COLLINS (RAY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 30, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000903-MR
RAY COLLINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00007
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; STUMBO, JUDGE; KNOPF,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE: On June 7, 2003, Ray Collins shot a 9mm pistol into a
car window striking one of the occupants, Michelle Porter. In February 2004, a
Floyd County grand jury returned an indictment charging Collins with one count of
first-degree assault and two counts of first-degree wanton endangerment. The next
year, in April of 2005, Collins withdrew his former plea of not guilty and entered a
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110 (5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
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plea of guilty to an amended count of first-degree assault under extreme emotional
disturbance and two counts of first-degree wanton endangerment. In exchange for
his plea of guilty, Collins received a sentence of eleven years imprisonment.
In January 2006, Collins filed a pro se motion under RCr 11.42 for
relief from the judgment. The circuit court granted his motion for appointment of
counsel, but no supplemental brief appears in the record.2 In March 2007, Collins
filed a pro se CR 60.02 motion asking the trial court to vacate his conviction. On
March 26, 2007, the trial court denied the requested relief but neglected to specify
which motion was denied. On May 1, 2007, Collins filed to a notice of appeal
from the circuit court’s order denying his CR 60.02 motion. However, Collins
does not address the issues raised in CR 60.02 motion. He only addresses the
issues presented in his RCr 11.42 motion.
The Commonwealth contends that the decision of the circuit court
must be affirmed because Collins failed to provide notice of his RCr 11.42 appeal,
as required by CR 73.03. We disagree. Although Collins must comply with the
rules and procedures governing the appellant process as set forth in the Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in Cleaver v. Commonwealth, 569
S.W. 2d 166 (Ky. 1978), held that RCr 11.42 requires substantial compliance in
order to confer jurisdiction on the appellate courts. Id. at 169.
Although Collins’s notice of appeal only states that he is appealing
from the denial of his CR 60.02 motion, we conclude that his notice was sufficient
Apparently, the clerk neglected to file Collins’ original RCr 11.42 motion in the record.
However, a copy of the motion is included in an envelope attached to the record.
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to preserve the issues raised in his RCr 11.42 motion because both motions were
denied by the same court order. Because Collins correctly identified the specific
court order that was challenged, we find that he substantially complied with the
procedural requirements of RCr 11.42.
We now examine Collins’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Although Collins pled guilty to an amended count of assault under extreme
emotional disturbance and two counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, he
only contests his counsel’s representation on the wanton endangerment conviction.
Collins appears to argue that his counsel was deficient in two ways: (1) his counsel
failed to investigate the potential defense of voluntary intoxication; and (2) there is
insufficient evidence to show first-degree wanton endangerment.
The Commonwealth contends that Collins waived his right to appeal
these issues when he pled guilty to the charges. By pleading guilty, however,
Collins only waived the right to appeal issues that should have been raised in the
original proceeding, Thacker v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1972), such
as the sufficiency of the evidence. Collins did not waive his right to appeal the
sufficiency of his representation.
“A guilty plea is valid only when it is entered intelligently and
voluntarily.” Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W. 3d 482, 486 (Ky. 2001). Because a
guilty plea taken with ineffective counsel may not meet that standard, “a guilty
plea is open to attack on the ground that counsel did not provide the defendant with
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reasonably competent advice”. Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 8, 10
(Ky. 2002).
Defense counsel’s performance is presumed competent unless the
petitioner proves that counsel was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the
defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). With respect to a
guilty plea, the movant must also show that the deficient performance was so
serious that, but for the counsel’s ineffective representation, there is a reasonable
probability that the defendant would not have pled guilty. Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Collins first argues that his counsel erred by failing to fully investigate
and present the defense of intoxication. Collins was entitled to competent
representation, including reasonable investigation of all potential defenses.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691. “In any ineffectiveness case, a
particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness
in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s
judgments.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691. Unless Collins shows
that his defense counsel “made errors so serious that counsel’s performance fell
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance,” it will be deemed
competent. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691.
Collins claims that the intoxication evidence would have been a
mitigating factor, warranting the charge of second-degree wanton endangerment, a
misdemeanor. Voluntary intoxication can be a defense and mitigating factor to
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charges that include culpable intent as an element, Commentary to KRS 501.080.
However, the defendant must prove that “he was so drunk that he did not know
what he was doing.” Stanford v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W. 2d 112, 118 (Ky.
1990). If Collins was charged with a crime that required intent, the defense of
voluntary intoxication should have been investigated to determine the level of
Collins’s intoxication. Wanton endangerment, however, is not an intentional
crime.
To prove first-degree wanton endangerment, the Commonwealth must
show that the defendant, manifesting extreme indifference to human life, engaged
in conduct which created a substantial danger of death and/or serious physical
injury to another. KRS 508.060. Voluntary intoxication does not negate the
requisite mental state required by KRS 508.060.
“A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by
reason of voluntary intoxication also acts wantonly with respect thereto.” Slaven
v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W. 2d 845, 857 (Ky. 1997). Strategically ignoring the
alleged intoxication would be not only reasonable, but prudent because the
evidence of intoxication could have been used against Collins to prove the wanton
element.
Consequently, Collins failed to prove that his counsel’s performance
was deficient, failing the cornerstone element of the Strickland test. Therefore, we
affirm the circuit’s order denying his RCr 11.42 motion based on ineffective
assistance of counsel.
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Collins also makes several arguments contesting the sufficiency of the
evidence. As previously mentioned, RCr 11.42 motion is not the proper method to
appeal the merits of the case or issues that should have been presented to the trial
court. Thacker v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1972).
In conclusion, although we find that Mr. Collins substantially
complied with the rules and procedures required in a criminal appeal, Mr. Collins
failed to show deficient performance by his counsel that prejudiced his case.
Therefore, we affirm the order of the Floyd Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ray Collins, pro se
Sandy Hook, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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