HATTON (ROBERT) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 18, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000826-MR
ROBERT HATTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BATH CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BETH LEWIS MAZE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00043
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: DIXON, LAMBERT, AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
DIXON, JUDGE: Robert Hatton appeals pro se from an order of the Bath Circuit
Court denying his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to CR 60.02. Finding
no error, we affirm.
Appellant was convicted in the Bath Circuit Court of second-degree
manslaughter and four counts of first-degree wanton endangerment. He was
sentenced to twenty years imprisonment and fined $1,000. The Kentucky Supreme
Court affirmed the convictions and sentence. Hatton v. Commonwealth, 20030722-MR (August 26, 2004). The appellate record herein only consists of one
transcript of pleadings filed in Appellant’s post-conviction challenge. However,
the facts underlying Appellant’s convictions were set out by the Supreme Court in
its unpublished opinion:
Appellant's convictions stem from a vehicular
accident involving Appellant and another vehicle. The
individual driving the other vehicle was killed, and the
passengers were injured. Evidence presented at trial
established two very different versions of events leading
up to the crash. Appellant stated that during the early
evening hours of October 6, 2002, he returned home with
his nine-year-old daughter, Jessica. Appellant stated that
they had intended to pick up his wife, Laura, and go out
for a family dinner. As Jessica exited Appellant's van, he
noticed that the door of his jeep, which was also parked
in the driveway, was open. Appellant then saw a man
duck down, run around the side of the jeep, get in it and
speed away. Appellant claimed that he thought Jessica
had been abducted and he yelled to his wife, whom he
believed was in their house, to call 911. Appellant got
back into his van and sped off in pursuit of the jeep. He
stated that when he caught up to the jeep at a curve in the
road, the driver hit the brakes, causing Appellant to run
into the back of it. After crossing over a bridge, both
drivers lost control of the vehicles. Appellant testified
that he realized he was not going to make the curve in the
road, locked his brakes, and his van hit an embankment
and pine tree. The jeep went over the embankment.
The Commonwealth, on the other hand, presented
evidence that on the day of the accident, Laura had
sought an EPO against Appellant due to repeated
physical abuse. Laura was waiting for Appellant to
return home so she could get Jessica and leave the
premises before he learned of the EPO. Laura testified
that when Appellant drove in the driveway, she exited the
house, followed by her sister, Christine, as well as
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friends, Patty and Joe Wills. Laura met Jessica in the
driveway and led her to the jeep. Laura stated that once
everyone was in the jeep, Joe drove away at a normal rate
of speed. The surviving passengers testified that they all
knew Appellant, and that, contrary to Appellant's story,
he clearly saw them exit the house and get into the jeep.
Laura further testified that shortly after they drove
away, Appellant's van appeared behind them and
repeatedly began rear-ending the jeep. Laura stated that
Patty Wills was able to call 911 from her cell phone to
report that Appellant was trying to kill them. The jeep
was then forced off the road and over the embankment.
Joe Wills died at the scene from injuries he sustained
during the accident. The Commonwealth presented
further evidence that immediately after the accident, a
test revealed that Appellant's blood-alcohol level was .19
percent.
On October 18, 2002, the Bath County Grand Jury
indicted Appellant for one count of murder, four counts
of first-degree wanton endangerment, and one count of
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence. The
case proceeded to trial in July 2003. The jury found
Appellant guilty of second-degree manslaughter and four
counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, and
recommended a total of thirty years imprisonment.
Pursuant to KRS 532.110(1)(c), the trial court reduced
the recommended sentence to the maximum aggregate of
twenty years, and fined Appellant $1,000.
Id.
Following his direct appeal, Appellant filed a motion for RCr 11.42
relief that was denied by the trial court. A panel of this Court affirmed the trial
court in an unpublished opinion. Hatton v. Commonwealth, 2006-CA-002134
(January 25, 2008).
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In the instant appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his CR 60.02 motion without an evidentiary hearing and ruling that his
motion failed to allege any newly discovered evidence. Appellant further raises
claims of judicial bias and sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions.
On appeal, we review the denial of a CR 60.02 motion for an abuse of
discretion. “Civil Rule 60.02 is not intended merely as an additional opportunity
to relitigate the same issues which could ‘reasonably have been presented’ by
direct appeal or RCr 11.42 proceedings.” McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d
415, 416 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1130 (1997) (quoting RCr 11.42(3)).
Likewise, CR 60.02 “is not a separate avenue of appeal to be pursued in addition to
other remedies, but is available only to raise issues which cannot be raised in other
proceedings.” Id.
Before a movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, “he must
affirmatively allege facts which, if true, justify vacating the judgment and further
allege special circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.” Gross v. Commonwealth,
648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983). In Land v. Commonwealth, 986 S.W.2d 440,
442 (Ky. 1999), our Supreme Court held that, “[t]he decision to hold an
evidentiary hearing is within the trial court’s discretion and we will not disturb
such absent an abuse of that discretion.”
Appellant claims that he presented newly discovered evidence
indicating that false or perjured testimony was used against him at trial and that the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct by allowing such perjury. Specifically,
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Appellant focuses on the fact that a detective testified that at the time of the
incident, Appellant was driving a blue van, when in fact the vehicle was actually a
gray over silver colored van. He also alleges that police falsified the incident
report, as well as the evidence sent to the Kentucky State Police Crime Lab. We
find such claims to be entirely without merit.
None of Appellant’s allegations constitute newly discovered evidence
as all of the evidence he relies upon was available prior to trial and certainly at the
time of his direct appeal. Further, as the trial court held:
Pursuant to Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 991 S.W.2d
651 (Ky. 1999), to allege prosecutorial misconduct for
failure to correct perjured testimony at trial, the
Defendant must show: (1) the statement was actually
false; (2) the statement was material; and (3) the
prosecution knew it was false. Further, in order to be
entitled to relief the Defendant has the burden of showing
within a reasonable certainty that perjured testimony was
in fact introduced against him at trial. The Defendant’s
motion contains only statements by him without an
independent verification and such has failed to show
within a reasonable certainty that any perjured testimony
was in fact used against him at trial.
We would note that Spaulding, supra, further requires a defendant to
show that “the conviction probably would not have resulted had the truth been
known before he can be entitled to such relief.” Id. at 657. Appellant clearly
cannot meet his heavy burden. We find it immaterial that the detective may have
misidentified the type of van Appellant was driving since it is uncontroverted that
he was operating the van that pursued the vehicle driven by the victim, and that the
two vehicles came into contact with each other. Quite simply, the evidence against
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Appellant was overwhelming. Appellant has not produced any proof, other than
his own statements, demonstrating that perjury occurred and, if so, that it affected
the outcome of his trial. Thus, we conclude that the trial court properly denied CR
60.02 relief.
Nor do we find any merit in Appellant’s allegation of judicial bias.
On March 27, 2007, Appellant filed with our Supreme Court a request/affidavit for
the disqualification of the trial judge. The Court, on the same day, issued an order
finding that “the scurrilous allegations against Judge Maze are not credible, and the
affidavit is insufficient to demonstrate any disqualifying circumstance . . . .” As
this issue has been considered and resolved, we need not address it herein.
Finally, Appellant again attempts to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence presented against him at trial. As previously noted, CR 60.02 may not be
used to relitigate issues which were or could have been raised on direct appeal.
McQueen, supra. It is apparent from the Kentucky Supreme Court’s opinion that
the evidence supported Appellant’s conviction and sentence.
The order of the Bath Circuit Court denying CR 60.02 relief is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert Hatton, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Wm. Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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