LEY (KATHLEEN) VS. LEY (BRUCE)
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RENDERED: JULY 11, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000662-MR
AND
NO.2007-CA-000709-MR
KATHLEEN LEY
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN M. GEORGE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-502812
BRUCE MORTON LEY
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE: Kathleen Ley and Bruce Morton Ley each appeal the
February 9, 2007, findings of fact and conclusions of law, disposing of their
property and debts in their dissolution of marriage action. We affirm.
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
21.580.
The parties were married on March 3, 1979. On August 3, 2005,
Kathleen filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the Family Division of
Jefferson Circuit Court. There were three children born of the marriage, all of
whom had been emancipated at the time the petition was filed. Although the
parties were residing in the same residence, they both testified that they had been
separated since 1995.
Prior to the marriage, on June 27, 1978, Bruce was granted the option
to purchase 300 shares of Wendy’s stock at $32.38 per share. The option was later
cancelled and subsequently reissued at a much lower price. On May 5, 1981,
Bruce exercised his option and purchased 450 shares of Wendy’s stock at $6.00
per share. The purchase was admittedly made with marital funds. The fair market
value of the stock at the time of purchase was $17.19 per share.
The primary debt to be divided between the parties was for federal
income taxes for the tax years of 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. The total amount
owed to the IRS was approximately $200,000, plus penalties and interest. The tax
returns were prepared by Bruce and signed by both of the parties. Bruce filed the
state tax returns under the state amnesty program but failed to file the federal
returns. Kathleen testified that she had failed to review the tax returns when given
the opportunity and that she was unaware the federal returns had not been filed
until the dissolution action was filed. Upon discovering this information, Kathleen
filed for those years as married filing separately, taking the standard deduction and
claiming all three children as dependency exemptions.
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On February 9, 2007, the trial court entered its findings of fact and
conclusions of law. In its judgment, the trial court found that the stock option was
non-marital as it was in the form of compensation for Bruce’s service to Wendy’s
prior to the marriage. The trial court then calculated the value as the fair market
value of the shares at the time of purchase, less the option price. Accordingly,
$5,035.50 of the stock was restored to Bruce as non-marital. The remainder of the
stock was ordered to be divided equally between the parties.
The trial court also found that the federal income taxes were a marital
debt. In so concluding, the court further ruled that the tax debt would be divided
equally between the parties, but that Bruce would be solely responsible for all of
the penalties and interest owed on the taxes. The trial court gave the parties the
option to file separately or jointly and ordered that if the tax liability was not paid
from other sources, that it was to be paid from the proceeds of the marital home.
The trial court also divided the marital debt amongst the parties in a manner that
will be further discussed later in this opinion. These appeals followed.
On appeal, Kathleen argues that the trial court erred in its allocation of
the tax obligation and abused its discretion in its allocation of the parties’ debt.
Bruce argues that the trial court abused its discretion in calculating his non-marital
interest in Wendy’s stock; in assigning the tax interest and penalties to him; and in
its assignment of assets and debts.
The Parties’ Tax Obligation
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Both parties take issue with the trial court’s division of the parties’ tax
obligation. Kathleen argues that Bruce should be required to pay all of the
principal as well as the interest and penalties. Bruce argues that Kathleen should
be made to share the interest and penalty payments due and owing to the IRS.
The division of marital property is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and will not be disturbed unless we find an abuse of discretion.
Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513 (Ky. 2001). Preferably
[i]n dividing marital property, including debts,
appurtenant to a divorce, the trial court is guided by
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 403.190(1), which
requires that division be accomplished in “just
proportions.” This does not mean, however, that property
must be divided equally. . . . It means only that division
should be accomplished without regard to marital
misconduct and in “just proportions” considering all
relevant factors.
Lawson v. Lawson, 228 S.W.3d 18, 21 (Ky.App. 2007) (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted).
In support of its decision to divide the parties’ tax obligation as it did,
the trial court looked to the factors of Neidlinger, supra. The trial court stated:
[t]hese factors include: which party received the benefits;
extent of participation; whether the debt was incurred to
purchase marital property; whether the debt was
necessary to provide for the maintenance and support of
the family; and the economic circumstances of the parties
and their ability to assume the indebtedness. There was
no evidence presented at trial that the income earned by
[Bruce] was used for non-marital purposes. Although the
parties maintained separate bank accounts and were no
longer speaking, [Bruce] continued to pay the mortgage
and utilities on the parties’ residence and contributed to
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the children’s expenses. After considering these factors,
the Court finds the income taxes for the years 1998-2001
is a marital debt, the burden of which should be shared
equally by the parties. However, [Bruce] acknowledged
that he did not inform [Kathleen] that the returns were
not filed. [Bruce] had historically prepared and filed the
parties’ tax returns. [Bruce] prepared and [Kathleen]
signed the tax returns in 2002, but [Bruce] did not file
them. The Court finds that [Bruce] alone should be liable
for all penalties and interest owed.
(Citation omitted).
In support of her argument, Kathleen cites to Dobson v. Dobson, 159
S.W.3d 335 (Ky.App. 2005), in which the Court affirmed a decision apportioning
only 40% of the tax liability to the wife, who had failed to show that any funds had
been used for non-marital pursuits. The 40/60 split that was affirmed in Dobson is
not a standard to be followed in all cases, it was merely the division that was
appropriate for those parties. Such an outcome does not remove the trial court’s
discretion to divide the marital debt in a “just” manner, as set out in Neidlinger.
Kathleen argues that, contrary to the trial court’s finding, she did
present evidence that Bruce’s income was used for non-marital pursuits. She
supports this argument by subtracting Bruce’s known marital expenditures from
his annual deposits. It is clear that Bruce invested in several business ventures that
did not prove profitable. Although Kathleen claims that these were non-marital
expenditures, she fails to recognize that the parties were in fact still married at the
time of these disbursements. There is no doubt that had the ventures proven to be
more profitable, Kathleen would be claiming them as marital property that she was
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entitled to a portion thereof and that such a finding by the trial court would have
been appropriate. It is not the burden of Bruce to show that his earnings were
spent on marital pursuits. This is assumed by law. See KRS 403.190(3). Instead,
it is the burden of Kathleen to show that the earnings were spent on non-marital
pursuits. A simple mathematical calculation of Bruce’s deposits, minus a specific
amount of alleged martial expenses does not suffice.
Bruce argues that the trial court abused its discretion in assigning the
full responsibility of the tax debt interest and penalties to him. He asserts that
Kathleen’s claim of ignorance, as to the tax obligation, is disingenuous. Because
the discretion of the trial court in distributing such a debt is broad, Bruce has failed
to persuade us that an abuse of discretion has taken place. It is clear from its
findings, that the trial court took Kathleen’s act of signing the returns and failing to
review them into consideration. However, the trial court was also clear that it
considered the history of the parties, which revealed that Bruce had been primarily
responsible for the parties’ tax filings. We note also that the trial court determined
Bruce’s portion of the tax obligation to be more than twice that of Kathleen’s, and
yet she was ordered to pay half of the obligation. Accordingly, a review of the trial
court’s judgment does not reveal an abuse of discretion in regards to the
assignment of the tax debt and neither party has been successful in showing one.
Kathleen argues in the alternative that even if she is obligated to pay
half of the principal, the manner in which the trial court ordered it paid makes her
responsible for one-half of the interest and penalties as well. We disagree. It is up
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to each of the parties to pay their portion of the tax obligation and to appropriately
apportion the proceeds from the sale of the house according to their obligations as
set out by the trial court. If either party fails to do so, a remedy is available to the
other party at the trial court level. Kathleen is essentially asking this Court to
remedy a hypothetical situation which has not yet occurred and we will not do so.
The Allocation of the Parties’ Assets and Debts
Both parties claim trial court error in its allocation of the parties’
assets and debts. Bruce argues that the trial court erred in the allocating the
majority of the parties’ interest bearing debts to him and allowing Kathleen to
leave the marriage “virtually debt free.” Kathleen argues that Bruce should have
been assigned the entirety of the debt that she claims was expended on non-marital
expenses without any credit against the division of marital property. In support of
her argument, Kathleen asserts that the debt was acquired without her knowledge,
for purposes other than marital expenses and after the date of separation.
In its judgment, the trial court assigned the debts in each party’s name
to that party, stating “the [c]ourt finds that the parties used separate accounts
throughout their marriage and often were not aware of the debts incurred by the
other party.” As long as a couple continues to remain legally married the court
may consider their financial gains and losses as marital. See Stallings v. Stallings,
606 S.W.2d 163 (Ky. 1980). It is clear that the trial court took the parties’
separation into consideration but found that it did not alter the marital status of the
debts, assets and expenditures.
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We are persuaded by the trial court’s worksheet included with its
judgment. This worksheet clearly displays the allocation of the assets and
liabilities of the parties and evidences the great length the trial court went to in
order to create a fair and equal distribution of assets and debts. The trial court
awarded approximately $194,228 worth of marital assets to Kathleen and
approximately $337,009 worth of marital assets to Bruce. Additionally, the court
assigned approximately $1,298 of marital debt to Kathleen and approximately
$50,056 of marital debt to Bruce. This allocation of assets and debts left Kathleen
with net assets of approximately $192,930 and Bruce with net assets of
approximately $286, 952. The court then ordered an equalizing payment from
Bruce, to be paid to Kathleen, of $47,011, giving both of the parties net assets of
approximately $239,941. Therefore, while Kathleen was apportioned a smaller
amount of the debt, Bruce was apportioned a larger amount of the assets, offsetting
the debt that he was assigned. When assigning several joint debts to Bruce, the
trial court stated that it was doing so “in consideration of the division of the marital
assets.” Although the trial court is not required to divide the marital assets and
debts equally, it has chosen to do so here. Both parties have failed to show how
this division is unjust under the requirements of Neidlinger, supra. In conclusion,
we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its division of the parties’
assets and debts.
The Wendy’s Stock
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Bruce’s final argument is that the trial court abused its discretion in
calculating his non-marital interest in the Wendy’s stock. Specifically, Bruce
argues that the stock today is a derivative of the original stock earned by him prior
to the marriage. He maintains that he should be awarded interest on his nonmarital share of $5,035.50.
On appellate review of a trial court's ruling regarding the
classification of marital property, we review de novo
because the trial court's classification of property as
marital or non-marital is based on its application of KRS
403.190; thus, it is a question of law.
Heskett v. Heskett, 245 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Ky.App. 2008) (citing Holman v.
Holman, 84 S.W.3d 903, 905 (Ky.2002)).
In response to Bruce’s argument, Kathleen argues that the option
acquired prior to the marriage is non-marital property, but that the actual stock was
acquired after the marriage and by marital funds, and is therefore marital property.
We agree. The trial court correctly awarded Bruce his non-marital share of the
stock, which is the value of the option, at the time it was purchased. The stock
itself and any increase in the value of the stock, purchased during the marriage and
with marital funds, is marital in nature and therefore entitled to equitable division
by the trial court as such. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s division of the
Wendy’s stock is appropriate.
For the foregoing reasons, the February 9, 2007, judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court, is hereby affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Mary Janice Lintner
Lynch, Cox, Gilman & Mahan, P.S.C.
Louisville, Kentucky
Douglas S. Haynes
Fernandez Friedman Haynes & Kohn
PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
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