PENDLETON (BRYANT) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 18, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000612-MR
BRYANT PENDLETON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM TODD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00018
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, KELLER, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: On March 18, 1999, a Todd County grand jury returned an indictment
charging Bryant Pendleton (“Pendleton”) with two counts of first-degree sodomy,
Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 510.070. Thereafter, a jury found Pendleton guilty
of both charges, fixing the punishment at 25 years on each count. The trial court
ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total of 50 years’ imprisonment. On
appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed this conviction, but remanded the case to
the trial court for a new sex offender risk assessment hearing. Pendleton v.
Commonwealth, 83 S.W.3d 522 (Ky. 2002). In accord with the Supreme Court’s
mandate, the trial court conducted the hearing on April 30, 2003.
Thereafter, Pendleton filed a pro se motion to alter, amend or vacate his
conviction and sentence pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”)
11.42. He alleged that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
request a missing evidence instruction, by failing to request a redaction of a taped
interview with a social worker, by failing to object to the prosecution’s closing argument,
and by failing to perform his role as an effective advocate. Once appointed, counsel
from the Department of Public Advocacy’s Office filed a supplemental RCr 11.42 motion
on Pendleton’s behalf. Pursuant to an agreed order, the trial court set a status
conference to discuss the issues raised in Pendleton’s post-conviction motions and to
determine whether Pendleton was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. A status hearing
would allow post-conviction counsel the opportunity to detail what evidence would be
produced at a subsequent evidentiary hearing. Having considered the arguments made
at the status conference on October 26, 2006, and supporting memorandum, the trial
court denied Pendleton’s RCr 11.42 motions without an evidentiary hearing. This
appeal followed.
On appeal, as before the trial court during the status conference,
Pendleton asserts that his counsel’s assistance was deficient and that he was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
a movant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3311, 92 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1986). The standard for
assessing counsel’s performance is whether the alleged acts or omissions were outside
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the wide range of prevailing professional norms based on an objective standard of
reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
First, Pendleton argues that counsel failed to request that the jury be given
a missing evidence instruction. Pendleton asserts that at the time the alleged crimes
occurred he suffered from herpes. He further alleges the disease would have been in
the blister stage, making it too painful for him to have committed the sodomy charges
filed against him. Pendleton claims that the police failed to preserve evidence when
they refused to take photos of his penis at the time of his arrest. Had the photos been
taken, Pendleton claims they would have shown that his genital herpes was in the
scabbing stage. Because the police did not take pictures, Pendleton argues that trial
counsel should have requested the court give a missing evidence instruction telling the
jury about his herpes defense.
In Estep v. Commonwealth, 64 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Ky. 2002), the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that a due process violation occurs when “the failure to preserve or
collect the missing evidence was intentional and the potentially exculpatory nature of
the evidence was apparent at the time it was lost or destroyed.” Further, in Estep, the
Court ruled that absent some degree of bad faith, a defendant is not entitled to an
instruction that the jury may draw an adverse inference from the failure to preserve or
collect any evidence. Former Logan County sheriff’s deputy Travis Harris testified
Pendleton told him he wanted his penis photographed to demonstrate the current
effects of the herpes disease. Harris declined to do so. However, there is no evidence
of record that the Commonwealth acted in bad faith with regard to the photos. “[W]hen
a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve
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potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process.” Collins v.
Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Ky. 1997). As such, a missing evidence
instruction was not appropriate. Further, Pendleton testified in his own defense that at
the time of the crimes he was suffering from symptoms of genital herpes. Further, he
told the jury that the genital herpes had caused blisters on his penis which would have
made it too painful to engage in sex. Although the prosecution challenged how he
remembered he was suffering an outbreak at the time of the crimes, there was no
challenge to his assertion he had herpes. Further, the arresting deputy confirmed
Pendelton’s story that he was using his herpes condition as a defense.
Finally, had the photos been taken and actually shown that Pendleton had
scabs on his penis when he was arrested, that alone would not be conclusive evidence
that blisters were actually present at the time of the crimes, or that the blisters would
have prevented him from engaging in sexual sodomy. If anything, such evidence would
have been cumulative of Pendleton’s testimony to the jury. The failure to present
merely corroborative or cumulative evidence of a defense otherwise raised is far less
likely to render the verdict erroneous. Mills v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 310, 329
(Ky. 2005).
An evidentiary hearing is necessary only where the record does not
conclusively refute the allegations in the motion. See Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59
S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001). No medical evidence was presented at trial to support
Pendleton’s herpes allegations. In response to direct questioning by the trial court
during the status hearing, post-conviction counsel stated she still could not produce
medical evidence supporting the theory that Pendleton’s herpes would have precluded
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him from committing the crimes for which he was convicted. Rather, Pendleton told the
court that, while he did not have the proof currently at the hearing, he would seek expert
testimony and present it at a subsequent evidentiary hearing. However, “RCr 11.42
exists to provide the movant with an opportunity to air known grievances, not an
opportunity to conduct a fishing expedition for possible grievances, and post-conviction
discovery is not authorized under the rule.” Mills, 170 S.W.3d at 325 (footnotes
omitted). Here, Pendleton has failed to identify any expert witnesses whose testimony
would have been helpful to his defense, what information they may have regarding a
herpes outbreak, or what their testimony would have been. Nor could he say whether
his assertions could even be supported by expert testimony. In short, Pendleton has
failed to confirm the exculpatory nature of the evidence, even six years after he was
convicted. Thus, he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
Next, Pendleton argues his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel
failed to play the videotape of a social worker’s initial interview of the victim into
evidence at trial. Pendleton concedes that much of the contents of the tape would be
inadmissible but asserts that some parts of the videotape demonstrate that the victim
was unresponsive to the social worker during her interview and that most of her
answers were supplied by the social worker. But at the status hearing, Pendleton made
only this blanket assertion, and could not say specifically how any portion of the tape
might impeach the witness’s testimony at trial. Also, Pendleton could not be specific
with regard to any inconsistencies or contradictions in the testimony of the witness as it
appeared on the videotape versus her testimony at trial. In fact, Pendleton’s assertion
at the hearing was that the testimony on the tape and the testimony at trial were not
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substantially different but somehow the atmosphere or the nature of the questioning of
the social worker might have been a basis for impeachment. We find no merit in this
argument as Pendleton fails to state clearly and objectively what is so compelling about
the evidence that it would have made a difference in the outcome of the case. Further,
during a pre-trial hearing the morning of trial, Pendleton’s trial counsel marked the tape
as an exhibit for avowal testimony. Counsel asked the trial court to conduct an in
camera review of the investigative interview. He advised he did not wish the tape
played for the jury for fear they would be affected by hearing yet again the prosecuting
witness’s version of the alleged criminal conduct. Such a decision not to play the tape
is clearly trial strategy.
Additionally, Pendleton criticizes trial counsel for not impeaching the social
worker with the tape. When recalled to the stand, she could not remember a question
or answer as to whether or not the prosecuting witness said something white came from
Pendleton’s penis. For the reasons stated above, trial counsel again apparently
refrained from playing the tape to refresh the witness’s memory.
The burden is on the movant to overcome a strong presumption that
counsel’s assistance was constitutionally sufficient or that under the circumstances
counsel’s action might be considered “trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104
S.Ct. at 2065; Moore v. Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1998); Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1998). In this case, we agree with the trial court
that in light of the fact that the impeachment value of the tape may not have been
particularly strong, trial counsel may have been reluctant to play it at trial for fear that
the effect would simply be to tell the victim’s story to the jury a second time, thus,
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bolstering her testimony. A court must be highly deferential in reviewing defense
counsel’s performance and should avoid second-guessing counsel’s actions based on
hindsight. Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436 (Ky. 2001); Harper v.
Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1998). In assessing counsel’s performance, the
standard is whether the alleged acts or omissions were outside the wide range of
prevailing professional norms based on an objective standard of reasonableness.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; Commonwealth v. Tamme, 83
S.W.3d 465, 470 (Ky. 2002); Commonwealth v. Pelfrey, 998 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1999).
Under the circumstances, Pendleton has failed in his burden of overcoming the strong
presumption of effectiveness.
Next, Pendleton contends the trial court erred in denying his RCr 11.42
motions because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to put the Commonwealth’s
case to a proper adversarial test. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct.
2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984). Specifically, Pendleton complains that his trial counsel
(1) failed to point out to the jury that the prosecutor failed to deliver his promise during
his opening statement that the Commonwealth would “pinpoint a date” of the crimes;
and (2) failed to object when the prosecutor told the jury, during closing argument, that
the Commonwealth could have charged Pendleton with many more crimes. Finally,
Pendleton was arrested on April 21, 1998, three days after the last offense date. The
prosecuting witness testified the previous event occurred a few days prior to the last
date. Thus, Pendleton was required to defend against allegations within the narrow
window of one week. He produced alibi witnesses as well as documentation for that
week.
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In his supplement to the RCr 11.42 motion, Pendleton argued he was
denied his right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. However, on appeal,
Pendleton argues his counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the prosecutorial
misconduct. We note that the former is normally an issue for direct appeal, while the
latter is appropriate for review under RCr 11.42. It is possible then that this discrepancy
renders Pendleton’s argument here unpreserved for our review.
Regardless, we do not find that counsel was ineffective because the
prosecutor failed to pinpoint a date as to when the crimes occurred. The victim in this
case was ten years old at the time of the crimes. She testified that Pendleton
sodomized her in April of 1998. We conclude that trial counsel may have made a
strategic decision not to address the issue any further due to the fact that the victim
indicated that the sodomy happened “a whole lot,” “maybe more,” and counsel did not
want to bring attention to that fact. Further, the victim’s testimony was specific enough
for a child of such a young age so that it is reasonable that the jury would not have been
swayed by the lack of a more specific time and date of the crimes.
Pendleton also contends that the Commonwealth’s comments to the jury
that Pendleton had been committing ongoing abuse, coupled with the fact that it was
unable to pinpoint a more specific date and time of the abuse, amounted to improper
allegations of uncharged prior bad acts, in violation of Kentucky Rules of Evidence
(“KRE”) 404(b). Pendleton cites Mack v. Commonwealth, 860 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Ky.
1993), wherein the Kentucky Supreme Court stated, “A defendant cannot confront
phantom witnesses, or cross-examine real witnesses on a ‘full story’ consisting of mere
suggestion.” But here, the Commonwealth’s reference to other abuse was just a
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reiteration of the testimony the jury had already heard from the victim. Despite that fact,
the strategy of trial counsel in not objecting may have been not to draw further attention
to the victim’s testimony that the abuse was frequent which placed Pendleton in an even
more negative position with the jury. We find no basis for a finding of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Finally, Pendleton essentially contends that the cumulative effect of trial
counsel’s errors resulted in ineffective representation. However, as we have
determined that counsel was not ineffective in any of the alleged failures herein, we do
not find any cumulative ineffectiveness. Pendleton received the effective assistance of
counsel that he was constitutionally entitled to. Strickland, supra.
In sum, Pendleton’s assertion that he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing is without merit as claims raised in his RCr 11.42 motions are conclusively
resolved from the record. Pendleton failed to substantiate his claims that the additional
evidence would have led to a different result, or that his counsel’s actions fell outside
the range of reasonable trial strategy. Therefore, the trial court did not err by failing to
conduct an evidentiary hearing.
Accordingly, the order of the Todd Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Y. Josephine Layne
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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