NATION (BOBBY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 23, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001376-MR
BOBBY NATION
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00312
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR
JUDGE.1
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: Bobby Nation appeals from an order of the
Laurel Circuit Court denying his motion to vacate his conviction and sentence,
pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42, for first-degree
robbery. We vacate and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
A Laurel County grand jury indicted Nation on three counts of firstdegree robbery in connection with the robbery of a drugstore. Nation was
represented by a court-appointed attorney.2 He entered into a plea agreement with
the Commonwealth and pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree robbery. In
accordance with the plea agreement, the court sentenced Nation to 16 years'
imprisonment on the charge and dismissed the other two charges. The final
judgment was entered on April 18, 2005.
On April 2, 2007, Nation filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis,
a motion for appointment of counsel, a motion for an evidentiary hearing, and a
motion to vacate the final judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42. In an order entered on
June 18, 2007, the court denied the motions without appointing counsel and
without granting an evidentiary hearing. This appeal by Nation followed.
Nation claims in his motion that his agreement with the
Commonwealth was that he would plead guilty to one count of first-degree robbery
and would receive a 16-year sentence with 20% parole eligibility. He further states
that his attorney told him that if the judge asked him if he had been offered any
promise in exchange for his guilty plea, he was to say “no”. In addition, Nation
also claims that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
2
The person who actually advised Nation had a law license in another state, was awaiting her
bar examination results in Kentucky, and was practicing pursuant to Rules of Supreme Court
(SCR) 2.112.. An attorney licensed in Kentucky did stand with Nation when he entered his
guilty plea, however.
2
incorrectly advising him that he would be eligible for parole after serving 20% of
his sentence.
Because Nation pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery, he was
classified under the statute as a violent offender. See Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 439.3401(1)(l).3 Therefore, he is not eligible for parole until he serves 85%
of his sentence. See KRS 439.3401(3).
Nation asserts that after he pleaded guilty and was sentenced, he later
learned that his parole eligibility was actually 85% of his sentence rather than 20%
of his sentence. He argues that 85% parole eligibility is contrary to his plea
agreement with the Commonwealth and also was the direct result of incorrect
advice given to him by his court-appointed attorney. Nation states that he would
not have pleaded guilty but would have gone to trial had he been correctly advised.
Nation's first argument is that the Commonwealth failed to honor its
plea agreement to allow him to plead guilty and receive a 16-year sentence with
20% parole eligibility. Although nothing was mentioned about parole eligibility in
the written plea agreement, Nation states that the Commonwealth had assured his
attorney that Nation would be eligible for parole after serving 20%, not 85%, of his
sentence. Thus, Nation contends that the oral agreement should be enforced and
his sentence should be amended to reflect 20% parole eligibility.
3
The definition of “violent offender” was extended to persons convicted of first-degree robbery
by an amendment to KRS 439.3401 that became effective on July 15, 2002. This amendment
applies only to persons who committed the crime of first-degree robbery after that date. The
first-degree robbery in this case occurred on December 2, 2004.
3
Nation cites Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001), to
support his argument. In Fraser, the defendant claimed in his RCr 11.42 motion
that he pleaded guilty only because his attorney told him that she was not prepared
for trial, that he would surely be convicted if he went to trial, and that the
Commonwealth had agreed that he would receive the minimum sentence of 20
years' imprisonment if he pleaded guilty. There was no written plea agreement.
After the defendant pleaded guilty, the court sentenced him to the maximum
sentence of life in prison.
After the trial court in Fraser denied the defendant's RCr 11.42
motion without an evidentiary hearing and the Court of Appeals affirmed, the
Kentucky Supreme Court heard the case on discretionary review. In vacating the
trial court's order and remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing, the court held
as follows:
We have held under the facts of a particular case that
admissions made during a Boykin hearing can
conclusively resolve a claim that a plea was involuntarily
obtained. However, part of this alleged agreement
supposedly required Appellant to deny its existence.
Proof of even a secret agreement has been held
foreclosed on the basis of statements made in a Boykin
hearing 'absent extraordinary circumstances, or some
explanation of why defendant did not reveal other terms.'
Nevertheless, while the representations of a defendant,
his attorney, and the prosecutor at a Boykin hearing, as
well as any findings by the judge accepting the plea,
'constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent
collateral proceedings,' that barrier is not insurmountable
if there is proof that the representations 'were so much the
product of such factors as misunderstanding, duress, or
misrepresentation by others as to make the guilty plea a
4
constitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment.'
Here, the appellant explains that his representations at the
Boykin hearing were the product of his oral agreement. If
so, the issue of whether there was, in fact, an agreement
could not be 'conclusively resolved' on the face of the
record of the Boykin hearing. An evidentiary hearing on
Appellant's RCr 11.42 motion is required. (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original)
Id. at 457-458.
In Fraser, there was no written plea agreement; here, there was. The
agreement here made no mention of parole eligibility. Further, Nation signed a
Motion to Enter Guilty Plea form that stated in part that the plea agreement
contained the entire agreement and that he had not been promised anything else.
Nevertheless, Nation alleged that there was also an oral agreement
wherein the Commonwealth had promised him he would receive 20% parole
eligibility if he pleaded guilty and that his attorney told him to remain silent if the
judge asked him about any promises.4 Whether or not such an oral agreement
existed cannot be determined from the face of the record. Therefore, in accordance
with Fraser, we conclude that Nation was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this
issue.5 6
4
Of course, any promise by the Commonwealth to Nation that he would receive 20% parole
eligibility would be a promise it could not keep since 85% parole eligibility is required for a
conviction of first-degree robbery. See KRS 439.3401(1)(l) and (3).
5
However, see Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1986), which was decided under
a specific federal rule.
6
If, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determines that such an oral agreement
existed, and if the court further determines that Nation is entitled to relief, then Nation would not
be entitled to enforcement of the alleged oral agreement of a 16-year sentence with 20% parole
eligibility for first-degree robbery as he desires since such a sentence is contrary to KRS
439.3401(1)(l) and (3). Rather, Nation's conviction should merely be vacated, the plea
5
Nation’s second argument is a claim that counsel incorrectly advised
him that he could be convicted of all three counts of first-degree robbery rather
than only one count. The trial court rejected this argument on the ground that
Morgan v. Commonwealth, 730 S.W.2d 935 (Ky. 1987), “clearly contradicts
Movant's assertion.” In Morgan, the Supreme Court affirmed a two count
conviction of robbery because two people were present in the home during the
robbery yet neither owned any of the property that was stolen. As with Nation’s
convictions, multiple victims resulted in multiple convictions.
Nation’s contention that he would not have accepted the plea
agreement and pleaded guilty to one count and accepted a 16-year sentence
because 16 years “is not much less than the maximum sentence of 20 years” is
based on a misunderstanding of the law. There was no double jeopardy violation
and counsel correctly advised him of the potential of three convictions based on the
three victims at the scene. See also Stark v. Commonwealth, 828 S.W.2d 603, 60809 (Ky. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Commonwealth, 931
S.W.2d 446 (Ky. 1996). Therefore, we agree with the trial court. There was no
ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard.
Nation's third argument is that he is entitled to have his conviction
and sentence vacated because his attorney incorrectly advised him as to his
eligibility for parole. He asserts that he specifically asked his attorney about the
statute concerning 85% eligibility for violent offenders and that his attorney
agreement set aside, and further proceedings conducted.
6
advised him that if he would accept the Commonwealth's plea offer of 16 years'
imprisonment for one count of first-degree robbery, he would not be subjected to
the violent offender statute because the use of the statute was in the discretion of
the prosecutor and the prosecutor had agreed to 20% parole eligibility. Nation
contends that “[a]ppellant's counsel was either not familiar with the consequences
of the plea agreement or outright deceived him as to the consequences and thus,
provided him with ineffective assistance.” He cites Sparks v. Sowder, 852 F.2d
882 (6th Cir. 1988), to support his argument.
In Sparks, the defendant claimed in a habeas corpus action that he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel because he was induced by his attorney
to plead guilty to murder because he was facing a sentence of life without parole,
when in fact the maximum sentence he could have received was life with the
possibility of parole. The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the trial court for an
evidentiary hearing. Id. at 885. The court reasoned that “[w]e now hold that gross
misadvice concerning parole eligibility can amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel.” Id.
The Sparks court relied in part on Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61
(4th Cir. 1979). Sparks, 852 F.2d at 885. In Strader, the Fourth Circuit stated that
“[o]rdinarily, parole eligibility is such an indirect and collateral consequence, of
which a defendant need not be specifically advised by the court or counsel before
entering a guilty plea.” Id. at 63. The Strader court further elaborated, however,
as follows:
7
Here, though parole eligibility dates are collateral
consequences of the entry of a guilty plea of which a
defendant need not be informed if he does not inquire,
when he is grossly misinformed about it by his lawyer
and relies upon that information, he is deprived of his
constitutional right to counsel.
Id. at 65.
Similarly, in Pitt v. U.S., 763 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1985), the Sixth
Circuit held that the defendant was entitled to have his sentence vacated where the
trial court and his attorney advised him before he entered a guilty plea that his
maximum possible sentence was more than it actually was. The court stated:
We stress that this case does not involve a mere failure to
give a defendant some information which he later claims
would have affected his pleading decision. Instead, it
involves affirmative misstatements of the maximum
possible sentence. Numerous cases have held that
misunderstandings of this nature invalidate a guilty plea.
(citations omitted)
Id. at 201.
The Commonwealth cites Jewell v. Commonwealth, 725 S.W.2d 593
(Ky. 1987), and Turner v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.2d 500 (Ky.App. 1982), to
support its argument that parole eligibility is a collateral consequence of a guilty
plea that has no bearing on Nation's guilty plea. In Jewell, the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that a defendant need not be informed of the range of sentences that
may be imposed in order for the guilty plea to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Id. at 594. In Turner, the defendant was not informed that his guilty plea to being
a first-degree persistent felony offender required that he serve at least 10 years in
8
prison before being eligible for parole. In rejecting the appellant's constitutional
argument, this court held that:
We do not feel that the failure of a trial court to inform a
defendant before accepting a guilty plea of mandatory
service of sentence before eligibility for parole is a
violation of constitutional due process or that such failure
is a ground to vacate a judgment under RCr 11.42.
Id. at 502.
When the trial court in Nation's case considered the Sparks case, it
held that “our Kentucky courts have not found a similar situation to Sparks and
have declined to follow it. The facts in this case also do not move this court to
follow Sparks.” Thus, the trial court rejected Nation's argument.
We agree that Kentucky courts have not addressed a fact situation
exactly like this. However, we disagree that Kentucky courts have declined to
follow Sparks. It appears that there are no published cases in Kentucky involving
facts like these and those in Sparks.7
Although the parties have not cited it, we believe that Commonwealth
v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384 (Ky. 2005), is significant. In Fuartado, the
appellant, an immigrant, alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in that his
counsel failed to inform him that his guilty plea to trafficking in marijuana could
have potential deportation consequences. The court rejected that argument and
7
We are aware of Groves v. Commonwealth, 2007 WL 2343767 (Ky.App. 2007), an
unpublished case of this court's, where a panel of this court's judges considered the same
argument and rejected it. However, the facts therein were different. In Groves, an evidentiary
hearing was held by the trial court and the trial court found that, although counsel had incorrectly
advised the appellant, there was no reasonable likelihood that the appellant would not have
pleaded guilty even if his attorney had properly advised him.
9
stated that deportation consequences are collateral consequences and that counsel
was not required to advise the defendant accordingly. Id. at 386. Specifically, the
Kentucky Supreme Court stated as follows:
Because the consideration of collateral consequences is
outside the scope of representation required under the
Sixth Amendment, failure of defense counsel to advise
Appellee of potential deportation consequences was not
cognizable as a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Id.
We begin by noting that the Jewell and Turner cases cited by the
Commonwealth are distinguishable from the facts in this case and in both Sparks
and Strader. In both Jewell and Turner, the appellants had not been advised of
certain consequences of their guilty pleas. In both Sparks and Strader, the
appellants had been advised of the consequences of their guilty pleas but had been
advised incorrectly. Further, the Strader court acknowledged that while parole
eligibility is a collateral consequence of which a defendant need not be specifically
advised, gross misadvice to a defendant by his lawyer concerning parole eligibility
deprives a defendant of his constitutional right to counsel in violation of the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Strader, 611 F.2d at 65.
In Nation's case, we conclude that the advice by his attorney, if such
advice was given, constitutes gross misadvice. On a 16-year sentence, if Nation
could be eligible for parole after serving 20% of the sentence, he would be eligible
for parole consideration after 3.2 years. If, however, Nation is not eligible for
10
parole consideration until serving 85% of his sentence, he would not be eligible for
parole consideration until he had served 13.6 years. The difference in time before
parole eligibility exceeds ten years. Thus, we believe that whether Nation would
be eligible for parole after 3.2 years or after 13.6 years could be a significant factor
in his determination of whether to plead guilty or not guilty. We conclude this
amounts to gross misadvice, if it occurred.
Having concluded that such advice, if it occurred, is gross misadvice,
the question remains whether such misadvice may constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel so as to afford relief under an RCr 11.42 motion. The Sixth Circuit in
the Sparks case held that “gross misadvice concerning parole eligibility can
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 885. Nevertheless, the
Kentucky Supreme Court has held that the failure of a trial court to inform a
defendant of mandatory service of sentence before accepting a guilty plea is not a
violation of constitutional due process or a ground for relief from a judgment under
RCr 11.42. See Turner, 647 S.W.2d at 502. Our supreme court has also held that
“the consideration of collateral consequences is outside the scope of representation
required under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.” See Fuartado, 170
S.W.3d at 386.8
8
In Fuartado, the appellant's counsel did not advise him of the deportation consequences of his
guilty plea. That case is distinguishable in that regard from this case because here Nation's
attorney did not just fail to give advice; rather, his attorney gave him gross misadvice.
11
It is apparent that our supreme court has impliedly rejected the Sixth
Circuit's decision in the Sparks case.9 Parole eligibility is a collateral consequence,
and failure to advise or to even give gross advice concerning collateral
consequences are not within the scope of a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
See Turner, supra; Fuartado, supra. Thus, we conclude that under Kentucky law,
Nation is not entitled to relief from his guilty plea even though his attorney grossly
misadvised him that he would be eligible for parole after serving only 20% of his
sentence when, in fact, he won't be eligible until he serves 85% of his sentence.10
The trial court correctly denied Nation an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
The order of the Laurel Circuit Court denying Nation's RCr 11.42
motion without an evidentiary hearing is vacated and remanded on the single issue
concerning whether the Commonwealth promised Nation 20% parole eligibility as
an oral part of the plea agreement.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bobby Nation, pro se
Northpoint Training Center
Burgin, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Henry Flores
9
In fact, our supreme court said as much in Commonwealth v. Padilla, __ S.W.3d __ (Ky. 2008)
(2008 WL 199818, rendered on January 24, 2008, but not yet final). In Padilla, our supreme
court held that a defendant who received misadvice concerning deportation consequences was
without remedy because collateral consequences are not within the scope of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.
10
The author of this opinion personally believes that the holding of the 6th Circuit in the Sparks
case should be adopted by our supreme court. However, such a position is contrary to precedent.
As the Court of Appeals, we are bound by the precedence of the supreme court. See Rules of
Supreme Court (SCR) 1.030(8)(a).
12
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
13
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