DUNCAN (ALLEN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 5, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000675-MR
ALLEN DUNCAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CLARK CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. JENNINGS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00174
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2007-CA-000784-MR
SAUNDRA STEPHENS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CLARK CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. JENNINGS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00174 AND 06-CR-00174-0
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND CAPERTON, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM,1 SPECIAL
JUDGE.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: Co-defendants Allen Duncan, Jr. (Duncan) and Saundra
Stephens (Stephens) bring this appeal from a March 17, 2007, judgment of the
Clark Circuit Court, whereby Duncan and Stephens entered a conditional plea of
guilty after their motions to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of an alleged
illegal stop were overruled. After a thorough review, we vacate and remand to the
trial court for specific findings consistent with this opinion.
The trial court held a suppression hearing in conformity with RCr
9.78. At the hearing, the arresting officer testified that he was on patrol on
September 13, 2006, when he noticed a white Thunderbird in front of him at a stop
sign. The in-cruiser video captured the entire arrest. The officer testified that the
occupants were “all over the vehicle” so he decided to follow the car.2 After the
vehicle merged onto I-64 the officer pulled up beside the vehicle and observed
Stephens “slumped over” against the passenger door frame. The vehicle merged
left I-64 and merged onto the Mountain Parkway. After speaking with his
1
Retired Judge Paul W. Rosenblum, sitting as Special Judge by Assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110 (5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
2
We note that the officer did not testify that the occupants’ movement in the vehicle created a
traffic hazard, i.e. occupants changing seating positions in a moving vehicle.
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supervisor,3 the officer made a u-turn on I-64 and found the vehicle on the
Mountain Parkway. The officer then stopped the vehicle.
The officer approached and asked the driver, Duncan, for his license.
The officer, through investigation, discovered Duncan was driving on a suspended
operators license and placed Duncan in the cruiser. The officer then asked
Stephens to exit the vehicle. Upon exiting the vehicle, Stephens appeared to be
intoxicated. The officer testified that at that moment he considered Stephens under
arrest for public intoxication but he feared for his safety, as he was outnumbered
three to one, and waited until a cruiser with a cage arrived before informing
Stephens of her arrest. The officer searched the vehicle and found nothing. In the
next fifty minutes the officer repeatedly asked Stephens to hand over the drugs,
threatened her with arrest, and even told her that he had “four troopers on the way
with a dog, and when they get here, they are going to give you a good enema.”4 At
that point Stephens confessed to the officer that she had oxycontin in her pants.
Afterwards, she was Mirandized.
At the hearing, the trial court stated that he would pass the motions to
suppress until he reviewed the video footage from the cruiser.5 The court later
overruled the motions, finding that the officer had probable cause to make the stop
3
The officer’s statement to the supervisor was “I got behind a vehicle from Illinois, a white
Thunderbird. It’s a nice one, with two black guys in it and there’s a girl slumped over in the
passenger seat....there’s a white girl slumped over in the passenger seat, I just don’t like it. I
think they’re running drugs.”
4
5
Cruiser video 3:30:35; Trial video record 3/13/06 at 2:00:22.
Video record 1/25/07 at 10:09.
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and that the evidence was obtained as a search incident to arrest. The trial court
stated it would make specific factual findings at a later date. Duncan and Stephens
appeal this ruling.
An appellate court reviews a trial court's suppression ruling using a
two part evaluation: the factual findings of the trial court are reviewed pursuant to
the “clearly erroneous” standard, while the trial court's application of the law to the
facts is subject to a de novo review. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691,
116 S.Ct. 1657, 1659, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d
920, 923 (Ky.App.2002); and Bishop v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 567, 568-9
(Ky.App.2007). The determination that a stop was supported by reasonable
articulable suspicion is reviewed de novo. Ornelas at 699. To make such a
determination, this court must look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding
Stephens's detention. U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 (1981).
Our review of the record reveals that the officer never articulated any
violation of law to provide grounds to stop the vehicle. The officer did state that
there was a lot of movement in the vehicle and that he feared for Stephen’s safety
because she appeared to be “passed out.” While perhaps a close call by the trial
court, based on the arguments of counsel we must conclude that the reasons
articulated by the officer to stop the vehicle fail to supply the requisite reasonable
articulable suspicion of criminal activity required by Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).
4
The Commonwealth argues that the stop was legal based on the
community caretaking function articulated in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,
441, 93. S.Ct. 2523 (1973). Our court addressed the applicability of the
community caretaking function in Poe v. Commonwealth, 169 S.W.3d 54
(Ky.App.2005). In Poe the officer pulled over a motorist who appeared to be lost.
When questioned by the officer, Poe admitted to having recently smoked
marijuana. In assessing whether the community caretaking function should apply,
our Court stated:
All courts that have considered the community caretaking
function have required, at a minimum, that the officer's
actions must be measured by a standard of
reasonableness. One court described this determination as
“balancing the public need and interest furthered by the
police conduct against the degree and nature of the
intrusion upon the privacy of the citizen.” State v.
Ellenbecker, 159 Wis.2d 91, 96, 464 N.W.2d 427, 429
(Wis.App.1990).... As others have noted, for the
community caretaking function to apply there must be
some specific and articulable facts that would lead the
officer to reasonably believe the citizen is in need of
assistance. Quoting State v. Jestice, 861 A.2d 1060, 1064
(Vt. 2004).
Poe at 58. The court in Poe noted that if Poe had requested assistance the entire
issue would be moot. Like Poe, the reasons articulated by the officer in the case
sub judice do not satisfy the stringent standards required by the community
caretaking function exception. We note that it is not unusual for vehicles to have a
sleeping passenger. Absent some indication of distress from the passenger,
allowing the officer to stop a vehicle with a sleeping passenger is questionably an
infringement upon our Constitutional rights. Therefore, a stop of a vehicle based
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solely upon observing a sleeping passenger would not fall within the community
caretaking function exception. For the stop of the vehicle to have been proper, the
officer must have had specific and reasonable facts leading to a reasonable belief
that a citizen is in need of assistance. See Poe.
While the officer noticed a lot of “suspicious” movement in the car,
this may not be enough to support the stop. The United States Supreme Court did
recognize in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676 (2000),
that “nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable
suspicion.” The cases cited us clearly focus on the evasive nature of a suspect's
behavior and not just their nervous demeanor. See U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 885, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2582, (1975) (stating that “obvious attempts to evade
officers can support a reasonable suspicion”); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6,
105 S.Ct. 308, 311, (1984) (noting that the suspect's “strange movements in his
attempt to evade the officers aroused further justifiable suspicion”); U.S. v.
Sokolow, 490 U .S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, (1989) (stating that “taking an
evasive path through an airport” may be “highly probative” of criminal activity).
The trial court stated it would issue specific findings in overruling the
motions to suppress; the record before us lacks the trial courts intended specific
findings of fact. See Hebert v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 798 (Ky.App. 1978);
Lee v. Commonwealth, 547 S.W.2d 792 (Ky.App. 1977).
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Therefore, we vacate the opinion of the trial court and remand to the
trial court for entry of findings of fact in support of its decision to overrule the
motions to suppress.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Russell J. Baldani
Lexington, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
William D. Elkins
Winchester, Kentucky
Jason B. Moore
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
7
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