METRY (ROBERT A.) VS. METRY (JANET S.)
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RENDERED: APRIL 18, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000592-MR
ROBERT A. METRY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION SIX
HONORABLE JERRY J. BOWLES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-FC-003971
JANET S. METRY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: LAMBERT AND MOORE, JUDGES, BUCKINGHAM, 1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Robert Metry appeals from an order denying his motion requesting
termination of maintenance due to a significant change in circumstances; or in the
alternative, to reduce his obligation. After careful review, we affirm.
Robert and Janet Metry were married on June 14, 1959, and were
divorced by a decree of dissolution of marriage on December 7, 1990. The parties had
four children, all of which were over the age of eighteen at the time of the divorce.
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Senior Judge David C. Buckingham, sitting as Special Judge by Assignment of the Chief
Justice pursuant to Section 110 (5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
On August 21, 1991, the trial court entered its findings of fact and
conclusions of law and order. The trial court found that Robert Metry, an attorney, had
a 1990 pre-tax income of $108,612.83. The court found that Janet Metry needed six
credit hours to become recertified as a teacher and that she acknowledged she was
going to get those hours. Both parties were fifty-two years of age at the time of the
divorce. The Metrys also had considerable debt. In light of these factors, the trial court
ordered that: (1) the parties would share the marital estate equally; (2) Robert would
assume all of the marital debt and tax liability (in excess of $400,000.00); and 3) Robert
would pay open-ended maintenance to Janet in the amount of $2,500.00 per month. At
a subsequent hearing, the trial court reaffirmed the appropriateness of the open-ended
maintenance but reduced the payment to $2,175.00 per month.
In 1999, Robert moved to terminate his maintenance obligation or, in the
alternative, to decrease his obligation. This motion was denied, as the trial court found
that Robert was earning $132,000.00 per year and no longer had the majority of marital
debt (as it had been discharged in bankruptcy). The trial court noted that since the
divorce Janet had not completed the six hours necessary to become a full-time certified
teacher. The trial court ordered Robert to continue to pay Janet monthly maintenance
of $2,175.00 per month.
On July 13, 2006, Robert again moved to terminate or modify his
maintenance obligation on the grounds that there were changed circumstances
between the parties so substantial and continuing as to make the continuance of
maintenance unconscionable. Robert presented evidence that he lost his job as an
attorney in 2005 when he was sixty-seven years old and that it took him a year to find
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other employment. His new job required significant travel and paid significantly less
than his previous salary. Robert also argued that at sixty-eight years old he had
virtually no savings and had paid Janet approximately $400,000.00 in maintenance over
the previous seventeen years.
Robert also presented evidence that since the divorce in 1991, Janet had
refused to obtain the six hours of education credits necessary to acquire her certification
to teach full-time. He argued that had she done so, she would have accrued salary and
pension benefits that she could have relied upon after retiring. Instead, Janet chose to
work part-time and care for her grandchildren. At the time of the hearing in July 2006,
Janet was collecting Social Security benefits of $9,315.00 annually and was earning a
part-time teaching income of $20,368.00.
A hearing was held in October 2006 wherein the above evidence was
presented. The court denied Robert’s motion in an order dated January 31, 2007,
finding that Robert was employed by Sullivan University earning $125,000.00. In
addition, he was receiving Social Security income of $22,000.00 per year. The court
found that Janet was earning $14,900.60 from teaching and $10,368.00 per year in
Social Security benefits. The court found that the maintenance was not rehabilitative in
nature and was instead open-ended and therefore permanent. The court found that the
maintenance could only be terminated upon the death of either Robert or Janet, or the
remarriage of Janet, pursuant to KRS 403.250(2). Further, the court found that the
maintenance could be modified under KRS 403.250(1) only if the court found a change
in circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscionable.
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The court declined to find the maintenance obligation unconscionable, given Robert’s
financial resources and Janet’s modest income and reasonable needs.
On February 12, 2007, Robert moved to alter, amend or vacate the court’s
order denying his motion to terminate maintenance. The court denied his motion on
February 28, 2007, and this appeal followed.
KRS 403.250(1) allows the provisions of any decree
respecting maintenance to be modified “only upon a showing
of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as
to make the terms unconscionable.” “Unconscionable”
means “manifestly unfair or inequitable.” Evidence for the
movant must be compelling for the trial court to grant the
relief requested; the policy of the statute is for relative
stability. The determination of questions regarding
maintenance is a matter which has traditionally been
delegated to the sound and broad discretion of the trial court,
and an appellate court will not disturb the trial court absent
an abuse of discretion. An appellate court is not authorized
to substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court where
the trial court's decision is supported by substantial
evidence.
Bickel v. Bickel, 95 S.W.3d 925, 927-928 (Ky.App. 2002)(internal citations omitted).
The question, therefore, is whether the trial court’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, meaning: “[e]vidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion” and evidence that, when “taken alone or in the light of all the
evidence . . . has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of
reasonable men.” See Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (quoting
Blankenship v. Lloyd Blankenship Coal Co., Inc., 463 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1970)(emphasis in
original omitted)). After reaching this conclusion, we then review the trial court’s
application of the law to those facts de novo. The trial court applied the standard set
forth in KRS 403.250(1) and (2) and the standard set forth by the Kentucky Supreme
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Court in Combs v. Combs, 787 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1990). In Combs, the issue was
whether there had been a change in circumstances sufficient to modify maintenance
pursuant to KRS 403.250(1). Here the issue is the same, whether there had been any
changed circumstances sufficient to warrant the court modifying the maintenance
agreement, given that the provisions of KRS 403.250(2) were not triggered by either
party’s death or Janet’s remarriage. The trial court found no such circumstances
warranting a modification.
On appeal, Robert argues that he is being forced to continue to work past
the normal age of retirement to pay Janet maintenance. However, in its order denying
Robert’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate, the trial court found that Robert failed to
realize that Janet is also sixty-eight years of age and has substantially fewer assets and
has lacked the ability to earn in excess of $100,000.00 per year since the parties
dissolved their marriage. In light of the totality of the evidence, the court reaffirmed that
their previous ruling requiring Robert to pay maintenance of $2,175.00 per month, which
calculated is less than seventeen percent of Robert’s total income, was not
unconscionable. We find that the trial court correctly found that there had not been any
changed circumstances sufficient to warrant the court modifying the maintenance
agreement.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Robert’s motion to
modify or terminate maintenance and affirm the order denying Robert’s motion to alter,
amend or vacate the previous order.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Louis I. Waterman, PLC
Fore, Miller & Schwartz
Louisville, Kentucky
Richard H. Nash, Jr.
Richard H. Nash, Jr., P.S.C.
Louisville, Kentucky
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