TODD (DICKIE) VS. CITY OF PADUCAH
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RENDERED: JULY 18, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001732-MR
DICKIE TODD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT J. HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00729
CITY OF PADUCAH
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON, NICKELL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Dickie Todd brings this appeal from a July 26, 2007, order of
the McCracken Circuit Court denying Todd’s motions for a restraining order and
temporary injunction and dismissing the complaint. We vacate and remand.
On July 10, 2007, Todd filed a verified complaint against the City of
Paducah a/k/a City of Paducah Public Improvement Corporation (City) challenging
Ordinance Nos. 51-57, commonly referred to as the smoking ban. Therein, Todd
alleged that the smoking ban restricted use of his property and constituted a zoning
ordinance in violation of the Paducah Zoning Code. In particular, Todd sought (1)
a temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of the smoking ban; (2) trial
by jury; (3) monetary damages; (4) a permanent injunction; and (5) any other relief
to which he may be entitled. Todd also filed a memorandum in support of the
temporary restraining order with accompanying affidavit. Thereafter, on July 16,
2007, Todd filed a motion for temporary injunction and memorandum in support
thereof with accompanying affidavit.
By order entered July 23, 2007, the circuit court denied the motion for
temporary restraining order. Following a hearing upon the motion for temporary
injunction, the circuit court denied the motion for temporary injunction, again
denied the motion for restraining order, and dismissed the complaint on July 26,
2007. In particular, the court held:
In light of the above, the Court hereby rules that
the motion for a temporary injunction as well as the
motion for a restraining order is DENIED. [Todd’s]
complaint was limited to a request for injunctive relief.
Given the Court’s ruling herein, [Todd’s] Complaint is
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
This appeal follows.
Todd contends that the circuit court committed error by denying the
motion for temporary injunction and by dismissing the complaint. For the reasons
hereinafter stated, we conclude the circuit court failed to make the necessary
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findings in denying injunctive relief and further erroneously dismissed the
complaint when ruling upon the motion for temporary injunction.
We begin our analysis by determining the appropriate standard of
review. Under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 65.04(5), the circuit court
is required to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds for granting or denying injunctive relief, pursuant to CR
52.01. Accordingly, the “clearly erroneous” standard must be applied by this court
in reviewing the circuit court’s findings and conclusions. CR 52.01. In Rogers v.
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 175 S.W.3d 569, 571 (Ky. 2005),
the Kentucky Supreme Court discussed this standard as applied to injunction
proceedings as follows:
This standard is set out in CR 52.01 which provides that
findings of fact shall not be set aside unless they are
clearly erroneous, with due regard given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses. On appellate review, the appellate court
may determine that findings are clearly erroneous if they
are without adequate evidentiary support or occasioned
by an erroneous application of the law. Cf. Oakwood
Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Sprowls, 82 S.W.3d 193 (Ky.
2002).
Having determined the appropriate standard for review, we first turn
to the denial of appellant’s motion for temporary injunction. The requirements for
considering a motion for injunctive relief were recently discussed by the Supreme
Court in Rogers, where the Court stated:
[T]he requirements for the issuance of an injunction must
be carefully considered. They are explained in the
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seminal cases of Oscar Ewing, Inc. v. Melton, d/b/a
Melton's Grocery, 309 S.W.2d 760 (Ky.1958) and
Maupin v. Stansbury, 575 S.W.2d 695 (Ky.App. 1978).
They are as follows: (1) Has the plaintiff shown an
irreparable injury; (2) Are the equities in the plaintiff's
favor, considering the public interest, harm to the
defendant, and whether the injunction will merely
preserve the status quo; and (3) Does the complaint
present a substantial question?
Rogers, 175 S.W.3d at 570-571.
In the case sub judice, the circuit court’s findings and conclusions
failed to address any of the necessary requirements for denying injunctive relief.
Based upon the meager record on appeal in this case, we cannot determine if the
circuit court considered any of the requirements set forth in Rogers.1 This is
clearly erroneous in our opinion and warrants remanding to the circuit court for
further consideration.
As concerns the dismissal of the action on the merits, in this
Commonwealth, it is well-established that the merits of an action are not before the
court when ruling upon a motion for temporary injunction. Oscar Ewing Inc. v.
Melton, 309 S.W.2d 760 (Ky. 1958)(holding that it is not the function of a motion
for temporary injunction to dispose of the case on the merits); Maupin v.
Stansbury, 575 S.W.2d 695 (Ky.App. 1978)(holding that merits of case are not to
The record on appeal consists of the pleadings, the affidavit of Dickie Todd, the planning
commission minutes from January 9, 2006, through September 18, 2006, and videotapes of the
hearings on the motions for temporary restraining order and temporary injunction.
Conspicuously missing from the record is a copy of the “smoking ban ordinance” which is the
subject matter of this litigation. Both parties did place a copy of the ordinance in the Index of
their respective briefs, which is prohibited under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
76.12(4)(vii), since the ordinance was not part of the record. Even if we were to address the
merits of this case, which we decline to do for the reasons stated in the Opinion, the case could
not be properly reviewed without the ordinance being made a part of the record.
1
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be addressed in a motion for temporary injunction.) As such, in the case sub
judice, the circuit court clearly erred by considering the merits and dismissing the
complaint in its order denying the temporary injunction. When a motion for
temporary injunction is pending before a circuit court, the court is narrowly
confined to ruling upon such motion and may not address the underlying merits of
the action. Id.
In addressing the merits of the case, the court concluded the complaint
was limited to a request for injunctive relief only. Where a court’s conclusion is
not based upon fact finding, our review is de novo for which we owe no deference
to the trial court’s conclusion. Blevins v. Moran, 12 S.W.3d 698 (Ky.App. 2000).
Upon review of the Verified Complaint filed in this case, the circuit court’s
conclusion is clearly in error as a matter of law. The complaint plainly alleges that
the Paducah Zoning Code controls the type of conduct prohibited by the smoking
ban and thus the ordinance was improperly enacted without first being approved by
the local planning commission. Notwithstanding whether an injunction is granted
or not, the underlying claim must still be addressed by the circuit court.
In this case, the circuit court apparently reached the merits and
ordered dismissal based upon the holding in Lexington Fayette County Food and
Beverage Association v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 131
S.W.3d 745 (Ky. 2004), where a smoking ban in Lexington was upheld. However,
in the Lexington case, the primary argument presented was whether the local
ordinance banning smoking was preempted by the Kentucky Food, Drug and
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Cosmetic Act. The case did not address whether the local zoning ordinances
enacted pursuant to KRS 100.203 would affect or supersede the passage of a
smoking ban, as alleged by Todd. While the result may be the same, the circuit
court is nonetheless required to address the issue on the merits and dispose of the
same, either by summary disposition or trial.
Accordingly, we vacate and remand this action to the circuit court.
Upon remand, the circuit court shall reconsider Todd’s motion for temporary
injunction following the requirements set forth in Rogers, 175 S.W.3d 569 and
shall further consider the underlying action on the merits.
We view Todd’s remaining contentions of error as moot.
For the foregoing reasons, the July 26, 2007, order of the McCracken
Circuit Court is vacated and this cause is remanded for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
Jeremy Ian Smith
Paducah, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David L. Kelly
Melissa D. Yates
Paducah, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
David L. Kelly
Paducah, Kentucky
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