COLEMAN (MARY A.) VS. ADAMS (LONES)
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RENDERED: AUGUST 8, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001586-MR
MARY A. COLEMAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN D. COMBS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-01655
LONES ADAMS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; NICKELL, JUDGE; GRAVES, SENIOR
JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: Mary Coleman appeals from the findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and judgment entered June 22, 2007, by the Pike Circuit Court.
The issue before the trial court concerned the status of real property as a public
right of way. After considering the evidence, the court concluded that an eighteen-
foot wide strip of land adjoining Coleman’s real property in Shelbinia, Kentucky,
was not a dedicated public thoroughfare. We affirm.
On November 20, 2002, Coleman filed a civil action against Adams.
In her complaint, Coleman alleged that her property was separated from Adams’s
property by an eighteen-foot wide, dedicated public way. Coleman alleged that
Adams was wrongfully claiming title to the strip of property and was otherwise
attempting to limit her use of the land. She sought a declaration that Adams had no
authority to block her access to the disputed land. A bench trial followed.
At trial, Coleman contended that the property had been dedicated to
public use by the recording of a subdivision plat. She introduced as a trial exhibit a
photocopied map of East Shelbinia, a subdivision abutting the Big Sandy River in
Pike County. The map shows building lots numbered 1 through 84. Several
streets are identified as well, and several narrow strips of land are designated as
alleyways. One narrow strip of land is designated as a walkway. Coleman’s
property, lot 74, adjoins the disputed eighteen-foot strip of land that is identified on
the map only by its width.
Photographs of the disputed parcel were also introduced. The
photographs show a rocky bank adjoining lot 74 and abutting U.S. Highway 460.
The bank continues at a steep grade, and Coleman does not contest the fact that it
leads directly to the remainder of Adams’s property. Adams contends that Sammie
Goff deeded the narrow strip of land to him and that his property abuts Coleman’s.
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The trial court found that there was insufficient evidence to conclude
that the disputed land had been dedicated for public use. Concluding that Adams
had shown that he had acquired title of the property through a deed from Sammy
Goff dated August 4, 1993, the court entered judgment in his favor. Coleman’s
motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment was denied, and this appeal
followed.
On appeal, Coleman contends that the trial court erred by determining
that Adams held record title to the disputed parcel of land. She argues that the
parcel was plainly identified on the recorded plat and that it was dedicated to the
public by virtue of the sale of the lots with reference to the map. She claims that
any attempt to deed the property to Adams was to no avail since the putative donor
retained no rights in the property.
Adams argues that the evidence supports his claim to the disputed
property. In the alternative, he contends that the judgment should be affirmed
since any public passway that arguably might have existed in the past had been
abandoned long ago. He relies on testimony at trial indicating that the property
had never been used by anyone as a passway and that it had never been accepted in
any manner by the county road system.
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the findings of fact of
the trial court shall not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of
the witnesses. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. Findings of fact are
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not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence. Black Motor
Co. v. Greene, 385 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1964). Substantial evidence is evidence
which, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient probative
value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people. Sherfey v. Sherfey,
74 S.W.3d 777 (Ky.App. 2002). The trial court’s conclusions of law remain
subject to our full, de novo review. Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474 (Ky.App.
1998).
Dedication by plat is a common method of reserving property for
public use. Shurtleff v. City of Pikeville, 309 Ky. 420, 217 S.W.2d 976 (Ky. 1949).
In Cassell v. Reeves, 265 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Ky. 1954), Kentucky’s highest court
observed as follows:
It is a settled principle that when a map or plat of a
subdivided tract of land is exhibited or recorded and
conveyances are made of the lots by reference thereto,
the plat becomes a part of the deeds, and the plan shown
thereon is regarded as a unity. And, nothing else
appearing, it is held that all the streets, alleys, parks or
other open spaces delineated on such map or plat have
been dedicated to the use of the purchasers of the lots and
those claiming under them as well as of the public. They
become appurtenances to the lots. It is presumed that all
such places add value to all the lots embraced in the
general plan and that the purchasers invest their money
upon the faith of this assurance that such open spaces,
particularly access ways, are not to be the private
property of the seller.
While “[i]t is not necessary that dedication to public use should be in
writing or in any particular form,” the donor's intention to dedicate must be evident
from the transaction. Id. at 802-803. See also Central Land Co. v. Central City,
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222 Ky. 103, 300 S.W. 362 (Ky. 1927). Where the intention to dedicate a public
way appears on the face of the plat, no additional evidence is necessary to prove
acceptance of the dedication. See Shurtleff v. City of Pikeville, supra. However,
where the donor’s intent is not plainly established by the contents of the plat, the
intent may be inferred from the context of the plat and evidence of actual public
use for the intended purpose. In Cassell v. Reeves, supra, the court was confronted
with the latter situation.
In Cassell, a landowner subdivided lake-front property and sold off
lots with reference to a recorded plat. The plat showed several streets serving the
area. However, the plat also showed two unnumbered lots along the lake front.
These two lots were eventually sold. When the purchaser of one of the lots wanted
to build a house on the property, the adjoining property owners resisted, asserting
that the original developer had represented that the lot was to be reserved for
public access to the lake.
The Cassell court acknowledged that dedication by plat is a widely
accepted method of proving an intention for the reserved property to be dedicated
for public use. However, the court held that merely leaving a blank on the plat
without a designation of its purpose does not in and of itself indicate a clear
intention to dedicate the space to public use. The Court observed that other
circumstances and conditions might demonstrate such an intention. It concluded
that leaving an unmarked space or strip between a street shown on the plat and a
navigable river, coupled with proof of actual public use of that space, was
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sufficient evidence to prove the intent of the developer to dedicate the property for
public use.
In the case before us, we note that the map does not expressly reserve
the disputed strip of land for any purpose. The map clearly designates several
thoroughfares and alleyways. It even identifies a walking path between two of the
building lots. On the other hand, the disputed strip is identified on the map only by
its dimension – namely, its width. No use is designated or readily apparent from
the geographical or topographical context. No road, alleyway, pathway, or other
thoroughfare was ever built in this space, and the public never made use of the
narrow strip of land to access the hilltop.
In light of this evidence, we cannot say that the trial court’s findings
of fact are clearly erroneous. The court concluded that the evidence of the
unmarked strip of land as depicted on the plat was insufficient to show an intention
by the landowner to dedicate the space for public use. We cannot find clear error
in that determination.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Pike Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE:
Lawrence R. Webster
Pikeville, Kentucky
Stephen W. Owens
Pikeville, Kentucky
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