ROTHWELL (EDDIE S.) VS. SINGLETON (E. ELOISE), ET AL.
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RENDERED: JUNE 6, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001348-MR
EDDIE S. ROTHWELL, SR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LINCOLN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID A. TAPP, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00302
E. ELOISE SINGLETON, INDIVIDUALLY;
AND E. ELOISE SINGLETON, ADMINISTRATRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF JEWELL E. RICE, DECEASED
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: This is a will contest action wherein it is alleged that a
holographic will is void because the testator lacked testamentary capacity and the
beneficiary exerted undue influence over the testator. The trial court found that
because a prior jury found that the testator had testamentary capacity when she
Senior Judge John W. Graves sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
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executed a different will, the doctrine of res judicata applied and dismissed the
claim. As to the issue of undue influence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor
of the sole beneficiary, E. Eloise Singleton.
The parties to this action have a lengthy history of family discord and
their relationships with one another have been less than harmonious.2 The testator,
Jewell E. Rice, was the mother of six children, four of whom survived her. Five of
her wills were admitted into evidence, but according to the testimony at trial, she
had executed more than nineteen wills during her lifetime. The testimony further
revealed that the numerous wills were executed in response to her disapproval of
the behavior of one or more of her children, who would then be disinherited as a
form of punishment.
Two of the wills and the facts surrounding their execution, have
particular significance to the present controversy: the will that is the subject of the
present controversy was executed on December 12, 1999, and the final will
executed on December 28, 1999, was declared void after a jury found it to be
executed under undue influence. Both left the entirety of the estate to Eloise.
In 1999, Jewell was ninety years old. In August of that year, she fell
and broke her leg while being cared for by her daughter, Helen Simpson. Jewell
was advised to receive two weeks of physical therapy and was placed in a nursing
home; prior to the expiration of that time, she was removed from the nursing home
The complaint was filed by Eddie S. Rothwell, Sr.; Helen M. Simpson; Kenneth W. Rothwell;
and Gary E. Rothwell. Eddie S. Rothwell, Sr. is the only appellant.
2
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by Eloise. Thereafter, until Jewell’s death on December 18, 2000, Eloise and her
husband resided in Jewell’s basement and provided daily care.
The holographic will bequeaths Jewell’s entire estate to Eloise and
states: “Eloise is my only help over many years.” It appears from the handwritten
document that Jewell had some difficulty writing Eloise’s name and twice
incorrectly spelled her name within the three sentence document.
The initial question to be resolved is whether the doctrine of res
judicata precludes the claim that Jewell lacked testamentary capacity to execute
the will of December 12, 1999. The concept of res judicata and its legal
requirements was explained in Yeoman v. Com., Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d
459 (Ky. 1998):
The rule of res judicata is an affirmative defense
which operates to bar repetitious suits involving the same
cause of action. The doctrine of res judicata is formed by
two subparts: 1) claim preclusion and 2) issue preclusion.
Claim preclusion bars a party from re-litigating a
previously adjudicated cause of action and entirely bars a
new lawsuit on the same cause of action. Issue
preclusion bars the parties from relitigating any issue
actually litigated and finally decided in an earlier action.
The issues in the former and latter actions must be
identical. The key inquiry in deciding whether the
lawsuits concern the same controversy is whether they
both arise from the same transactional nucleus of facts.
If the two suits concern the same controversy, then the
previous suit is deemed to have adjudicated every matter
which was or could have been brought in support of the
cause of action.
For claim preclusion to bar further litigation,
certain elements must be present. First, there must be
identity of the parties. Second, there must be identity of
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the causes of action. Third, the action must have been
resolved on the merits. The rule that issues which have
been once litigated cannot be the subject matter of a later
action is not only salutary, but necessary to the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
....
For issue preclusion to operate as a bar to further
litigation, certain elements must be found to be present.
First, the issue in the second case must be the same as the
issue in the first case. Second, the issue must have been
actually litigated. Third, even if an issue was actually
litigated in a prior action, issue preclusion will not bar
subsequent litigation unless the issue was actually
decided in that action. Fourth, for issue preclusion to
operate as a bar, the decision on the issue in the prior
action must have been necessary to the court's judgment.
Id. at 464-465 (footnotes and internal quotations omitted).
The trial court found that the issue of Jewell’s testamentary capacity
to execute the will on December 12, 1999, was resolved in the prior will contest
where it was held that Jewell had such capacity. A jury subsequently found,
however, that the will was executed under undue influence. Consequently, the
December 12, 1999, will was offered to probate.
The prior action involved a will that was executed sixteen days after
December 12, 1999. Thus, the question is whether a testator’s testamentary
capacity at a time other than that during which the contested will was executed, is
decisive of the issue. We believe it is not and conclude that the court erred when it
dismissed the claim of testamentary capacity based on the rule of res judicata.
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The issue in the prior action was Jewell’s testamentary capacity on
December 28, 1999. The issue before us is Jewell’s mental capacity on December
12, 1999.
To validly execute a will, a testator must: “(1) know the natural
objects of her bounty; (2) know her obligations to them; (3) know the character and
value of her estate; and (4) dispose of her estate according to her own fixed
purpose.” Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Ky. 1998)(internal citations
omitted). In Bye, the Court refused to rule that a judgment of partial disability
removed the capacity of a ward to draft a will. The Court applied the lucid interval
doctrine under which a testator who suffers from a mental illness that “ebbs and
flows” in terms of its effect on mental competency is presumed to have executed
the will during a lucid interval. Id. at 456. The Court’s acceptance of the lucid
interval doctrine reaffirms and is based on the principle that the issue is whether
testamentary capacity existed at the time the will was executed. Although only a
short time elapsed between the executions of both wills, her testamentary capacity
is only relevant at the time of the execution of the December 12, 1999, will. Id. at
455.
On remand, the appellant will have an onerous burden. “In Kentucky
there is a strong presumption in favor of a testator possessing adequate
testamentary capacity. This presumption can only be rebutted by the strongest
showing of incapacity.” Id. However, we hold that the doctrine of res judicata
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cannot be applied to the issue of testamentary capacity to execute a will not
challenged in a prior proceeding.
The issue of undue influence was resolved by the trial court’s grant of
a directed verdict to Eloise, thus, our standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review for an appeal of a directed
verdict is firmly entrenched in our law. A trial judge
cannot enter a directed verdict unless there is a complete
absence of proof on a material issue or there are no
disputed issues of fact upon which reasonable minds
could differ. Where there is conflicting evidence, it is the
responsibility of the jury to determine and resolve such
conflicts. A motion for directed verdict admits the truth
of all evidence favorable to the party against whom the
motion is made. Upon such motion, the court may not
consider the credibility of evidence or the weight it
should be given, this being a function reserved for the
trier of fact. The trial court must favor the party against
whom the motion is made, complete with all inferences
reasonably drawn from the evidence. The trial court then
must determine whether the evidence favorable to the
party against whom the motion is made is of such
substance that a verdict rendered thereon would be
“palpably or flagrantly” against the evidence so as “to
indicate that it was reached as a result of passion or
prejudice.” In such a case, a directed verdict should be
given. Otherwise, the motion should be denied.
It is well-argued and documented that a motion for
a directed verdict raises only questions of law as to
whether there is any evidence to support a verdict. While
it is the jury's province to weigh evidence, the court will
direct a verdict where there is no evidence of probative
value to support the opposite result and the jury may not
be permitted to reach a verdict based on mere speculation
or conjecture.
Gibbs v. Wickersham, 133 S.W.3d 494, 495-96 (Ky.App. 2004)(internal citations
omitted).
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The essence of a claim of undue influence is that prior to or during the
execution of the will, the testator was so inappropriately influenced that she no
longer possessed the free will to dispose of her property in accordance with her
own judgment. Because it is usually subtly imposed and exerted without
witnesses, direct proof of undue influence is generally unavailable. Zeiss v. Evans,
436 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1969). As a result, the courts are required to examine the
“badges” of undue influence. Such badges include:
[A] physically weak and mentally impaired testator, a
will which is unnatural in its provisions, a recently
developed and comparatively short period of close
relationship between the testator and principal
beneficiary, participation by the principal beneficiary in
the preparation of the will, possession of the will by the
principal beneficiary after it was reduced to writing,
efforts by the principal beneficiary to restrict contacts
between the testator and the natural objects of his bounty,
and absolute control of testator's business affairs.
Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 457 (internal citations omitted).
When the will provides for an unequal or unnatural disposition and
there is slight evidence of the exercise of undue influence, the evidence will be
deemed sufficient to submit the case to the jury. Burke v. Burke, 801 S.W.2d 691
(Ky.App. 1990).
Jewell was described by her children as a strong-willed individual.
However, at the time she executed the will in controversy, she was elderly and
physically weakened. The evidence that she suffered from a mental infirmity
consisted primarily of a notation by Dr. Finely Hendrickson who treated Jewell in
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August 1999 that Jewell suffered from Alzheimer’s disease. Although no other
physician made a similar diagnosis, Dr. Hendrickson’s testimony was evidence
upon which a jury could conclude that Jewell suffered from a diminished mental
capacity at the time the will was executed. Moreover, the will itself could be
viewed as evidence of her mental capacity. Within the relatively brief document,
she twice misspelled Eloise’s name. A jury could reasonably conclude that absent
some diminished mental capacity, a testator would properly spell the name of the
sole beneficiary, particularly when, as here, that beneficiary is the testator’s child.
The will in question leaves the entirety of the estate to Eloise and
leaves nothing to the remaining children. Although the omission of the remaining
children could be attributed to the dissension between them and Jewell, a jury
could reasonably conclude that such was caused by the influence exerted by Eloise.
When the wills admitted into evidence are examined closely, only the
two wills written in December 1999, bequeath the entire estate to a sole
beneficiary, Eloise.
According to the testimony at trial, none of the children were
consistent in their relationships with Jewell; Eloise’s relationship intensified,
however, after she removed Jewell from the nursing home and began living in her
residence. Immediately after Eloise resumed care for Jewell, Jewell revoked Helen
Simpson’s Power of Attorney which was then mailed to Helen in an envelope
mailed and addressed by Eloise.
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We conclude that there were sufficient “badges” of undue influence to
submit the issue to the jury.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEES:
Frederick V. Short
Hustonville, Kentucky
Ephraim W. Helton
Danville, Kentucky
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