HACK (NATHAN), ET AL. VS. LONE OAK DEVELOPMENT, INC. , ET AL.
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RENDERED: JUNE 13, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
OPINION ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY SUPREME COURT:
JUNE 17, 2009
(FILE NOS. 2008-SC-000496-D & 2008-SC-000497-D)
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001431-MR
NATHAN HACK AND KRISTIE HACK
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00125
LONE OAK DEVELOPMENT, INC. AND
CENTRAL PAVING COMPANY OF PADUCAH
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: This is a claim for negligence filed by homeowners
Nathan Hack and Kristie Hack against a subdivision developer and the contractor
who installed a drain pipe. The McCracken Circuit Court granted summary
judgment to the developer and installer. We conclude that the homeowners
presented a material issue of fact that precluded summary judgment and, therefore,
reverse.
As alleged in the complaint, the facts are as follows: On April 29,
2002, Nathan and Kristie Hack purchased a subdivision lot from Jimmy and Candy
Varble. The Varbles had purchased the lot from Lone Oak Development, Inc.
(Lone Oak), the developer of the Coleman Place Subdivision where it is located.
Prior to the purchase of the property by the Hacks, Lone Oak contracted with
Central Paving Company of Paducah (Central Paving) for the installation of a
drainage pipe on the property.
After the Hacks constructed a residence on the property, in February
2004, the driveway and a portion of the yard collapsed. When the area was
excavated, the Hacks discovered that the drainage pipe had collapsed because a
variety of fill materials, including tree stumps and other vegetation, had been
placed there by Central Paving, and the underground drainage pipe was placed
directly on top of the tree stumps. The cost to repair the sinkholes, driveway, and
yard was in excess of $50,000. The Hacks maintain that Lone Oak and Central
Paving negligently installed the drainage pipe and were further negligent when the
area surrounding the pipe was filled with vegetation.
The issue presented is whether absent privity of contract, the Hacks
can pursue a negligence action against Lone Oak and Central Paving for the
damage caused by their negligence.
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The standard of review applicable to summary judgment is whether
the trial court properly found that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that Lone Oak and Central Paving were entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779 (Ky.App. 1996). We review the case de
novo giving no deference to the conclusions of the trial court. Baker v. Coombs,
219 S.W.3d 204 (Ky.App. 2007).
The Hacks admit that there was no privity of contract among them,
Lone Oak, and Central Paving. They assert their claims in negligence.
Unlike actions based on contract, negligence does not require privity
between the parties. Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Ky. 1985). In
Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973), the Court recognized that a builder had
a legal obligation to respond for personal injuries caused by its negligent
construction despite the fact that there was no privity between it and the injured
plaintiffs. When the damage is limited to property, however, the legal remedy is
not as easily discernible.
When the damage is exclusive to property, the plaintiffs seeking to
recover under a theory of negligent construction have encountered a legal
quagmire.
Although privity is no longer required to maintain
a tort action, “one who is not a party to the contract or in
privity thereto may not maintain an action for negligence
which consists merely in the breach of the contract.”
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Presnell Const. Managers, Inc. v. EH Const., LLC, 134 S.W.3d 575, 579 (Ky.
2004) (citations omitted). In the case of negligent homebuilders, the resulting
damage is most often damage caused by the builders’ failure to fulfill its
contractual obligations to the original owner of the property. In such cases, there is
a trend to deny a subsequent purchaser compensation for losses caused by the
negligent construction under the theory of what is commonly referred to as the
“economic loss rule.”
The economic loss rule is relatively new in American jurisprudence
and its genesis is found in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 403 P.2d 145
(1965). In this Commonwealth, little has been written concerning the rule, and
although references have been made that it is applicable to negligence actions
against homebuilders and sellers, it has never been explicitly adopted by our
courts. However, in Real Estate Marketing, Inc. v. Franz, 885 S.W.2d 921 (Ky.
1994), the Kentucky Supreme Court’s implicit adoption of the economic loss rule
is found in the following passage:
In Saylor v. Hall, Ky., 497 S.W.2d 218 (1973), we
recognize a legal obligation to respond in damages for
negligent construction despite the absence of privity.
The case involved two children of tenants, one injured
and one killed, crushed by a fireplace and mantle that
collapsed due to defective construction. The argument
made in the present case, as recited in the Court of
Appeals' Opinion, is that “it seems capricious to deny
recovery to a vigilant property owner who discovers a
latent defect, which ‘only’ diminishes the value of his
property, and allow recovery if he had ‘waited’ for a
member of his family to be injured as a result of the
defect.” Nevertheless, this Court recognizes that tort
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recovery is contingent upon damage from a destructive
occurrence as contrasted with economic loss related
solely to diminution in value, even though, as to property
damage, both may be measured by the cost of repair. See
Dealers Transport Company, Inc. v. Battery Distributing
Company, Ky., 402 S.W.2d 441 (1966), adopting Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in defective
products cases.
Id. at 926. The Court concluded the homeowner could not recover in tort against
the home’s builder after water leaked into the home’s foyer, the floor warped, and
mold and mildew accumulated. The loss suffered, the Court reasoned, was solely
diminution in value.
Other than the passage quoted, there was no historical basis for the
rule given nor was it explained how the rule was to be applied in future cases. The
most informative explanation of the rule is found in Justice Keller’s concurring
opinion in Presnell Const. Managers, Inc., 134 S.W.3d at 583. As noted in that
opinion, the economic loss rule evolved as part of American product liability
jurisprudence. Id. at 585. Its purpose is essentially to draw a line of demarcation
between contract and tort law, limiting consumers of products to damages other
than those sustained merely because the product failed to meet economic
expectations. Id. Supported by a thorough citation to authorities from other
jurisdictions, Justice Keller summarized the rule as follows:
The “economic loss rule” is a judicially created doctrine
that “marks the fundamental boundary between contract
law, which is designed to enforce the expectancy
interests of the parties, and tort law, which imposes a
duty of reasonable care and thereby encourages citizens
to avoid causing physical harm to others. The crux of the
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doctrine is not privity but the premise that economic
interests are protected, if at all, by contract principles,
rather than tort principles. Although originally rooted
primarily in product liability cases to protect
manufacturers from tort liability for damage that is
limited to the product itself, the economic loss rule has
evolved into a modern, general prohibition against tort
recovery for economic loss. In its broadest formulation,
the economic loss rule prohibits tort recovery in
negligence or products liability absent physical injury to
a proprietary interest. Under this sweeping rule, recovery
of economic loss is foreclosed when a product or service
falls short of an expected level of quality yet causes no
personal injury or property damage. (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
Id. at 583-584.
Justice Keller observed that although the rule has been adopted by the
majority of jurisdictions, its parameters remain unclear. Id. at 584. One jurist has
analogized it to the “all-consuming alien life form portrayed in the 1958 B-movie
classic The Blob,” and observed that the economic loss doctrine “seems to be a
swelling globule on the legal landscape . . . .” Grams v. Milk Products, Inc., 283
Wis.2d. 511, 539, 699 N.W.2d 167, 180 (2005), Justice Abrahamson, Chief
Justice, dissenting. Most recently, the Oregon Supreme Court expressed its
displeasure with the potential expansion of the economic loss rule into the
traditional legal concept of compensation for damages caused by the negligence of
others.
Every physical injury to property can be characterized as
a species of “economic loss” for the property owner,
because every injury diminishes the financial value of the
property owner's assets. Damage to a car reduces the
value of the car-one of the owner's assets. A tree falling
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on a person's residence is damage to property, but also
can be characterized as a financial loss because it reduces
the value of the residence, which the owner may properly
view as an asset or financial investment as well as a
residence. Yet the law ordinarily allows the owner of the
damaged car or residence to recover in negligence from
the person who caused the damage.
Harris v. Suniga, 344 Or. 301, 310, 180 P.3d 12, 16 (2008).
We concur with the Oregon court’s observance that left without
exception, the economic loss rule could be interpreted to abolish a massive wedge
of traditional tort law on the premise of a doctrine rooted in contract law. Applied
originally to product liability cases, it has spread into the realm of building
construction cases which, unlike the manufacturing of a product destined to reach
the mass consumer market, is essentially the rendering of a service to a specific
property. Nevertheless, by virtue of Franz, in this Commonwealth, the rule has
been swept into the realm of construction litigation.
In Franz, the Supreme Court briefly addressed the limitations on the
economic loss rule. It stated:
We do not go so far as the Court of Appeals'
opinion in Falcon Coal Co. v. Clark Equipment Co.,
Ky.App., 802 S.W.2d 947 (1990), limiting recovery
under a products liability theory to damage or destruction
of property “other” than the product itself. But we do
recognize that to recover in tort one cannot prove only
that a defect exists; one must further prove a damaging
event.
Franz, 885 S.W.2d at 926. In our present analysis, we find the Court’s use of the
language “damaging event” pivotal.
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In Franz, there was no damaging event. The alleged negligent
construction caused defects only to the structure, including water leaking into the
front hallway, warping of the flooring, and mold and mildew. The alleged defects
could, and presumably were, part of the negotiations for the purchase of the home
by the subsequent purchaser. Although the Court held the plaintiffs’ claims for
negligence were precluded by the economic loss rule, had there been a “damaging
event,” the plaintiffs could pursue a negligence claim.
The facts now alleged are quite distinguishable from those in Franz.
The Hacks purchased an undeveloped lot. As alleged in the complaint,
unbeknownst to them, the underground drainage pipe was supported by tree
stumps destined to rot and cause a collapse of the system. Ultimately, not only did
the pipe collapse, but also the driveway and the landscaping were destroyed. The
“damaging event” was not isolated to the drainage pipe. In this case, the alleged
damaging event was the collapse and destruction of the landscaping and driveway,
neither of which was integrated into the drainage system. We do not believe that
such damages are precluded by the economic loss rule.
Certainly, under basic negligence principles, had the Hacks’ car been
demolished by the collapse of the driveway, the rule would not bar recovery. It
would be but a legal fiction unsupported by reason to preclude such damages
attributable to the collapse of the driveway and landscaping based on the economic
loss rule.
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The circuit court suggested that the Hacks could have obtained a
warranty from their predecessor in title or insurance to protect against the improper
installation of the drainage pipe. While both are options to procure coverage for a
structure, we cannot reach the similar conclusion that as a matter of law, damage to
a driveway or landscaping from the use of vegetation as landfill is encompassed
within the reasonable expectation of either the traditional homeowners insurance or
warranties. The issue of whether the collapse of the drainage pipe was a damaging
event caused by its negligent installation is properly left for a jury to determine.
Lone Oak raises as a defense the rule of caveat emptor. Although it
correctly recites that rule as applicable to real estate contracts, it is a defense to an
action brought by the purchaser against the vendor. In that context, it is a general
rule prohibiting actions based on breach of implied warranties. It is an ancient rule
derived from common law and applies unless the vendor does something to
prevent the prospective purchaser from making a thorough examination of the
premises to ascertain its nature and value. Osborne v. Howard, 195 Ky. 533, 242
S.W. 852 (1922). The action brought by the Hacks sounds in tort and is not against
the vendor but against Lone Oak for its alleged negligence. The caveat emptor rule
is simply not applicable.
For the purpose of our review of the summary judgment, the final
issue is whether, as a matter of law, neither Lone Oak nor Central Paving owed a
duty to the Hacks. Actionable negligence consists of “a duty on the defendant, a
breach of the duty, and a causal connection between the breach of the duty and an
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injury suffered by the plaintiff.” Lewis v. B & R Corporation, 56 S.W.3d 432
(Ky.App. 2001). Included in the concept of duty is whether the risk of injury was
reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 437. Whether a duty exists is generally a legal
question. Id. at 438.
The circuit court found that neither Lone Oak nor Central Paving
owed a duty to the Hacks. Relying heavily on public policy considerations and the
corresponding need to protect purchasers of real property, the court in Smith v.
Frandsen, 94 P.3d 919 (Utah 2004), held that a developer, subdivider or person
performing similar tasks has “a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the
subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type of ordinary, average
dwelling house, and he must disclose to his purchaser any condition which he
knows or reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such
residential building.” Id. at 924.
Reaching the same legal conclusion as did the Utah Court, the
Supreme Court of South Dakota held that a cause of action for negligent
construction was not limited to the original purchaser. Brown v. Fowler, 279
N.W.2d 907 (S.D. 1979). It was foreseeable that the house would be sold to a
subsequent purchaser and structural defects could harm the subsequent purchaser
as the first. Id. at 909.
In Floraday v. Don Galloway Homes, Inc., 114 N.C.App. 214, 441
S.E.2d 610 (1994), the court held that the subsequent purchasers could pursue a
negligence action against the builder of a defective retaining wall. It distinguished
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the purchase of a residence from other consumer purchases noting that it is often
the consumer’s largest single investment. “The need for special protection of these
investments justifies extending the duty of reasonable care to subsequent
purchasers.” Id. at 216, 441 S.E.2d at 612. See also, Coburn v. Lenox Homes,
Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599 (1977); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600
P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).
Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that Lone Oak and
Central Paving owed the purchasers of the lot, including the Hacks, the duty to use
reasonable care when the drainage pipe was installed. It was foreseeable that the
lot would be sold to subsequent purchasers for the construction of a residence and
that within a relatively brief time, damage would be caused by a negligently
installed drainage pipe.
We have not addressed the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
merit of the Hacks’ negligence claim against either Lone Oak or Central Paving.
We merely hold that the circuit court erred in holding that Lone Oak and Central
Paving were entitled to summary judgment based on the rules of economic loss and
caveat emptor, and its finding that Lone Oak and Central Paving did not owe a
duty to the Hacks.
Based on the foregoing, the summary judgment is reversed and the
case remanded for further proceedings.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
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ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURRING: Respectfully, I disagree with too
much of the analysis in the majority opinion to concur in more than the result.
Therefore, I write separately regarding the issues presented.
I believe Central Paving Company’s liability is governed by
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 385 (1965).
One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a
structure or creates any other condition thereon is subject
to liability to others upon or outside of the land for
physical harm caused to them by the dangerous character
of the structure or condition after his work has been
accepted by the possessor, under the same rules as those
determining the liability of one who as manufacturer or
independent contractor makes a chattel for the use of
others.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 385 (1965). Our Supreme Court first recognized
this articulation of such a duty in Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973). A
cursory reading of that case might lead one to the erroneous conclusion that
“physical harm” and “personal injury” are the same. They are not. “The words
‘physical harm’ are used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the
physical impairment of the human body, or of land or chattels.” Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 7 (1965)(emphasis supplied).
According to the allegations of the complaint, Central Paving
Company, on behalf of Lone Oak (the possessor of the land), created a condition
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on the land resulting in physical harm to the Hacks’ real property. Upon the proper
proof, Central Paving Company is liable for that physical harm.
Still, Central Paving Company tempts us to consider the economic
loss rule as a defense to its liability. As the majority noted, our appellate courts
have hardly touched upon the doctrine and have never explicitly adopted it.
However, federal courts applying Kentucky law have had an awful lot to say.1
The economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for
economic loss. Economic loss is both loss in the value of
a product caused by a defect in that product (direct
economic loss) and consequential loss flowing from the
defect, such as lost profits (consequential economic loss).
[Citation omitted] The economic loss rule marks the
border between tort and contract law. Where tort law,
primarily out of a concern for safety, fixes the
responsibility for a defective product directly on the
parties responsible for placing the product into the stream
of commerce, contract law gives the parties to a venture
the freedom to allocate risk as they see fit.
The following cases predict whether and how the Kentucky Supreme Court would adopt and
apply the economic loss rule: Mt. Lebanon Personal Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc.,
276 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 2002); Miller's Bottled Gas, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 955 F.2d 1043
(6th Cir.1992); Barton Brands, Ltd. v. O'Brien & Gere, Inc. of North America, --- F.Supp.2d ----,
2008 WL 819068 (W.D.Ky. March 25, 2008); Brewer Mach. & Conveyor Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Old
National Bank, --- F.R.D. ----, 2008 WL 490587 (W.D.Ky. February 20, 2008); Westlake Vinyls,
Inc. v. Goodrich Corp., 518 F.Supp.2d 955 (W.D.Ky. 2007); General Cable Corp. v.
Highlander, 447 F.Supp.2d 879 (S.D.Ohio 2006); Davis v. Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc.,
399 F.Supp.2d 785, 801 (W.D.Ky. 2005); Louisville Gas and Elec. Co. v. Continental Field
Systems, Inc., 420 F.Supp.2d 764 (W.D.Ky. 2005); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298
F.Supp.2d 575 (W.D.Ky. 2004); Custom Products, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel Canada, Inc., 262
F.Supp.2d 767 (W.D.Ky. 2003); Gooch v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 40 F.Supp.2d 863
(W.D.Ky. 1999); Bowling Green Mun. Utils. v. Thomasson Lumber Co., 902 F.Supp. 134
(W.D.Ky. 1995); see also, Pioneer Resources Corp. v. Nami Resources Co., LLC, 2006 WL
1778318 (E.D.Ky. 2006); Highland Stud Intern. v. Baffert, 2002 WL 34403141 (E.D.Ky. May
16, 2002); Strathmore Web Graphics v. Sanden Machine, Ltd., 2000 WL 33975406 (W.D.Ky.
May 16, 2000); McCracken County School Bd. of McCracken County Kentucky v. Hoover
Universal, Inc., 1994 WL 1251233 (W.D.Ky. April 1, 1994). At least one of our sister state
courts has also predicted whether and how Kentucky would eventually address the economic loss
rule. Teledyne Technologies Inc. v. Freedom Forge Corp., 2002 WL 748898 (Pa.Com.Pl. April
19, 2002).
1
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Mt. Lebanon Personal Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 276 F.3d 845,
848 (6th Cir. 2002)(applying Kentucky law).
While the majority fears the economic loss rule will move across
Kentucky’s jurisprudential landscape like “The Blob,” consuming too many valid
tort claims that happen to get in its path, I view the rule differently. I agree with
Justice Keller’s approbation of
the economic loss rule's underlying rationale – i.e., the
need to establish a boundary between contract law and
tort law so that “parties to a contract may allocate their
risks by agreement and [will] not need the special
protections of tort law to recover for damages caused by
breach of contract.”
Presnell Const. Managers, Inc. v. EH Const., LLC, 134 S.W.3d 575, 589 (Ky.
2004)(Keller, J., concurring). I share the concern of the United States Supreme
Court that, were there no economic loss rule, “contract law [might] drown in a sea
of tort.” East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
866, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 2300, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986).
Nearly every discussion of Kentucky’s development of the rule (albeit
unlabeled) has included consideration of Real Estate Marketing v. Franz, 885
S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1994). The case sub judice is no exception. However, different
courts read Franz in different ways. The majority here sees in Franz the implicit
adoption of the economic loss rule. The Sixth Circuit interpreted Franz in a
contrary manner and rejected the view that it signifies application of the rule.
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While the Kentucky Supreme Court agreed with the trial
court that the Franzes could not sustain a negligence
claim, it did so because there was no “damaging event,”
not because their claim was barred by the economic loss
doctrine. [citation omitted] Indeed, in its decision, the
Kentucky Supreme Court expressly refused to extend
Franz to a Kentucky Court of Appeals decision which
had adopted the economic loss doctrine.
Mt. Lebanon, supra, at 849 (emphasis supplied), see also Barton Brands, Ltd. v.
O'Brien & Gere, Inc. of North America, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2008 WL 819068 p.6
(W.D.Ky. 2008)(“Kentucky has declined to extend the economic loss rule to
consumer purchases, see, e.g. Real Estate Mktg., Inc. v. Franz”).
The confusion is understandable but the conflicting views can,
perhaps, be reconciled. Though Franz does not mention § 385 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the case cites and clearly relies on Saylor v. Hall, supra, which
found that section to be consistent with Kentucky common law. While the only
claim in Saylor was for personal injury, Franz involved no personal injury, only
property damage. It was consistent with Saylor and with § 385 for the Supreme
Court to treat the construction of the subject dwelling as equivalent to the
manufacture of a chattel. Compare Restatement (Second) of Torts § 385
(1965)(calling for application of “the same rules as those determining the liability
of one who as manufacturer or independent contractor makes a chattel for the use
of others”), and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 395 (1965)(with particular
attention to Comments d and g, and Illustration 1, indicating the breadth of
liability, though not beyond reasonable foreseeability).
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Also consistent with the language and intent of § 385, Franz applied a
limitation on liability borrowed from product liability law that had already been
utilized by other courts – the “sudden and dangerous” test. See Sidney R. Barrett,
Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for Construction Defects: a Critical
Analysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891, 914-19 (1989)(an economic loss rule test thoroughly
criticized before Franz was decided). Using slightly different wording, Franz held
that before a claim can be brought in tort for negligent construction of a residence,
there must be a “destructive occurrence” or “damaging event” that causes physical
harm (to use § 385’s term) to something other than “the product”, i.e., the
dwelling. The practical effect is that when Franz was rendered, construction cases
joined product liability cases and business purchases cases as those in which
Kentucky recognizes a limitation on tort liability – i.e., Kentucky’s unlabeled
economic loss rule. See, Davis v. Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc., 399
F.Supp.2d 785, 801 (W.D.Ky. 2005)(In Kentucky, “the economic loss rule has
been limited to apply to products liability cases . . . to business purchases . . . and
to construction cases”).
But we need not delve any more into this analysis of Kentucky’s
unlabeled economic loss rule. We have already gone further than necessary to
decide the issue in this case. “Economic loss,” as that term is used in the literature
and cases discussing the rule, is simply not a category of damage suffered by the
Hacks. “‘Economic loss’ is defined generally as damages for inadequate value,
costs of repair and replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss of
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profits-without any claim of personal injury or damage to other property [and] also
encompasses the diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in
quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured
and sold.” Barrett, supra, at 892 fn.1 (Citations and quotation marks omitted). No
matter where it has made an appearance, the economic loss rule has never
prohibited “recovery for damages to property other than the product purchased.”
Mt. Lebanon at 849. Because the Hacks experienced damages to their property
other than “the product” itself, the economic loss rule is not implicated at all.
Central Paving Company’s liability, if any, is simply governed by
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 385. See, Gilbert v. Murray Paving Co., Inc., 147
S.W.3d 736, 742-43 (Ky.App. 2003)(tort liability under Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 385 (1965) where contractor negligently resurfaced road).
I also agree that the summary judgment in favor of Lone Oak should
be reversed, but for different reasons. Lone Oak’s liability, if any, is governed by
traditional tort and property law concepts. See Real Estate Marketing at 926 (“if
this were simply a matter of real estate law, rather than of defective construction,
this case would be governed by [o]the[r] principles”).
The majority’s analysis of the claims against Lone Oak relies heavily
on cases addressing a home builder’s liability for defective residential construction.
I believe this reliance is misplaced.
Our Supreme Court has carved out special tort liability rules for those
who construct dwellings. While some rules expand a home builder’s liability,
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Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Ky. 1969)(“caveat emptor rule is
completely unrealistic and inequitable as applied in the case of the ordinarily
inexperienced buyer of a new house from the professional builder-seller”), others
limit that liability. Real Estate Marketing, Inc. v. Franz, 885 S.W.2d 921, 926 (Ky.
1994)(“[t]ort recovery is contingent upon damage from a destructive occurrence”).
Neither the expansion nor the limitation of tort liability for home builders,
however, comes into play in this case.
The four cases from foreign jurisdictions relied upon by the majority,
beginning with Brown v. Fowler, are particularly unpersuasive. Each was an
action brought against a home builder. Lone Oak is a developer. Even if home
builder liability concepts were applicable as between the Hacks and Lone Oak, or
Central Paving for that matter, none of these cases would be persuasive because
not one of them involved a “damaging event” or “destructive occurrence.” If this
Court were presented with these same fact patterns, Franz would compel us to
exonerate the home builder in each case.
The case against Lone Oak is governed by Kentucky’s doctrine of
caveat emptor, including its exceptions, which is consistent with the expression of
that doctrine contained in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 352 (1965).
Except as stated in § 353, a vendor of land is not subject
to liability for physical harm caused to his vendee or
others while upon the land after the vendee has taken
possession by any dangerous condition, whether natural
or artificial, which existed at the time that the vendee
took possession.
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Restatement (Second) of Torts § 352 (1965). Just as in § 385, the “others” referred
to in this section include subsequent purchasers. Saylor v. Hall, supra. The
doctrine, subject to its exceptions, should be available to remote sellers against
subsequent purchasers. See, Wooldridge v. Rowe, 477 So.2d 296, 298 (Ala.
1985)(Caveat emptor barred claim of subsequent purchasers against remote seller).
The exception referenced in § 352 and stated in § 353 is where there is
an undisclosed dangerous condition known to vendor, and the vendor either
actively conceals or fails to disclose its existence. Here, presuming the installation
of the culvert represents a dangerous condition, the Hacks’ complaint, read
liberally, alleges Lone Oak’s knowledge of the existence of that dangerous
condition, and the failure to disclose it to the Hacks. The circuit court made no
specific finding whether Lone Oak was unaware of this condition but, instead,
stated that Lone Oak “oversaw the work.” Therefore, summary judgment in favor
of Lone Oak was improper if § 352 is applied.
I, too, would reverse both grants of summary judgment but would do
so on the basis of the principles set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as
cited herein.
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BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE LONE OAK
DEVELOPMENT, INC.:
James A. Harris, Jr.
Paducah, Kentucky
Max S. Hartz
Owensboro, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE CENTRAL
PAVING COMPANY OF
PADUCAH:
Burke B. Terrell
Paducah, Kentucky
-20-
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