DUTY (DANNY R.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 25, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: SEPTEMBER 12, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000708-MR
DANNY R. DUTY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEFFREY T. BURDETTE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 06-CR-00149 & 07-CR-00031
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM,1 SPECIAL
JUDGE.
ROSENBLUM, SPECIAL JUDGE: Danny R. Duty appeals the March 28, 2007,
final judgment of the Pulaski Circuit Court, sentencing him to ten (10) years
Retired Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
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imprisonment for theft by unlawful taking over $300.00 and persistent felony
offender, second degree. We affirm.
On May 24, 2006, Duty was indicted by a Pulaski County grand jury
on one (1) count of burglary in the second degree and one (1) count of theft by
unlawful taking over $300. The indictment was based on allegations that on
March 28, 2006, Duty had stolen jewelry from the home of Imogene Hacker. After
a jury trial, Duty was found guilty of one (1) count of theft by unlawful taking over
$300 and being a persistent felony offender in the second-degree. He was then
sentenced to a total of ten (10) years imprisonment by the court’s final judgment
on trial verdict, entered March 28, 2007. This appeal followed. On appeal, Duty
argues improper introduction of KRE2 404(b) evidence, prosecutorial misconduct,
and improper jury instruction.
The first argument Duty makes is that the trial court erred by allowing
the introduction of certain KRE 404(b) evidence. In support of its case against
Duty, the Commonwealth sought to call Janet Mosley to testify “after the incident
charged, [Duty] entered her home and made statements to her that he intended to
take her property.” Duty objected to the testimony and moved to have the
testimony excluded. His motion was denied. KRE 404(b) reads as follows:
[o]ther crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible:
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Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
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(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident; or
(2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence
essential to the case that separation of the two (2) could
not be accomplished without serious adverse effect on
the offering party.
Typically, abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review of a
trial court’s decision regarding the admissibility of evidence. See, e.g., Partin v.
Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky.1996). The Kentucky Supreme Court
has set out a three-part test for determining the admissibility of KRE 404(b). Bell
v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1994). That test requires the trial court to
examine the relevance of the evidence, its probative value, and the prejudice that it
may create against the defendant. Id. at 889-91.
The relevancy inquiry relates to whether the
evidence is admissible for a “proper purpose” under KRE
404(b)(1), i.e., some purpose other than to prove bad
character or propensity. This is a mixed issue of fact and
law. Whether the purpose for which the evidence is
offered is a “proper purpose” is a question of law that is
reviewed de novo. If the evidence falls within one of the
“other purpose” exceptions expressly listed in KRE
404(b)(1), i.e., motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or the absence of mistake or
accident, the resolution is obvious. However, the listed
“other purpose” exceptions are illustrative, not
exhaustive. For example, . . . evidence strongly
suggesting that the defendant had suborned perjury was
admissible as evidence tending to prove “consciousness
of guilt.” And . . . evidence of the defendant's voluntary
participation in a three-person sexual encounter was
relevant to rebut her claim that her husband had forced
her to engage in such acts. Whether the evidence tends
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to prove a valid “other purpose” is a question of fact
reviewed for “clear error.”
Having determined that the other act actually occurred
and that evidence of that act is admissible for a proper
purpose, the trial court must then make a KRE 403
determination of whether the probative value of the
evidence of the other act is substantially outweighed by
its prejudicial effect. The resolution of that issue, which
is essentially a balancing process, is reviewed for abuse
of discretion.
Matthews, supra, at 33-34 (internal citations omitted).
During the trial, and after Mosley’s testimony, the trial court gave the
following limiting admonition to the jury:
[l]adies and gentlemen, you’ve heard some evidence that
I’ve been dealing with through the testimony of this
witness. I’ve decided that the evidence has relevance to
another act that I don’t want to go to showing the
propensity to do the act that . . . the defendant is being
charged with.
In other words, I do not want you to consider this
evidence for any other purpose, except insofar as it
shows an absence of mistake or a general course of
conduct on this defendant’s part. Do you understand
what I’m trying to tell you? The evidence that’s been
presented by this witness should not be used by you or
considered by you in determining that . . . he had the
propensity to do the act that he’s being charged with. It’s
only to be used to show that there was no mistake or that
it was . . . a continuing conduct on that evening.
Everyone with me on that?
(Emphasis added).
We are satisfied, after reviewing this admonition, that the evidence
was offered for a valid purpose. Furthermore, we fail to find clear error in the trial
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court’s determination that the purpose for which it was offered was other than
those prohibited by KRE 404(b). The trial court clearly stated in its admonition
that it was to be considered on as evidence of an absence of mistake or modus
operandi. As stated above, the list of proper purposes, as determined by KRS
404(b), is not exhaustive. Lastly, we do not believe the trial court abused its
discretion when, in allowing the evidence with the admonition, it determined that
the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.
A jury is presumed to follow an admonition to disregard
evidence and the admonition thus cures any error. . . .
There are only two circumstances in which the
presumptive efficacy of an admonition falters: (1) when
there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be
unable to follow the court's admonition and there is a
strong likelihood that the effect of the inadmissible
evidence would be devastating to the defendant; or (2)
when the question was asked without a factual basis and
was ‘inflammatory’ or ‘highly prejudicial.’
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430,441 (Ky. 2003) (internal citation
omitted). Duty has failed to show that either of these circumstances existed in the
case sub judice and therefore, we must assume that the jury followed the
admonition that was given to them.
Duty further argues that Mosley’s testimony should have been
excluded because, contrary to KRE 404(c), the three day notice was not
reasonable. We do not agree. Duty admits that he objected to the introduction of
Mosley’s testimony through a motion that was heard in limine and overruled.
The intent of KRE 404(c) is to provide the accused with
an opportunity to challenge the admissibility of this
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evidence through a motion in limine and to deal with
reliability and prejudice problems at trial. Obviously, no
prejudice occurred, because Appellant had actual notice
and did raise the 404(b) issue in his in limine motion.
Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293,300 (Ky. 1997) (internal citations
omitted).
Duty next argues that prosecutorial misconduct resulted in reversible
error. Specifically, Duty claims that the prosecutor told the jury that this was not
Duty’s “first rodeo;” repeatedly and aggressively approached Duty during closing
arguments; made improper statements of personal opinion regarding Duty’s
credibility; told the jury that defense counsel was interrupting him; and referred to
his own military record during closing arguments. By admission of Duty, this
issue is not preserved. Therefore, we will review this issue under the palpable
error standard of RCr3 10.26, which states:
[a] palpable error which affects the substantial
rights of a party may be considered by the court on
motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on appeal,
even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review,
and appropriate relief may be granted upon a
determination that manifest injustice has resulted from
the error.
The trial court admonished the jury after the prosecutor’s comment
that this was not Duty’s “first rodeo.” The trial court stated: “the reference to this
not being (Duty’s) first rodeo is irrelevant and should not be considered.” Again,
we note that “a jury is presumed to follow an admonition to disregard evidence and
the admonition thus cures any error.” Johnson, supra, at 441. Duty has failed to
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Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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show us a reason to believe otherwise. Accordingly, we fail to hold that the court’s
admonition was palpable error resulting in manifest injustice.
Duty fails to include any citation to the record in support of his
argument that the prosecutor made improper statements of personal opinion and
improper comments regarding his military record. CR 76.12(4)(c)(v).
Consequently, we view this argument to be without merit and therefore will not
address it. Lastly, Duty’s contentions that the Commonwealth’s attorney
repeatedly approached Duty in an aggressive manner, and reported to the jury that
defense counsel kept interrupting him, do not constitute palpable error.
Duty’s final argument is that the trial court erred by failing to instruct
the jury on criminal trespass first-degree, a lesser included offense to burglary
second-degree. “Alleged errors regarding jury instructions are considered
questions of law that we examine under a de novo standard of review.” Hamilton
v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 272, 275 (Ky.App. 2006) (citation
omitted). The trial court judge is generally required to instruct the jury on any and
all offenses that can be supported by the evidence. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 355, 360 (Ky.1999). However, instruction on lesserincluded offenses is not required when there is no evidentiary foundation for the
instruction. Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1988). Rather,
lesser-included offense instruction must be given “only if, considering the totality
of the evidence, the jury might have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt
of the greater offense, and yet believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty
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of the lesser offense.” Id. Here, Duty was acquitted of his burglary charge
altogether, making such an argument moot.
For the foregoing reasons the March 28, 2007, judgment of the
Pulaski Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Erin Hoffman Yang
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Joshua D. Farley
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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