HARSTAD (MICHAEL) VS. HARSTAD (BONNIE)
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RENDERED: JUNE 20, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001211-MR
MICHAEL HARSTAD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE C. MICHAEL DIXON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00361
BONNIE HARSTAD
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, KELLER, AND WINE, JUDGES.
KELLER, JUDGE: In this dissolution action, Michael Harstad has appealed from
the judgment of the Jessamine Family Court related to property division and
visitation. We affirm.
Michael and Bonnie Harstad were married in St. Louis County,
Missouri on June 1, 1974. Three children were born of the marriage, and the
youngest, Keith, has not yet reached the age of majority. Michael and Bonnie
separated on June 6, 2003, and Michael filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage
on May 24, 2004. At the time he filed the petition, Michael was a college
professor; he now works at a Louisville high school. Bonnie is a musician and
music teacher.
This action was initially assigned to Jessamine Circuit Court Judge
Hunter Daugherty and, in turn, to then-Domestic Relations Commissioner C.
Michael Dixon (the DRC), who heard the proof in this case. Although the record
is somewhat unclear, the DRC scheduled a hearing for December 16, 2005. At that
time, the parties addressed motions concerning custody, support, and the payment
of the mortgage on the marital residence. The DRC’s January 3, 2006, report
concerning those issues was confirmed by the circuit court in an order entered
February 7, 2006.
A final hearing was scheduled for January 6, 2006, on the remaining
issues, including the division of marital property.1 The DRC issued a report on
January 9, 2006, detailing his findings and recommendations as to the division of
real estate, automobiles, and retirement and investment accounts, among other
issues. Bonnie filed timely exceptions to the DRC’s report, addressing her ability
to raise non-marital claims, the assignment of non-marital interests, the DRC’s
failure to address one of the Schwab accounts, the value of various accounts, the
division of credit card debt, and the division of musical instruments and other
The record of this hearing is not in the certified record. We have attempted to retrieve the
videotaped recording of this hearing from the clerk’s office in the Jessamine County, but it is
apparently missing.
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personalty.2 On January 26, 2006, the circuit court entered a calendar order, in
which it granted the decree of dissolution and ordered the parties to submit the
decree, including all resolved matters. The unresolved matters would then be
referred back to the DRC. The decree was eventually entered on March 27, 2006.
That order also confirmed the DRC’s report as to custody, support and partial
timesharing. The circuit court specifically remanded all other issues that were not
resolved by the decree to the DRC for hearing, redetermination, and report.
A trial on the remaining issues was held on January 9, 2007. By that
time, the DRC had been sworn in as the new family court judge and was presiding
over this action as the judge, rather than as a DRC. Prior to the trial, the parties
filed their respective trial disclosure statements pursuant to the discovery schedule.
In addition to the property issues, the family court heard testimony concerning the
visitation schedule. Bonnie moved the family court to modify Michael’s visitation
due to a change in circumstances, in that she no longer had any leisure time with
Keith. Regarding the visitation issue, the family court found that the parties’
situations had changed and that it would be in Keith’s best interest to modify
visitation. It then entered a new visitation schedule effective January 9, 2007.
Michael filed a CR 52.02 motion requesting that the family court make findings of
fact on its decision to modify visitation.
On May 23, 2007, the family court entered an order addressing the
property issues as well as the previously decided visitation issue. In many
Bonnie specifically contested the valuation amount of the marital residence, as the DRC used
an incorrect mortgage payoff amount.
2
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instances, the family court indicated that a particular issue had been dealt with at
the first hearing and adopted the earlier factual findings as to that issue. After
assigning non-marital interests, including assigning Bonnie a non-marital interest
in the Corbitt Drive property in the amount of $84,150, the family court split the
marital equity equally between Bonnie and Michael. It is from this order that
Michael has appealed.
On appeal, Michael argues that 1) he was denied his due process right
to a fair hearing; 2) the family court’s findings on the amount of equity in the
marital home were erroneous; 3) the family court failed to follow KRS 403.190 in
dividing the property; 4) the family court erred in finding a gift from Bonnie’s
father to her in relation to the Corbitt Drive real estate; 5) the family court
committed error regarding its award and division of the Mazda and in allocating
credit card debt; and 6) the family court erred in modifying visitation. In her brief,
Bonnie responds to each of Michael’s arguments, and specifically argues that
several of his arguments were not preserved for appeal. We shall review each of
the six issues in the order as they appear in Michael’s brief.
Our standard of review is set forth in Hunter v. Hunter, 127 S.W.3d
656, 659 (Ky. App. 2003):
Under CR 52.01, in an action tried without a jury,
“[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses. The findings of a commissioner, to the
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as
the findings of the court.” See also Greater Cincinnati
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Marine Service, Inc. v. City of Ludlow, Ky., 602 S.W.2d
427 (1980). A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if
it is supported by substantial evidence. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, Ky., 976 S.W.2d 409, 414
(1998); Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Garland, Ky., 805
S.W.2d 116, 117 (1991). Substantial evidence is
evidence, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence,
which has sufficient probative value to induce conviction
in the mind of a reasonable person. Golightly, 976
S.W.2d at 414; Sherfey v. Sherfey, Ky.App., 74 S.W.3d
777, 782 (2002). An appellate court, however, reviews
legal issues de novo. See, e.g., Carroll v. Meredith,
Ky.App., 59 S.W.3d 484, 489 (2001). (Footnote
omitted).
With this standard in mind, we shall consider the issues raised in the present
action.
1) Lack of Due Process
For his first argument, Michael contends that his due process right to a
fair hearing was violated. He bases this argument on what he described as a
disjointed and piecemeal procedural history that took place in this action.
Specifically, Michael contends that the family court should have reheard all of the
property issues, as it was precluded from relying upon any testimony or evidence
from the first hearing in January 2006. Bonnie disagrees with Michael’s
contentions, arguing that he failed to preserve the issue below for our review or list
it as an issue in his prehearing statement, that he agreed to the use of the factual
findings from the first hearing as evidence at the second one, and that the case law
is not supportive of his argument.
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In his prehearing statement, Michael listed the following issues that he
would be raising in his appeal:
VISITATION: Court failed to make specific findings
and abused its discretion in restricting Appellant’s
visitation.
PROPERTY: Court erred in awarding Appellee nonmarital property found to be and designated to be
Appellant’s. Court failed to award Appellant his nonmarital interest in the marital residence and awarded
Appellee an improper share of the marital residence.
Michael did not list any issue as to his claimed violation of his due process rights
to a fair hearing. Accordingly, we agree with Bonnie that Michael failed to raise
this issue before the family court or list it as an issue on his prehearing statement,
precluding appellate review.
Before an issue may be raised on appeal, “a trial court must first be
given the opportunity to rule on a question for which review is sought.”
Taxpayer’s Action Group of Madison County v. Madison County Board of
Elections, 652 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Ky. App. 1983). Failure to do so renders an
argument unpreserved for appeal. Hoy v. Kentucky Indus. Revitalization Authority,
907 S.W.2d 766, 769 (Ky. 1995). Furthermore, CR 76.03(8) provides: “A party
shall be limited on appeal to issues in the prehearing statement except that when
good cause is shown the appellate court may permit additional issues to be
submitted upon timely motion.” The Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed an
appellant’s failure to list an issue on his civil prehearing statement in Osborne v.
Payne, 31 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Ky. 2000):
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We must also note that Payne has failed to
preserve properly his claim against the diocese. Civil
Rule 76.03(8), provides that a party shall be limited on
appeal to the issues in the prehearing statement before the
Court of Appeals. Here, the civil appeal prehearing
statement contained no issue regarding the diocese. The
argument sections of the brief of Payne in the Court of
Appeals referred only to the ruling of the circuit court
regarding the conduct of Osborne. The failure to argue
before the Court of Appeals that summary judgment was
improper as to the diocese is tantamount to a waiver. Cf.
Hall v. Kolb, Ky., 374 S.W.2d 854 (1964). Any part of a
judgment appealed from that is not briefed is affirmed as
being confessed. Cf. Stansbury v. Smith, Ky., 424
S.W.2d 571 (1968).
Despite our holding that Michael failed to preserve this issue, our
review of the videotaped records reveals that the parties extensively discussed this
issue on several occasions below, including on the morning of the January 2007
hearing. At that time, the parties indicated that they agreed that the testimony from
the January 2006 hearing (with a few exceptions, including the amounts of the
respective investment accounts) would stand, and that the family court could rely
on the previous recommendations as made by the DRC. They agreed that the only
disputed issues at the 2007 hearing would relate to the marital shares in the Corbitt
Drive house, the Mazda and the Harley Davidson motorcycle, as well as visitation
and other expenditures. Therefore, we disagree with Michael’s contention that he
was entitled to a new trial de novo on all of the property matters at issue or that he
was denied any of his due process rights. The family court did not commit any
error in adopting several of the DRC’s prior recommended findings in its final
judgment.
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2) Corbitt Drive Brandenburg Calculation
Next, Michael attacks the family court’s Brandenburg3 calculation
concerning the marital residence on Corbitt Drive. Michael argues that the family
court used the wrong amount of equity in its calculation; that the family court did
not show its calculation; and that Bonnie was precluded by her prior judicial
admission from asserting that there was an additional gift. Bonnie disputes each of
these arguments.
First, we agree with Bonnie that the family court used the correct
equity amount in its calculation, although in the body of the order the number is
incorrect. As Bonnie pointed out, the spreadsheet attached to the judgment
contained the correct equity amount, $158,572, rather than the incorrect amount
mentioned in the body, $155,572. Likewise, we perceive no error with regard to
the family court’s failure to set out its calculations, as the calculation that it
ultimately used was set forth in the record. Finally, Bonnie was not limited in
claiming that she had an additional non-marital interest in the Corbitt Drive
property, and was not precluded by what Michael described as a “judicial
admission” in the first hearing from supplementing her proof in the second one.
3) Application of KRS 403.190
Next, Michael contends that the family court failed to follow the
mandatory three-step process as outlined in KRS 403.190 when it assigned and
divided the property. Bonnie asserts that this issue was not preserved below and
3
Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. App. 1981).
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was not included as an issue on Michael’s prehearing statement, precluding our
review. She also asserts that the family court properly followed the three-step
process and was not precluded from using findings from the first hearing before the
DRC. While we agree with Bonnie that Michael did not specifically preserve this
issue below or in his prehearing statement, we shall briefly review it.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky extensively addressed the
classification and division of property in Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 264-65
(Ky. 2004):
The disposition of parties' property in a
dissolution-of-marriage action is governed by KRS
403.190, and neither record title nor the form in which it
is held, e.g., partnership, corporation, or sole
proprietorship, is controlling or determinative. Under
KRS 403.190, a trial court utilizes a three-step process to
divide the parties' property: “(1) the trial court first
characterizes each item of property as marital or
nonmarital; (2) the trial court then assigns each party's
nonmarital property to that party; and (3) finally, the trial
court equitably divides the marital property between the
parties.” “An item of property will often consist of both
nonmarital and marital components, and when this
occurs, a trial court must determine the parties' separate
nonmarital and marital shares or interests in the property
on the basis of the evidence before the court.” Neither
title nor the form in which property is held determines
the parties' interests in the property; rather, “Kentucky
courts have typically applied the ‘source of funds' rule to
characterize property or to determine parties' nonmarital
and marital interests in such property.” “The ‘source of
funds rule’ simply means that the character of the
property, i.e., whether it is marital, nonmarital, or both, is
determined by the source of the funds used to acquire the
property.” (Footnotes omitted).
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Our review of the record supports Bonnie’s argument that the family
court properly followed the three-step process set out in KRS 403.190 by first
characterizing and assigning the non-marital property, and then equitably dividing
the remaining marital property between Bonnie and Michael. This is clear from
the spreadsheet the family court attached to its final judgment, in which it set forth
the assets, along with each asset’s value, net equity, any non-marital interests,
marital equity, and the ultimate division. As we stated earlier, the family court was
not precluded from relying upon the findings from the January 2006 hearing to
support its ultimate decision.
4) Gifts from Bonnie’s Father
Michael next argues that the family court erred when it determined
that money from Bonnie’s father, Edward Nissen, was her non-marital property,
rather than a part of the marital estate. The family court determined that Bonnie
was given a total of $21,000 by her father, which was traced to the purchase of real
estate and the building of the residence on Corbitt Drive. Michael asserts that the
family court prejudged this issue and that there was not clear and convincing
evidence that the transfers of money were gifts to her. Bonnie contends that
Michael failed to preserve the argument that the family court prejudged this issue,
that the proper standard of proof is the preponderance of the evidence standard,
and that the family court’s decision that the gifts were to Bonnie alone was
supported by substantial evidence of record.
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We agree with Bonnie that Michael failed to preserve his argument
that the family court prejudged this issue in determining that the transfers were
gifts to Bonnie. Therefore, we shall concentrate our review on the decision itself.
We recognize that gifts are specifically excluded from marital
property pursuant to KRS 403.190(2)(a): “‘[M]arital property’ means all property
acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except: (a) Property acquired
by gift . . . during the marriage and income derived therefrom[.]” In Hunter v.
Hunter, 127 S.W.3d 656 (Ky. App. 2003), this Court addressed the application of
this subsection, and specifically stated that “[t]he party claiming property acquired
after the marriage as his/her nonmarital property through the gift exception bears
the burden of proof on that issue.” Id. at 660. Regarding the standard of proof, the
Court stated, in a footnote, “that the preponderance of the evidence standard is the
proper standard of proof necessary to rebut the [marital property] presumption.”
Id. at 660 n.8. The Court then listed the relevant factors a lower court must
consider in determining whether property was a gift, including “the source of the
money used to purchase the item, the intent of the donor, and the status of the
marriage at the time of the transfer.” Id. at 660. However, the Court made it clear
that “the intent of the purported donor is considered the primary factor in
determining whether a transfer of property is a gift.” Id. Finally, the Court stated
that “[w]hether property is considered a gift for purposes of a divorce proceeding is
a factual issue subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.” Id. We
specifically reject Michael’s assertion that a clear and convincing standard of proof
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applies in this case, and agree with Bonnie’s argument that a preponderance
standard applies.
We have also examined Sexton for its explanation of the concept of
tracing, as it applies to determining whether property, or some portion of it, is
marital or non-marital:
“Tracing” is defined as “[t]he process of tracking
property's ownership or characteristics from the time of
its origin to the present.” In the context of tracing
nonmarital property, “[w]hen the original property
claimed to be nonmarital is no longer owned, the
nonmarital claimant must trace the previously owned
property into a presently owned specific asset.” The
concept of tracing is judicially created and arises from
KRS 403.190(3)'s presumption that all property acquired
after the marriage is marital property unless shown to
come within one of KRS 403.190(2)'s exceptions. A
party claiming that property, or an interest therein,
acquired during the marriage is nonmarital bears the
burden of proof. (Footnotes omitted).
Sexton, 125 S.W.3d at 266.
Turning to the record in the present case, we agree with Bonnie that
substantial evidence supports the family court’s decision on this issue, specifically
the deposition testimony of Mr. Nissen in which he testified that the gifts of money
he gave were intended for Bonnie, not Bonnie and Michael. Furthermore, Michael
agreed that the $16,000 was a gift from Bonnie’s father. Although this is a close
call, especially due to the timing of the transfers of money several years before the
separation, we decline to disturb the family court’s decision on this issue.
5) Apportionment of Mazda and Credit Card Debt
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Next, Michael contends that the family court committed error in
failing to credit him with his non-marital portion of the Mazda, along with his
marital portion, and in failing to allocate the credit card debt as it did in the first
order. We agree with Bonnie that Michael failed to preserve these issues for our
review by moving the family court to amend its order pursuant to CR 52.02 or CR
59.05. Michael is precluded from seeking such review before this Court by
operation of CR 52.04.
Despite this holding, it appears to the Court that Michael was indeed
assigned his non-marital portion of the Mazda. The family court assigned the nonmarital portions of the Mazda to Michael and Bonnie, and then divided the
remaining marital portion of the Mazda equitably between them. It further appears
that the credit card debt issue was addressed in the first order and was not disputed
by Michael.
6) Visitation
For his final argument, Michael contends that the family court erred in
modifying his visitation schedule with their youngest son, Keith. For four years,
Michael exercised visitation with Keith every weekend, based on his and Bonnie’s
respective work schedules. Once Bonnie stopped home-schooling Keith, she did
not have as much time with him as she did before, which led her to file a motion to
modify visitation. In a calendar order entered on January 9, 2007, following the
second hearing, the family court wrote: “The parties’ situation has changed for
[Bonnie] and for the child, leaving [Bonnie] with no liesure [sic] time. The
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attached schedule is Ordered.” The attached schedule provided for visitation
between Michael and Keith during the first, third, and fifth weekend of each
month, for two evenings per week, as well as holidays. Presumably based upon
Michael’s request for findings pursuant to CR 52.02, the family court made
additional findings in its May 23, 2007, order:
[Bonnie] seeks a change in visitation for the son
with the father. Her employment situation has changed
and the son’s schooling has changed over time. She now
is off on weekends and works some evenings. He [sic]
child now attends public [school] and returns home later
than previously with home school and at a private school.
She states that her only time with the child is on school
nights and that her interaction is by necessity that of
disciplinarian or taskmaster i.e., homework, bed time etc.
She states that this is not in the best interests of the child
and that he and she also need to spend casual leisure time
where the interaction is not so skewed to making sure
tasks are accomplished as he does with his father. The
court agrees and the schedule attached to the order of
January 9, 2007 is adopted and ordered.
Michael contends that the family court did not have any basis for restricting his
visitation with Keith and did not make sufficient findings to warrant the
modification. Bonnie disagrees, asserting that the family court entered sufficient
findings to support its decision to modify visitation.
The law applicable to visitation is set forth in KRS 403.320:
(1)
A parent not granted custody of the child is
entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless the
court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would
endanger seriously the child’s physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health. Upon request of either
party, the court shall issue orders which are
specific as to the frequency, timing, duration,
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conditions, and method of scheduling visitation
and which reflect the development [sic] age of the
child.
(2)
If domestic violence and abuse, as defined in KRS
403.720, has been alleged, the court shall, after a
hearing, determine the visitation arrangement, if
any, which would not endanger seriously the
child’s or the custodial parent’s physical, mental,
or emotional health.
(3)
The court may modify an order granting or
denying visitation rights whenever modification
would serve the best interests of the child; but the
court shall not restrict a parent’s visitation rights
unless it finds that the visitation would endanger
seriously the child’s physical, mental, moral, or
emotional health.
In Hornback v. Hornback, 636 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Ky. App. 1982), this Court
addressed the requirements of KRS 403.320 as follows:
Under K.R.S. 403.320(1), the noncustodial parent has
absolute entitlement to visitation unless there is a finding
of serious endangerment. No “best interests” standard is
to be applied; denial of visitation is permitted only if the
child is seriously endangered. . . .
Under subsection (2)[4] of the statute, a “best
interests” of the child standard is required when a
judgment is sought to be modified. In modifying a
previous denial of visitation to allow visitation, there is
no presumption, as in subsection (1), of entitlement to
visitation. Instead, the child’s best interests must
prevail. . . .
We interpret the second clause of subsection (2) as
referring to a situation where a party seeks to modify
visitation rights that have been previously granted. In
such a situation the court may not take away a parent’s
visitation rights without a showing that the child would
4
In the current version of the statute, this is subsection (3).
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be seriously endangered by visitation. The standards for
modifying a judgment to disallow visitation are no less
stringent that the standards to deny visitation at the outset
of the case. Once a finding has been made that the
children’s welfare is endangered, however, the court may
not modify the judgment without finding that the best
interests of the child are served.
For purposes of the present case, we must first determine whether
Michael’s visitation with Keith was restricted by the modification. In such cases,
the statute requires a showing of serious endangerment before visitation with the
non-custodial parent may be restricted. KRS 403.190(3). However, we note that
“[a]s used in the statute, the term ‘restrict’ means to provide the non-custodial
parent with something less than ‘reasonable visitation.’” Kulas v. Kulas, 898
S.W.2d 529, 530 (Ky. App. 1995). When viewed in this light, it does not appear
that Michael’s visitation was restricted, as he would continue to receive reasonable
visitation with Keith pursuant to the schedule adopted by the family court.
Accordingly, we must review the family court’s decision in light of the best
interest of the child. KRS 403.190(3). The evidence introduced at the hearing, as
set forth in the family court’s findings, supports the decision to modify Michael’s
visitation. The modification was in Keith’s best interest, as it would provide
Bonnie with the leisure time with Keith that she no longer had, and the family
court specifically found that it was not in his best interest to interact with Bonnie in
a purely disciplinarian role. Therefore, we hold that the family court did not
commit any error or abuse its discretion in modifying Michael’s visitation with
Keith.
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jessamine Family
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John E. Reynolds
Nicholasville, Kentucky
Bruce E. Smith
Nicholasville, Kentucky
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