RUDOLPH (DESHAWN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 25, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001418-MR
DESHAWN RUDOLPH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-000873
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: LAMBERT, MOORE, AND WINE, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: DeShawn Rudolph, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order
of the Jefferson Circuit Court in which the trial court denied DeShawn’s motion to
vacate his conviction and sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Finding no merit to DeShawn’s many claims, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
DeShawn Rudolph was convicted of murder for killing 15-year old
Joseph Epps and reckless homicide for causing the death of his 16-year old
brother, Sedrick Rudolph. DeShawn was sentenced to a total of 30 years in prison
for these crimes.
DeShawn’s cousin, Nathaniel Rudolph, testified that Sedrick and
Nathaniel were sitting in a car when Joseph Epps ran to the vehicle, pulled a pistol
and demanded that Sedrick give him marijuana. Nathaniel testified that Sedrick
told Epps that the marijuana was at Sedrick’s home; that Epps demanded that
Sedrick take Epps to the drugs; and that Epps ordered Nathaniel out of the car.
Nathaniel attested that, after he exited the vehicle, he called DeShawn and told him
that Epps was robbing Sedrick.
DeShawn gave a statement to the investigating officer1 that he was at
home on the night of the incident, where he lived with several relatives including
Sedrick. DeShawn told police that he was in the basement when he received the
telephone call from Nathaniel informing him that Epps was robbing Sedrick.
DeShawn grabbed his .357 magnum pistol, proceeded upstairs, and told his other
relatives to leave the home. Instead of leaving, DeShawn’s relatives went into the
basement.
Apparently, by the time DeShawn received the telephone call, Sedrick
and Epps arrived and entered Sedrick’s upstairs bedroom. After DeShawn ushered
At trial, DeShawn did not testify, but the audiotape recording of this statement was played for
the jury.
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his family downstairs, he heard the door to Sedrick’s room open, so he hid behind
the refrigerator in the kitchen. According to DeShawn, when he heard Epps and
Sedrick descending the stairs, he cocked his pistol. When Epps and Sedrick passed
by DeShawn’s hiding place, DeShawn stepped out behind Epps and demanded that
Epps return Sedrick’s property. According to DeShawn, Epps turned around,
pulled a pistol2 and tried to cock it. After Epps turned around, DeShawn shot him.
According to DeShawn, Sedrick was standing directly behind Epps.
The Commonwealth’s forensic expert testified, however, that when
DeShawn shot Epps, Epps was standing with his back against something solid like
a wall or another person. The bullet that hit Epps exited his body and struck
Sedrick near the throat. Both teenagers died quickly. DeShawn was later
convicted for their deaths.
After DeShawn’s conviction, he filed an appeal with the Supreme
Court of Kentucky, which upheld his conviction.3 After that, DeShawn filed a pro
se motion pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 to vacate
his conviction and sentence, accusing his trial counsel of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The Jefferson Circuit Court denied DeShawn’s motion without benefit of
an evidentiary hearing.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
According to DeShawn, Epps’s alleged firearm was a nine millimeter semi-automatic of
unknown make. In his statement, DeShawn explained that, after he shot Epps, Epps dropped the
pistol. However, the police never found the alleged gun.
2
3
Rudolph v. Commonwealth, 2003-SC-0050-MR (Ky. March 18, 2004).
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To succeed with an RCr 11.42 motion, the movant must demonstrate:
1) that his trial counsel’s performance fell below the objective standard of
reasonableness; and 2) that the counsel’s performance was so prejudicial that the
movant was deprived of a fair trial and a reasonable result. Simmons v.
Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Ky. 2006) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).
Furthermore, the movant must set forth in his motion all the facts necessary to
demonstrate his claim. Simmons, 191 S.W.3d at 561. If the movant fails to do so,
the trial court is prohibited from presuming that the facts omitted from the motion
establish the violation. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
A. CLAIM REGARDING THE FORM OF THE JURY VERDICT
Regarding the death of Epps, the trial court instructed the jury on both
the theory of intentional murder and the theory of wanton murder. Both of these
theories were presented to the jury in one instruction, Instruction No. 2. However,
Verdict Form No. 1, which corresponded to Instruction No. 2, did not allow the
jury to distinguish between intentional murder and wanton murder.
DeShawn avers that because the form did not allow the jury to choose
between intentional and wanton murder, this violated his right to a unanimous
verdict. Because this right was violated, DeShawn argues his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object.
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It is well established in the Commonwealth to convict a criminal
defendant; the jury’s verdict must be unanimous. Miller v. Commonwealth, 77
S.W.3d 566, 573-574 (Ky. 2002) (citing Ky. Const. § 7, Cannon v.
Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 50, 163 S.W.2d 15, 16 (1942) and RCr 9.82).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that a trial court can submit
a “combination” instruction, which would permit a conviction for the same offense
under two alternative theories of the crime, if the evidence adduced at trial
supports a conviction under either theory. Miller, 77 S.W.3d at 574. If the
evidence supports both theories, the criminal defendant has not been deprived of
his right to a unanimous verdict. Id.
In the present case, the trial court used a “combination” instruction
regarding the murder of Epps. In DeShawn’s RCr 11.42 motion, he does not take
issue with this instruction but with the form of the verdict, which did not allow the
jury to designate under which theory it found him guilty. These facts are very
similar to the facts in Hudson v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106 (Ky. 1998). In
Hudson, the murder instruction contained two theories, intentional and wanton, but
the jury’s verdict form did not allow the jury to distinguish between the two
theories. Id. at 109. Like DeShawn, the appellant in Hudson argued that his right
to a unanimous verdict had been violated. Id. The Hudson Court noted that a
“combination” instruction is proper if the evidence supports both theories.
Furthermore, the Hudson Court stated that
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[i]ntent to kill can be inferred from the extent and
character of a victim’s injuries. Further, because a
person is presumed to intend the logical and probable
consequences of his conduct, “a person’s state of mind
may be inferred from actions preceding and following the
charged offense.” However, whether a defendant
actually has an intent to kill remains a subjective matter.
Moreover, neither the inference nor the presumption of
intent [is] mandatory. Indeed, if they were, most trials
would be mere formalities.
Id. at 110.
In this case, DeShawn does not dispute the facts surrounding the death
of Epps, nor does he argue that the evidence adduced at trial did not support both
theories. Furthermore, from the evidence adduced at trial, the jury could easily
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that DeShawn acted either intentionally or
wantonly when he shot Epps. Thus, there was no error in the jury verdict form.
Absent such an error, there was no reason for DeShawn’s trial counsel to object.
Consequently, the attorney’s performance did not fall below the objective standard
of reasonableness regarding this issue.
B. CLAIM REGARDING INSTANCES OF PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT
In addition to taking issue with the verdict form, DeShawn argues that
the prosecutor engaged in several instances of misconduct. First, in his brief,
Deshawn claims misconduct because the prosecutor stated at a bench conference
that the defense of protection of another, as set forth in Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS) 503.070, does not “allow for an ‘[u]nreasonable [b]elief’ in the need to
protect another[.]” According to DeShawn, these remarks were misstatements of
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law, but his counsel neither objected to nor corrected these misstatements.
DeShawn argues that his counsel was unprepared and failed to know the relevant
law. As a result, he rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
A quick review of the record reveals this statement was made outside
of the jury’s hearing and that the trial court never instructed the jury regarding the
defense of protection of another. Because the jury was never instructed on this
defense, DeShawn cannot demonstrate that his attorney’s performance fell below
the objective standard of reasonableness and that he suffered any prejudice.
Second, DeShawn alleges that during closing argument, the
prosecutor told the jury that DeShawn and Sedrick were robbing Epps, not the
other way around as DeShawn claimed. According to DeShawn, the evidence did
not support this remark, yet his trial counsel did not object. On appeal, DeShawn
claims that the prosecutor’s remark amounted to misconduct that prejudiced him
and coerced the jury into convicting him of murder.
It has long been recognized in the Commonwealth that counsel has
great leeway in making closing arguments. Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d
343, 350 (Ky. 2006). In addition to having great leeway during closing, a
prosecutor may also comment on the evidence during closing. Slaughter v.
Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Ky. 1987). From the evidence adduced at
trial, it was reasonable for the prosecutor to infer that DeShawn and Sedrick were
attempting to rob Epps. So, in this particular instance, the prosecutor’s remark was
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not misconduct. Rather, the prosecutor was commenting on the evidence. Given
the lack of prosecutorial misconduct, DeShawn’s attorney had no reason to object.
Third, DeShawn claims that, during the prosecutor’s closing
argument, he stated to the jury, “You can’t I.D. guns like you do humans.”
DeShawn also claims the prosecutor called him a liar during closing. DeShawn
avers that his attorney did not object to either remark. DeShawn argues these
remarks were unfair and were extensive and deliberately placed before the jury, in
order to mislead the jury and to prejudice him. He claims U.S. v. Carroll, 26 F.3d
1380, 1385 (6th Cir. 1994) supports his view. DeShawn claims that the strength of
the evidence against him was not overwhelming. Because his attorney did not
object to these remarks, DeShawn reasons that he rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel.
Regarding the prosecutor’s remark about identifying pistols, the
prosecutor was merely commenting on the evidence adduced at trial, which is well
within the Commonwealth’s right. See Slaughter, 744 S.W.2d at 412.
Regarding the prosecutor’s remark calling DeShawn a liar, the Sixth
Circuit has stated that
a prosecutor may assert that a defendant is lying during
[the government’s] closing argument when emphasizing
discrepancies between the evidence and that defendant’s
testimony. To avoid impropriety, however, such
comments must “reflect reasonable inferences from the
evidence adduced at trial.” [M]isconduct occurs when a
jury could reasonably believe that the prosecutor was . . .
expressing a personal opinion as to the witness’s
credibility.
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United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 551-552 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted). In the present case, the prosecutor called the defendant, DeShawn, a liar;
however, DeShawn did not testify. Accordingly, the prosecutor could not have
been emphasizing the discrepancies between the evidence and DeShawn’s nonexistent testimony.
While the prosecutor’s remark may be construed as misconduct,
reversal was not and is not assured. An appellate court will reverse for
prosecutorial misconduct in a closing argument only if the misconduct was flagrant
or if the misconduct satisfies each of the following requirements: 1) proof of the
defendant’s guilt is not overwhelming; 2) the defendant’s attorney objected to the
prosecutor’s actions; and 3) the trial court failed to cure the misconduct with a
sufficient admonition to the jury. Barnes v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d 564, 568
(Ky. 2002) (citing Carroll, 26 F.3d at 1390), and United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d
749, 757 (6th Cir. 1979).
DeShawn’s attorney did not object to the prosecutor’s remark and,
given this failure, DeShawn’s attorney’s performance may have fallen below the
objective standard of reasonableness. This does not necessarily mean that
DeShawn is entitled to the extraordinary relief of RCr 11.42. To reverse for
prosecutorial misconduct the proof of DeShawn’s guilt must not be overwhelming.
Given DeShawn’s taped police statement and the fact that Epps’ alleged weapon
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was not found, there is overwhelming proof of DeShawn’s guilt. Thus, DeShawn
cannot satisfy all prongs of Strickland, and this claim of ineffective assistance fails.
C. CLAIM REGARDING TRIAL COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO CROSSEXAMINE
Epps’s mother, Paula Epps, testified for the Commonwealth.
According to DeShawn, Paula Epps testified that the last time she heard from her
son was three days prior to his murder when he asked her for money. DeShawn
also avers that Paula Epps testified that Epps was supposed to pick up the money
on the day DeShawn killed him. On appeal, DeShawn claims that, during Paula
Epps’s testimony, he asked his trial counsel to cross-examine Paula Epps regarding
the money, but his attorney refused.
DeShawn argues that if Paula Epps had been cross-examined, this
may have shown that Epps was in need of money and, thus, had a motive to rob
Sedrick. DeShawn contends his trial counsel abdicated his responsibility to crossexamine Paula Epps; thus, DeShawn accuses his trial counsel of rendering
ineffective assistance. To support this claim, DeShawn states in his brief:
It should also be noted that Joseph had several bags of
marijuana which where found on his person. For a
person who had begged his mother for some money three
days earlier, it does not compute and add up that Joseph
[Epps] would be found with several $20.00 bags of
marijuana when he was killed in defense of another
[Sedrick].
To succeed with this claim, it was incumbent on DeShawn to set forth
facts that support his claim. See Simmons, 191 S.W.3d at 561. However,
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DeShawn failed to set forth any supporting facts. In his motion, he merely made
conclusory statements that Epps needed money. Furthermore, while DeShawn did
set forth the fact that Epps had several bags of marijuana on his person, this fact
does not support DeShawn’s claim. Thus, this claim fails.
IV. CONCLUSION
The order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying DeShawn’s RCr 11.42
motion is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
DeShawn Rudolph, pro se
La Grange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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