WOOLUM, M.D. (JERRY L.), ET AL. VS. HILLMAN (LISA ANN), ET AL.
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RENDERED: MAY 2, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
DISCRETIONARY REVIEW GRANTED BY SUPREME COURT:
AUGUST 19, 2009
(FILE NO. 2008-SC-000396-DG)
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000376-MR
&
NO. 2007-CA-000499-MR
JERRY L. WOOLUM, M.D.,
INDIVIDUALLY; AND WOOLUM
& COMBS-WOOLUM, P.S.C.
v.
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00391
LISA ANN HILLMAN, AS
ADMINISTRATIX OF THE ESTATE
OF CAITLYNN HILLMAN, DECEASED;
AND LISA ANN HILLMAN AND AARON
HILLMAN, AS SURVIVING PARENTS OF
CAITLYNN HILLMAN, DECEASED
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND STUMBO, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
Senior Judge John W. Graves, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
1
STUMBO, JUDGE: This appeal and cross-appeal stem from a medical negligence
wrongful death action. Lisa Ann Hillman was the patient of Dr. Jerry Woolum during her
pregnancy with Caitlynn Hillman. Complications occurred during her pregnancy and
Caitlynn was stillborn. A jury found medical negligence on the part of Dr. Woolum and
awarded Mr. and Mrs. Hillman a total of $500,600 for their loss of companionship claims
and funeral expenses. The jury also returned a verdict of $0 for the permanent
impairment of Caitlynn to earn money had she lived. The trial court later ordered a new
trial on the issue of the zero verdict for permanent impairment to earn money. Following
the court’s ruling on motions in limine in regard to certain evidentiary issues, the parties
entered into an agreement stipulating that the loss to Caitlynn’s estate was $475,000.00
and this appeal followed.
Dr. Woolum argues that the trial court made two evidentiary mistakes,
erred in denying his motion for directed verdict, erred in not declaring a mistrial, and
erred by granting the Hillmans a new trial on the issue of damages. The Hillmans
cross-appeal and raise two additional issues to be considered by this Court. They
argue that the trial court erred by not excluding the testimony of two of Dr. Woolum’s
experts during the first trial and erred by not preventing the jury of the second trial2 from
being informed about the damages awarded to them at the first trial.
After reviewing the records, briefs, and case law, we affirm the trial court
on all the issues presented by Dr. Woolum except for the order preventing him from
providing evidence at the new trial on damages. We find that he should be allowed to
do so and reverse the trial court on this issue. As for the arguments presented by the
Hillmans, we affirm the trial court as to the decision to allow expert testimony
(KRS) 21.580.
2
The second trial referred to is the new trial dealing with damages only, which did not take
place after the parties entered into the agreement described above.
2
concerning an unknown genetic defect. Their second argument is without merit as it is
contrary to established Kentucky case law.
As stated above, this case revolves around a claim of medical negligence.
Mrs. Hillman first learned she was pregnant when she saw Dr. Woolum on February 12,
2002. She began seeing Dr. Woolum regularly. On August 7, 2002, Dr. Woolum
discovered Mrs. Hillman had high blood pressure. He put her on bed rest and told her
he wanted to wait a couple more weeks before he delivered the baby.
During the rest of August, Mrs. Hillman began complaining to Dr. Woolum
of not feeling well. This led to multiple office visits and at least one hospitalization.
During the night of September 2 and early morning of September 3, Mrs. Hillman went
into labor. She was taken to the hospital where she delivered a stillborn child. The
cause of the child’s death was contested. The Hillmans’ theory was that the death was
the result of uncontrolled preeclampsia, which is a rise in the mother’s blood pressure
which can cause the placenta to stop functioning. Dr. Woolum claimed the child died
from an unknown genetic defect that resulted in a placenta too small to sustain the
child.
Dr. Woolum’s first argument is in regard to a decision by the trial court to
permit evidence of a common medical malpractice insurance carrier between Dr.
Woolum and one of his expert witnesses, Dr. Butcher. Before trial, Dr. Woolum made a
motion in limine to exclude any testimony regarding the commonality of insurance
between Dr. Woolum and his expert. His argument was and is that it is irrelevant
because it was merely a coincidence; alternatively, if the court found it relevant, the
prejudicial effect would greatly outweigh any probative value. He cites Wallace v.
Leedhanachoke, 949 S.W.2d 624 (Ky. App. 1996), which states:
The mere fact that the two physicians shared a common
insurance carrier – absent a more compelling degree of
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connection – does not clearly evince bias by the expert, and
its arguable relevance or probative value is insufficient to
outweigh the well-established rule as to the inadmissibility of
evidence as to the existence of insurance.
Id. at 628. Additionally, Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 411 states that:
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against
liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person
acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not
require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against
liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of
agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a
witness.
The trial court overruled Dr. Woolum’s motion, noting that Dr. Butcher
stated during depositions that he thought his malpractice insurance rates might rise if
Dr. Woolum, who was insured by the same carrier, lost the case. Further, the court’s
order denying the motion set forth five additional reasons:
(1) Dr. Butcher unequivocally stated in his deposition that he
is of the belief and opinion that malpractice cases result in,
and have a direct link to, rate increases;
(2) Dr. Butcher left one state because he believed there was
a collusion between judges and lawyers in malpractice
cases;
(3) Dr. Butcher’s comments were so severe during his
deposition that defense counsel felt the need to rein him in
and caution him;
(4) Dr. Butcher has established a general hostility to medical
negligence cases;
(5) Dr. Woolum and Dr. Butcher have more than simply the
casual connection of having the same insurance company,
as they had worked side by side for 20 years in the same
community hospital.
Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.
v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000). “The test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by
sound legal principles.” Id. at 581.
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The trial judge carefully articulated his reasons for overruling this motion
and only after having considered it carefully. Taking into consideration KRE 411 and
using the KRE 403 balancing test (balancing the probative value against the danger of
unfair prejudice), we find that the trial judge’s decision to admit the evidence did not
constitute abuse of discretion. The evidence was being utilized to show Dr. Butcher’s
extreme bias toward medical malpractice cases, which was a legitimate consideration
for the jury in evaluating his testimony. Ordinarily, the prejudicial effect of such
testimony would outweigh the probative value, but Dr. Butcher’s hostility to malpractice
cases is extreme and combined with his personal relationship to Dr. Woolum, provides
a sufficient basis for the trial court to find that the testimony is admissible. Therefore we
affirm the trial court’s decision to overrule the motion in limine.
Dr. Woolum next argues that the trial court erred by allowing a videotape
of an ultrasound done during the course of Mrs. Hillman’s pregnancy to be shown to the
jury during the testimony of Mrs. Hillman. Dr. Woolum moved in limine to exclude this
evidence. During Mrs. Hillman’s testimony, an ultrasound of Caitlynn at seven months
was shown. Dr. Woolum argues that an ultrasound must be authenticated by a medical
professional in order for the jury to understand what it is seeing. Furthermore, he
contends that allowing the ultrasound to be shown so that Mrs. Hillman could cry as she
testified was extremely prejudicial. Finally, Dr. Woolum claims that an ultrasound report
had already been introduced; therefore, the video was unnecessary and cumulative.
The Hillmans claim that the video was necessary to show that at seven
months, the child was healthy and moving and it was probative of the love and affection
the Hillmans had for their daughter as it was the final image they had of her. They claim
that a layperson can understand an ultrasound because a moving baby and heartbeat
can be discerned.
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According to KRE 1001(2), a video is considered a photograph. In order
for a photograph, and therefore a video, to be introduced as evidence, it must be tested
for admissibility using three factors.
First, the [video] shall be properly authenticated. “An
authentic [video] is one that constitutes a fair and accurate
representation of what it purports to depict.” Thus, “the
[video] must ... be verified testimonially as a fair and
accurate portrayal of [what] it is supposed to represent.”
Second, the [video] must be relevant by having a tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the [video]. “[I]f the fact to
be evidenced by the [video] is itself not admissible, obviously
it cannot be proved by [video] or otherwise.” Third, the trial
court must determine that the [video’s] probative value is not
“substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice,
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, . . . or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” (Citations
omitted).
Gorman v. Hunt, 19 S.W.3d 662, 669 (Ky. 2000).
We find that the video meets all three factors. The tape was authenticated
by Mrs. Hillman as an ultrasound of Caitlynn. This was never refuted by the defense.
During the hearing on this issue, the trial court found that the video was also relevant to
the loss of companionship claim. Finally, the trial court pointed out that the prejudice
must substantially outweigh the probative value and that during criminal trials, pictures
of victims are allowed to be shown. We do not believe that the trial judge abused his
discretion in admitting this evidence.
We do note that the video could be considered cumulative evidence since
the ultrasound report had already been introduced into evidence. We find that even if it
is cumulative evidence, it would not result in reversible error.
Dr. Woolum next argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for
a directed verdict after the Hillmans failed to present proof of the viability of their child.
He argues that in order for the Hillmans to maintain a wrongful death cause of action,
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they would have to prove Caitlynn would have been a viable infant sometime during
Mrs. Hillman’s pregnancy. Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955). A viable
infant is one that “if separated prematurely, and by artificial means, from the mother, it
would be so far a mature natural human being as that it would live and grow, mentally
and physically, as other children generally . . . .” Id. at 905-906.
The standard of review for motions for directed verdict was set forth by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface Min. Co., 798 S.W.2d 459, 461462 (Ky. 1990), when it stated:
the role of an appellate court is limited to determining
whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion for
directed verdict. All evidence which favors the prevailing
party must be taken as true and the reviewing court is not at
liberty to determine credibility or the weight which should be
given to the evidence, these being functions reserved to the
trier of fact. The prevailing party is entitled to all reasonable
inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. Upon
completion of such an evidentiary review, the appellate court
must determine whether the verdict rendered is “‘palpably or
flagrantly’ against the evidence so as ‘to indicate that it was
reached as a result of passion or prejudice.’” If the reviewing
court concludes that such is the case, it is at liberty to
reverse the judgment on the grounds that the trial court erred
in failing to sustain the motion for directed verdict.
Otherwise, the judgment must be affirmed. (Internal
citations omitted).
Dr. Woolum claims the Hillmans put forth no evidence about the viability of Caitlynn and
that the alleged genetic abnormality called into question the viability.
We find that the Hillmans did put on ample evidence regarding Caitlynn’s
viability. One of the Hillmans’ expert witnesses, Dr. Richard Fields, stated that on
August 7, 2002, he believed the baby was 31 or 32 weeks old. He further testified that if
a baby is delivered at 31 weeks, the odds are overwhelmingly in its favor that it will
survive. Also, he said that had the baby been delivered on August 19, during a
hospitalization of Mrs. Hillman, that there was almost a one hundred percent survival
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rate. Since the child was not delivered stillborn until September 3, it is clear that the
child could have been viable in August.
Dr. Woolum’s fourth argument is that a mistrial should have been granted
due to inadvertent jury misconduct. During deliberations, two juror members became ill
due to high blood pressure and heart problems. Dr. Woolum made a motion for a
mistrial which was denied. He argues that because an issue in the case revolved
around high blood pressure - the preeclampsia - a mistrial should have been granted.
He argues that the two jurors could have become biased against him due to their high
blood pressure and that the jurors who witnessed the illnesses may have become
biased themselves due to the tense situation.
In order for a judge to grant a mistrial, the record must reveal “a manifest
necessity for such an action or an urgent or real necessity.” Gould v. Charlton Co., Inc.,
929 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Ky. 1996)(quoting Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 672,
678 (Ky. 1985)).
It is universally agreed that a mistrial is an extreme remedy
and should be resorted to only when there is a fundamental
defect in the proceedings which will result in a manifest
injustice. The occurrence complained of must be of such
character and magnitude that a litigant will be denied a fair
and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect can be removed
in no other way.
Id. Appellate courts review the denial of a motion for a mistrial using the abuse of
discretion standard. Shabazz v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 806 (Ky. 2005).
After the two jurors fell ill, the trial judge gathered everyone into the
courtroom and explained the situation. Because the deliberations could not continue
that day, he recessed the trial, but admonished the jury multiple times before he did so.
Further, the trial judge had properly admonished the jury each day of the trial not to talk
to people about the case and to form no opinions about the case outside of the
8
evidence presented. Juries are presumed to follow the admonitions of the court.
Gould, supra. “The trial judge is best qualified to weigh the possibilities of his
admonitions having been disobeyed, by his knowledge and observation of the
community and of the jurors.” Gravett v. Commonwealth, 449 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Ky.
1969).
As noted above, the trial court admonished the jury on a daily basis.
Further, when the jurors returned to finish their deliberations, the court asked if they had
anything to report regarding the admonition he had given. None did and the
deliberations continued. We also note that one of the jurors who fell ill found in favor of
Dr. Woolum. We find that there was no jury misconduct and that without some
evidence that the jury disregarded the admonitions given, a mistrial was not warranted.
Next, Dr. Woolum argues that the trial court erred by overruling the jury’s
verdict and granting the Hillmans a new trial on damages. The jury awarded the
Hillmans $600 for funeral expenses and a total of $500,000 for the loss of
companionship claims. The jury gave the Hillmans zero dollars for the total and
permanent impairment of Caitlynn’s power to earn money. The Hillmans moved for a
new trial on the issue of damages because under Kentucky law, “[t]he measure of
damages in a wrongful death action involving an infant is the destruction of the infant’s
power to earn money.” Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Ky. 1970).
Case law in Kentucky is clear that “damages flow naturally from the
wrongful death of a person unless there is evidence from which the jury could
reasonably believe that the decedent possessed no power to earn money.” Turfway
Park Racing Ass’n v. Griffin, 834 S.W.2d 667, 671 (Ky. 1992). “There is an inference
that the child would have had some earning power, and in this lies the basis for
recovery.” Rice at 735. Dr. Woolum contends that the evidence presented in regard to
9
the child’s genetic defect could have permitted the jury to find that the child would have
had no ability to earn money.
When reviewing a motion for a new trial, we use the clearly erroneous
standard. Turfway at 669. The Kentucky Supreme Court in Turfway found that only
evidence of a “disability so profound as to render [the child] incapable of earning money
upon reaching adulthood[,]” Turfway at 671, would defeat a claim for permanent
impairment. As noted supra, Dr. Woolum’s defense was premised on there being a
genetic defect that prevented the placenta from developing properly and thereby
resulting in the stillbirth. On cross-examination, Dr. Woolum’s expert was asked
whether there was any evidence that, had Caitlynn been delivered before her
intrauterine demise, she would have grown up to be anything but a normal woman. He
replied that he had no evidence regarding that. The other experts who testified about
the alleged genetic defect had no evidence that it would have caused her to grow up to
be anything but normal. The Hillmans’ expert witnesses testified that had Caitlynn been
delivered prior to her intrauterine death, she would have grown up to be normal.
We find that the decision to grant a new trial on the issue of damages was
not clearly erroneous. There was no evidence that the genetic defect would cause
Caitlynn to have a “disability so profound as to render [her] incapable of earning money
upon reaching adulthood.” Turfway at 671. Rather the evidence indicated that the
genetic defect alleged by the experts could have resulted in no negative effect on the
child, mental retardation, downs’ syndrome or death. None could say with any certainty
which result was most likely. This issue was properly placed in the jury’s hands to
determine. The trial court did not err in granting a new trial on the issue of damages.
This leads us to a second issue regarding the new trial. Dr. Woolum also
claims that the trial court erred by precluding him from presenting evidence at the new
10
trial that Caitlynn possessed no earning capacity. The Hillmans moved in limine to
prevent Dr. Woolum from presenting the evidence regarding the unknown genetic
defect because it was used solely as evidence of the cause of death and not as
evidence regarding Caitlynn’s earning capacity. They contended that the “law of the
case doctrine” prevented the introduction of evidence not previously presented on the
issue. The trial court agreed, finding that “[n]o evidence was introduced nor was it
contended at trial that Caitlynn would have been profoundly disabled and unable to earn
wages if she had survived.” The Hillmans argued that this settled the issue of Caitlynn’s
earning capacity and as such, the “law of the case doctrine” precludes Dr. Woolum from
putting on evidence that Caitlynn would have zero or diminished earning capacity due to
the genetic defect.
The law of the case doctrine holds that “a ruling made at one stage of a
lawsuit will be adhered to throughout the lawsuit.” Hallahan v. The Courier-Journal, 138
S.W.3d 699, 706 n.4 (Ky. App. 2004). We do not believe this doctrine is applicable in
this case. Saying no evidence was introduced regarding Caitlynn’s lack of earning
capacity is not the same as finding that issue settled. The finder of fact in this case, the
jury, was not asked to determine whether a genetic defect existed or even whether or
not it caused Caitlynn’s death. All the jury was asked to determine was whether or not
Dr. Woolum was negligent in his care for Mrs. Hillman and Caitlynn. There has been no
ruling by the trial court which can be described as determinative of the issue of
Caitlynn’s earning capacity. Furthermore, the law of the case applies to rulings of law,
not issues of evidentiary admission, and binds the lower court to which an appellate
court remands the proceeding. Hutson v. Commonwealth, 215 S.W.3d 708, 714-715
(Ky. App. 2006); Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2006). We
11
cannot find any Kentucky law that would prevent Dr. Woolum from presenting additional
evidence regarding Caitlynn’s diminished or lack of earning capacity on retrial.
As such, we reverse the trial court’s order prohibiting Dr. Woolum from
presenting evidence at the new trial regarding the genetic abnormality and Caitlynn’s
earning capacity.
On cross-appeal, the Hillmans first argue that the trial court erred by failing
to exclude the proffered testimony regarding the genetic abnormality as the cause of
Caitlynn’s death. Prior to trial, the Hillmans filed a motion in limine to prevent Dr.
Woolum’s two experts from testifying as to their theory that Caitlynn died due to a
genetic abnormality. They argued that the testimony did not meet the test for expert
testimony set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113
S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Daubert requires a trial judge to determine if
proffered expert testimony is “(1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact
to understand or determine a fact in issue.” Daubert at 592.
Daubert lists a number of factors a trial judge should consider when
making decisions regarding admissibility. While not exclusive, four pertinent factors to
consider are: (1) whether the theory or technique can be tested; (2) whether the theory
or technique has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) whether the theory or
technique has a known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory or
technique is generally accepted in the scientific community. Id. at 593-594.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that the standard of review of a
trial court’s Daubert ruling is two-fold. Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909 (Ky. 2004).
The Daubert standard exists to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Miller at 914, citing Daubert at 589.
[A]s a result, the distinct aspects of the Daubert analysis-the
findings of fact, i.e., reliability or non-reliability, and the
12
discretionary decisions, i.e., whether the evidence will assist
trier of fact and the ultimate decision as to admissibility-must
be reviewed under different standards. Because the findings
of fact that Daubert rulings are based on are preliminary in
nature-the ultimate decision as to admissibility depends on
these findings-an error that is alleged in the trial court’s
findings of fact must be reviewed for clear error before the
appellate court can reach the discretionary aspects of the
trial court’s decision.
Miller at 915. If the trial court’s decision regarding the witness’s reliability was
supported by substantial evidence, then it is not clearly erroneous. Id. at 918. If the trial
court’s decision regarding the relevancy of the expert testimony was arbitrary or
unreasonable, then it was an abuse of discretion. Goodyear Tire, supra.
The Hillmans focused on the four Daubert factors set forth above when
making their argument concerning the expert testimony. They contend that because the
genetic defect fell into the “unknown” category, it was unreliable and could not be
tested. Additionally, they state that because the genetic disorder was an “unknown” one
and did not have a name, it was impossible to determine if it had been subject to peer
review. Further, the “unknown” status of the disorder prevented the court from
determining if there was a rate of error or if the theory was accepted by the scientific
community.
As stated above, these four factors are not exclusive. We must, therefore,
examine the evidence using the two part test set forth by Miller and not focus solely on
the four factors. First, we will look at the reliability of the expert testimony and see if it
was supported by substantial evidence. The genetic defect was identified by Dr.
Woolum’s experts based on trophoblast inclusions found in the placenta. Dr. Woolum
provided the Court with evidence in the form of testimony from his experts and articles
from medical journals that trophoblast inclusions have been found in placentas and
have been linked to genetic defects. One of the experts, Dr. Butcher, is an obstetrician
13
and gynecologist and the other, Dr. Kliman, is a placental pathologist. Dr. Kliman has
also authored and co-authored articles dealing with placentas and genetic anomalies.
We do recognize that the genetic defect discussed in this case fits in the
“unknown” category, but that is no reason to exclude the evidence out of hand. Based
on the evidence presented, the qualifications of the two experts and the additional
scholarly material supplied by Dr. Woolum, dealing with placentas and trophoblast
inclusions, there was substantial evidence upon which the trial court could find that the
testimony was reliable. The decision to permit the introduction of the evidence was not
clearly erroneous.
Next we look to the relevancy of the evidence. This evidence was clearly
relevant to the case. It was Dr. Woolum’s entire defense. He claimed it was this
genetic defect and not his negligence that caused Caitlynn’s death. Further, it assisted
the trier of fact in understanding the correlation between placentas, unborn babies, and
genetic defects. It was not unreasonable for the trial judge to admit this evidence at
trial.
“The decisions of trial courts as to the admissibility of expert witness
testimony under Daubert are generally entitled to deference on appeal because trial
courts are in the best position to evaluate first hand the proposed evidence.” Miller at
914.
[A]ppellate courts must recognize the unfortunate but
necessary corollaries of deference to the trial court: that it is
possible for a trial court to rule contrary to what an appellate
court would rule without abusing its discretion or being
clearly erroneous, and that an appellate court is powerless to
disturb such rulings. The abuse of discretion and clear error
standards allow an appellate court to walk this fine line-to
engage in a meaningful review without resorting to retrying
the issue-by requiring a thorough but deferential examination
of the record and the trial court’s findings of fact and rulings.
14
Id. at 917 (emphasis in original). We find that the evidence of the genetic defect was
properly admitted. The areas of genetics is an ever expanding field and this Court, like
the trial court, understands that not all genetic abnormalities will have names or be fully
understood. Further, any concerns the Hillmans had with the genetic defect evidence
could and were brought out during cross-examination of the witnesses.
The final argument of the Hillman’s cross-appeal is that the trial court
erred by rejecting their proffered jury instructions for the trial on damages only and in
denying their motion in limine to exclude the introduction of the prior jury verdict at the
trial on damages.
The proposed jury instructions would have omitted the awards the
Hillmans received at the first trial. The same issue is the focus of the motion in limine
addressed above. The Hillmans did not want the second jury to be informed about their
earlier awards for loss of companionship. This issue has already been decided by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in the case of Turfway Park Racing Ass’n v. Griffin, 834
S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1992).
In Turfway, the Supreme Court recognized that the loss of companionship
and the capacity to earn money were two distinct legal claims, but found that the
ultimate beneficiaries were the same people, that the litigation arose out of a single
event, and that the claims were initially tried in one proceeding. Id. at 673. The
Supreme Court stated that “it would be inherently unjust to permit the jury on retrial to
award what it may mistakenly believe to be the parents’ only compensation. To achieve
a just and informed verdict, and under the unique facts presented here, the jury on
retrial should be told of the damages previously awarded.” Id. The case at bar is
extremely similar to the Turfway scenario and the same reasoning applies. Thus we
affirm the trial court’s decision on this issue.
15
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the lower court is affirmed in
part, reversed in part and remanded for a new trial on the issue of loss of power to earn
money only in accordance with the directions of this court.
ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GRAVES, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
GRAVES, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent.
Dr. Butcher declared under oath that his insurance premiums would not be
directly affected by his testimony on behalf of Dr. Woolum. That is, his cost of
insurance would neither be increased nor decreased. This evidence is unrebutted.
Consequently, the mere coincidence of being covered by the same
insurance company does not indicate sufficient bias or prejudice to affect credibility.
Any probative value of admitting evidence of insurance coverage is substantially
outweighed by the likely predilection to find liability without fault. With a hired expert
witness, prejudice or bias may be demonstrated without mentioning common insurance
coverage. Admitting evidence of common insurance coverage was superfluous.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS/
CROSS-APPELLEES:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES/
CROSS-APPELLANTS:
Gerald R. Toner
Katherine Kerns Vesely
Louisville, Kentucky
Stephen M. O’Brien, III
B. Clark Batten, II
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS/CROSSAPPELLEES:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES/
CROSS-APPELLANTS:
Gerald R. Toner
Louisville, Kentucky
Stephen M. O’Brien, III
Lexington, Kentucky
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