child. It is
apparent from the argument that Marie objects only to H.L.K’s negative portrayal of her
as a mother. However, Davis candidly admitted (both in her deposition testimony and in
her written assessment) that she had not met with Marie and that she did not feel
comfortable making a professional judgment with respect to the relationship between
H.L.K. and Marie. It is also clear that the trial court admitted the deposition testimony
for its limited purpose concerning medical treatment and that it did not utilize the
deposition in reaching a conclusion with respect to Marie’s fitness as a parent. We find
no error.
Next, Marie argues that the court erred by admitting the testimony of
several witnesses who had no information regarding her relationship with H.L.K. While
Marie does not identify these witnesses, she challenges the court’s admission of their
testimony tending to show that she: has had serious difficulty with her finances; has
had a run-in with law enforcement officials and others with respect to her attempts to
procure prescription medication; has suffered through profound emotional crises; and
has experienced (at best) tumultuous relationships with her prior-born children.
We are not persuaded that this argument has been properly preserved for
our review. Nevertheless, we have undertaken a careful review of the entirety of the
trial court’s record in this matter. We conclude that the court did not err by admitting the
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challenged testimony. In this proceeding, the trial court was charged with deciding
whether Marie was “suited to the trust” of raising her young daughter. The evidence
came from a variety of witnesses – including Marie herself.
Without exception, the evidence focused on factors relevant to the court’s
determination with respect to the custody of H.L.K. The evidence pertaining to Marie
was overwhelmingly and disturbingly negative. In reviewing the court’s thorough
findings of fact, we are persuaded that it carefully assessed the testimony and
considered the evidence material to its conclusion. We find no error.
Next, Marie argues that the trial court erred in its application of the
provisions of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 405.020. She contends that the law
entitled her to custody. We disagree.
KRS 405.020(1) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
The father and mother shall have the joint custody, nurture,
and education of their children who are under the age of
eighteen (18). If either of the parents dies, the survivor, if
suited to the trust, shall have the custody, nurture, and
education of the children who are under the age of eighteen
(18).
(Emphasis added.)
Our courts have recognized that a parent’s being “suited to the trust”
under KRS 405.020(1) is synonymous with the parent’s being “fit.” See Rice v. Hatfield,
638 S.W.2d 712 (Ky.App. 1982). Since a child’s parents have a fundamental right to
raise a child, the unfitness of a parent must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. Vinson v. Sorrell, 136 S.W.3d 465 (Ky. 2004). In order to defeat a parent’s
superior right to custody, the non-parent must prove that the parent has engaged in
conduct akin to the kind of behavior that could result in the state’s action to terminate
parental rights. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2003).
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The type of evidence necessary to show parental unfitness has been
described as follows:
(1)[E]vidence of inflicting or allowing to be inflicted physical
injury, emotional harm or sexual abuse; (2) moral
delinquency; (3) abandonment; (4) emotional or mental
illness; and (5) failure, for reasons other than poverty alone,
to provide essential care for the children.
Davis v. Collinsworth, 771 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Ky. 1989). The Supreme Court of
Kentucky has also held that the trial court must take into consideration the surviving
parent’s “moral fitness and habits, surroundings, age, financial ability, interest and
affection for the child, and any circumstances which would be prejudicial to the best
interest of the child, including the breaking up of her present relations. . . .” Sumner v.
Roark, 836 S.W.2d 434 (Ky. App. 1992), quoting Rallihan v. Motschmann, 200 S.W.
358, 361-362 (Ky. 1918).
Marie contends that Young was required to prove each and every element
identified by Davis as relevant to a determination of parental “unfitness.” Since the
court did not find that Marie had abandoned H.L.K., she argues that she is automatically
entitled to custody. We disagree.
The provisions of KRS 625.090 authorize a circuit court to involuntarily
terminate all parental rights when it finds by clear and convincing evidence that a child
has been adjudged or found to be abused or neglected and that termination would be in
the best interest of the child. Additionally, the court must find by clear and convincing
evidence the existence of one or more of the following grounds:
(a) That the parent has abandoned the child for a period of
not less than ninety (90) days;
(b) That the parent has inflicted or allowed to be inflicted
upon the child, by other than accidental means, serious
physical injury;
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(c) That the parent has continuously or repeatedly inflicted or
allowed to be inflicted upon the child, by other than
accidental means, physical injury or emotional harm;
(d) That the parent has been convicted of a felony that
involved the infliction of serious physical injury to any child;
(e) That the parent, for a period of not less than six (6)
months, has continuously or repeatedly failed or refused to
provide or has been substantially incapable of providing
essential parental care and protection for the child and that
there is no reasonable expectation of improvement in
parental care and protection, considering the age of the
child;
(f) That the parent has caused or allowed the child to be
sexually abused or exploited;
(g) That the parent, for reasons other than poverty alone,
has continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or is
incapable of providing essential food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, or education reasonably necessary and
available for the child's well-being and that there is no
reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the
parent's conduct in the immediately foreseeable future,
considering the age of the child;
*****
KRS 625.090(2).
The statutory provisions involving a court’s involuntary termination of all
parental rights do not require proof of each and every element that might indicate a
parent’s unfitness. Therefore, in a case involving a court’s determination of fitness for
physical custody, we cannot conclude that a court’s scrutiny or analysis of the statutory
factors must exceed that which is required for involuntary termination of parental rights.
We conclude that the trial court did not err by determining that Marie was unfit to
exercise physical custody of H.L.K. even though it did not find that Marie had
abandoned the child.
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Finally, Marie contends that the trial court erred by basing its findings on
factors that she regards as peripheral to her immediate relationship with H.L.K; i.e., her
past pattern of conduct with her other children from other relationships. Again, we
disagree.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky noted decades ago that in weighing the
fitness of a parent, the trial court must consider “any circumstances which would be
prejudicial to the best interest of the child.” Rallihan v. Motschmann, 200 S.W. 358,
361-362 (Ky. 1918). That venerable holding has been reiterated and reinforced in
numerous cases over the years. Our review of the trial court’s findings, conclusions,
and judgment indicates that the court carefully considered a variety of factors relevant to
a determination of whether Marie was the fit and proper person to exercise custody of
H.L.K. The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrated that Marie was not suited
to the task and the trust. The trial court did not err by determining that Marie is not fit to
provide the necessary level of care and protection required by a young child and that
there is no reasonable expectation that she will become a suitable custodian.
The judgment of the Lyon Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brad Goheen
Benton, Kentucky
Barclay W. Banister
Princeton, Kentucky
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