UPCHURCH (SCOTTY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 18, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001130-MR
SCOTTY UPCHURCH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WAYNE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. CAIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00148 & 04-CR-00317
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON, LAMBERT, AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
STUMBO, JUDGE: Scotty Upchurch appeals from an order of the Wayne Circuit
Court denying his motion to vacate his judgment and sentence pursuant to
CR 60.02(e) and (f) and to be granted a new trial. Upchurch contends that the
circuit court erred in failing to hold a competency hearing. He also maintains that
his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to seek a competency
hearing. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the order on appeal.
By way of separate indictments handed down on June 24, 2004, and
October 19, 2004, the Wayne County grand jury indicted Upchurch with one count
each of complicity to commit robbery in the first-degree and complicity to commit
capital murder. The charges arose from events occurring on May 15, 2004, when
William E. Wells, Sr., age 91, and his son, William E. Wells, Jr., were robbed and
beaten in their home. William Wells, Sr. died as a result of his injuries.
A police investigation followed, whereupon evidence was developed
that Upchurch and at least two other persons committed or otherwise participated
in the robbery and murder. The parties were found to be in possession of forged
checks belonging to Wells, and were observed changing their clothes and
attempting to dispose of them in a Wal-Mart parking lot.
On September 1, 2006, Upchurch appeared in Wayne Circuit Court
and entered a guilty plea to both charges pursuant to a plea agreement with the
Commonwealth. In return for the guilty plea, the Commonwealth recommended
concurrent sentences of imprisonment totaling 34 years. On September 19, 2006,
the guilty plea was accepted and Upchurch was sentenced to 34 years in prison in
accordance with the Commonwealth’s recommendation.
On February 23, 2007, Upchurch filed pro se motions seeking
CR 60.02 relief from judgment claiming error in the circuit court’s failure to
conduct a competency hearing. He also claimed that his counsel was ineffective
for failing to seek a competency hearing. A hearing on the motions was
conducted, after which the circuit court rendered an order denying the relief
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sought. In so doing, the court found that Upchurch did not seek a competency
hearing, and that his guilty plea rendered moot any claim of incompetency. This
appeal followed.
Upchurch first argues that the circuit court erred in failing to conduct
a competency hearing. He contends that in response to a motion of his trial
counsel, the circuit court rendered an order to have Upchurch undergo a psychiatric
evaluation. According to Upchurch, an independent evaluator conducted the
examination and subsequently opined that Upchurch was mildly retarded.
Upchurch maintains that this finding of mild retardation was sufficient to cause the
court to act sua sponte to conduct a competency hearing. The court’s failure to do
so, he argues, constitutes reversible error. He seeks to have the order vacated and
his criminal judgment set aside, so that the matter may be remanded for a
competency hearing.
We find no error on this issue. We must first note that Upchurch does
not cite to anything in the record in support of his claim that he was found to be
mildly retarded, and our cursory examination of the approximately 900 page record
has uncovered nothing on that claim. Upchurch does append to his appellate brief
a cryptic “Tests of Adult Basic Education” answer sheet completed on November
20, 2006, but it does not reveal his IQ or cognitive ability. Also appended is a
“Department of Corrections Resident Record Card” containing the words
“mentally ill” but not addressing his IQ.
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Assuming, arguendo, that Upchurch’s IQ is as he claims, we
nevertheless find no error in the circuit court’s alleged improper failure to conduct
a competency hearing. As both the Commonwealth and the circuit court properly
note, Upchurch was represented by counsel on the underlying charges, and the
issue of Upchurch’s competency to stand trial was never raised. Upchurch,
through counsel, did seek to challenge the competency of William Wells, Jr. to
testify. He also moved for a finding that he was not eligible for the death penalty.
At no time, however, was the issue raised regarding his competency to stand trial.
To the contrary, at the time of the guilty plea, Upchurch’s counsel expressly stated
on the video record (09/01/06; 10:03) that while Upchurch had taken medication in
the past, he was competent to proceed. The trial court asked Upchurch a number
of questions, including whether he was the person named in the indictment, if he
was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and if he understood the guilty plea he
was about to enter. After considering counsel’s statement and Upchurch’s
responses, the Special Judge, William Cain, expressly found Upchurch “competent
to proceed.”
Upchurch cites KRS 504.100 in support of his claim that the court
should have acted sua sponte to order a competency hearing. That statute,
however, which addresses the appointment of a psychologist or psychiatrist,
requires such a hearing only if the court is apprised of “reasonable grounds to
believe the defendant is incompetent to stand trial . . . .” Id. Given the totality of
the record, including the fact that counsel never raised the issue of Upchurch’s
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competency to go to trial or enter a plea, Upchurch’s cogent responses to Judge
Cain’s inquiries, and counsel’s assertion on the record of Upchurch’s competency
to proceed, we find no basis for concluding that the court had reasonable grounds
to believe that Upchurch was incompetent to stand trial. Accordingly, we find no
error.
Upchurch moved for relief from judgment pursuant to CR 60.02(e)
and (f). That rule states that, “On motion a court may, upon such terms as are just,
relieve a party or his legal representative from its final judgment, order, or
proceeding upon the following grounds: . . . (e) the judgment is void, or has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason of an extraordinary
nature justifying relief.” Section (e), i.e., that the judgment is void, is not
applicable to the facts at bar. Similarly, Upchurch has not satisfied the
requirements of section (f) by demonstrating entitlement to relief from judgment
for a reason of extraordinary nature.
Upchurch also argues that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel arising from counsel’s failure to request a competency hearing. He
contends that if a hearing had been requested, the court would have learned that he
was not competent to enter an intelligent guilty plea. He goes on to argue that his
counsel “from day one never attended [sic] to look out for the best interest of her
client, she never investigated the case, never interviewed the Appellant’s alibi
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witnesses, never interviewed the alleged co-defendants to see how they were going
to implicate her client, she never showed any interest in her client’s innocence or
guilt.” The corpus of this argument, however, centers on his assertion that but-for
counsel’s failure to seek a competency hearing, the court would have determined
that he was not competent to tender a guilty plea. He seeks an order reversing the
judgment and remanding the matter for trial.
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
movant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient to such an extent that
the integrity of the trial was impaired. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In order to be found ineffective, counsel’s
performance must fall below the objective standard of reasonableness and be so
prejudicial as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial and a reasonable result. Id.
“Counsel is constitutionally ineffective only if performance below professional
standards caused the defendant to lose what he otherwise would probably have
won.” United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992). The critical
issue is not whether counsel made errors but whether counsel was so thoroughly
ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of probable victory.
In order to prevail on this claim of error, Upchurch would have to
demonstrate that he was not competent during the same timeframe that both he and
his counsel stated to the circuit court on the record that he was competent. He
would also have to show that but-for counsel’s failure to seek a competency
hearing, the outcome of the proceeding would have been more favorable than the
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plea that he accepted. He has not met this burden. As noted above, Upchurch has
cited to nothing in the record supportive of his claim of being mildly retarded
and/or having a low IQ. Even if that assertion is accepted, he has not overcome the
strong presumption that counsel’s strategy was proper. Strickland, supra; Sanborn
v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1998). Proper trial strategy may include
pleading guilty. Hendrickson v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d 234 (Ky. 1970). As
there is no basis in the record to support the hypothesis that counsel should have
sought a competency hearing nor that such a hearing would have benefited
Upchurch, we find no error on this issue.
For the foregoing reason, we affirm the order of the Wayne Circuit
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Scotty A. Upchurch, pro se
Fredonia, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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