MCGRANNAHAN (PATRICIA) VS. BOMAR (GARY E.), ET AL.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JULY 11, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000942-MR
PATRICIA MCGRANNAHAN, EXECUTRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM GREENE,
DECEASED
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-02620
GARY E. BOMAR AND INTERLAKE
MATERIAL HANDLING, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: FORMTEXT ACREE, DIXON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Patricia McGrannahan, Executrix of the Estate of William
Greene, Deceased, (the Estate) brings this appeal from a June 15, 2006, summary
judgment dismissing negligence claims against Gary E. Bomar and Interlake
Material Handling, Inc. We affirm.
William Greene was involved in a motor vehicle accident in which
Greene suffered severe injuries that ultimately caused his death. Greene’s vehicle
collided with a motor vehicle driven by Bomar. Bomar’s vehicle was insured by
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and Greene’s vehicle was
insured by Safeco Insurance Company.
Following the accident, State Farm, Bomar’s insurance carrier,
offered to the Estate the policy liability limit of $50,000 as settlement of all claims
against Bomar. Safeco elected to preserve its subrogation rights against Bomar
and substituted payment of the $50,000 policy limit under the procedure outlined
in Coots v. Allstate Ins. Co., 853 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1993). Thereafter, the Estate
settled its underinsured motorist (UIM) claim against its carrier, Safeco, for
$90,000.
Safeco and the Estate initiated an action against Bomar in the Fayette
Circuit Court. Safeco and the Estate initially filed the action to pursue Safeco’s
subrogation claim. During the course of litigation, it was revealed that at the time
of the accident Bomar was acting within the course and scope of his employment
with Interlake Material Handling, Inc. Upon this information, Safeco and the
Estate moved for leave to file an amended complaint. Therein, Safeco and the
Estate asserted a vicarious liability claim against Interlake. The motion was
granted.
Subsequently, Bomar and Interlake both filed motions for summary
judgment. Therein, they argued that the Estate’s claims were barred under Coots,
-2-
853 S.W.2d 895 and True v. Raines, 99 S.W.3d 439 (Ky. 2003). Specifically, they
contended that the Estate accepted Bomar’s liability policy limit of $50,000 as
settlement of all liability claims. As Safeco elected to tender a substitute payment
thereof, the only claim remaining was a subrogation claim.
By summary judgment, the circuit court granted the motions and
dismissed all negligence claims against Bomar and Interlake. The court reasoned:
The Court finds that the claims of Patricia
McGrannahan, Executrix of the Estate of William
Greene, deceased[,] against Defendant Gary E. Bomar
are barred as a result of True v. Raines, 99 S.W.3d 439
(Ky. 2003). As a result, the Court further finds that the
claims by Patricia McGrannahan, Executrix of [the Estate
of] William Greene, deceased, against Interlake Material
Handling, Inc. are barred since they are based solely on a
theory of respondeat superior. The claims of the
Plaintiff, Patricia McGrannahan, Executrix of the Estate
of William Greene, deceased, against the Defendants are
dismissed with prejudice.
This appeal follows.1
The Estate contends that the circuit court erred by entering summary
judgment dismissing its negligence claims against Bomar and Interlake.
Specifically, the Estate argues:
The Estate of William Greene was presented with
a situation in which the Executor was confronted with an
obligation to settle the affairs of the Estate, which
included resolving any claims of the Estate against the
tortfeasor, Gary Bomar, and his insurer, State Farm. The
only information available to the Estate was that Bomar’s
limits of liability coverage with State Farm was [sic]
$50,000, which the insurer offered to the Estate. The
A final order that adjudicated all the rights of all the parties was entered on April 10, 2007.
Thereafter, a timely notice of appeal was filed by the Estate challenging the summary judgment.
1
-3-
Estate then brought a claim against Greene’s own insurer,
Safeco, on the Underinsured Motorist (UIM) coverage on
the policy. Eventually, the UIM claim of the Estate were
[sic] resolved by settlement with Safeco, which also
advanced to the Estate the limits of coverage on Bomar’s
policy with State Farm, in order to protect its subrogation
rights under the guidelines of Coots v. Allstate, supra.
However, at no time was it ever disclosed by Bomar or
his insurer, State Farm, to the Estate or Greene’s insurer,
Safeco, until after the lawsuit was filed, that Bomar was
acting within the scope of his employment at the time of
the accident, and that his employer might be vicariously
liable.
....
[T]he evidence of record is clear that the Estate had no
disclosure of information as to Bomar acting within the
scope of an employment relationship with Interlake that
might impose vicarious liability on Bomar’s employer.
Had the Estate been in possession of such knowledge,
certainly no settlement would have been entered into for
Bomar’s limits, nor would the lawsuit have been filed
solely against Bomar. As noted, [sic] above, it was only
after the Estate subsequently learned that Bomar was
acting within the scope and the course of his employment
with Interlake that the Estate sought to amend the
complaint to seek vicarious liability against Interlake.
The Estate’s Brief at 4 and 7. The Estate maintains that no “settlement” occurred
because there was no writing evidencing same and that even if a settlement did
occur under Coots, the Estate never intended to release Bomar’s employer,
Interlake. In support thereof, the Estate points out that it was unaware that Bomar
was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident when it
accepted Bomar’s policy liability limit of $50,000. Thus, the Estate argues that
summary judgment was improper.
-4-
Summary judgment is proper where there exist no material issue of
fact and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure 56; Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d
476 (Ky. 1991). For the reasons hereinafter elucidated, we believe the circuit court
properly entered summary judgment dismissing the Estate’s negligence claims
against Bomar and Interlake.
In Coots, 853 S.W.2d 895, the Supreme Court established a
mechanism where an injured party could settle for the tortfeasor’s liability policy
limit and still maintain a claim for UIM coverage against his motor vehicle
insurance carrier. Thereunder, the injured party, tortfeasor, and tortfeasor’s
liability insurance carrier may agree to settle in exchange for the tortfeasor’s policy
liability limit. In such a case, the injured party must give notice to his UIM carrier,
and the UIM carrier may then substitute payment by paying the injured party the
tortfeasor’s liability policy limit amount. If the UIM carrier substitutes payment,
the UIM carrier protects its subrogation right. If, however, the UIM carrier elects
not to substitute payment and the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier pays the
policy limit to the injured party, the UIM carrier forfeits its subrogation rights.
Under either scenario, the tortfeasor is released from any further liability to the
injured party. True, 99 S.W.3d 439.
In the case sub judice, the Estate admits that it “entered an agreement
with Greene’s insurer, Safeco, that allowed Safeco to advance Bomar’s liability
limits and protect its subrogation rights pursuant to the guideline of Coots v.
-5-
Allstate.” Under Coots, 853 S.W.2d 895 and True, 99 S.W.3d 439, it is clear that a
tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier’s offer to tender policy liability limits to an
injured party is conditioned upon release of the tortfeasor from additional liability,
and the injured party’s acceptance operates as a release of the tortfeasor from
additional liability:
We hold, therefore, that, under Coots, a tortfeasor's
liability carrier's settlement offer is conditioned upon a
release of its insured from any further liability to the
injured party, and the injured party's acceptance of the
UIM insurer's payment of the contemplated settlement is
an acceptance of that condition and a release of the
tortfeasor from any further liability to the injured party.
The injured party's UIM insurer, however, preserves its
subrogation claim against the tortfeasor for any amount
that it is thereafter required to pay its insured under its
UIM coverage.
True, 99 S.W.3d at 448.
Accordingly, we hold that State Farm’s offer to tender the liability
policy limit of $50,000 to the Estate was conditioned upon release of Bomar from
additional liability and the Estate’s acceptance of the substituted payment by
Safeco operated as an acceptance of the condition and a release of Bomar from
additional liability. As the Estate’s claim in the amended complaint against
Interlake rested upon vicarious liability, these claims were, a fortiori, released by
the Estate’s acceptance of the policy liability limit of $50,000. See Copeland v.
Humana, 769 S.W.2d 67 (Ky.App. 1989). In sum, we are of the opinion that the
circuit court properly entered summary judgment.
-6-
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
E. Patrick Moores
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE GARY E.
BOMAR:
Paul C. Gaines, III
Stewart C. Burch
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
INTERLAKE
MATERIAL HANDLING, INC.:
Lee E. Sitlinger
Louisville, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.