THRONEBERRY (GRADY) VS. THE CITY OF AUDUBON PARK , ET AL.
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 10, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001033-MR
GRADY THRONEBERRY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN F. MCDONALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-010506
THE CITY OF AUDUBON PARK AND
CARL REESOR
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; KELLER, JUDGE; HENRY,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: Grady Throneberry appeals from a summary
judgment granted by the Jefferson Circuit Court to the City of Aububon Park and
its Police Chief, Carl Reesor. Throneberry claims that he was improperly
terminated from his employment as a police officer by the City in violation of the
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Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
Kentucky Whistleblower Act, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 61.101 et seq.,
because he made inquiries about the availability of the state hazardous duty
pension plan. He further argues that the trial court erred in ruling that pension
benefits do not constitute wages under KRS 337.010, and that Throneberry was a
probationary employee and therefore not entitled to the due process protections
provided in KRS 15.520 and KRS 95.765.
Throneberry was hired as a part-time police officer by the City in
August 2003. He initially worked approximately sixteen hours per week and later
worked additional hours in exchange for the use of his marked patrol car in his
other employment as a security officer for local companies. At the time of his
hiring, Carl Reesor, the City Police Chief, and Colonel Dale Vittitoe, the Deputy
Chief, explained that additional benefits would become available to Throneberry if
he became a full-time employee of the City. According to Throneberry, Reesor,
Vittitoe and Major Richardson Dodson told him on various occasions that these
benefits included eligibility for one of two retirement plans: the state hazardous
duty pension plan or a private retirement plan awarding a lump sum based on years
of service. On February 9, 2004, Throneberry accepted a full-time position with
the City police department. While on duty some time later, he injured his ankle.
As a result, Throneberry went on workers’ compensation medical leave for an
extended period in June 2004, during which time his police powers were
suspended. While on leave, he accessed an Internet service known as Kentucky
Courtnet on several occasions.
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Before going on medical leave, Throneberry had asked Reesor and
Vittitoe about the hazardous duty pension plan because he was not seeing
deductions from his paycheck going towards the plan. Throneberry was
dissatisfied with their answers and therefore contacted a friend, George Hunter,
who submitted an Open Records request to the City in order to learn whether it
participated in the hazardous duty plan. Hunter’s Open Records request was
denied by the City in a letter dated August 17, 2004. After the request was denied,
Reesor asked Throneberry if he knew who might have submitted the request. On
the next day, August 18, 2004, Reesor directed Vittitoe to initiate an internal
affairs investigation of Throneberry on the grounds that Throneberry’s use of
Courtnet while on medical leave was a violation of both departmental policy and
Throneberry’s individual user agreement with Kentucky Courtnet.
Following the investigation, Throneberry received a letter dated
September 16, 2004, from City Mayor Michael Scalise, informing him that he had
been terminated because he had accessed Courtnet while on medical leave. The
termination letter also referred to Throneberry’s probationary status, although
Throneberry maintains that he was not a probationary employee at that time.
After the termination, Throneberry contacted Richard Dodson, who
had recently retired from employment with the City, and told him he believed he
had been fired because of his inquiries into the availability of the hazardous duty
pension. After contacting an acquaintance with the retirement board in Frankfort,
Dodson informed Throneberry that Audubon Park did not participate in the
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hazardous duty pension plan. According to Throneberry, Dodson was taken aback
by his discovery.
Throneberry contends that he accepted the full-time position with the
City in reliance on the appellees’ representations regarding the availability of the
hazardous duty pension plan. He also contends that he took on significantly fewer
off duty side jobs as a result of accepting the full-time position.
Throneberry brought a lawsuit against the City of Audubon Park and
Chief Reesor, in his individual and official capacities, claiming violations of the
wage and hour laws set forth in KRS Chapter 337; retaliation for making a
worker’s compensation claim; violations of the Kentucky Whistleblower Act; and
violations of KRS 15.520 and KRS 95.765 (the “Police Officer’s Bill of Rights”).
The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants on
Throneberry’s worker’s compensation retaliation claim and the Whistleblower
claim against Reesor in his individual capacity. These rulings have not been
appealed. Later, on a renewed motion by the defendants, the circuit court granted
summary judgment on the Whistleblower claim. It also entered an order in
response to a joint motion filed by the parties, which held that pension benefits did
not constitute “wages” under KRS 337.010, and that Throneberry as a probationary
employee was not entitled to the protections of the Police Officer’s Bill of Rights.
Throneberry filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied, and this appeal
followed.
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Throneberry argues that he successfully established a prima facie case
under the terms of the Whistleblower Act, KRS 61.101 et seq., and that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment to the appellees on this issue. The
Whistleblower Act “was designed to protect employees from reprisal for the
disclosure of violations of the law.” Boykins v. Housing Authority of Louisville,
842 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Ky. 1992).
It provides in pertinent part as follows:
No employer shall subject to reprisal, or directly or
indirectly use, or threaten to use, any official authority or
influence, in any manner whatsoever, which tends to
discourage, restrain, depress, dissuade, deter, prevent,
interfere with, coerce, or discriminate against any
employee who in good faith reports, discloses, divulges,
or otherwise brings to the attention of the Kentucky
Legislative Ethics Commission, the Attorney General,
the Auditor of Public Accounts, the General Assembly of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky or any of its members or
employees, the Legislative Research Commission or any
of its committees, members or employees, the judiciary
or any member or employee of the judiciary, any law
enforcement agency or its employees, or any other
appropriate body or authority, any facts or information
relative to an actual or suspected violation of any law,
statute, executive order, administrative regulation,
mandate, rule, or ordinance of the United States, the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, or any of its political
subdivisions, or any facts or information relative to actual
or suspected mismanagement, waste, fraud, abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety. No employer shall require any
employee to give notice prior to making such a report,
disclosure, or divulgence.
KRS 61.102(1).
In order to demonstrate that a violation of KRS 61.102(1) has
occurred, a claimant must establish the following elements:
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(1) the employer is an officer of the state; (2) the
employee is employed by the state; (3) the employee
made or attempted to make a good faith report or
disclosure of a suspected violation of state or local law to
an appropriate body or authority; and (4) the employer
took action or threatened to take action to discourage the
employee from making such a disclosure or to punish the
employee for making such a disclosure. The employee
must show by a preponderance of evidence that the
disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel
action. The burden of proof is then on the state employer
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
disclosure was not a material fact in the personnel action.
Davidson v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Military Affairs, 152 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Ky.
App. 2004) (footnotes and quotation marks omitted).
The circuit court found that Throneberry could not prevail on two of
the four elements. First, it found that the City of Audubon is not a political
subdivision of the Commonwealth, on the ground that municipal corporations are
separate and distinct entities from counties; and second, it found that there was no
evidence that Throneberry had ever made or attempted to make a report or
disclosure of a suspected violation.
We will address the latter point first. Specifically, Throneberry
offered as evidence that he had reported or attempted to report a suspected
violation that (1) he had asked Reesor and Vittitoe, apparently on several
occasions, whether the City employees were eligible for the hazardous duty
pension plan; (2) he had later asked why deductions for the plan were not being
taken from his paycheck; and (3) he had asked a friend to make an Open Records
request to determine whether such pension eligibility existed. Throneberry
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contends that these numerous attempts to expose the alleged fraud being
perpetrated on the City employees (that they were eligible for the hazardous duty
pension plan) met the reporting requirement of the statute as it was described in
Commonwealth Dept. of Agriculture v. Vinson, 30 S.W.3d 162, 164 (Ky. 2000):
The acts which are prohibited are described and easily
understood as actions which are in response to an
employee who in good faith reports or otherwise brings
to the attention of an appropriate agency either violations
of the law, suspected mismanagement, waste, fraud,
abuse of authority or a substantial or specific danger to
public safety or health. The reprisal or other retaliation
occurs in response to the good faith reporting and such
retaliation is done to either punish, silence or stifle a state
employee.
Including Throneberry’s actions within this definition would expand
the scope of the reporting requirement to an extent that is simply not supported by
the language of the statute or our case law. In Miracle v. Bell County Emergency
Medical Services, 237 S.W.3d 555 (Ky. App. 2007), this Court recently addressed
a factual situation similar to this one and concluded that the reporting requirement
was not met. In that case, Harold Miracle and Amy Brumbach, who were
employed as an EMT and a paramedic, respectively, alleged that they were
discharged by the Bell County EMS, because of their whistleblowing reports of
alleged Medicare or Medicaid fraud.
Although he accused Broughton [the Bell County EMS
Director] of being involved in the alleged fraud or abuse,
Miracle admitted in his deposition that his reports of
wrongdoing were limited to oral complaints to
Broughton, and “probably . . . to some ER staff maybe
possibly.” As Miracle admittedly made no timely report
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of the alleged fraud or abuse to a statutorily-designated
authority, he does not fall within the whistleblower
exception to the terminable at-will doctrine. Further,
there is no merit to any claim that Brumbach engaged in
whistleblowing activities if and when she conversed with
Broughton's wife about his alleged marital misconduct in
the workplace. Neither this report nor appellants' various
other allegations of workplace inefficiency and
mismanagement were made to a statutorily-designated
authority, and the claims did not allege specific violations
of statutory or constitutional provisions. Hence, as a
matter of law, appellants were not entitled to the
protections of the whistleblower exceptions to the
terminable at-will doctrine. KRS 61.102(1).
Miracle, 237 S.W.3d at 559.
Throneberry has presented no evidence that he attempted to bring his
concerns to the attention of a statutorily designated authority, nor has he specified
violations of any statutory or constitutional provisions. Because his actions failed
to meet this element of the statute, we need not address the contention that the
employees of a municipal corporation are not covered by the Whistleblower Act.
Next, Throneberry argues that the circuit court erred in ruling that his
claim for damages pursuant to Kentucky’s wage and hour statutes failed because
the pension benefits he relied upon are not “wages” as defined in KRS 337.010.
KRS 337.055 provides that “[a]ny employee who leaves or is discharged from his
employment shall be paid in full all wages or salary earned by him[.]”
Furthermore,
Any employer who pays any employee less than wages
and overtime compensation to which such employee is
entitled under or by virtue of KRS 337.020 to 337.285
shall be liable to such employee affected for the full
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amount of such wages and overtime compensation, less
any amount actually paid to such employee by the
employer, for an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages, and for costs and such reasonable attorney's
fees as may be allowed by the court.
KRS 337.385. The statute defines wages as follows:
(c) “Wages” includes any compensation due to an
employee by reason of his employment, including
salaries, commissions, vested vacation pay, overtime pay,
severance or dismissal pay, earned bonuses, and any
other similar advantages agreed upon by the employer
and the employee or provided to employees as an
established policy. The wages shall be payable in legal
tender of the United States or checks on banks
convertible into cash on demand at full face value,
subject to the allowances made in this chapter;
KRS 337.010.
The circuit court relied on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, concluding that because “pension benefits” were not listed among the
items enumerated as wages, (as opposed to elsewhere in the KRS where the
legislature has listed wages and pension benefits individually as income), they
were not wages for purposes of KRS 337.010.
In our view, it is irrelevant whether pension benefits are wages under
the statute because Throneberry has provided no evidence that he was entitled to
receive any pension benefits whatsoever. If, for instance, he had voluntarily
terminated his employment with the City, there is no indication that he would have
been entitled to receive any pension benefits (even if the City had participated in
the hazardous duty plan), that he had any vested interest in any pension plan, or
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what the liquidated amount of these benefits would be. Indeed, he has testified that
no deductions or withholdings were made from his paychecks for any such
benefits, and that this fact contributed to his suspicions that the hazardous pension
plan was not available as allegedly promised.
His final argument concerns the trial court’s holding that, as a
probationary employee, he was not entitled to the due process protections of KRS
15.520 and KRS 95.765. It is undisputed that the City had adopted the provisions
of these statutes for its non-probationary employees.
The City’s “Personnel Policy/Civil Service Policy” handbook, which
is provided to all officers, states in pertinent part:
A person initially appointed to a position shall be on
probationary status for one (1) year.
Any employee who has served an initial probationary
period and is promoted from within the City service to a
new position shall be on probation in the new position for
one (1) year.
While on probation, a new employee may be dismissed at
any time without right of appeal.
The circuit court found that Throneberry had been employed as a full-time officer
for less than one year, and that prior to that time, he had been an independent
contractor on a part-time basis. As he was on probation at the time of his
dismissal, he had no right to appeal.
Throneberry contends that his change in status from part-time to fulltime officer on February 9, 2004, was not a “promotion,” and that therefore he had
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served out his one-year probationary period at the time of his termination. He
argues that his situation is analogous to that of the appellant in Bunch v. Personnel
Bd., Commonwealth of Ky., 719 S.W.2d 8 (Ky. App. 1986), who was employed as
a cook at a state park. The regulations provided that an employee attained various
due process protections after serving a six-month probationary period. Bunch’s
employment classification was changed after two and one half years. He had
completed his probationary period under the first classification. The question was
whether he would be required to complete a second probationary period in the
second classification, even though the work he was performing was identical. This
Court held that he should not be required to complete a second probationary
period. It explained its reasoning as follows:
The appellees claim that the probationary period is
necessary in order to gauge a new employee's ability to
adequately perform a job. This statement is no doubt true
in circumstances such as when a new employee is hired
or a present employee is transferred to perform a
different job than he had done previously in which his
responsibilities or duties are increased or changed.
This rationale does not hold true for someone in the
appellant's circumstance. As he was continuing in the
same position and performing the same tasks he had done
for two-and-a-half years, a probationary period was
completely unnecessary. If his work was unsatisfactory,
it does not seem logical that he would have been placed
on full-time basis.
Bunch, 719 S.W.2d at 9-10.
The facts in Throneberry’s case are entirely distinguishable: he had
not completed a full probationary period as a part-time employee, and was
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therefore not being required to serve a second probationary period, and his
responsibilities and duties had increased as a full-time officer because he began
working full-time hours. Most importantly, under the terms of the City’s personnel
policy, the probationary period did not start to accrue until he became a full-time
employee. The City’s Personnel Policy/Civil Service Policy specifically exempts
part-time employees from the coverage of civil service. The section entitled
“Scope of Coverage” explicitly exempts from coverage the following officers and
employees of Audubon Park:
a. All elected officials
b. All members of Boards or Commissions;
c. City Engineer
d. Consultants, advisors, and counsel rendering
e. Independent contractors
f. Seasonal/Part-time; and
g. Members of volunteer organizations.
2. All officers and employees not explicitly exempted
from coverage of these policies and procedures shall be
subject to its provisions.
Thus, Throneberry’s status for purposes of coverage under the terms
of the policies and procedures only began to accrue when he became a full-time
employee. In other words, the one-year probationary period did not start to run
until he was hired full-time. As such, he was still a probationary employee at the
time he was terminated.
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Throneberry further argues that even if he was a probationary
employee at the time of his termination, he was still entitled to statutory due
process protections under the holding in Brown v. Jefferson County Police Merit
Bd., 751 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Ky. 1988). We disagree because the holding in Brown is
expressly limited to members of county police forces covered under KRS 78.425:
In Rottinghaus v. Board of Commissioners of City of
Covington, Ky.App., 603 S.W.2d 487 (1979), the Court
of Appeals upheld the validity of a Covington city
ordinance providing that “all appointments from the
Police Eligibility List shall be for an initial probationary
period of one year,” and “that until such time as the
appointee has successfully completed this one-year
probationary period he is not to be considered a
permanent employee and, therefore, is not entitled to the
procedural protections afforded police and fire
department members under KRS 95.450.” Id. at 488.
However, the statutory scheme controlling the present
case differs from the Rottinghaus case. KRS 78.425,
quoted above, specifies that “[a]ll police officers of
whatever rank and title” appointed to the county police
force are “covered by the provisions hereof” and
“deemed to be permanent employes” [sic] for purposes of
the procedural protections afforded by the county police
force merit system. This eliminates the discretion
enjoyed by the city council in the Rottinghaus case to
create a class of probationary officers who were not
given the procedural protections granted to permanent
officers. Unlike the City of Covington, the
administrative agency here involved, the Merit Board,
exists for one reason only, to carry out the county police
force merit system established by the legislature,
including the procedural guarantees.
Brown v. Jefferson County Police Merit Bd., 751 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Ky. 1988).
Like the city council in Rottinghaus, the City was free to create a class of
probationary officers who were not given the procedural protections granted to
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permanent officers. Under Brown, therefore, the circuit court was correct to rely
on Rottinghaus to find that, as a probationary employee, Throneberry was not
entitled to an administrative appeal of his termination.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment and other rulings of
the Jefferson Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Garry R. Adams
Thomas E. Clay
Louisville, Kentucky
Mark A. Osbourn
Louisville, Kentucky
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