CHRISTY (DONALD T.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 14, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001304-MR
DONALD T. CHRISTY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STOCKTON B. WOOD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00038
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON, JUDGE; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE: Donald T. Christy appeals from his judgment and sentence
from a conditional plea of guilty before the Mason Circuit Court. Finding no error, we
affirm.
Christy was arrested on January 19, 2007, for suspected driving under the
influence (DUI). He was indicted by the Mason County Grand Jury on March 23, 2007,
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Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol,2 fourth
offense, and operating a motor vehicle while license suspended for driving under the
influence,3 first offense. Christy had three prior DUI convictions. He was convicted of
his first DUI offense on September 22, 2003, while he was sixteen years of age.
Christy’s second conviction on March 2, 2005, and his third conviction on March 28,
2005, both occurred when he was eighteen years of age.
On April 11, 2007, Christy filed a “motion to exclude juvenile DUI and
prohibit enhancement” arguing that the enhancement statute of KRS 189A.010(5)(d),
which makes a fourth or subsequent DUI offense a felony, does not apply to Christy
because he was a minor when he was convicted of his first DUI offense. The trial court
entered an order denying Christy’s motion on April 30, 2007. Christy entered a
conditional guilty plea on May 11, 2007, and was sentenced to a total of two-years’
imprisonment. This appeal followed.
Christy argues that his 2003 conviction for his first DUI offense, while he
was sixteen years of age, was governed by the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code and
should not be used as the basis for a fourth offense DUI enhancement making the offense
a felony. Christy also argues the enhancement denies him equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Finally, Christy argues that the
rule of lenity should be applied in his favor because KRS 610.010 and KRS 189A.010 are
in conflict. Because we find no error in the circuit court’s decision, we affirm Christy’s
conviction.
2
KRS 189A.010.
3
KRS 189A.090.
2
The Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code does not apply to DUI prosecutions.
KRS 610.010 of the juvenile code titled, “District Court jurisdiction of juvenile matters,”
reads:
(1) Unless otherwise exempted by KRS Chapters 600 to 645,
the juvenile session of the District Court of each county shall
have exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any
child living or found within the county who has not reached
his or her eighteenth birthday or of any person who at the
time of committing a public offense was under the age of
eighteen (18) years, who allegedly:
(a) Has committed a public offense prior to his or her
eighteenth birthday, except a motor vehicle offense
involving a child sixteen (16) years of age or older. A
child sixteen (16) years of age or older taken into
custody upon the allegation that the child has
committed a motor vehicle offense shall be treated as
an adult and shall have the same conditions of release
applied to him or her as an adult.
KRS 610.010(1)(a) also states that a “’motor vehicle offense’ shall not be deemed to
include the offense of stealing or converting a motor vehicle no operating the same
without the owner’s consent nor any offense which constitutes a felony.” A first DUI
offense committed at the age of sixteen clearly falls outside of the jurisdiction of the
juvenile code because it is not one of the exempted motor vehicle offenses listed above
and thus, falls within the jurisdiction of the adult session of the district court as outlined
in KRS 610.010(1)(a). In other words, Christy’s first DUI offense in 2003 was within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the district court.
Christy is correct in stating that “in a case of statutory interpretation, the
duty of the court is to determine and enforce the intent of the General Assembly.” See
Commonwealth v. Harrelson, 14 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Ky. 2000). The Kentucky Supreme
Court also noted in Harrelson that “we are not at liberty to add or subtract from the
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legislative enactment or discover meanings not reasonably ascertainable from the
language used.” Id. This is exactly what Christy asks this Court to do. If the legislature
had intended for DUI offenses to fall within the purview of KRS 610.010(1)(a), it would
have added explicit language to accommodate its intentions. Since KRS 610.010(1)(a)
fails to mention anything about DUI offenses, we are convinced that the statute does not
apply to DUI offenses and such offenses are not governed by the juvenile code.
Applying Phelps v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 237 (Ky. 2004), Christy
argues that “the Kentucky Supreme Court noted that the Juvenile Code was enacted with
the stated purpose of rehabilitating juvenile offenders, when possible, as opposed to the
punitive purpose of the adult penal code.” However, the purpose of the juvenile code is
of no importance in this case, as we have already discussed that DUI offenses are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the adult session of district court.
Christy next argues that the felony enhancement denied him equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. He argues
that his fourth DUI conviction violates equal protection because the circuit court allowed
the use of the DUI conviction he received as a juvenile to enhance his current DUI
offense from a misdemeanor to a felony. There is a violation of equal protection, as
Christy argues, because two distinct classes of individuals are being arbitrarily excluded
from such felony enhancement. The two distinct classes are: 1) juveniles who are
adjudicated for enhanceable crimes or tried as youthful offenders in circuit court for
serious felonies but are not subject to PFO enhancement as adults: and 2) juveniles in
district court who receive four DUI convictions but are excluded from felony
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enhancement. Christy alleges that there is no rational basis for putting only certain
individuals in jeopardy of an enhanced sentence based on their behavior as juveniles.
The Commonwealth argues that Christy has failed to point to any particular
statute that violated his equal protection rights because he only alleges that his fourth
DUI conviction is in violation of equal protection. We agree with the Commonwealth.
The burden of proving a constitutional violation, including equal protection violations,
rests with the party alleging the violation. Commonwealth v. Howard, 969 S.W.2d 700,
703-04 (Ky. 1998). In this case, the burden is on Christy to show that some statute
violated his equal protection of the law. Since Christy does not argue that a particular
statute violates his right to equal protection of the law as afforded by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, he has not met his burden of proof.
Finally, Christy argues that a conflict exists between KRS 610.010(1)(a)
and KRS 189A.010(5) & (7), and the rule of lenity applies when it is unclear whether or
not a conviction will be classified as a felony or a misdemeanor. Christy argues:
The juvenile code prohibits any motor vehicle offense
committed by a juvenile from being treated as a felony. See
KRS 610.010, supra. However, KRS 189A.010(7) is in
conflict with that statute, providing that a person under
twenty-one with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more
shall be subject to the penalties in subsection (5) of the
statute. Subsection (5)(d) makes a person’s fourth DUI in
five years a Class D felony.
The rule of lenity applies only when statutes are ambiguous and must be resolved in favor
of a criminal defendant. White v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.3d 470, 484 (Ky. 2005).
Again, Christy alleges that he was convicted of his first DUI, while a juvenile, in district
court pursuant to the juvenile code, “which prohibits a motor vehicle offense committed
by a juvenile from being treated as a felony.” As noted earlier, KRS 189A is not
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included in the juvenile code, and persons under eighteen years of age charged with KRS
189A offenses are to be prosecuted in the adult session of district court. Neither KRS
189A.010 or KRS 610.010 is ambiguous, nor are they in conflict with each other.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Mason Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Erin Hoffman Yang
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
David W. Barr
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
David W. Barr
Frankfort, Kentucky
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